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Immigrant Integration in Western Europe,
Then and Now
Leo Lucassen, David Feldman and Jochen Oltmer
Introduction
In the 1990s, an interesting and heated discussion emerged among
migration scholars in the United States on the question, if and to what
extent the ‘new’ post 1965 immigrants to the US would experience in-
tegration and assimilation processes similar to those experienced by
the equally massive immigration wave from Southern and Eastern Eur-
ope between 1880-1914.1 Thus far, this debate has had virtually no reso-
nance in the European context. One reason for this may be that many
scholars remain prisoners of their national histories.2 This limitation
has led them to foster assumptions concerning the ethnic homogeneity
of populations within European nation-states. Furthermore, the insight
that emerged in the early 1980s among social and economic historians,
that geographical mobility was a structural element of European his-
tory,3 did not change the dominant view that migration was a sign of
crisis, caused by political (war, repression) or economic distress (over-
population, famine). This belief was strengthened by the understand-
ing of the modernisation process in the 19th century as a fundamental
break with the past. Large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation,
which caused millions to move from the countryside to cities, and the
simultaneous massive emigration from Europe to the New World fitted
well into this interpretation.
These factors help account for historians’ repeated neglect of the
scale and impact of immigration on European societies from the Mid-
dle Ages onwards. One consequence of this neglect has been that
mainstream historians and social scientists have neither acknowledged
nor taken into account the fact that most Western European countries
have experienced important migrations from the Early Modern period
onwards, including the ‘classical’ American decades of mass immigra-
tion, 1880-1914, and the inter-war years. In other words, contrary to
the assumptions of many scholars and commentators who stress the
unprecedented character of recent developments, the European past
does present many cases that lend themselves to a comparison with
immigrations in post-war Western Europe.
This has become apparent since the late 1980s when an increasing
number of studies began focussing on immigration to Western Eur-
opean countries in the 19th and 20th centuries.4 Notwithstanding this
advance in scholarship, its results and implications have not yet influ-
enced the reading of either national or European histories. According
to the German migration historian Dirk Hoerder, the misinterpretation
of the past looms large over the present:
Official recognition of a many-cultured past has been achieved
in but few European states. In general, neither public, nor politi-
cians are searching for a past different from the currently ima-
gined national ones. Historians as gatekeepers, with few excep-
tions, share these nationalist and nation-centred approaches.5
Instead, Europe is still considered by many primarily as an area of emi-
gration to other parts of the world. In this view, it was not until the
1950s that Western Europe was confronted with large-scale immigra-
tion, caused by decolonisation and labour recruitment in Southern Eur-
ope, Northern Africa, and Turkey. Although we now know better,6 the
idea that immigration is a recent phenomenon remains a stubborn pre-
sence in both the popular memory and academic scholarship. This
may explain why the gulf between historians and social scientists is
much deeper and communication even more sparing than in the
American case. As a result, the scholarly research on integration pro-
cesses7 is divided into two mutually isolated domains that seldom inter-
act. The inevitable consequence is that there is no common ground for
discussion and for the integration of research results and perspectives.
With this volume we hope to show that the issues and questions
raised in the US debate are highly relevant for Europe as well and that
the transfer of this debate might help to promote a dialogue between
European historians and social scientists in the migration field.8 By
presenting this first systematic comparison of migration and integra-
tion processes of past and present we aim to stimulate scholarly discus-
sions on this topic and we hope to deepen our understanding of inte-
gration processes both in the past and present. Finally, it will be argued
that European perspectives in their turn can enrich and put into per-
spective the American discussion on old and new migrants, which un-
til now remains largely confined to its national frame of reference.
The US Debate
In the last decade, complaints have been voiced by various American
migration scholars about the lack of inter-disciplinarity in their field.
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The gulf between historians and social scientists is regarded as deep
and enduring. Notwithstanding the increasing interest of sociologists
and historians in each other’s disciplines, both with regard to perspec-
tives and methods, the sub-fields remain distinct. As a result, histor-
ians often shake their heads wearily when social scientists label certain
phenomena as new and unprecedented, because in their view continu-
ities and similarities are much more apparent. Historians stress long
term developments and often unmask apparently new trends, such as
transnationalism, as old wine in new bottles. Sociologists, on the other
hand, have the impression that their historical colleagues lack a suffi-
cient theoretical framework and restrict themselves to mining the ar-
chives and other sources for information about immigrants without a
coherent paradigm. This deadlock was eloquently summarised by Ewa
Morawska some fifteen years ago and since then, the ‘mutual aliena-
tion’ seems not to have lessened, simply because the main causes – on-
going specialisation and academic parochialism – have not declined.9
In general, historians display a greater tendency to look over the
fence than their sociological brethren.10 Most social scientists, as far as
they ever integrate historical research into their analyses, tend to treat
history as anecdote, background, often to ‘prove’ that the present fun-
damentally differs from the past.11
From a European historical perspective, however, the situation in the
American migration field seems close to heaven. In contrast to their
colleagues in the old world, American scholars from various disciplines
at least engage in discussions of important themes, such as the debate
on the differences and similarities between the old (1870-1914) and
new (1970-present) immigration. Although the discussion on immi-
grant adaptation in the past and present is by no means over, it has
structured the discussion by focussing on a number of particular
themes and variables, which are considered as the key to our under-
standing of integration processes:
– the characteristics of immigrants;
– the nature of (transnational) networks and communities;
– the structure of the labour market of the receiving society;
– the opportunity structure of the receiving society.
At the same time, the sometimes intense interdisciplinary discussion
has not produced a common viewpoint. Instead, the American debate
has divided scholars roughly into two camps. On the one hand, there
are specialists who stress the discontinuities in integration processes
over time. They argue that not only the composition of immigrant
groups has changed drastically (from Europeans to Asians, Africans,
and Hispanics), but also that the structure of the receiving society dif-
fers greatly from that of circa 1900. In this respect, they point to new
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forms of racial categorisation,12 the rise of the hour-glass economy,
which leaves little room for gradual social mobility through un- or
semi-skilled blue-collar work,13 and the emergence of transnational
communities. Finally, they argue that immigration after 1965 – in con-
trast to the first period – is an ongoing process in which ethnicity is
constantly rejuvenated by new arrivals. As a result, the influence of the
original language and culture are expected to be much more lasting.14
The differences in both the composition of the immigrant groups and
the receiving society are deemed to be so fundamental that the classical
assimilation process is not likely to repeat itself. Instead, they predict
that dark-skinned migrants will either experience a form of segmented
assimilation into the American (black) lower classes, whereas others
(like many Asians) will hold on to their ethnic culture much longer.15
This view is criticised by both historians and social scientists who ba-
sically argue that the interpretation of the past is too positive, whereas
the present is pictured too gloomily.16 They underline that the adapta-
tion of Italians, Poles, Russian Jews, and others in the first half of the
20th century went less smoothly than is often assumed. Many of them
experienced no – or only limited – social mobility and at the same time
met with considerable (racial) discrimination and only gradually be-
came ‘white’. Moreover, they argue that transnationalism is nothing
new. The ‘old’ immigrants who came to the US in circa 1900 also re-
mained in regular contact with their home communities through let-
ters, newspapers, and frequent return migration.17
Although those who stress continuities and similarities acknowledge
that the post-1965 immigration is to some extent different (less physi-
cal resemblance to mainstream Americans, as far as ongoing immigra-
tion, changes in the economy, stronger transnational ties), they suggest
that it is still too early to draw conclusions. Moreover, they tend to
downplay these differences and point to the fact that integration pro-
cesses have a dynamic of their own, which is to a certain extent inde-
pendent from the context in which they take place.18
Immigration and Integration in Europe
Despite the fact that the world has become a global village, certainly
the academic version of it, this American debate has thus far not
reached European shores. Although the theorising on modes of incor-
poration by scholars like Richard Alba, Alejandro Portes and Rubén
Rumbaut19 has gained ground among European social scientists,20 the
comparison between past and present immigrants in Western Europe
is virtually non-existent. Thus far, studies by historians who have
worked on immigration in Western European countries, like France,
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Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Great Britain, have barely been noticed in the social sciences and his-
torians have seldom discussed at length the relevance of their analyses
for current debates on immigration and integration.21 As argued be-
fore, this lack of interdisciplinary communication can first of all be ex-
plained by the different conceptualisation of the immigration history of
most European countries. Furthermore, as in the American case, the
assumption among migration scholars that past and present immigra-
tions diverge greatly is quite strong. Many point to the deviant phenoty-
pical and cultural characteristics of recent immigrants and the transna-
tional phenomenon, and argue that comparisons would mainly high-
light differences. Finally the context in which immigration and
integration take place has changed considerably over the course of the
20th century. The power of the state to control immigration and inter-
vene in the integration process has especially increased, even more so
in Western European welfare states than in the US, so that it is plausi-
ble that integration follows different paths than in the past. To what ex-
tent are these claims convincing?
Immigration history
In contrast to the United States of America, Canada, Argentina, or Aus-
tralia, prior to 1945, Western European states never considered them-
selves as immigration countries. Even in the second half of the 20th
century, when immigration soared, the awareness among governments
that they were de facto immigrant societies only very slowly gained
ground in the face of political resistance. From the mid-1980s on-
wards, historians have hesitantly begun paying attention to this topic.
This slow maturation was also influenced by the overarching interest
of migration scholars in transatlantic migrations, which (often impli-
citly) were considered of much more interest than intra-European mo-
bility. Only sporadically have scholars ventured to make comparisons
between these two types.22
The studies on migration within Europe that have been published
since the late 1970s have made it clear that the reluctance to make
structural comparisons between the past and the present is not due to
an actual absence of immigration in the earlier decades of the 20th
century. Immigration to Germany from Russia, Austria, Poland, Italy
and the Netherlands after the 1880s was massive.23 The number of for-
eigners increased from some 200,000 in 1871 to 1,2 million in 1920.24
Similar trends occurred in France and Switzerland both before and
after the First World War.25 Great Britain, Belgium and the Nether-
lands experienced lower rates of immigration until the Second World
War, but considerable numbers of immigrants settled here as well.26
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Finally, we have to take into account the internal movements of people.
Contrary to what is often assumed, internal migrants (be they the Bre-
tons in Paris, the Irish in Liverpool, or the Poles from the Prussian
East in the Ruhr district)27 also had to adjust to their new environ-
ments and experienced similar adaptation processes as foreign mi-
grants. Although political scientists, as well as some historians, stress
the difference between internal and external migrants and argue that
the political and legal conceptualisation of ‘the alien’ from the 19th cen-
tury onwards has created a different sort of migrant,28 there are en-
ough points of comparison left both where migration mechanisms and
modes of incorporation are concerned.
‘Race’, culture and colour
A second factor which explains the lack of comparisons over time in
Europe is the often implicit assumption that intra-European migrants
(let alone the huge numbers of internal migrants) were in cultural and
physical respects much more similar to the population of the host so-
cieties. As the ‘old’ migrants were overwhelmingly Europeans, the as-
sumption is that their integration was much easier and therefore fun-
damentally different from the non-European ‘new’ migrants who ar-
rived in large numbers after 1945.
There are numerous indications, however, that in the period 1850-
1940 immigrants from other European countries (especially Italians,
Irish, and Poles) were perceived as culturally and ‘racially’ different. As
Foner, Roediger, and others have underlined with respect to the United
States,29 race is a highly elastic concept and subject to changes in so-
cial constructions of difference. The Poles in Germany, Irish in Britain,
and Italians and Jewish-Russians in France have lost their (racial) stig-
ma only gradually in the course of the integration process. There is
therefore no fundamental reason to assume that the contemporary co-
loured migrants in Western Europe cannot be compared with intra-
European migrants of the past.
Transnationalism
A third reason why many European migration scholars assume that
the recent immigration is fundamentally different and therefore not
suited to comparisons with previous settlement processes is the phe-
nomenon of transnationalism.30 Whereas the newness of this factor is
heavily debated in the US, in Europe, because of the assumed absence
of a first ‘wave’, it is more or less taken for granted. As in the US, most
sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists argue that due to
changed circumstances in transport, communication and the more lib-
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eral attitude of receiving societies, transnationalism will exert its influ-
ence over generations to come.31 Cheap phone rates, frequent vacations
in the countries of origin (especially among former guest workers from
Turkey and Morocco), satellite television32 and the active involvement
of sending states (and their places of worship) with the immigrant
communities in Western Europe, have given rise to the impression that
integration is going to be much slower than in the past and that the
character of integration has changed drastically. Moreover, the dis-
course of multiculturalism itself makes it easier for immigrant groups
to maintain their own cultures, as receiving states, influenced by the
discourse of multiculturalism, give greater legitimacy to these kinds of
group expression.33
Although a real debate on the newness of transnationalism is lack-
ing, existing historical studies come up with roughly the same results
as in the United States. We know, for example that a century ago mi-
grants in Europe kept in contact with their home region through let-
ters, the ethnic press, and frequent return migration, especially among
Italians. Furthermore, it is stressed that sending states continued to
reach out to their citizens abroad. In this manner, the Italian govern-
ment subsidised organisations and offered social services to Italian
emigrants.34 From the 1890s onwards Germans in the Netherlands
and other countries were supported by a German state that was eager
to promote German culture and ethnicity,35 whereas in the 1920s and
1930s, the Italian and Polish states (including the Polish Catholic
Church) tried to get a similar grip on ‘their’ migrants in Western Eur-
ope by subsidising schools, churches, and associations.36
Apart from continuities, the transnationalism among present-day im-
migrants also has new elements, most of which are linked to the trans-
port and communication revolutions that have taken place in the last
decades. It remains to be seen, however, whether in the long run most
second generation migrants will keep functioning in a transnational
field.37 Showing that it is much easier nowadays to remain in contact
with the home culture does not necessarily imply that descendants of
migrants will continue to use these possibilities in the long run. Data
on the European situation suggests that transnationalism does not in-
evitably hinder integration.38 Moreover, it is conceivable that, due to
the much greater importance of education and the penetration of Eur-
opean and American culture through movies, television, and pop mu-
sic, young second-generation Turks and Moroccans will assimilate even
faster than Italians and Poles a century earlier.
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The state and migration policies
The last reason why the present in Europe is assumed to differ funda-
mentally from the past is the role of the state in controlling immigra-
tion and shaping integration.39 With regard to immigration controls, it
is undisputed that both for the United States and Europe the First
World War marked an important break with the past,40 although this
by no means implied that immigration was restricted everywhere.41
For the first time Western European states started to control and moni-
tor immigration on a wide scale, especially in view of the national la-
bour market. The power of the state to distinguish between its own ci-
tizens and ‘aliens’ increased in step with the extension of its welfare
functions at the national level. Thus, after World War II, states took a
leading role in both the regulation of colonial immigration and guest
worker schemes.42 Finally, in the last quarter of the 20th century, most
countries developed integration policies.43 The state is therefore not
only important in deciding who is admitted, but also who is treated as
a full citizen.
However, this fundamental transformation of the state need not ne-
cessarily imply that comparisons between ‘now’ and ‘then’ are point-
less. First of all, we should not let ourselves be obsessed by the national
state. Long before its emergence migration was regulated and moni-
tored by state institutions, but then at the local level. In England, but
also in Germany and the Netherlands, from the early modern period
onwards, migrants who moved from one municipality to another were
considered aliens or strangers. The scale was different but the reasons
behind this demarcation were similar. Both now and then it was con-
cerns about the costs of poor migrants for the (local/national) welfare
state. The Law of Settlement (1662) in England, for example, was expli-
citly developed to give municipalities the right to refuse migrants and
send them back to the parish where they were entitled to poor relief.44
The treatment of migrants in these ‘miniature welfare states’45 bears
many resemblances to that of foreigners in the last decades of the 20th
century.46
In the intermediary period, roughly from the mid-19th century to the
1980s, the state became a much more dominant player in the welfare
domain, but this did not necessarily put aliens at a disadvantage. As
David Feldman has shown, in the 1840s the British state changed the
poor law system and stimulated free mobility by severely limiting the
power of local parishes. Since 1911, the extension of state benefits such
as national insurance, old age pensions, unemployment insurance and
assistance, in many cases, did not make a distinction between citizens
and immigrants until the end of the 20th century.47 Since the 1970s,
these largely indiscriminate effects of national welfare provisions, com-
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bined with progressive residence rights for aliens, led to the unin-
tended long-term settlement of former guest workers and other tem-
porary migrants throughout Western Europe, labelled by James Holli-
field as the ‘liberal paradox’.48
This longue durée approach to the relation between the state and mi-
grants shows that the First World War was, at least in this respect, a
less-decisive turning point than is sometimes assumed. Nevertheless,
the national state did make a huge difference in the 20th century.
Never before were so many people forced to flee or confronted with
abrupt changes in citizenship: people moved across borders, but bor-
ders also moved over people, to use Klaus Bade’s apt summary of these
dramatic changes,49 leading to ‘enormous discontinuities and disloca-
tions’.50 Moreover from the 19th century onwards, the emergence of
ethno-national and racial categories in social and political thought en-
abled the reification of such differences between natives and immi-
grants in policy and practice.
Finally, exclusive attention to the state easily blinds us for important
structural aspects of the integration process. Immigration policies – na-
tionally defined, and culturally embedded – may be crucial to under-
standing the selectivity of migration and the possibilities for immi-
grants to integrate, but it remains to be seen whether and to what ex-
tent they influence the long-term integration processes over
generations. Moreover, analyses of policies and discourses can also di-
vert attention from the day-to-day interactions between migrants (and
their descendants) and the rest of the population.51 An uncritical as-
sumption that immigrants comprised homogeneous national or ethnic
groups often stands in the way of a nuanced understanding of the inte-
gration process. In some cases, specific groups of immigrants are ac-
cused of opposing integration (the Turks), whereas in reality the second
generation is integrating in a number of important domains. On the
other hand, there are examples of groups, such as the Italians who
went to Germany after World War II, who since the 1980s have been
depicted as successful migrants, although their children do less well in
schools and in the labour market.52 A long-term perspective combined
with attention to developments in the key domains of integration (so-
cial mobility, intermarriage, housing, social networks, links to the
home country) is therefore of great importance in evaluating both dif-
ferences between countries and differences between time periods.
Europe’s Specificities
Although the comparison between old and new immigrants developed
in the United States can be fruitfully applied to (Western) Europe, it is
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necessary to underline a number of specific characteristics of the Eur-
opean situation. These are related to the timing of migration, the nat-
ure of colonialism, the ensuing different ethnic and racial categorisa-
tions, and the political and institutional context in which immigration
and integration has taken place.
Periodisation
Whereas the US shows a clear divergence between the first and the
second ‘wave’ of immigration,53 with relatively low immigration rates
in the intervening period, this is much less clear-cut in the European
case. To some extent, we can distinguish a roughly similar timing of
the first and the second immigrant waves, with the Irish migration to
England (1840-1900), the Prussian Polish-speaking minority to the
Ruhr area (1870-1914) and the Italians to France (1870-1914), followed
by the post-World War II immigrations from the colonies and labour-
exporting countries outside and of Europe.54 However, this dichotomy
covers only part of the complex migration picture. Some countries, like
France (see the contributions in this volume by Marie-Claude Blanc-
Chaléard and Laure Teulières), and to a lesser extent Belgium and the
Netherlands, also experienced considerable immigration in the inter-
war period, whereas others were only marginally touched by immigra-
tion in the second half of the 19th century. Therefore, this intermediate
period is for some countries an alternative comparator for immigration
in recent decades. Furthermore, in some countries the second half of
the 20th century is characterised by at least two distinct waves of im-
migration. In Germany, for example, the massive immigration of refu-
gees from (South)Eastern Europe – almost 13 million in the period
1945-195055 – perfectly lends itself for a comparison with the almost
four million Aussiedler who arrived in the latter decades of the 20th
century (mostly) from the (former) Soviet Union. Another possibility is
to compare various Aussiedler groups and explain their different paths
of integration, as is illustrated in this volume by the insightful contri-
bution of Barbara Dietz. It would be equally interesting to contrast the
integration process of post-World War II refugees in Germany with
that of the former ‘guest workers’, the Italians, Greeks, and Turks, who
have settled there in large numbers since 1960.
Decolonisation
In contrast to the United States, most Western European countries
(with the exception of Germany and Belgium) were confronted with
immigration from the colonies on an unprecedented scale, starting im-
mediately after the Second World War (New Commonwealth migrants
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in Great Britain, Eurasians from Indonesia and the Surinamese in the
Netherlands, and Algerians in France). Given the specific relations with
the ‘mother country’, most of these immigrants enjoyed a privileged le-
gal position which enabled them to enter Western Europe without
much problem. It is interesting, though, that this ‘imperial legacy’ pro-
duced a much less fixed racial categorisation than one might expect.56
Racism clearly already played a role in the era of decolonisation and
the subsequent flow of (partly coloured) migrants from the colonies,
like the Dutch Eurasians in the Netherlands, people from the West In-
dies in Great Britain and Algerians in France, but it never acquired the
semi-primordial status that we witness in the United States.57 Even in
the British situation, for example, which bears the most resemblance
to North America when it comes to the definition of race, policymakers
in the 1950s did not generally label black migrants as undesirable, as
Randall Hansen shows in a recent analysis of the post-war immigration
policy. The Colonial Office in particular stressed the importance of the
Civis Britannicus sum, pointing out that all subjects of the British em-
pire, wherever they lived in the Old Commonwealth, had the right to
enter the home country. Even the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act,
which restricted immigration from the Commonwealth by creating a
skills-based quota system, would now seem quite generous.58 Even if
Hansen’s provocative attack on a whole body of literature that high-
lighted the racist character of the post-war immigration policy is too
one-sided,59 it is clear that the issue of race was more complicated than
has thus far been assumed and less fixed in a black-white dichotomy
than in the United States.
The experience of migrants from the other Dutch colony, Suriname,
further illustrates the way in which perceived as well as real social and
cultural differences offer a better explanation for the attitude of the na-
tive population towards newcomers than skin colour.60 The descen-
dants of former African slaves in Suriname who have migrated to the
Netherlands since the early 20th century were black in a phenotypical
sense, but in the long run this has not produced a rigid race barrier in
the Netherlands. Because of the absence of an internal Dutch slavery
tradition, these migrants, as well as the descendants of indentured
workers from India who have left Suriname for the Netherlands en
masse since the late-1960s, did not automatically fall into a well-de-
fined racial category and experienced modest, and sometimes fast, so-
cial mobility. Moreover, as most of them spoke the language of the co-
loniser (similar to the situation of francophone Africans in France and
English-speaking West Indians in Great Britain) and were educated in
a more or less Dutch system, acceptance of these newcomers by the in-
digenous population and inclusion in the nation-state was much easier
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than for the more ‘white’ labour migrants from Turkey and Morocco,
who settled in Western Europe in roughly the same period.
The socio-economic position of Turks and Morrocans in the Nether-
lands was (and still is) considerably lower than of the native population
as a whole and, further, due to their adherence to the Muslim faith,
they are considered as much more alien. It is striking that these factors
make them more ‘black’ in the eyes of the public than the Surinamese.
Even the discourse of policymakers is dominated by this use of the
term ‘black’. ‘Black schools’, for example, is generally used to designate
schools where a large proportion of the pupils are first- and second-
generation Moroccans and Turks. As the official target groups of policy-
makers (‘minorities’) are defined on the basis of socio-economic handi-
caps, migrants from Suriname are perceived as less ‘black’ than the
Turks or Moroccans, because, on average, they do better in school and
in the labour market. Thus, in this context, ‘black’ transcends its origi-
nal ethnic meaning and has turned into a proxy term for class.61
A similar argument has been made for France, where the ‘beurs’
(second-generation Algerian migrants) are deemed more alien than
much darker-skinned francophone migrants from central Africa. Mi-
chèle Lamont, who compared working-class attitudes towards blacks in
the US and France, attributes the lower salience of racism in France
partly to the republican ideal:
Indeed, if republicanism strengthens the boundary between a
French ‘us’ and a foreign ‘them’, it also has had a powerful effect
in downplaying the salience of skin color in the French public
sphere: it presumes a voluntaristic or contractual approach to
political participation that posits that anyone can join in the po-
lity as long as he or she comes to share a political culture based
on the universal (and superior) values of reason and progress.62
Both the Dutch and the French cases shed an interesting light on our
comparison with the United States. Thus, it seems not that far-fetched
that the phenotypical black Surinamese as well as black immigrants
from (former) French colonies have profited from the immigration of
other groups and in a sense have become more white (that is, less pro-
blematic). In this respect, their history has been similar to the experi-
ence of Jews and Italians in the US. These contrasting cases support
the idea that race is a social construction in an even more fundamental
way; for here colour is disconnected from the original phenotypical
connotation. In principle, in certain contexts, even the ‘real’ blacks can
escape from the determinations of colour.
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The state and institutions
When we look at the role of the state, two major differences between
Europe and the United States stand out. First of all, the fact that the
US is one, be it federal, state, versus the many nation-states in Western
Europe each with their own political and cultural heritage. Secondly,
the differences in state ideology between the two continents stand out.
Whereas in Western Europe, an interventionist welfare state, often of a
corporatist nature, emerged in the 20th century, the US has followed a
classic liberal path, characterised by a low level of interference both in
the realm of welfare and benefits, regarding social policies, with the ex-
ception of the – heavily debated – affirmative action policies. Even the
most well-known American assimilation policy, the Americanisation of-
fensive in the inter-war years, was characterised by a noncommittal in-
dividual attitude by those involved in teaching immigrants (often by
former migrants themselves) how to become an American, illustrated
in the chapter by Dorothee Schneider in this book.63
Given the obvious differences in state formation between the United
States and Western Europe, many migration scholars have focussed on
nation-state comparisons with the explicit aim of accounting for devel-
opments in specific nation-states. The best known example is the Ro-
gers Brubaker’s work on France and Germany,64 which inspired a
number of other students to compare the integration processes of mi-
grants in other countries.65 In this volume, the value of such analyses
becomes apparent in the contribution of Thijl Sunier, who discusses
the reactions of Islamic newcomers in France and the Netherlands.
However insightful such an approach may be, nation-state compari-
sons can also lead to the exaggeration of national characteristics and
the neglect of the common features of the countries involved, espe-
cially with respect to the socio-political system and its effect on migra-
tion control and the integration process.66 The welfare state after the
Second World War throughout Western Europe in particular has influ-
enced the selection of immigrants as well as the settlement process.
This could all be with well-defined intentions, through immigration
and integration policies, but the unintended effects of state and non-
state institutions are also of great importance. One can think of the un-
foreseen permanent settlement of former guest workers and their fa-
milies, who established social, economic, and legal rights through their
inclusion as legal workers. In structuring the settlement process, non-
state actors, such as churches and unions, were also important. The
role of trade unions in including and excluding migrants in the labour
market and society in general is well known, as is demonstrated by
Barbara Schmitter-Heisler in this volume.
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, THEN AND NOW 19
Comparative studies of the policies and practices of particular states
over time remain scarce.67 In this volume, Karen Schönwälder studied
Germany from the moment of its unification in 1871 until the present
day and offers a number of interesting suggestions and research ques-
tions. Using the central state as the measure of analysis over a long
period of time has advantages. One is that it reveals that the welfare
state has deep roots, which go well beyond the traditional Second
World War caesura. Moreover, Schönwälder’s contribution reminds us
of the oppressive nature of state policies in Germany over the long-
term with regard to migration controls and integration, as the forced
assimilation of the Polish minority has made clear.
New Contributions
Given the various timings of migration within and into Western Eur-
ope and the partly dissimilar economic, cultural, and political opportu-
nity structures, the old and new comparisons are less clear-cut than in
the American case. Contributors in the first section of this book have
chosen what Nancy Green has defined as ‘convergent’ comparisons,68
which means observing different groups, often in different periods, in
one country. Others, like Dorota Praszalowicz, Mark-Anthony Falzon,
and Laurence Brown studied a single group in various locations, both
within and between national states, following a divergent approach.
Furthermore in this volume, we not only focus on large groups who
were seen as problematic at the time, as is often the case in American
studies,69 but we also look at ‘silent’ processes of integration, exempli-
fied by the contribution of Laure Teulières on Italian immigrants in a
French rural setting. Finally, the role of important actors in the receiv-
ing society is highlighted in the contributions by Barbara Schmitter-
Heisler (unions), Thijl Sunier (state and religious organisations), Mar-
lou Schrover (migrant organisations), and Dorothee Schneider who fo-
cuses on the similar interactions of the state and intermediate institu-
tions, using the Americanisation movement as a case study.
This volume aims to demonstrate that structured comparisons of
past and present integration processes in Western European nation-
states are relevant and necessary for a better insight into the ways the
paths of integration develop over the long run. By implication we argue
that the ‘American’ debate on differences and similarities between the
past and present immigrants could, with care, be applied to Europe as
well. As we have seen, this is not to say that there are no differences
between the two continents, or between countries.
To summarise, the situation of the European immigrant-receiving
states diverges in at least four respects: 1) Most European nation-states
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have yet to conceive of themselves as immigration countries; 2) there
is no comparable disenfranchised and discriminated group as the for-
mer African slaves in the US, and by implication, less emphasis on col-
our; 3) the character of the (gradually expanding welfare) state is strik-
ingly different from the US; and 4) immigration policies in Europe
vary not only over time, as in the US, but also from country to country.
It is obvious that these contextual differences have to be taken into ac-
count when we transplant the American debate to Europe. Doing so,
the comparison of integration processes in Western Europe may then
in the future stimulate a second kind of (meta)comparison: long term
trends in the modes of incorporation in Europe and the US.
By stressing the similarities between past and recent migrations and
paths of integration, we do not claim that historical patterns repeat
themselves. It is clear that many of the variables (both where migrants
and the structures of the societies of settlement are concerned) have
changed over time. In order to assess the extent to which modes of in-
corporation in the past diverge from the present, structural compari-
sons of integration processes over generations are crucial. What the in-
terdisciplinary migration field needs now more than ever is a thorough
comparative approach which brings together and confronts research re-
sults from both historians and social scientists working on migration
and integration in Europe. This book is meant to support this project.
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PART I
THEN AND NOW: CONVERGENT COMPARISONS





One of the first migration scholars who stressed the value of compar-
ing old and new migrants in Western Europe was the French historian
Gérard Noiriel. Inspired by American scholarship he used the concept
of the ‘melting pot’ to characterise the settlement process of migrants
in France since the 19th century.2 In one of his earlier studies, on the
city of Longwy, situated in the northeast of France, Noiriel used a com-
parison which may be typified as ‘diachronic-convergent’.3 Focusing on
Longwy, which emerged as a centre of heavy industry in the period
1880-1980 he showed how in the course of time different immigrant
groups settled in this region and to a certain extent had similar experi-
ences, both with regard to migration and integration.4
In this paper I use a related comparison, juxtaposing old (Poles) and
new (Turks) migrants in the German Ruhr area. In itself such a com-
parison is not new. Several authors have hinted at the resemblances in
the migration and integration process of these two groups,5 but only
rarely has the comparison been systematically explored. One of the few
attempts is the study by Aloys Berg.6 In his dissertation, however, he
could only map the settlement process of the Turks until the end of
the 1980s. Moreover, his study did not analyse in depth a number of
important aspects of the settlement process in the long run. Following
up on Berg’s pioneering work, in this chapter I will focus on the mi-
gration process and the reception by the German society by concentrat-
ing on the key domains of the integration process: the migration pro-
cess, stereotyping, housing, work, education, intermarriage and trans-
nationalism.7
The central question of this chapter is, to what extent the integration
process of these two groups was similar or different and to what extent
the experiences of the Poles then help us to understand better the cur-
rent settlement process of the Turks now. At a more general level, this
case study and the application of the diachronic/convergent compari-
son is meant to contribute to the ongoing debate about the comparabil-
ity of old and new migrants and the added value of historical migration
studies.
The reason for choosing this specific comparison is that both groups
have a number of important characteristics in common. First of all
they were labour migrants with a largely agricultural background, and
who were/are seen as a threat to the national unity of Germany, espe-
cially when it became clear that they would settle and not return.
Furthermore, Poles and Turks were on average low skilled and ended
up in the second segment of the labour market, even to some extent in
the same mines and the same houses. Thirdly, partly because of the
stigmatising discourse on the ‘ethnic other’, Poles and Turks organised
themselves in ethnic associations, thus stressing their own ethnic iden-
tity and resisting integration or assimilation. Finally, they both were, at
least in the first phase of the settlement process, highly spatially segre-
gated and opposed to intermarriage.
The Migration Process
From the 1850s onwards the rural Ruhr area developed rapidly into
one of the largest industrial hotspots of Western Europe, dominated by
mining and heavy industry.8 This transformation attracted many mi-
grants, not only from the nearby Southern part of the Netherlands, but
also from Italy and other parts of Germany. Within these internal Ger-
man migrants the ‘Poles’ were a distinct group. They were German ci-
tizens from the Polish-speaking parts of Prussia, born in the provinces
of Upper Silesia, Posen, East and West Prussia. Like the Turks a cen-
tury later, the migration initially consisted of young men who assumed
that their stay was temporary and who hoped to return soon to the East
with the money they saved. As not only wages but also prices were
much higher in the West they tried to live as sober as possible and in-
itially made few attempts to settle permanently. Women and children
stayed in the agricultural East, working the land and waiting for the
men to return. In this sense, both push and pull factors were largely si-
milar for the Poles and the Turks.
After about a decade it became clear to the Poles that returning was
not an enviable option. Not only was the East densely populated and
lacked economic prospects, by their confrontation with capitalist labour
relations in the West, they increasingly resented the feudal situation in
the East where most people worked as (day) labourers at large agricul-
tural estates, mostly owned by German (Junkers) or Polish speaking
(Schlachta) nobility. Notwithstanding the similarities in the migration
process of Poles and Turks, there was one important difference. Poles,
who came from the largely Polish-speaking Eastern provinces of the
German empire were German citizens, whereas the Turks were for-
eigners and until the 1990s had huge problems trying to naturalise.
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Nevertheless, in practice this did not fundamentally alter the migration
process. Thanks to the unforeseen effects of the liberal welfare state,
characterised by James Hollifield as ‘embedded rights’,9 Turks could
prolong their stay as ‘guest workers’ and thus gradually exercise the
right to settle and bring over their families. Moreover, the decision by
the government in 1973 to put an end to the recruitment and pursue a
restrictive aliens policy discouraged many Turks into leaving, because
they realised that this could jeopardise their residence rights. The Poles
may have been German citizens and the Turks foreigners, but in the
end, the migration and settlement process in the West of Germany did
not fundamentally differ: Both migrations started as male dominated
and were meant to be temporary, whereas in both cases, most of the
migrants were followed by family members and stayed for good.10
Stereotyping and Stigmatisation
Most immigrants, in the past and in the present, have faced a certain
level of stereotyping and discrimination. In the case of the Poles and
the Turks, however, their presence – especially from the time that they
decided to send for their families and started building their commu-
nities – was felt as a serious threat, both by the state and segments of
the population.
In the case of the Poles, it was the powerful chancellor Bismarck
who regarded them (along with the German Catholics) as a menace to
the national unity. He was especially afraid that the Polish-speaking
majority in the Eastern provinces – now part of Poland – would try to
break away from the fresh and fragile German state, whose unification
had been his life’s goal, and revive the Polish state which had been di-
vided among Prussia, Russia and Austria at the end of the 18th century.
The repression of Polish organisations and the use of the Polish lan-
guage by the Prussian authorities in the East only stimulated nationa-
listic feelings further and when a considerable number of Poles settled
in the Western Ruhr area, the state decided to keep them under firm
control and in 1906 even established a special ‘Poles-monitoring-cen-
tre.’11 Poles were not only feared for their nationalistic aspirations, but
were also seen as inferior to the Germans, because of their Slavic roots
and peasant backgrounds. To some they were even considered as ra-
cially inferior, whereas their adherence to Catholicism made them extra
suspicious in the eyes of the largely Protestant Prussians. The anti-Pol-
ish policy coincided with the repression of Catholics, whom Bismarck
also suspected of being disloyal to the German state, in the last decades
of the 19th century during the so-called Kulturkampf.12
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This development, which took place between 1880 en 1914, bears a
number of striking similarities to the Turkish case. Although the latter
did not have separatist aspirations, the fact that they were foreigners
and from a different cultural background, made them in the eyes of
many – though by no means by all13 – unfit for full citizenship. When
in the mid-1970s it became clear that the Turkish guest workers would
not return, the ethno-nationalist ius sanguinis legislation was not chan-
ged so that the second generation was also largely excluded from Ger-
man citizenship. Only in the 1990s was the legislation on citizenship
changed so that since 1993 the number of naturalised Turks is now
slowly increasing.14 Those who opposed the structural inclusion of
Turks in the German state, especially the political right, argued that
Turks for cultural and religious (Islam) reasons were too different to as-
similate. Especially since 1990s (stimulated by the Rushdie affair, the
Iraq war and, of course, the attack on the World Trade Center on Sep-
tember 11, 2001) the Islam argument has become dominant and the
discourse shifted from the nationalist to the cultural domain. Closely
connected to this change in anti-Turkish sentiment is the fear that the
Turks (and other Islamic newcomers) build Parallelgesellschaften (Paral-
lel societies) or are causing a ‘Balkanisation’ of Germany .15
In this sense the situation of the Turks is somewhat different from
the Poles a century earlier, when the Catholic religion was not a central
element in the negative stereotyping. Bismarcks Kulturkampf withered
in the 1880s and Catholicism was after all an indigenous Christian reli-
gion, culturally closer to Protestantism and Lutherism than Islam
nowadays. To what extent the heightened problematisation of Islam
and the defensive reaction of a part of the Turkish population in Ger-
many will slow down the integration process is difficult to forecast. A
massive shift towards radical forms of Islam, as is feared by many,
however, is not very likely, as many religious associations increasingly
embrace a more moderate European version of Islam which is compa-
tible with the core norms and values in Western European societies.16
To what extent, then, did this partly similar, partly different stigmatisa-
tion lead to different paths of integration in the key domains of hous-
ing, labour market, education, intermarriage, and transnationalism?
Housing and Segregation
The hundred thousands of Poles who settled in the Ruhr area (slightly
over 100,000 in 1890, and by 1910 some 500,000) never exceeded 6%
of the population, but especially in the north of the Ruhr area, this per-
centage was often much higher, ranging from 10% in Oberhausen to
23% in Herne and Recklinghausen.17 Moreover, Poles were concen-
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trated in specific quarters. The residential intensity of the Poles directly
resulted from the policy of the mines to provide special housing, so-
called colonies, for their workers. In this way, employers hoped to en-
courage company loyalty. Furthermore, the mines deliberately segre-
gated workers along ethnic lines in an attempt to prevent class solidar-
ity.18 Many of the colonies were mainly occupied by Polish migrants,
who often originated from the same area. It seems that, in general, the
Poles were quite pleased with their relatively spacious houses and gar-
dens, which was reminiscent of the rural environment they came
from.
Increased mobility, especially after World War I, meant that those
Poles who remained in the Ruhr area moved to other parts of town in
the course of the 20th century. However, the stigma attached to colo-
nies in general and Polish colonies in particular lingered on for a long
time. In a socio-graphic study of a Ruhr town, published in 1958, the
authors found that the remaining local Polish colony was still looked
down upon by the rest of the population.19
The spatial concentration in the Ruhr area on the city level was consid-
erably higher than that of the Turks (in 2004), who reached a maxi-
mum of only 11% in Duisburg. One of the reasons is that the Turks are
much more evenly distributed across Germany than the Poles, who
were predominantly found in the Ruhr area. Turks may be concen-
trated in cities, especially Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Duisburg,
but at least a quarter of them live in smaller towns, whereas southern
parts of Germany (like Hessen, Württemberg and Bavaria) also house
considerable numbers of Turkish migrants.20 While Poles made up 20
to 30% of the population of certain towns in the Ruhr area around
1910, the Turks are way below these percentages. This kind of compari-
son, however, can be problematic for at least three reasons: the level of
analysis, the quality of housing, and the context of immigration.
First of all, the level of analysis is too general to ascertain what is
going on at the neighbourhood level. We know, for example, that Turks
are not spread evenly across the cities where they settled, Kreuzberg
Berlin being the most well-known example. These concentrations in
certain city quarters, often labelled ‘Little Turkey’ or ‘Little Istanbul’
have led the media, politicians, but also scholars, to label this develop-
ment as a form of ghettoisation. Geographers and scholars from other
disciplines, however, argue that this is misleading. Whereas the segre-
gation index for African-Americans in the United States is around 81,
the highest levels in Western Europe are around 68 (Bangladeshi in
London), and for most groups below 50.21 For Turks in Germany circa
1995, this figure ranges from 20 to 40.22 When we look at the neigh-
bourhood level, it is clear that within certain quarters, Turks tend to be
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concentrated in certain parts. A good example is Marxloh, a quarter of
about 22,000 inhabitants in the city of Duisburg. At the turn of the
century, in this industrial town in the Ruhr area some 11% of the popu-
lation was of Turkish descent. In Marxloh, the share was 25%, whereas
within this neighbourhood they are concentrated in the eastern part
where in certain parts almost 90% of the inhabitants are of Turkish
descent.23
As these pockets are limited in scale, and given that the Turks overall
have a relatively moderate segregation index, it would be exaggerated
to label the settlement of Turks as a form of ghettoisation or to inter-
pret it as a tight ethnic network.24 This interpretation ignores the fact
that most of the migrants had virtually no choice and that these con-
centrations are a direct reflection of their weak labour market position
and the availability of inexpensive (social) housing.25 Nevertheless, the
ethnic preferences of Turks to live among their own people cannot be
denied.26
A second factor which makes the settlement of Turks different from
that of the Poles is the quality of the housing. During the phase of fa-
mily reunification, most Turks rented cheap, poor-quality accommoda-
tions in the working-class quarters of German towns. Subsequently
they moved to specific neighbourhoods where they were concentrated
in large numbers. In the 1990s, more Turks started buying houses,
although predominantly in those parts of town where they already
lived. This coincided with a decrease in remittances sent to Turkey –
although at the end of the 20th century, Turkey was still the third lar-
gest receiver in the world – and with a growing awareness that their fu-
ture lay in Germany.27
Finally, the context of the immigration of Poles and Turks is differ-
ent. As Blecking has argued recently, when the Poles arrived in the
Ruhr they encountered a relatively ‘empty’ space. The area was sparsely
populated and the small indigenous population were predominantly
small farmers who were disinclined to work in the mines. Moreover,
the mines deliberately built special ‘colonies’ for the miners, often seg-
regated by ethnicity. Therefore, the housing was not only of good qual-
ity, but the frictions with the German population were also greatly re-
duced.
Labour Market Position, Schooling and Social Mobility
The disappearance of Turkish ‘ghettos’ will largely depend on the social
mobility of German-born generations of Turks. In the case of the Poles,
we know now that it took a long time before their descendants moved
up the social ladder and left the Polish quarters. In the Ruhr area, the
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composition of the Polish population was dictated by the mining in-
dustry and of the first generation, 80 to 90% worked as miners. This
was much higher than among workers of German descent or foreign-
ers from other countries.28 While the Polish men found employment
in the coal mining industry, most of the women stayed home. Some of
them found work in the textile industries of Bremen and Wilhelms-
burg in the North and younger women often worked as domestics.
Polish men were vital to the mining industry. In the 1890s, a quarter
of all miners were Poles and this increased to almost 40% in 1908.29
As a result of recruitment policies, these Polish men were concentrated
in certain mines. In 1899, 41% of all the Polish men employed in the
Dortmund mining district worked in only 19 of the 294 mines.30
These Polish mines, which were much larger than the average mine,
were concentrated in Gelsenkirchen, Essen and Herne, towns that lie
very close to one another. By the outbreak of the First World War, the
number of Polish mines had grown to 33 (out of 291).31
The data on the social mobility and school levels of the second gen-
eration are scarce, but suggest that they did only barely better than
their parents.32 Even in 1948, research claimed that Polish children in
Gelsenkirchen, by now the third generation, were still doing much
worse in school than those with roots in Western Germany.33 Although
the researcher was certainly biased and influenced by the racialist dis-
course of his time, other studies point in the same direction.34 It seems
not far-fetched to assume that even the third generation lagged behind,
both at school and in the labour market and that a large portion of the
offspring among Poles did not manage to rise above the working class.
In other words, many of the Germans whom the Turks encountered in
the 1960s in the Ruhr area, were probably grandchildren of the Polish
migrants, who now had become ‘Germans’ and finally managed to
leave the lowest rungs of the industrial labour market.
The position of Turkish migrants in the German labour market are to
some extent similar to those of the Poles. They were primarily re-
cruited for unskilled or semiskilled work in the labour-intensive indus-
tries like metallurgy, mining, and textiles and although some of the
Turks were skilled labourers, they had to accept the dangerous and tir-
ing jobs at the bottom end of the labour market. For many this resulted
in downward social mobility, not only because they had little choice,
but also because their primary interest was in making money to save
and send back to their home country and not in ‘making it’ in Ger-
many.35 This does not imply that they were docile and always accepted
their working conditions. Their contracts may have tied them to speci-
fic jobs and industries, but in practice, many of them moved as soon
as they could find better-paid jobs.36 The position of female guest
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workers was to a large extent similar to that of the men. They too
worked as unskilled or semiskilled workers in the industrial sector, in
textile and electronics factories, while only a minority found jobs in the
service sector.
However, an important difference between the Poles and Turks is
that the weak labour market position of the Turks was strengthened by
the fact that many of them were concentrated in industries that were
ripe for an overhaul and subsequently became centres of mass redun-
dancies in the 1980s. The economy offered plenty of jobs until 1973,
but with the recession of the 1980s, employment rapidly decreased
and unemployment skyrocketed since 1981. That the unemployment
rates among the former guest workers were soon twice as high as
among Germans is not surprising. What is striking in the long term is
that the Turks, who were on average better skilled than other guest
workers,37 performed worse.
General unemployment figures, however, do not tell us much about
intergenerational shifts in social mobility. During the 1980s, the pic-
ture was gloomy. Both the first generation as well as their children only
managed to improve their position marginally and the segmentation
on the labour market seemed permanent.38 A few decades, however,
are too short a period to draw up an accurate balance sheet. Many
young workers in the 1980s were either born in Turkey or were at the
very beginning of their careers. If we compare the skill level of the
first-generation Turks who were active in 1972 and 1980 with that of
those working at the end of the 20th century, which includes many of
their children, it is clear that the idea of a closed second segment for
the Turkish immigrants cannot be upheld, certainly not for women.
Both men and women, now predominantly of the second generation,
are still overwhelmingly unskilled or semiskilled, but this group is de-
creasing. Meanwhile, the number of those in the more promising
white-collar occupations in the service sector (Angestellten) is slowly ris-
ing. Gender differences are conspicuous in these shifts: women are
doing considerably better than men and clearly adapt better.39
At the same time this development does not provide a basis for too
much optimism. Turks as a whole are not locked into an underclass,
but for the time being, unemployment remains very high, while an im-
portant part of the second generation has inherited their parents’
status.40 This process may have been stimulated by the German ap-
prenticeship system, a combination of vocational and job training.
Although this has helped to reduce unemployment among second-gen-
eration Turks considerably, ethnically-specific access to job training and
employment has developed, with many children following in the foot-
steps of their parents, the guest-worker generation.41 The only bright
spots are: the period of unemployment for the second generation is
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much shorter, and there are few signs of ethnic segregation or of wage
discrimination in the labour market.42 Finally, Turks, and for that mat-
ter Italians, have profited more from the economic upturn at the end
of the 20th century than the average German and other foreign worker.
To gain more insight into the future perspectives of the second and
third generation, we now turn to their school achievements.
It will come as no surprise that initially, Turkish children in German
schools did badly when compared to their German peers. Many of
them were born in Turkey and left for Germany in the middle of their
schooling. In fact, they were more like a one-and-a-half generation than
actual second-generation migrants.43 Moreover, as their parents still in-
tended to return, many thought a German education would be of little
value. This attitude changed in the course of the 1980s and 1990s
when it became clear that their future lay in Germany and when the
share of children born and bred in the host country began outnumber-
ing those born back home. Nevertheless, the situation only improved
very slowly. When we look at those who managed to finish their educa-
tions in 1997, it is clear that the children of ‘foreigners’ finished far be-
hind their German peers, with – as usual – the girls doing better than
boys. In 1997, for example two-thirds of the foreign pupils – as op-
posed to only one-third of the German students – left school without a
diploma or with only a Hauptschule (elementary school) diploma,
which is the lowest academic level.44
On the other hand, the Turks are catching up, with girls doing
slightly better than boys.45 Whereas in 1989, the large majority (62%)
did not go beyond the Hauptschule, this share decreased considerably
in the 1990s.46 Furthermore, the number of Turkish students who go
to university is also rising.47 Nevertheless, again, there is no reason to
be too optimistic for the near future. In a 2000 study, Turks were still
clearly underrepresented at the higher levels of the German school sys-
tem, also when compared to other immigrants, such as Italians,
Greeks, and Spaniards. It is not inconceivable that we are witnessing
the beginning of a split between those who have succeeded in attaining
higher education qualifications and those who are stuck at the bottom
of the educational ladder, i.e., those with mainly elementary vocational
education (Hauptschule) who, moreover, have the least chance of ob-
taining an apprenticeship (Lehre), which functions as an important
gateway to obtaining a regular job.48
Furthermore, the dropout rates among second-generation migrants
are almost three times as high as those among Germans.49 We have to
realise, however, that the available data only refer to young people with
a foreign passport under the age of 25. Turks with German citizenship,
who are probably more integrated and are therefore likely to be doing
better, have not been included in the German statistics which – just
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like in France – use nationality and not ethnicity as a criterion. This
‘creaming-effect’ will only increase in the years to come and make the
evaluation of social mobility among the second-generation migrants in-
creasingly difficult. Moreover, Turks with no German primary educa-
tion (35%) are more numerous than Italians (30%) and Greeks (23%)
and their performance is therefore partly explained by their less fortu-
nate starting position.
Apart from the (low) social-economic position of their parents, the
relatively poor performance of the Turks seems to have been caused by
the first generation’s failure to identify with Germany, along with their
lack of proficiency in speaking the German language (only one third,
as opposed to two thirds for other groups). Around 1990, for example,
scholars found a clear relationship between the parents’ lack of fluency
in the German language and the chance that their children would end
up at the Hauptschule.50 Given the increasing orientation toward a per-
manent stay in Germany, one can expect that this effect will become
less important and that the differences between Turks and similar
guest-worker groups, such as the Greeks and Italians, will further de-
crease.
Mixed Marriages
Because of a lack of systematic research on intergenerational changes
among Poles in Germany, the patterns of intermarriage among the dif-
ferent generations are difficult to reconstruct. However, there is en-
ough anecdotal evidence to piece together part of this puzzle. During
the early stages of immigration in Western Germany, when the num-
ber of migrants was still relatively low, mixed marriages between mi-
grants and locals were not uncommon. In the Ruhr area, about one in
five Poles married a local German woman.51 This relatively large pro-
portion of mixed marriages can be explained by the fact that there were
hardly any Polish female migrants at that time. After 1890, when im-
migration was at its height and ethnic Polish communities emerged,
mixed marriages declined considerably to between 2 to 5%.52 First-gen-
eration male migrants decided en masse to marry Polish women and
bring them along to the Ruhr area.53
Second-generation Polish men, those born in the Ruhr area between
roughly 1890 and 1914, still predominantly married Polish women
(also from the second generation), but the proportion was significantly
lower. In the 1920s, 30% found a spouse outside their ethnic circle54
signalling a clear decrease in endogamy and a further step towards as-
similation. Nevertheless, the majority of the second generation still pre-
ferred a partner from their own ethnic group and until the Second
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World War, more than half a century after the start of the immigration,
the Poles displayed much more ethnic cohesiveness than is commonly
assumed.
Again, the parallel with the Turks is striking. It is a well-known fact
that Turkish migrants in Western Europe have a strong preference for
marrying within their own group, either with second-generation peers
or with partners from Turkey. This strong national preference is for a
mix of nationalistic, cultural, and religious reasons, and related to the
anti-Turkish feeling among part of the population in the countries
where they have settled. Nevertheless, despite the violent attacks on
Turks in the first half of the 1990s, the percentage of young Turks who
choose a German partner is rising. To some extent this increase since
1995 may have been because of the growing numbers of naturalised
Turks, but still, the trend is clearly upward.55 Equally telling is the shift
in opinion among the unmarried Turks about mixed marriages.
Whereas in 1980, about 28% could imagine marrying a German, with-
in two decades this had doubled, with men slightly more positive than
women. Negative opinions concurrently decreased from 45 to 28%.56
Turks may still display the greatest hesitation compared to other guest-
worker groups, but the rise is much more pronounced. Given the rela-
tively short period that Turks have lived in Germany and their strong
ethnic and religious bonds, the growing openness in the domain of
marriage is a remarkable indicator of progressive integration.
Transnationalism and Associational Life
When we follow Ewa Morawska’s definition of transnationalism as ‘a
combination of civic-political memberships, economic involvements,
social networks, and cultural identities that links people and institu-
tions in two or more nation-states in diverse, multi-layered patterns’,57
and for the sake of the argument equate the Polish-speaking Eastern
provinces of the German empire (Posen, Silesia, and East Prussia) with
a nation-state, then it is clear that both the Poles and the Turks were
engaged in elaborate transnational activities. Among the Poles, this
phenomenon was to have a variety of manifestations. First of all, the
first generation maintained their contacts with the East via personal
networks, frequent travelling, and via the ethnic press. Economic invol-
vement is expressed through investments in Polish savings banks and
the buying of land and houses back home. These banks responded to
the Poles’ desire to invest in property in the homeland, especially dur-
ing the years of the colonisation attempts by the German state in the
latter part of the 19th century.58
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Whereas personal contacts and investments decreased after the turn
of the century, Polish associations mushroomed. In 1896 there were 75
clubs with a total of 8,000 members in the Ruhr area, whereas by
1910 this had risen to 660 and 60,000 respectively.59 These clubs had
various goals and ranged from unions to singing clubs. What they all
had in common was the use of the Polish language and strong nationa-
listic feelings, which were actively supported by comparable associa-
tions in the provinces of origin, especially Posen.60 The emergence of
Polish associations is well illustrated by the development and aims of
two of these associations: the Polish Union ZZP and the ultra-nationa-
listic Sokoł (pronounce: sokoh) movement. At first, the Polish miners
joined the new German miners unions as they were being established
in the Ruhr district in the 1860s and 1870s. These unions became
powerful in the late 1880s, but at the same time it became clear that
German unions were not particularly committed to their Polish mem-
bers. Therefore, in 1902, the Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polkskie (a sepa-
rate Polish union, ZZP), that followed a more or less social-democratic
course, was established in Bochum. It soon attracted thousands of
members and membership grew to 50,000 in 1910. Over the years,
the ZZP became an integrated part of the German labour movement
and even entered into alliances with other miners unions such as the
local socio-democratic Alter Verband.61 After World War I, the ZZP
chose for a more nationalistic stance. It took the position that, in prin-
ciple, all migrants had to return to Poland and therefore, it regarded
their presence in Germany as temporary.62 The result was that within
a few years, the ZZP declined from being the third most powerful
miners union in Germany to an insignificant club.
With the re-instatement of the Polish state after World War I, the na-
tionalist struggle within the German Empire, was solved and the na-
tionalist strongholds in the Ruhr district lost their salience. During the
first half of the 1920s, the nationalist fire would, however, flare up one
more time, which manifested itself in anti-Polish propaganda and in
ethno-politics among Poles themselves. The defensive reaction of the
Polish migrants could easily give the impression that they would al-
ways be an ‘alien body’ in Germany, as Bismarck and others had
warned from the start. For example, the new Polish National Workers
party (NSR) in the Ruhr district, which followed the ZZP union’s mod-
erate Christian socialist line, warned parents not to let their children
assimilate and told them to make sure that children retain their Polish-
ness.63
During the Weimar Republic, the German state opted for a more lib-
eral policy towards national minorities, which was in part motivated by
the realisation that this could guarantee similar rights for Germans in
Poland.64 The state therefore supported initiatives to teach the Polish
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language at (private) schools, and to set up language courses outside
the public domain. Subsequently, several books and journals were pub-
lished in Polish often aimed at children, for example the journal, Maly
Polka w Niemczech (‘The Little Pole in Germany’).65 Finally, during the
summer, special train trips were organised to send children to Poland
where they could learn the language and experience Polish culture first
hand.66 That in practice only a small minority of the second generation
participated,67 was not so much the result of the lack of supply and ob-
struction by German authorities, but reflected the ongoing integration
process and the realisation by most Poles that their future lay in Ger-
many.
In the course of the 1920s, identification with the Polish cause and
the desire to remain within a restricted Polish subculture decreased ra-
pidly. This trend can be related to the decline in Polish associational
life. In 1920, in the Ruhr area, nearly 1450 organisations flourished,
but by 1926 this number had fallen to 700,68 with most of these orga-
nising social events without any political or nationalistic aims. This
gradual shift in orientation is also illustrated by the gradual increase in
intermarriage rates and the Germanification of Polish surnames.69
The development of transnationalism among Turks in Germany (as
well as in other Western European countries) is rather similar. Again
we see the classic pattern of intensive contacts with the home country
through personal networks and investments by the first generation, de-
clining with the awareness, especially in the 1990s, that return was
not a viable option. In their case it also took some time before associa-
tional life started to blossom, whereas the coming of age of the second
generation is slowly changing the orientation of most organisations to-
wards a permanent stay in Germany.
The Islamic faith has been used as a rallying point in the develop-
ment of organisational networks aimed at recruiting Turks and thus
‘Islam… emerged as a common core of Turkish identity and gained a
prominence which it had not possessed when migration into Germany
first began’.70 There was a short period in which most Turkish organi-
sations in Germany were more or less reproducing the Turkish political
and religious landscape. Soon, however, Islamic organisations became
dominant and in 1995, more than 2,000 Turkish-Islamic organisations
were established with 100,000 (almost exclusively male) members,
who, when we include their family members, represent roughly one
quarter of the total Turkish population in Germany. Most of these orga-
nisations are affiliated with the DITIB mosques controlled by the Turk-
ish state, in addition to this, the Islamist Milli Görüs movement
(AMTG) continues to grow. Militant fundamentalists, joined together
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in 50 organisations throughout Germany, represent only a tiny fraction
of the Turkish Muslims.71
As the second generation gradually assumes control of the governing
bodies of the mosques, it is striking to witness how these Islamic orga-
nisations adopt the European rallying cries as they strive for human
rights and religious freedom, which are threatened in their home coun-
try. Moreover, the Milli Görüs movement stimulates their members to
opt for German citizenship and clearly sees a future for the Turks in
Germany, where they will become German Muslims, as the president
of the AMGT, Osman Yumakogullari declared at a congress of his orga-
nisation in June 1995.72 The expectation that Turkish Islam in Europe
will increasingly focus on integration into Western European society,73
therefore, seems not at all far-fetched.
Conclusion
What has this comparison yielded? As mentioned in the introduction,
the Poles and Turks share a number of noticeable similarities. Both
were, on average, low-skilled migrant workers whose temporary migra-
tion project resulted in permanent settlement. Both were seen as un-
wanted and as a danger to the ethnic/national homogeneity of the Ger-
man society, with a mixture of exclusion and self-exclusion as a result.
Furthermore, in both cases, the slow integration process was/is charac-
terised by low intermarriage rates among the first and second genera-
tion, limited upward social mobility and the perseverance of transna-
tional ties, at least in the first 40 years. Finally, as Berg has noted,
there are some striking parallels in the gendered perception of Polish
and Turkish women, who were/are seen by the indigenous population
as culturally more different than the men, both because of their cloth-
ing.74
Does this observation imply that the course and the outcome of the
settlement process of the Turks will strongly resemble that of the
Poles? With this question we are immediately confronted with two lim-
itations of the diachronic, old and new, comparison: 1) it is difficult
and often impossible to find the same kind of data for both groups,
and 2) even if we did have the same data and measurement techni-
ques, the opportunity structure has changed through time, which
makes it often unclear whether the relevance of the factors is similar,
given the changes in the societal context.
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Data problems
Although I have tried to find data on the same kinds of issues for both
groups, it is easy to point out the incompleteness and inadequacies,
both for the past and the present. The situation of the Turks in Ger-
many is monitored much better and in more detail than was the case
with the Poles, for whom many vital data are lacking. In the case of
the Turks, however, it is also often difficult to measure certain develop-
ments, because they are ‘hidden’ in the overarching category of ‘for-
eigners’, a category used in many government statistics. This not only
makes it impossible to break data down for certain national groups,
but also neglects the increasing number of Turks who have become
naturalised Germans and who are probably better integrated (the
‘creaming effect’). These data and measurement problems, which are
inherent in all old and new comparisons, should not make us wary of
these kinds of analyses, however, but should warn us about making fa-
cile conclusions.
Different opportunity structures
The second point is well illustrated by Diethelm Blecking’s warning
against comparisons between the Poles and the Turks (or guest work-
ers in general) that are too superficial.75 Thus, he justly criticised Ger-
man politicians (probably from the SPD) who use the historical exam-
ple of the Poles to reassure voters that the integration of the Turks will
(also) turn out fine in the long run. Blecking could have added, that
the opposite assumption (‘the old migrants were better’), is even more
popular and tempting, but then in right-wing circles. Instead of ‘histor-
ical legend making’, scholars should also map out the differences.
Blecking, and Berg before him, pointed out that when the Poles arrived
in the Ruhr area this region was still relatively empty and fluid, a kind
of ‘wild west’,76 which meant that they could shape it themselves to
some extent, whereas the Turks had to readily adapt to an already es-
tablished society.77 In other words, the worlds these two groups of mi-
grants had to integrate into had the same geographical co-ordinates,
but were socially and institutionally very different. In this chapter,
three important changes in the overall opportunity structure have been
identified in the domains of economy, education, and cultural orienta-
tion.
When the Poles settled in Germany, the mining industry was ex-
panding and would remain a viable economic sector for almost a cen-
tury to come. Their position as miners may not have been very envi-
able, but the pay was good and work abundant. The Turks, in contrast,
entered a shrinking sector, which was ripe for restructuring, resulting
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in massive layoffs and high unemployment rates among the first gen-
eration. Furthermore, the Turks may have in part lived, and continue
to live, in the same kinds of houses inhabited by the Poles (in the mine
colonies), the quality of these dwellings has dramatically worsened. All
of these factors have influenced the social and economic positions of
the second-generation Turks in a negative way. As a result, the socio-
economic differences between them and the German population are,
and have become, larger than those between the Poles and the Ger-
mans.
Comparing Poles and Turks with Germans in the field of education
is not easy, not least of all because the relation between education and
social mobility has changed over the last century. Formal education be-
came much more important in the second half of the 20th century,
whereas the lack of upward social mobility in various periods can have
different effects and meanings. Most Polish children did not find better
jobs than their parents. But this was true for most indigenous peers at
the time, whereas the Turks, who now find themselves in a similar po-
sition as the Poles back then, see the gap between them and the Ger-
mans only decreasing very slowly.
Finally, there are indications that the cultural distance between Turks
and Germans is larger than that between the Poles and Germans a
century earlier. Their nationalist fervour may have been similar (both
for themselves and in the eyes of the outside world), Catholicism –
even the Polish style – was less alien and threatening to most Protes-
tant Germans than Islam is today. Moreover, one could argue that the
cultural problems between parents and their children connected with
modernisation are more serious and traumatic in the Turkish case than
they were in the Polish case.
The added value of historical comparisons
These caveats, however, do not imply that the diachronic-convergent
comparison as used in this chapter is untenable or useless. The com-
parison makes clear that a number of developments are to a certain ex-
tent independent from the specific historical context. Thus, the dia-
chronic comparison between Poles and Turks, allows us to identify
striking parallels in the first phase (first and second generation) of the
settlement process and shows that the slow integration pace of the
Turks is not unprecedented and can to a large extent be explained by
the way they have been categorised and by their unfavourable starting
position. It is clear, for example, that both Poles and Turks in the first
and second generations were stigmatised as culturally different, which
led to their retreating in their own ethnic world, were wary to marry
outside their own group and that the second generation is lagging be-
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hind their German peers in the fields of education and the labour mar-
ket.
At the same time, there are indications that the prospects of the
Turks are bleaker, however. First of all, in contrast to the Poles, many
second-generation Turks tend to choose marriage partners from the
country of origin. Most of them do not have much knowledge of Ger-
man society, which negatively influences the chances of their children.
Secondly, the restructuring of the industrial sectors in which the first
generation started out, resulted in high unemployment and a fragile
socio-economic position, which was easily reproduced in the second
and future generations. And finally, the overall gap between home and
school cultures which, together with unemployment and the low in-
comes of the parents, is partly responsible for the low achievement le-
vels (also compared with other guest-worker groups) and high dropout
rates. It is conceivable that these factors will translate into a consolida-
tion of an important part of the Turkish group at the lower rungs of so-
ciety as a separate ethnic group, at least in the short run.
This danger of a socio-economic minority formation seems to be
much more immanent than that of a ‘parallel’ and permanent transna-
tional society of which commentators like Bassam Tibi warn. The fore-
cast of a permanent cultural clash ignores the dynamic of the settle-
ment process and the adjustments that take place within the second
and third generations. As with the Poles (and many other current and
historical examples), the change among Turks in their orientation from
the land of origin to the land of settlement will very likely lead to reli-
gious and cultural patterns which are largely compatible with that of
the surrounding society. What is left in the long run will be a form of
‘symbolic ethnicity’.78 Although the speed of this development will de-
pend on how a number of factors (such as the salience of global anti-
Islamophobia, policies toward immigrants and minorities, economic
developments, etc.) will develop in the future, the direction as such is
less sensitive to outside factors.
Notwithstanding the methodological intricacies and the obvious dif-
ferences in the integration process of Turks and Poles in the Ruhr area,
the convergent-diachronic approach underlines that at least within one
and the same institutional-political regime (liberal nation-states) the
migration and settlement process over time displays its own dynamic,
independent from the specific opportunity structure. In other words,
structured historical comparisons provide us with the tools to distin-
guish between real and apparent differences between old and new mi-
grants (both where the characteristics of migrants and the structure of
the receiving society is concerned) and thus can correct the facile
claims of scholars who work only in the present.
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Old and New Migrants in France: Italians and
Algerians1
Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard
Contrary to most European countries, France has had a history of near-
constant immigration since the 19th century. Historians only began
studying immigration much later, however, within a context of the vio-
lent rise of xenophobia of the 1980s, a period when one of the leitmo-
tivs of public opinion was to compare the recent non-European and
Muslim immigrants (for the most part Algerians and their children,
quickly lumped together in a ‘Maghrebi’ ensemble), considered inassi-
milable, to the European immigrants of the past who had ‘easily’ been
assimilated into the French nation. The challenge then for historians
(and other social science researchers) was to combat conventional wis-
dom by emphasising the similarities between past and present. In his
pioneering work Le Creuset français (The French Melting Pot), Gérard
Noiriel put forward a cyclic model that became authoritative and that
we can summarise thusly: Throughout the migration process, a period
of great mobility precedes a period of stabilisation/integration. The sta-
bilisation, imposed by an authoritarian halt to immigration, takes place
in a context of economic and xenophobic crisis; the conditions for inte-
gration were therefore essentially painful, but this pain is finally forgot-
ten at the end of the long process of social assimilation.2
The analysis put forward by Nancy Foner3 has therefore long been
popular in France. By contrast, she notes that, faced with the persistent
difficulties encountered by certain groups coming from immigration,
the historian nowadays investigates the differences between old and
new migrations. This is what we shall try to do by looking at the two
emblematic cases: the Italians and the Algerians.
I The Italians
The lengthiest ‘old migration’
Mass migrations to France began during the second half of the nine-
teenth century. In 1881, there were more than a million foreigners.
They came from neighbouring countries; these migrations were the
prolongation of movements sometimes stretching back from before the
French Revolution. The Italians (until then, settled predominantly in
the Southeast) became the largest immigrant group in the country
from 1901 onwards. They would remain so until the 1968 census,
when the Spanish replaced them. This is the largest and longest lasting
past migration, and the one that has left the most descendants in the
French population, all origins taken into account.4
We can distinguish three large periods in this long history, separated
by the two world wars.5 The first, between the mid-19th century and
1914, is composed of successive ebbs and flows, with a larger number
of migrants at each turn in the cycle (100,000 Italians were counted
during the Second Empire; more than 400,000 just before the war).
At this time, the situation of these immigrants is highly contrasted:
Early on, there were many merchants (Léon Gambetta’s father was a
merchant in Cahors) and farmers (in the South); others were included
long-term migrants (girovaghi: travelling musicians, peddlers, or sellers
of statuettes); but at the time the Third Republic in 1870, most were
contadini (farm workers) turned proletarians. They experienced the
same fate as almost all immigrants in France. They were then the poor-
est migrants, doing the hardest work. Employers appreciated them for
their endurance and their docile nature. Workers saw them as danger-
ous and hated competitors, ‘scabs’ and, for the French common people,
they were considered dirty, dangerous, knife-wielding enemies of the
Republic. The era was violent and they fell victim to several pogroms.
Two infamous episodes were the massacre of Aigues-Mortes (1893),
where 30 Italians were lynched by the population which had joined the
workers after a dispute related to work in the salt marshes; and in
1894, when the Italian shops in Lyons were ransacked following the as-
sassination of President Sadi Carnot by the anarchist Caserio. After
1900, the Belle Époque attenuates these conflicts and many Italians
were able to find their place as craftsmen, shopkeepers, or building tra-
desmen in an industrialised France where both the economy and so-
ciety were slowly evolving.
The inter-war period is the most important of the three. Italian im-
migration in France increased by outflows that had previously focussed
on settling in the central powers or the United States. Those leaving
the North and Northwest of Italy had been the most numerous; now,
migrants from the centre and Northeast were added. Those seeking
work and antifascist refugees (often one and the same) were mixed
into this considerable wave of immigration. In 1931, when there were
some 3 million foreigners in France, the Italians numbered nearly one
million. There were already many women prior to 1914, but the chil-
dren were often raised in villages. During the inter-war period, a large
number of families were reunited in France for an indeterminate peri-
od of time. Several events forced them to settle permanently in France:
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greatly increased obstacles to emigration by fascist rule from 1927, the
1932 French law fixing quotas on foreign workers, and the 1927 law fa-
cilitating naturalisation in France. This meant a large number of chil-
dren born in France or who arrived young made up a ‘second genera-
tion’ who destined to remain. What was the situation’s context? The Ita-
lians were certainly no longer the most despised immigrants. Unlike
the Armenians or Jews, they were not considered to be ‘impossible to
assimilate’.6 The context of the 1930s is nevertheless one of the worst
in history. Hatred of foreigners flared up in the country along with the
first symptoms of economic crisis (late 1931). Political concerns were
added to the economic depression. On the domestic front, attacks in-
volving foreigners multiplied (including numerous assassinations:
Barthou and Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934, the Rosselli brothers in
1937, among others).7 Abroad, war threatened, with Fascism and Naz-
ism shoulder to shoulder. Regarded as Mussolini’s henchmen or sub-
versive communists, the Italians were ‘undesirable’ (the 1930s’ term
for ‘undesirable foreigners’). Il Duce’s decision to declare war on
France in June 1940 created a divide that would only close slowly dur-
ing the first decade after 1945. Even long after the war, schoolchildren
were still called ‘fascists’, ‘macaronis’, or ‘dirty ritals’.
However, towards the end of the 50s, this was all forgotten: the hos-
tility of the 30s, the Italian origins of many young adults (who other-
wise often mingled with the native-born population through marriage).
The Italians had become transparent inside French society. There were
not even any community groupings linked to the last wave of Italian
immigration. Between 1945 and 1960, the Italians were still the most
numerous immigrants (along with the Algerians). A final wave of inte-
gration then occurred which, though still little studied, leads us to be-
lieve that it did not encounter any large obstacles.8 These immigrants,
including those who came from southern Italy or the islands who were
rare until then, symbolised the entire history of emigration, benefiting
in France from an image which helped them to move up within the
working class, against the backdrop of the economic growth of the
Trente Glorieuses.
A valid model for all past migrations
The case of the Italians was in no way unique among past migrations;
on the contrary, it seems to be emblematic. Almost nothing was known
about the history of the very first immigrations, of those involving Bel-
gians, the Swiss, or Germans. On the other hand, the foreigners of the
inter-war period have been the subject of many studies.
These studies have emphasised the extreme diversity of the commu-
nities: refugees from all over Europe as a result of 20 years of violence
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and dictatorship (Russians, Armenians, Eastern European Jews, then
Germans, Spaniards, etc.), workers hired by the Société générale d’im-
migration (Czechs and especially Poles, who rank second behind the
Italians). All met with their own destinies, but all of them were preoc-
cupied with maintaining strong ties with their homelands or their own
cultures. Thus, the Armenians constituted territories where the com-
munity feeling was strengthened by the memory of the original cata-
strophe, the 1915 genocide.9 The Poles, proud of their nation’s recently
regained independence and under surveillance by their State, were in-
tent on making their children truly Polish.10 The Italians themselves,
not terribly patriotic before 1914, were transformed by the challenges
of the fight against Fascism or by Mussolini’s active propaganda. This
was the sign of the times, communities of foreigners were highly visi-
ble and public opinion decried the ‘Paris of Babel’ where one hardly
heard French spoken.
At the same time, the Little Polands, Little Italies, Little Armenias,
etc., were territories where isolated emigrants could find a stable way
of life and the assistance that no one in the host country offered them.
Moreover, the Republic encouraged the community spirit because it
guaranteed order and good insertion. Teachers and priests appointed
by the Polish government were accepted in the emigrant colonies,
while Russian associations were used as an intermediary with a popu-
lation that appeared to be quite foreign.
The evolution of these populations followed the same steps that we
have described for the Italians, from xenophobic aggression to trans-
parency. On the one hand, Spanish exiles were held in detention
camps, with the men separated from the women and children in other
camps, and above all, the violent antisemitism that accompanied the ar-
rival of German refugees, foreshadowing the Vichy regime’s policy of
exclusion and collaboration in the Holocaust.11 On the other hand, for
those who had survived those dark years and especially for their chil-
dren, the differences and hostilities were erased: There was a dispersal
of the closed communities, followed by a professional insertion that
gained them a standing equivalent to that of the French, and mixed
marriages. Neither trips to the mother country (whenever possible) nor
culinary customs and religious practices contradicted this feeling of as-
similation.
How can this integration into transparency be understood?
It was quite common to cite a ‘French integration model’, associating
equality with a certain uniformity in public behaviour. The descendants
of Italian immigrants across the globe claimed they experienced this
when cousins from different countries were reunited in Italy: Accord-
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ing to the ‘Italo-French’, the ‘Italo-English’ kept more ‘to themselves’
and were less integrated into English society. Without resorting to the
fixed idea of a model, it was obvious that cultures and political tradi-
tions differed from one country to another, and modes of acculturation
could be felt. France has experienced the joint effects of a highly cen-
tralised state, resulting from a long history, and the principles of the
Third Republic: the egalitarian ideal which considers the French people
to be a unique ensemble of citizens ‘without distinction between ori-
gin, or religion’; an idea of the secular that led to churches being de-
nied any official power. The relationship of the individual to the State
was direct and (theoretically) excluded any intervention by a commu-
nity organisation in society.12 The egalitarian treatment of citizens has
had two effects: As reserved for the French, it has maintained the legal
exclusion of foreigners.13 For those who became French through natur-
alisation, it has offered a true opportunity for assimilation. At the same
time, population needs led to citizenship being opened up (through
property rights in 1889 and facilitated naturalisation in 1927). The rela-
tive openness of French society went in the same direction. On aver-
age, 20% of the marriages within communities of foreigners have been
mixed, depending on nationality and location.14
However, the effectiveness of this structural framework cannot be
understood without the existence of long-term sociological and political
factors. A certain social proximity existed between the working classes
of the host country and the new proletarians who were migrants on
French soil. The integration of immigrants and the integration of the
working class both followed parallel paths, often crossing each other.
In terms of politics, the position of foreigners in the workers’ move-
ment (the first strikes in Lorraine were initiated by Italians in 1905)
and shared combat (in the antifascist movement and the Resistance)
have been the subject of several studies.15 Protest was a powerful cata-
lyst for integration, even if it only concerned a minority. During a few
great moments of communion, such as the strikes of the Front Popu-
laire in 1936, the effects of militant culture and working-class culture
were linked. The latter was the real melting pot for integration. Inter-
acting in the day-to-day at work or in the working-class districts, the
feeling of a certain shared destiny, the similar importance placed on
schooling (even though the children of foreigners still mainly sought
apprenticeships): all helped to encourage transparency. In our view,
this general movement succeeded in making the European immigrants
of this period seem culturally closer to the French.16
Lastly, an account must be made of the historical and economic di-
mensions of the results of integration during this large inter-war wave
of immigration17. The sociological forces already in play at the end of
the 30s were undone somewhat by the economic crisis which for im-
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migrants reminded them of the precariousness of their condition, of
living between unemployment and the threat of deportation, and xeno-
phobia which sometimes led immigrants to return to their origins, for
example, the French youths of Italian origin who were ready to follow
Il Duce. Then the war dramatically changed their outlooks. The terrible
events, including the years of German occupation, led to a shared de-
sire for liberation. A new era began with the end of the war. Sustained
economic growth and the birth of a consumer society meant the full
integration of workers of all origins. It was even easier to erase the la-
bel of foreignness because everyone preferred to forget the Vichy re-
gime and what had led up to it. Foreigners and French people of for-
eign origin, after enduring so much, encouraged this amnesia. The
egalitarian and centralised traditions now encoutered the economic
and ideological contexts ideal for their effectiveness.
II The Algerians
An immigration between colonisation and decolonisation
In proportion to the overall population, the wave of immigration of the
Trente Glorieuses was comparable to that of the 1920s. In 1975, France
had nearly 3.5 million foreigners (7% of the population). During this
time, Europeans were still predominant (60%, with the Portuguese
topping the list at 750,000). The biggest change occurred in the num-
ber of immigrants from the former colonial empire, most of all from
Algeria (711,000).
Contrary to what is often believed, this immigration began quite
early; before 1914, when the industries in Marseilles and the mines in
northern France hired workers from Kabylie. After the forced recruit-
ment during the First World War, a steady stream of immigrants be-
came farm workers or manual labourers in the industrial suburbs. Leg-
ally, these immigrants were neither foreigners nor French citizens.
They were ‘French subjects’ with a Muslim status and they were sel-
dom naturalised. Furthermore, they were dependent on the State,
which controlled them, but also on the Algerian colonists, who were
unhappy to see workers leave because life in Metropolitan France
might subvert them. Socially, they were kept isolated in all-male groups
and in hotels where the old village hierarchies were re-established.
Nevertheless, some of them succeeded in staying in France, in buying
a café and some even ended up living with French women. In fact,
Messali Hadj’s nationalist movement, Etoı̂le Nord-Africaine, which was
created in 1926, grew out of emigration.
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Algerian emigration changed in magnitude after 1945. The poverty
of a fast-growing population drove the men to seek work in urban
France. This movement was facilitated by the opening of access to
French citizenship in 1947. To avoid worries from the Office National
d’Immigration (ONI), which controls the entry of foreign workers, em-
ployers often resorted to these ‘French Muslims from Algeria’ (FMA).
When the Algerian War began in 1954, living conditions in the slums
and shantytowns occupied by these workers began to worry those in
power, who feared the growth of militant ghettos. A specific policy for
housing and social services was instituted to administer them (a lot)
and to help them (a little): construction of boarding houses for workers
by the SONACOTRA (Société nationale de construction pour les tra-
vailleurs algériens), created in 1956; and social assistance through the
Fonds d’action sociale (1958). Even if this policy was later extended to
all immigrants, the Algerians continued to be a separate group of im-
migrants from a colonial point of view.18
This was first evidenced by the fact that they remained in the lowest
levels of employment for a long time, despite acquiring more skills
and despite an economy that was rather favourable for promotions.
They remained permanently classified as manual labourers, or ‘O.S.’
(specialised labourers) in the automobile industry for their entire ca-
reers, as recent studies by Renault have demonstrated.19 This was to
exact a heavy price during the economic crisis of the 1980s, which be-
gan with the laying off of the O.S. workers.
Next comes the question of racism. The racism that Algerians faced
was distinct from that of the old French xenophobia. First of all, it com-
prises the view of the native from the era of colonisation. Oscillating
between condescending paternalism and mistrust in the face of uncon-
trolled ‘savageness’, this viewpoint can only conceive of subjects who
were too estranged from civilisation to have any claim to equality. Dur-
ing the inter-war period, the sidi (North African) was condemned as a
‘procurer’ and ‘cutthroat’. The war for independence, which fuelled re-
sentment among the Algerians (torture, violent repression in Metropo-
litan France), pushed certain categories of French people toward hatred
(policemen, repatriates from Algeria). Anti-Arab racism led to a return
of lynching (ratonnades’).20 Faced with the dramatic increase in mur-
ders, the Algerian government decided to suspend emigration in Sep-
tember 1973, just a few weeks before the first 1970s oil crisis.
The refusal to imagine a settlement immigration of Algerian origin
was also an effect of colonial racism. As the baby boom brought back
demographic growth, the topic of immigration had no doubt become
outdated. Without saying it as explicitly as the Germans, the immi-
grant was considered as nothing more than a Gastarbeiter who in-
tended to eventually return to his home country. But the public records
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concerning the Algerians reveal the reticence of public officials to allow
North African families to settle permanently in France, because they
‘may create difficulties with their French neighbours, given that their
customs were so foreign to our civilisation’. The arrival of Portuguese
immigrants (even illegal immigrants) was favoured as a counterba-
lance.
But political contradictions led to the increased numbers of immi-
grants from Algeria and other former colonies. With the Evian Accords
maintaining free circulation, the immigration of Algerian families in-
creased immensely beginning in 1962. At the same time, numerous
others seeking work arrived from Africa (Morocco and Mali notably)
and could not be denied privileged status. When the period of econom-
ic crisis began in 1974, these immigrants were almost exclusively men;
with their families joining them later on. Among the Algerian families,
the children had already grown up. Along with other immigrants from
shantytowns, notably the Portuguese, they were progressively moved
into public housing projects (HLMs) constructed during the Trente
Glorieuses, which the French natives themselves had already begun to
abandon.
The time of the ‘Beurs’
In 1974, worker immigration was halted. A new phase of stabilisation
began against a backdrop of social crisis. As in the 1930s, this stabilisa-
tion accompanied renewed xenophobia, marked by the emergence of
the Front National, a political party whose success was founded on its
rejection of foreigners. It was no surprise that the Algerians were their
main target. However, not only were the immigrants ‘who take jobs
from the French’ at the heart of the turmoil, but so were their children.
Social problems as a whole were focused on these young people.
First of all, their poor results in school were linked to the failure of a
system which was unable to adapt to a large scale. Unemployment be-
came endemic in the housing projects where they lived and where ten-
sions only continued to worsen. In the 1980s, a climate of violence set
in (which was highly publicised) and the public was outraged, which
led to violence against Maghrebi youths, who were the victims of sev-
eral murders; and violence by young people, riots, and rodeos dans les
cités.21
These young people were very quickly labelled: ‘young immigrants’
(whereas, for the most part, they were born in France), ‘second genera-
tion’, ‘Beurs’ (a verlan slang term inverting the word ‘Arab’). Those of
Algerian origin were predominant, while the presence of Tunisians
and Moroccans justifies the term ‘Maghrebi’ which erases nationality,
thus making it possible to resort to global colonial references: They
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could not be ‘assimilated’ because they were ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’.’ In
1986, the right wing returned to power and adopted one of the Front
National’s ideas: modification of the law on citizenship whereby the
right of the soil automatically confers the right of citizenship.22
These young Arabs were more visible because of their willingness to
make demands, which was something new in the history of immigra-
tion. These demands first took the form of peaceful citizen protests,
known as ‘March of the Beurs’ (1983, 1984, 1985). Using a very Repub-
lican sense of logic, a demand for equality was made, but a form of
equality that would recognise cultural diversity. Marginalised by the
worsening social and political situations, this movement gave way to
much more radical and hostile demands, encouraged by the rise of Is-
lamic fundamentalism around the world. At the end of 1989, the first
‘crisis of the headscarf’ took place (girls in high school demanding the
right to wear the hijab in school). This crisis deliberately targeted the
secular tradition of the country.
These kinds of protests have not abated since then – much to the
contrary. Nor has the social crisis been alleviated. Many of the younger
children seem even more disoriented than their elders, and their vio-
lent actions have taken on a more serious character (i.e., gang rapes,
juvenile delinquency among the very young). Difficulties have also ex-
panded to affect neighbouring groups who have increased in size
through family immigration (regroupement familial): This includes Mor-
occans and Malians, but also Turks in certain regions (including Al-
sace).23
In 1993-94 a large nation-wide survey was conducted that affected a
large portion of the population with foreign origins.24 The portrait of
the processes of social insertion and acculturation was somewhat con-
tradictory. Acculturation was undeniable among all of the communities
(with the exception of the Turks, at that time the most recent arrivals).
Indicators showed that things were progressing a rapid rate: use of
written and spoken French (over 90% of the children arriving in
France before the age of 16), abandonment of religion (notably among
young Algerians, even if certain practices such as Ramadan were main-
tained), the pursuit of schooling (especially among Algerians). Mixed
marriages reached a level of 50% for young people born in France,
with important exceptions: Algerian girls and the entire Turkish and
Malian immigrant populations. Indicators of social insertion revealed
important differences among the various groups. Young people of Al-
gerian origin were situated among both the best integrated and among
those who had the most difficulties succeeding (in school or at work).
Today, such studies no longer receive any financing, perhaps for fear
of their results. However, recent partial surveys show that discrimina-
tion against young people of North African or Sub-Saharan African ori-
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gin has worsened in the areas of job opportunities, housing, and even
access to certain activities (notably night clubs). Young graduates of
Maghrebi origin suffer from a level of unemployment that can only be
explained by their names or physical appearance.25 A sign of the times
is that after the ‘integration policy’ of the 1980s, an ‘anti-discrimina-
tion policy’ has now been implemented.26
A ‘cycle of difference’
Indeed, the question now asked is whether a population is being con-
structed which will suffer permanent discrimination. This would con-
stitute another fact hitherto unseen in the history of immigration in
France. Contrary to former migrations in which the children, half-way
between their parents and the host society, played the role of ‘media-
tors’ for integration, the children of new migrations appear to perpetu-
ate their parents’ difficulties instead of attenuating them. This phe-
nomenon can be seen geographically. In the past, as immigrant popu-
lations grew transparent, their members no longer lived in the same
neighbourhoods; this dispersion made the communities invisible (or
transparent). Today, in survey after survey, we can see that segregation
is growing worse. In the Ile-de-France, where in 1999 nearly 40% of
the foreigners in the country lived (versus 22% in 1936 and 31% in
1968), the towns where the number of foreign households had in-
creased the most by 1999 were the ones which already counted the
most in 1990 (and vice versa). Ghettos were being formed, with ser-
ious consequences for education. These neighbourhoods of relegation
were not true communities, but rather brought people together who
share numerous social handicaps.27 Among them, foreign households
were predominant, especially those from Africa. That these neighbour-
hoods were characterised by ethnicisation was a sign that social pro-
blems have come to be characterised by ethnicisation. This was one of
the aspects of the ‘cycle of difference’, a term chosen by some research-
ers to signify a new phase in the history of integration in France.
The ‘Algerian model’ was not valid for everyone, however, and we
could speak of targeted discrimination. Young people of Portuguese
origin, globally less affected by unemployment than the North Africans
during the economic crisis (but relying less upon schooling), enjoy bet-
ter economic integration today, even if they often came from modest
backgrounds. Recent research has shown that European immigrants
(the Portuguese and the Spanish) have generally left the troubled pub-
lic housing projects, seeking to become homeowners in a process of
dispersal similar to that of the Italians earlier.28 Asians, though quite
often living in urban areas marked by strong ethnic visibility, cham-
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pion citizenship through naturalisation; integration through the school
system was combined with maintaining their cultural traditions.
This cycle of difference has more positive aspects. The demands of
young people of Algerian origin have introduced the possibility of a
new form of equality that consists of recognising cultural differences
as a mark of identity, on a par with the French national identity. This
evolution corresponds to a general tendency that the new immigrations
were not responsible for, although they have served as a catalyst. Since
the 60s, a taste for individuality has developed in France, along with
criticism of the national tradition of excessive centralisation.29 In 1981,
just before the law on decentralisation was passed, legislation re-estab-
lished the freedom of association for foreigners.30 A policy of subsidies
encouraged expression among ‘cultures of foreign origin’, notably the
‘Beur’ culture which, through music, literature, and a very active cine-
ma, plays a contemporary part in regenerating national culture. The
children of other immigration groups have followed in these footsteps
(young people of Portuguese origin claim their ‘Luso-descendant’ iden-
tities). Those descended from old immigration groups got in touch
with their roots; some with Italian grandparents, for instance, have ap-
plied for Italian citizenship.31 In the eyes of many, the European Union
has helped to redefine the framework of integration and has encour-
aged cultural diversity.
However, it must not be forgotten that proclaiming one’s cultural
heritage can be a political act, especially for young people of Algerian
origin, who symbolically continue to fight against the former colonial
power through this process. Their revolt against social exclusion was
expressed in the growth of radical forms of Islam. As the sociologist
Michel Wieviorka has suggested, claiming one’s cultural heritage can
be read as a substitute for the class struggle as the mode for expressing
one’s social demands.32 The image of Islam in the world today as a
powerful means of protest makes it all the more successful among
young people who suffer discrimination.
Although during the first mass integration, French society was final-
ly able to absorb the diverse groups that had come to join it, it would
appear that the opposite process has been set in motion by the off-
spring of Algerian immigration. By refusing to submit to the immi-
grant status that their parents had accepted, they were pushing for a re-
definition of the national contract. Greatly shaken, French society has
oscillated between passionate debates and attempts to adapt. The offi-
cially designated objective of finding a compromise between maintain-
ing the egalitarian and unitary traditions and accepting diversity is not
always visible.33
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III Two Different Immigrations, Two Different Eras
Of these two processes, many similarities can be noted. The Italians
and the Algerians both experienced similar difficulties in their own
ways: A situation of inferiority which leads to multiple handicaps in
the host country, a process of integration which includes a struggle to
find a place in a xenophobic society. Insofar as we were able to advance
a conclusion, the results remain inconclusive because the future has as
yet not been decided, the differences, however, merit a closer look. As
we have seen, these differences result in part from the heritage of colo-
nialism, but also in part because the context of integration has chan-
ged.
The weight of colonialism
The Algerian situation was a casebook study of the specific difficulties
encountered with immigrants originating from the former colonies. It
was also an exceptional case. Divided into départements, the only settle-
ment colony, Algeria held a unique place in the French Empire: it was
an extension of Metropolitan France. Its mode of administration was
largely affected by the demands of the French colonists; these demands
aggravated the processes of domination of the Muslim population. The
local populations developed a lasting mistrust of France and trans-
formed it into open hostility with the war for independence. Moreover,
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) demanded that Algerian immi-
grants in France return to Islam to demonstrate their attachment to
their homeland (and to refuse the non-religious influences of the colo-
niser). From within Metropolitan France we have seen how this immi-
gration was different from all of the others and how the colonial heri-
tage still affects French hostility towards Arabs and Muslims (uncon-
sciously confused with Algerians). In the same way, the colonial
heritage weighs on the hostility of young French people of Algerian ori-
gin who consider themselves robbed of the social status they believe
they were entitled to in a society which bears a great debt towards their
people.34
Colonisation opened the way to the massive post-war immigration
period. Furthermore, the case of the former French Empire was similar
to that of several other European countries, including the United King-
dom. French colonial history has resulted in discrimination problems
that have less to do with colour (what Leo Lucassen calls the ‘colour
path’ for those from the West Indies living in Great Britain) than with
religion (might we speak of a ‘Muslim path’?).35 Thus, it can be under-
stood that those coming from the former protectorates of Tunisia and
Morocco, where the effects of colonisation were of less consequence, or
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that of the Turks, who were never colonised by France, all find them-
selves caught in an ‘Algerian model’. For the Malians, the problem of
religion was less political and more family-oriented (polygamy, very
large families), but patterns of segregation were nonetheless present.
This colonial link is currently shifting from a category of explanation
to a new form of protest. Young French Muslims recently proclaimed
themselves ‘Indigènes de la République’, thereby emphasising the past
colonisation as the reason for today’s discrimination. At the same time,
a colour movement is also on the rise: some residents of African origin
have tried to form a black community around the memory of slavery.
Transformations in the host society
The weight of the colonial heritage accounts for the existence of precar-
ious groups in present-day French society. Beyond that, the comparison
between Italian and Algerian immigrants brings to light a more global
historical evolution. For the Italians, the working world has been in-
sisted upon as the setting for their integration. To the immigrants of
that era, the dominant working class environment offered a culture
and a goal of integration that was easily attained.36 No matter their ori-
gin, the industrial society offered all children from the working classes
the same means for social mobility; factory work or the crafts industry
were central for the boys, while girls became seamstresses or secre-
taries.
The French working world of the Trente Glorieuses is far removed
from that of the Front Populaire. The spirit of struggle is no doubt the
same, but the distance between it and recent immigrants is wider.
Here again, housing has symbolic value, with a much more radical seg-
regation than in the past. While the working classes move by and large
into new public housing projects and adopt a ‘middle class’ lifestyle,
immigrants (especially the Algerians and the Portuguese) find them-
selves at best in boarding homes, at worst in slums. They remain the
instruments of production that needs them as cheap and temporary
manpower. The question is whether economic growth, had it been sus-
tained, would have allowed these differences to be progressively re-
duced, as it was then imagined, by enabling immigrant families to ben-
efit from public housing.
The period of crisis which has followed has prevented us from know-
ing the answer, because, above all, this crisis has sounded the death
knell of classic working class society which, deprived of any outlook,
can no longer serve as the setting for integration. The racist Front Na-
tional has progressively become the top workers’ party in France. In-
dustrial jobs no longer constitute a means of economic integration for
the children of migrants and, in the new service society, they were of-
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ten rejected in favour of new immigrants in jobs requiring unskilled la-
bourers. As a sign of this evolution, the towns of the former banlieue
rouge (‘red suburbs’) surrounding Paris, formerly a privileged setting
for the integration of French and foreign workers, have these days be-
come the ones that face the worst difficulties (the Seine Saint-Denis
district).
We have remarked that this evolution has not led to the same diffi-
culties for everyone. A university education and high-level diplomas
have become much more widely available for the children of immi-
grants than in the past. The success of girls is clearly visible, and this
is a sign of hope for the future of groups suffering from discrimina-
tion. In an increasingly mobile world, being of foreign origin can be an
opportunity (entrepreneurs without borders, like those from the Chi-
nese Diaspora). In the context of the European Union, bilingualism
and biculturalism were regarded as advantages by many descendants
of European immigration. But the differences that have been carved
out between groups demonstrate that the overall capacity for integra-
tion is diminished in a more competitive, more demanding society.
The role of the economy
If the economic and social context has been deeply altered, the differ-
ence in the economic situation at the end of these two immigrations
also explains the different destiny of the second generation: thirty years
of economic growth on one side, thirty years of economic crisis on the
other. The War and the Vichy regime coming on the heels of the 30s
constituted the first collective catastrophe in the history of integration
in France, and this should not be forgotten if we are to put current pro-
blems into perspective. However, the period that has followed demon-
strates to what degree economic prosperity and an overall improvement
in living conditions had a beneficial effect on social integration, which
is the basis for cohesion in a society. The Italians were hated after
1944 and were still quite impoverished. Some of their children entered
the world of petty delinquency and small gangs. But all this was soon
forgotten: a decade later, the ritals were only spoken of with sympathy
and the young people, now married, had jobs allowing them a more
stable lifestyle.37
The context of integration for young people of Algerian origin was
one of massive unemployment, dilapidated living conditions, and grow-
ing segregation in the schools. Their fathers, already experiencing diffi-
culties during the period of growth, lost their only recognised identity
in France, that of the worker. And the sons thus experience a compar-
able level of unemployment, firstly because in France, young people
were the first to fall victim to unemployment, secondly because they
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suffer from discrimination due to their Maghrebi origins, even when
economic growth makes a timid comeback. Consequently, their social
and psychological structures were quite different from those of the
young Italians living during the Trente Glorieuses.
It has been obvious that many aspects of this evolution were not un-
ique to France. On several points, our analysis echoes the findings of
Nancy Foner in her book on the role of the post-war boom which saw
Jewish and Italian descendants permanent settling down in American
society, and on the inequality of the contemporary integration pro-
cesses, much more favourable than in the past for some, but leading to
a greater level of marginalisation and exclusion for others. Western so-
cieties have been progressively converging and many of the problems
concerning the position of recent immigrants have been common to
all of the Western European countries, from the persistence of specific
forms of discrimination to the management of the question of Islamic
fundamentalism. We have attempted to demonstrate here how a differ-
ent history has explained certain specific cases in France. On the one
hand, a long tradition of immigration and social and cultural assimila-
tion, the different crises of xenophobia notwithstanding, which did not
challenge the myth of the unitary nation. On the other hand, the his-
tory of France as a colonial power, filled with successive contradictions
– between a universalist discourse and differentialist practices, between
a bloody period of decolonisation and the maintaining of specific rela-
tions with the formerly dependent populations. Managing the ‘diver-
sity’ in integration, a key element of current immigration, is only much
more problematic. Beyond that, the challenges have been the same for
all of the countries that receive sizeable numbers of immigrants who
are caught between socio-economic imperatives and North-South rela-
tions.38
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Rural Dimensions at Stake:
The Case of Italian Immigrants in
Southwestern France
Laure Teulières
Italian immigration to southwest France, which started in the early
1920s, presents a particular modality of migrants’ integration, as the
settlement of Italian newcomers had a major impact on the country-
side and on local communities. The aim of this paper is to underline
the specific characteristics of this massive immigration,1 especially its
rural dimension, and to think through the implications of this specific
case for our general insights into the integration process.
The general image of this Italian migration has long been that of a
successful and swift assimilation, that is the complete disappearance of
the migrant group into French society. It is commonly assumed that
the Italians became integrated without any tensions. Interpreting the
settlement process of these Italians as a ‘miracle’ of integration, how-
ever, ignores the many difficulties and conflicts, especially during the
first decades of their stay.2 These representations overshadow the
harshness of the migrants’ working and living conditions, while, on
the other hand, individual success stories have been glorified. In a way
such a reading of the past can be seen as the price migrants have to
pay for their integration; the price one has to pay in order to lose one’s
status as a foreigner.3 Thus, it is a manner of imposing invisibility, of
tolerating nothing but accepted differences.
To better understand the relations between the Italians and the indi-
genous French population in the South West, it is necessary to assess
the reactions of public opinion at the time. Hence, the presentation
will emphasise a plural approach combining an analysis of both the so-
ciological dimension and the social discourse it generated. To do so, it
is also essential to take into account the various systems of representa-
tion at work in southern French society.
Unlike other parts of France, like the East and the Paris region, until
the beginning of the 1920s, there were very few Italians in southwes-
tern France. They represented in general less than 5 % of the foreign-
ers established in the different districts (départements) in a region
where Spanish migrants were traditionally very numerous. The 1921
population census notes only 2,557 Italians in the territory of the cur-
rent Midi-Pyrénées and Aquitaine regions, of which about 800 were lo-
cated in the Gironde département. Some of those Italians were stall
holders, some specialised in transalpine products, as for example little
handmade statuettes. Many others were small craftsmen, such as chair
makers, or employed as industrial workers, builders, or woodcutters.4
At the time most of them were seasonal migrants, who returned to
their native country after a while. They used to move from place to
place in order to find work, and were perceived as nomads. They were
practically absent in agriculture, except in viticulture in the areas of
Languedoc, the Mediterranean coast, or, to the west, in the Bordeaux
region. In short, Italian migrants were scattered, represented a small
population, were atypical, and practically invisible.
Things started to change in the early 1920s, when a significant mi-
gratory influx reached the Southwest region. Within a few years, be-
tween 1923 and 1926, approximately 40,000 Italians immigrated to
the area. Men and women, adults and children, entire families. Gener-
ally speaking, men came first, found a place and then called for their
wives, children, and eventually other relatives like brothers, sisters, or
cousins. This massive and sudden movement5 was caused by the great
shortage of manpower in the countryside, which for a long time had
been dependent upon seasonal migrant labour. However, after the First
World War and the dramatic demographic losses, the regional labour
market reached an acute crisis. Farmers and property owners who were
desperately looking for workers, called in the help of French recruit-
ment agencies.
The legal procedures permitted the introduction of migrants into
France as paid workers or as farmers leasing a piece of land. For the
single year of 1924, the Italian State published an official statistic of
4,300 agricultural workers placed in the southwest of France, of whom
2,500 were métayers, that is to say farmers paying rent proportionally
to the harvest and partially or even entirely in kind. A large minority of
the newcomers established themselves as landowners from the very
start of the settlement. Consequently, some of them contributed to en-
courage the migratory movement itself because they recruited fellow
countrymen to immigrate as farm workers for their newly owned prop-
erties.
In that sense, the migratory movement produced its own internal dy-
namic, as Italians called for relatives, friends or even close relations
from their village or region of origin. There are striking cases of nu-
merous immigrants from the same transalpine village who settled in
the same locality in France. In 1925, for instance, 184 Italians from the
village of Medea (Friuli province) went to the French village of Castel-
culier (Lot-et-Garonne département).6 These chain-migration networks,
which depended on local bonds, played an important role. They caused
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an autonomous recruitment, actually a sort of ‘co-option’ between mi-
grants, determined by personal ties. Nearly all of the immigrants came
from the northern part of Italy, principally the provinces of Venice and
Piedmont, but also Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria.
Almost no one came from the south, or the rest of the country in gen-
eral.
After that first boom, characterised by a contemporary as ‘the rush
to Gascony’,7 the rate of immigration changed. The influx was reduced
by Mussolini after 1926. With the aim of preventing emigration, the
Fascist government’s policy reinforced its control over migrants and de-
creased the number of departures by enacting many legal obstacles
such as new requirements concerning placement and housing, restric-
tions on family reunification, especially for adolescent sons, tightening
of the rules for passports, etc. Moreover, it created a ‘General Depart-
ment of Italians Abroad’ (1927), under the authority of the Foreign
State Department, in charge of supervising all aspects of emigration
and expatriates. According to the Fascist regime, this was the ‘mother-
land’s tutelage’, the project of holding sway over migrants and of estab-
lishing nationalist control.
However, the movement continued until the eve of Second World
War in various ways. Of course, clandestine immigration played a cer-
tain role. Italians illegally crossed the border in the Alps or along the
coast, others entered France with a tourist visa, in order to visit, or to
undertake the Lourdes’ pilgrimage, and never returned. Another way
consisted of taking legal migratory detours via other French regions to
the Southwest. Some Italian iron workers, for instance, deserted their
tough jobs in Lorraine and reached the southern countryside to enter
the agricultural sector. At that time, in the neighbourhood of Toulouse,
Auch, Albi, Montauban or Agen, it was quite easy for clandestine mi-
grants to get their situation sorted out by the authorities because of the
lack of workers in the region. As soon as they had found a place, they
asked for an identity card as ‘farm worker’ and generally succeeded in
obtaining it.
According to the census of 1936, more than 80,000 Italians had
settled in the area. Nevertheless, that later influx remained underesti-
mated by French people at the time. The first arrivals, during the mid-
20s, had marked a milestone. The continuation of the phenomenon,
somewhat fluid and diffuse, went more or less unnoticed. At the end
of the 1930s, Mussolini tried to persuade the emigrants to return to
Italy, using propaganda and promising various kinds of aid and help.
Even if the statistics are not precise, that policy was largely a failure,8
especially in southwestern France, where many of them, involved in
the agricultural world, were already firmly settled.
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After the Second World War, Italian immigration again resumed in
France as a whole.9 The influx became sizeable again in the southwest
in particular during the years 1946-1948, then declined during the fol-
lowing decade and finally dried up in the early 1960s. Those newco-
mers remained largely confined to the agricultural sector. Moreover, it
is necessary to point out that most of them were chain migrants, at-
tracted for a significant part by previously settled Italians, who called
for their family, relatives, or other workers from their native country.
In 1954, the census mentioned 78,340 Italians in the Aquitaine and
Midi-Pyrénées regions. At that time, naturalisations were already in-
creasing, which has to be taken into account to arrive at an accurate
picture of the demographic balance.
What then were the important factors involved in this rural-rural
path of integration? It seems, first of all, that the original conditions of
the movement are decisive. After the Great War, France’s southwest re-
gion had been depopulated. Since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, many areas had lost a considerable part of their inhabitants, about
a third in only seventy years for départements such as Gers, Tarn-et-Gar-
onne, and Lot-et-Garonne, and even more in some of the remotest rur-
al sub-districts (cantons). Such a depopulation was therefore a long-
lasting phenomenon. It was caused mainly by spontaneous birth con-
trol, notably on the part of peasant families, reluctant to divide their
possessions by right of inheritance since the French Revolution had
suppressed birthrights. The slaughter of the Great War had reinforced
and accelerated this demographic trend. With about 1,467,000 people
killed in France, the rural people were the majority of the victims. Fi-
nally, from 1911 up to 1921, the whole southwestern region lost some
235,000 inhabitants.
The Garonne’s basin was the epicentre in this process of deserting
the countryside. The Italian rural settlement superposed on it closely,
with the same heart formed by the districts of Haute-Garonne, Gers,
Tarn-et-Garonne and Lot-et-Garonne, and similar fringes in direction of
Lauragais (to the east), Quercy and Rouergue (to the north), Gironde
and Périgord (to the west) and Pyrénées’ Piedmont (to the south).10
Over the previous decades, French society as a whole, and its south-
western region in particular, had seemed to be haunted by the fear of
depopulation and Malthusianism.11 The views of commentators, jour-
nalists, officials, notables, etc. were more or less similar on that point.
They all made a tragedy out of the demographic problem, perceived as
a dreadful danger, a warning sign of a sort of collective death. The pre-
vailing attitude consisted in predicting a silent but nonetheless inevita-
ble disaster, metaphorically dramatising its consequences: the south-
west was becoming ‘the dying land’, ‘the old people’s country’, with
‘empty cradle homes’, etc. The falling birth rate was commonly called
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‘another Verdun’, i.e., another huge demographic loss equivalent in
scope to the most memorable battle in 1916. Moreover, it signalled an-
other kind of defeat in relation to Germany which was, on the contrary,
a high birth rate country. The demographic issue thus involved the
feeling of decadence and thoughts about national decline. According to
that representation, southern France was gradually decaying.
Within this context, the countryside was indeed passing through a
crisis, because there was a shortage of workers to farm the Garonne
valley’s land. The soil was under-utilised, neglected, with many fields
lying fallow. In the Gers district alone, 2,500 farms were vacant in
1922. The drift from the land towards the cities was considered a disas-
ter. The rural exodus represented an important theme for the press
and various commentators. It did not only play an economic role but it
also dealt with self-representation and symbolic foundations, which
form the very keystones of French and regional identities. With the
passage of time, one might today consider this evolution a long-term
sociological alteration. But back then, it was perceived as the agony of
civilisation itself. Regarding society as a whole, its rural nature was
thought of as a guarantee against anomie and corruption, as if the vir-
tuous countryside constituted a form of protection against the urban
world, often depicted as a ‘new Babylon’, cosmopolitan, uprooted, and
soulless.
Italian immigration was thus perceived according to these views.
The prevailing representations were allowed to appreciate its qualities
and to integrate its contribution in more ways than one. Meanwhile,
the situation was quite different in southeastern France where Italians,
traditionally very numerous, were commonly called babis, a disparaging
term, or, in Occitan language, manja macaroni (macaroni-eater).12 The
hostility was reinforced in the cities, particularly along the Mediterra-
nean coast, where people feared a so-called ‘Italian peril’, i.e., unfair
competition, criminality, indeed, even debauchery.13 In brief, in the
southwest, Italian immigration was thought to be a remedy for de-
population and the crisis in agriculture. It was considered as a factor of
revival, and hence frequently likened to a ‘demographical grafting’ or a
‘blood transfusion’ by the commentators of the time.
The attitude of the French elites and professional world is another
key factor. Emigration was advocated by local agricultural unions, offi-
cials and even the regional political party leaders of a broad ideological
spectrum from the conservatives to the republicans and radical socia-
lists. The local elites themselves were mostly landlords and their own
prosperity depended on farming. As a result, they promoted a repopu-
lating policy in the countryside. According to the needs of the time,
Spanish immigrants were not efficient enough and were to a certain
extent resented. Often seasonal, and nomadic, they crossed the border
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with their own social strategy, such as giving up farming as soon as
possible to move to the cities. Most of them preferred urban jobs and
were consequently considered as unreliable. In the context of under-po-
pulated regions, with a predominance of mixed farming and share-
cropping, passing migrants were no longer useful. Landlords and em-
ployers in agriculture were looking for people who wished to settle per-
manently, in other words for a new type of immigration.
It is important to underline the numerous failed attempts to settle
rural migrants in that area. After the Great War, many local authorities,
administrations and private offices tried to introduce farm workers
from Spain or Portugal, Polish cowherds, Ukrainian shepherds, farm-
hands from Bohemia, and even French families from Brittany, Vendée
or Savoy. The results, however, proved inadequate and sometimes piti-
ful. With the Italians, on the contrary, a migratory phenomenon of an
increasing scale emerged. The local institutions welcomed their immi-
gration and even intended to provide facilities, such as refunding the
cost of the preliminary travel of the immigrants, promoting the transal-
pine labour force, encouraging the French to appeal to it and editing
bilingual textbooks for everyday situation. Their views about the benefit
of Italian immigration for the region’s development were widely circu-
lated and rapidly prevailed.
Migratory projects on both sides were closely connected. On the one
hand, the need for permanent migrants, on the other convergent perso-
nal emigration strategies. A considerable number of Italians came with
the intention of remaining for good. Moreover, the migratory pressures
were inter-linked. The emigrants left Italy as an effect of overpopula-
tion and economic poverty and also as a consequence of political perse-
cution by the Fascists. In the 1920’s, France represented an attractive
choice for those who wanted to settle in rural areas. Central Europe –
Germany as well as the former Austro-Hungarian Empire – had been
turned upside down, Argentina was undergoing a crisis and entering
the United States was becoming more and more difficult because of
the quota policy. Thus, the French Midi became available at the right
time as an alternative to previous destinations: an ideal area where it
was possible to settle easily, where one could succeed in clearing a rur-
al path, where it was still possible to rise up the social ladder via farm-
ing. For those Venetian or Piedmontese peasants, emigrating permitted
them to continue the same work, without proletarianisation, without
even being obliged to break with their rural ways of life.
Whereas most of the migrants came to rent agricultural property, a
minority also managed to buy it after having sold their holdings in
Italy. A survey of 1927 offers us more precise information. Of the Ita-
lians working in agriculture in the regions of Aquitaine and Midi-Pyré-
nées, 4,830 were landowners (22%), 12,152 were tenants (56%) and
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4,756 were paid workers (22%). All of the Italian peasants had a strong
desire to be the sole owners of a piece of land with a farm. That was
nearly impossible for many of them back in Italy because of various
factors such as overpopulation, no land available to purchase or prices
were too high in certain territories, especially in the Po plain. Consider-
ing the peasant population of Piedmont, an Italian anthropologist has
rightly mentioned its ‘hunger for land’.14 To hold on to a small holding
appeared to be the main objective of most of the emigrants.
The acquisition of land by foreigners was sometimes resented in
France at the national level. At the beginning of the movement, during
the mid-1920s, this polemical theme was introduced in the Parisian
press, with front pages headlines like the ‘Italian invasion in the
French Midi’ or the ‘scandalous conquest of the soil by foreigners’.15 In
the southwestern region, however, it was perceived as extremely posi-
tive. Moreover, it contributed to the positive image of Italian immi-
grants. Insofar as it was considered as a repopulating movement, it
had to be durable, even permanent. According to the prevailing opi-
nion on immigration, buying land was considered as an important sign
of integration. To be in close contact with the soil (la terre) seemed to
be a sort of pre-condition for the settling of foreigners, and rootedness
formed a crucial element. Collective representations extolled the virtues
of the land and an idealised rural society Becoming rooted in French
soil, especially among those in the countryside, was perceived as the fi-
nal proof of assimilation.
This background reveals that Italians were initially welcomed. At
first, demographic preoccupation coupled with a general agreement on
the benefits of an increased labour force eased the acceptance of this
immigration. Indeed, the employment of the migrant population of-
fered real advantages. The contracts they accepted at the beginning for
the renting of land favoured the landlords. The working conditions
were severe, with many obligations and additional fees. If one consid-
ers the neglected state the fields were in, the migrants’ efforts restored
the soil fertility at very low costs. Within an archaic agricultural system,
many men were needed to do the harvesting or to lead the yoke of oxen
while ploughing. That is why French requests for immigration often
specified tenant farmer families with ‘at least two [or more] men’. It is
also the reason why the large Italian families were immediately appre-
ciated by landowners: many people to work, many arms to maintain
the farms and, in many cases, to clear them at the beginning.
The Italians’ social strategy were generally based – before and after
emigration – on familial solidarity; the work of every member contri-
buting to the prosperity of the group. Furthermore, family structures
were often based on communitarian solidarity. While for the French
peasants the estate was destined for the eldest boy, many Italian farms
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were run by several brothers, as is revealed by the oral testimonies of
migrants or descendants.16 The role of children working in domestic
agriculture also has to be taken into account. Since 1936, foreign chil-
dren were theoretically obliged to attend school until 14 years of age.
Many of them, however, ended up working on the farms as well. In the
case of share croppers, children contributed to help increase revenues
from the property and consequently benefited the landlord.
Without any negative impact on the labour market, Italian immigra-
tion also had unexpected outcomes on the real estate market. Land had
been depreciating in value for a long time. The sudden demand for
land by the immigrants boosted prices, which peaked during the mid-
1920s and some French landowners made good profits. The Italians
were therefore easily integrated into the rural economic system. With-
out resolving the rural crisis, they at least contributed in many ways to
improve the rural and agricultural decline and soften its socio-econom-
ic problems.
The case of other economic sectors makes it clear what was at stake
in this rural path of integration. The economic crisis of the 1930s con-
firms that the peculiar representation of Italian immigration was not
due to their (alleged) national characteristics, but was dependent more
on the specific configuration of the local labour market. Between the
crisis of 1929 until the Second World War, unemployment in the build-
ing industry had caused many tensions between French and immi-
grant workers. The increasing numbers of foreigner workers and entre-
preneurs in the building trade provoked a lot of protest movements in
a xenophobic atmosphere, notably on the reconstruction sites after the
great Tarn River flood in 1930, on major civil engineering sites, in the
aeronautics industry in Toulouse, and the hydroelectric dam in the Pyr-
enees.17 In the framework of those times, Italians were targeted as
were others foreigners.
The geographical framework is important as well. In this case, one
could argue that the scattered pattern of settlement was another key
factor. In the plains and the hills of the Garonne River area, farms
were spread throughout the countryside. The majority of Italian mi-
grants had settled outside the villages on isolated estates. They were
not concentrated and thus were not very visible as a group, even if their
numbers were large. As a result, there was never any ‘little Italy’, i.e.,
ethnic neighbourhood, neither in the small towns nor in the villages.
Italian families did not live close to one another, which made the emer-
gence of ethnic group formation unlikely. Such was the general situa-
tion, apart from very rare cases, as for example the concentration of Ita-
lian property in Blanquefort, in the Gers.18 In that very peculiar case,
the Italian founders built a complete community life, with Catholic
Church supervision.
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Finally, the shared rural values above all stimulated the shaping of a
favourable image among local French people. Even if the divergent per-
ception of some cultural practices gave rise to feelings of otherness –
for instance the question of food and domestic eating habits19 – it often
revealed how much they had in common. In the words of the geogra-
pher Dominique Saint-Jean: ‘the similarities between two peasant cul-
tures have probably contributed to reinforce the reassuring image of
the ‘‘cousins from Italy’’’.20 The shared background of peasant culture
and know-how and the way professional relations were conducted, cre-
ated a common ground between the Italian immigrants and the local
French population.
One could also suggest the possibility that the regional dialect – Oc-
citan – has played a role in the relatively smooth integration. Insofar as
it is a Latin language, closer to ancient Latin than French, it sounded
more familiar to the newcomers, making communication in the early
stages easier. In the southern French countryside, it was the language
of work, of trade talks at the local rural fairs and in many cases, more
or less until the 1940s, the most useful way to communicate with one’s
neighbours. How such a movement was perceived was connected,
among other things, to the collective representations with regard to re-
gionalism and Occitan identity. It is remarkable that the arrival of the
migrants was framed in sympathetic and familiar terms, as if this was
the only way for the indigenous population to come to terms with the
immigration. The republican elite, in regional press articles, and those
by key public figures, the original migratory influx was put into a his-
torical context in which the past and present were linked by a chain of
historical precedents.
The event was related to more ancient movements and it was em-
phasised that there had been periods in the past in which similar devel-
opments had taken place. Writers in the 1920s who were particularly
keen on classical culture, accounted for the deep historical roots of
Gascony’s and Italy’s bonds by recalling the Roman age and the com-
mon civilisation it had bred. However, they had also rediscovered all
the Italian figures who had migrated to the area during the Renais-
sance including priests, artists, tradesmen, and bandits. These charac-
ters were used as an example of the geographic mobility of the ances-
tors of the contemporary Italian migrants. It was assumed that their
ancestors had composed some kind of Latin-Occitan region pantheon,
making the 20th-century immigrants the heirs of a fantasised tradition
of exchanges, bound by a symbolic ancestry.
The national educational system played a crucial role in socialising
and acculturating migrants by denying the expression of any specific
ethnic culture. Even in the remote villages, the school integrated for-
eign children into a common French culture and language.21 But this
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is only true in a very general sense. Despite the high attendance rate at
primary schools, very few Italians went on to secondary schools before
the 1960s.22 Moreover, following familial traditions, endogamy contin-
ued to prevail largely during the 1920s, especially as the Italian consu-
lates frequently refused to deliver legal documents for those nationals
who wanted to marry a French person. Mixed marriages were rejected
by most migrants23 so that many men went back to their native coun-
try to find a spouse. In the 1930s, however, intermarriages increased.
This is well illustrated by the case of the La Réole district, where the
rate of endogamy dramatically fell from 56% during the period 1931-
1940 to 19% in the years 1941-1949; while it declined in the country-
side from 75% (1931-1940) to 47% (1941-1949).24 Consequently, the
high Italian fertility rate quickly adapted to the French average. The
change of nationality is another indicator of the integration process of
migrants. For the Italians, the number of naturalisations increased
slowly during the 1930s, while it rose quickly after the Second World
War, favoured by a new context and the long-term settlement of mi-
grants. In 1950, for instance, in the Lot-et-Garonne district, 31% of the
Italians applied for French citizenship.25
Finally, it should be stressed that integration is not a linear process,
because of the repercussions of the Second World War. Whatever the
level of social integration, according to standard indicators, the assess-
ment can be radically modified when the political context changes. The
Second World War gave rise to deep tensions and conflicting passions,
even in the case of a relatively peaceful rural settlement. International
developments, the consequences of the Italian declaration of war
against France and the new tensions resulting from the German occu-
pation transformed the image of Italians in the public opinion and
strained relations between French and Italians.
One must notice that the climate became more tense during the late
1930s, when Mussolini reaffirmed his nationalist diplomacy, which
was particularly aggressive towards France. When, in November 1938,
the Fascist regime once again allowed free expression for its territories
– Corsica, Tunisia, Djibouti, and even Nice and Savoy – it provoked a
very contentious situation between the two States. Moreover, Italy en-
tered into an alliance with National Socialist Germany, resulting in the
German-Italian treaty of May 1939. Even if the French press had been
very careful not to blame the migrants for the policy of their native
country, public opinion towards Italians gradually deteriorated. In the
emerging xenophobic atmosphere, foreigners in general were more
and more perceived as ‘undesirable’, which affected the relationships
between the indigenous population and the Italians. This is illustrated
by several trivial events, which took place not only in cities. French peo-
ple became more and more suspicious, and it did not take much for in-
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cidents with Italians, who were perceived as being provocative anyway,
to escalate.
Nazi Germany’s attack of Poland in September 1939, led to France’s
official entry into the war. In that stage of the conflict, Italy was still
neutral and as a result, its citizens had no particular obligations. Never-
theless, many Italians tried to spontaneously enlist in the French army,
including anti-Fascist refugees as well as young immigrants. But such
loyalist fervour was not encouraged by the French government, which
did not want to provoke Italy.26 In the mean time, French men were
being mobilised. In the countryside, this meant leaving their farms,
whereas their Italian neighbours remained behind. This situation pro-
voked immediate hostility towards migrants. Many were indignant that
Italians maintained control of the soil and evaded the ‘blood tax’, an ex-
pression that illustrates what was at stake. Not simply a xenophobic
outbreak, but a crisis in the integration process itself. In spite of being
firmly rooted, Italian people appeared more ‘alien’ than they had fifteen
years earlier, when they were still newcomers. Because of the deterior-
ating international political climate they were suddenly perceived as
different, on their own, and isolated within a foreign community.
It became even worse after the 10th of June 1940 when Mussolini
declared war on France at the very moment of its military debacle, de-
feat at the hands of Nazi Germany. Mussolini’s decision to attack
France aroused an angry outburst and was seen as a major act of
treachery, reviving the representation of Italians as deceitful and cow-
ardly people. Some demonstrations, as in Toulouse or Marmande, illu-
strated this ‘explosion of hatred, from the main cities to the depth of
the country’.27 Because of this ‘stab in the back’ – as the event became
known by the French –Italians became the enemy, and continued to be
for a long time, even after the rapidly signed armistice between the two
countries. The resentment against Italian immigrants lasted, as well as
the desire for revenge. For the immigrants, however, it was a painful
experience. Most of them felt dismayed and torn between their mother-
land and their adopted land, where they had become rooted. During
this period, they endured a very strained situation. To avoid any ani-
mosity, they generally adopted a wait-and-see attitude, were discrete,
hard-working, and tried to make themselves invisible.
During the war, the restraints resulting from the German occupation
only fuelled the acrimony. Because Italy viewed itself as a victorious
state, it defended the emigrants’ status, which increased feelings of ex-
asperation in French public opinion. Meanwhile, the French population
worried about the prisoners of war still interned, and those who had to
endure the everyday difficulties under the Vichy regime. It comes as
no surprise that the Italian community had a bad reputation. Italians
were considered indifferent, disrespectful, and arrogant. In the spring
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of 1943, young Frenchmen were conscripted to work in Germany as
part of the Obligatory Work Service (STO), while Italians were ex-
empted. This marked yet another conflicting stage and caused many
quarrels in the villages. Being very hostile towards the occupying Ger-
mans, most of the French held the Italians responsible for the hard-
ships of the day, and for the actions of the Nazi occupier after Novem-
ber 1942. The migrants were called ‘macaroni’, as before, but hence-
forth also Boch’ (another word for ‘Kraut’) or ‘collabo’, or traitor.
The Second World War ultimately left behind a confusing legacy be-
cause things did not change suddenly in June 1944, the date of French
Liberation.28 Feelings did not return to normal easily. Indeed, the ex-
perience of the war cast its shadow for a long period and the aftermath
of the Second World War seemed unlikely to fade very fast. The French
kept blaming the Italians for the June 1940 ‘stab in the back’. Immedi-
ately after the Liberation, public rumours accused the immigrates of
having collaborated with the enemy during the German Occupation, as
well as having taken advantage of their protected status to grow rich by
buying and selling on the black market. Actually, a great number of tri-
vial events marked the strong Italophobic feelings that lingered on in
the public opinion. In this context, the discredited Italian community
needed to recover its legitimacy in the minds of the French population.
Gradually the essential economic role of the Italian immigrants in
southwest France in the post-war years, as well as its working skills
and tact eased the negative image built up during the War and slowly
favoured their acceptance. This process, however, was not easy. Quite a
few Italian partnerships attempted to present a positive image of the
immigrant community, while struggling against the very negative wide-
spread stereotypes. One of the ways to fight prejudice was to propagate
an anti-Fascist image as well as glorifying the blood shed by the Resis-
tance fighters. Such a reaction could already be observed in some ille-
gal pamphlets prior to liberation. When a young Italian was put to
death for acts of terrorism in Toulouse in June 1944, pamphlets en-
titled ‘He died so France could live!’ were distributed for some time
after by his fellow countrymen who had joined the French resistance.
The text praised this immigrants’ son, descended from that hard-work-
ing agricultural population who had helped to bring the lands of Fran-
ce’s Midi back to life, who had been so heroic that he had ‘shed his
blood in sacrifice to his host country’. Some people were portrayed as
the embodiment of the sacrifice of second generation migrants. In this
way, the anti-Fascist representation and discourse were used to symbo-
lise ongoing integration.
The integration process from the 1940s onwards has not yet been
fully studied. In the mid-1950s, the National Institute for Demographic
Studies (INED) realised various surveys concerning immigrant adapta-
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tion, more particularly the Italian farmers in southwestern France.
They provide details concerning cultural changes within the families,
showing the progressive adoption of French values and standards and
ways of life.29 During the following decades, the immigrant population
remained somewhat ‘invisible’, even as new migrants began arriving in
the 1950s. In 1946, the law on the rural social system offered a more
favourable status to sharecroppers (métayers), instituting a two-thirds
share for the tenants, favouring their advancement to farmer status,
and giving them a pre-emptive right to buy their land in cases where
owners decided to sell their properties. France’s ‘Thirty Glorious Years’
– les Trente Glorieuses –, referring to the period of continuous economic
growth in the three decades following the Second World War, marked
an important phase of modernisation in French society, especially in
the countryside. As a result, some of the Italian farmers using loans,
became landowners during this period. ‘Those who arrived in the
1920s (due to the difficult circumstances experienced in the 1930s and
during the war) finally acceded to land ownership and a certain wealth
at the end of the 1950s, more or less at the same time as those who
had arrived after the war’.30 The building industry also attracted many
Italians who were seeking a better life, because it was possible to work
in that sector without any particular qualifications. Many of them rose
to a very good social status in that sector and a great number of suc-
cessful building or civil engineering contractors were established.31 The
emergence of local elites completed, to a certain extent, the collective
path of integration. Since the 1950s, many people with Italian origins
held functions in associations, trade unions or municipal councils,
some of them even became mayors.32
Nowadays, that community seems to be searching for its roots and
some visibility again. Interest by the second and the third generations
in their ancestors’ migratory history depends to a great extent on their
parents’ social mobility. The quest for memories regarding the immi-
grants and their descendants’, however, goes beyond the simple private
sphere. Nowadays, they claim a collective public memory, which trans-
cends the family circle or group membership. This trend aims to repre-
sent the history of immigration in the guise of cultural events. The mi-
gratory experience has thus become integrated into a more collective
memory supported by the wider rural society and the community’s
commemorations of integration takes place in this context. Although
the former ethnic community only constitutes a ‘residual identity’,33
what remains of their cultural specificity is very much valued, claimed,
brandished, often reconstructed and reinvented as well. That is equally
true for the third generation, made up of youngsters searching for their
roots and trying to preserve the traces left by the immigrants.
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Italian associations offer interesting dynamics. The immigrants’ or
their lineage’s associations or clubs aimed to maintain and hand over
the identity elements to the group of similar origin. They are also con-
cerned with conveying their cultural heritage to the French population.
Many associations are regionally based (Piedmont, Venice), which ac-
counts for their strong affinities and succes. Locally, Italian nationals,
naturalised migrants and descendants in the southwestern region re-
present a considerable demographic weight, enough in any case to al-
low an identity and a curiosity for origins to be expressed and demon-
strated. This explains the arrival of associations where immigrant
memory developed its cultural turn. These associations are also clearly
related to transalpine movements, revealing a transnational orientation
crossing different spaces in France and Italy, defined as the immigra-
tion region and the home region.
Finally, the increasing number of French villages with Italian villages
as ‘‘sister cities’’ is a revealing phenomenon. It has expanded from the
late-1980s and the role played by the Italian associations was and still
is crucial. Near Toulouse, in particular, it was an immigrant who rea-
lised the first matching up, which was followed by many others. At the
moment the consular constituency in Toulouse (which covers the Midi-
Pyrénées, Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes regions) counts more than
70 municipalities twinned with Italian villages. In most cases, they
stress the migratory links between them. These endeavours give rise to
ceremonies that pay tribute to this migration. It is a symbolic way of
combining the immigration and them two countries. The bonds that
were thus established between two European regions were particularly
favoured, maybe anticipating the integration movement of European
societies in general.
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Assigning the State its Rightful Place?
Migration, Integration and the State in Germany
Karen Schönwälder
In the American debate about integration and assimilation ‘then and
now’, changing economic conditions and the social context of the eth-
nic communities feature prominently, but little consideration is given
to the possible impact of changing political conditions on integration
processes – although the problem is occasionally mentioned.1 To some
extent this may reflect a general disregard for the state in migration re-
search – as observed by James Hollifield as well as Aristide Zolberg.
Thus Zolberg noted that ‘‘the role of states in shaping international mi-
gration has been largely ignored by immigration theorists’’.2 And Holli-
field sees theorists scrambling to ‘‘‘bring the state back in’ to social
scientific analyses of migration.’’ While Hollifield mentions the ‘issue
of incorporation’ as one major theme and poses the question of the role
of the state ‘in incorporating immigrants into society and the econo-
my’3, his review of the literature, like Zolberg’s discussion, reflect the
fact that recently revived discussions on the role of the state have fo-
cussed on migration control, i.e., in Tomas Hammar’s terms, immigra-
tion policy rather than immigrant policy.
For the US it may to some extent be justified to assume continuity
of at least major political structures and disregard change in this field
as one component of the framework for integration. For Germany,
however, this would be absurd. Here, in the last 100 to 120 years, enor-
mous ruptures have occurred: Two world wars were fought by and in-
side the country, and six different regimes (seven if we include the oc-
cupation of 1945-1949) partly represent radically differing political
structures. And yet, if we reconsider the literature on Germany’s mi-
gratory experience, the emphasis is often on continuity, and it is the as-
sumed continuity of the key aims of government policy and the legal
framework that is at its core.
So does it make sense to compare the integration processes of immi-
grants in Germany today and, say one hundred years ago? And what
impact did state policies have on integration processes, to what extent
did differing political frameworks determine integration outcomes?
As an analytical framework, it seems useful to refer to a model sug-
gested by Alejandro Portes among others. It distinguishes between
three levels of immigrant reception that affect their modes of incor-
poration:4
1. The first reception level is the government’s policy toward different
immigrant groups which can in principle take three different
routes: exclusion, passive acceptance, and active encouragement.
2. The second level involves civic society, public opinion, and the la-
bour market, and Portes assumes that it is not necessarily depen-
dent on the first level.
3. The third level is the ethnic community. Here the importance is
whether a sizeable community exists and whether it offers econom-
ic opportunities.
Portes and Rumbaut suggest that ‘The combination of positive and ne-
gative features encountered at each of these levels determines the dis-
tinct mode of newcomers’ incorporation.’5 As Portes emphasises, it is
the intention of this model to direct attention away from the individual
capacities of the immigrants (education, skills) to the social and politi-
cal environment. Furthermore, while at least in German public debate
the question of integration is often reduced to whether it has been
achieved or not, a distinction between different modes of incorporation
allows a more neutral and differentiated assessment of the situation.
The following text provides a sketch of migrant incorporation and
major factors influencing it over the last 130 years of German history.
In the last paragraphs the new integration policy of the current govern-
ment will be outlined. Throughout, particular attention will be paid to
the role of the state and it will be argued that – while we need to find
out much more about the mechanisms of immigrant incorporation –
overall the ability of the state to enable or control integration has de-
creased.
Active Exclusion and Laissez-Faire: The Kaiserreich
In the 1880s, Germany (i.e., the Kaiserreich was founded in 1871) be-
came a country of immigration (as immigration now exceeded emigra-
tion)6 and of major internal migratory movements. It is estimated that
of the about two million internal migrants from east to west, roughly
20% were ethnic Poles. But there was also significant other foreign im-
migration. Official statistics for 1910 recorded 1.26 million foreigners
in the Reich, of whom the biggest groups came from Austria-Hungary
(667,000), the Tsarist Empire (138,000) – both ethnically mostly Pol-
ish – the Netherlands (144,000), Italy (104,000), and Switzerland
(68,000).7 Government intervention focussed on the Poles (and the
Jews), and it is with reference to the Poles that many scholars have ar-
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gued that harsh restrictive anti-immigration policies (mass expulsions
in 1885, forced seasonal rotation, exclusion of families) made perma-
nent settlement and integration virtually impossible.8 It seems that the
Prussian state (and partly the Reich) was in control of migration and
settlement.
However, some scholars claim that the ‘Polo-centrism’ (Polenzentris-
mus) prevailing among researchers has obstructed an appropriate as-
sessment of state activities and that the treatment of the Poles repre-
sented a special case.9 Indeed, several restrictions applied specifically
to ethnic Poles, while migrants from Italy, Ruthenians, or Czechs were
not affected.10 Referring to the Italians, Del Fabbro argues that a ‘liber-
al foreigners law’ and a non-interventionist state stance constituted fa-
vourable conditions for an initial settlement process.11 At least the
southern borders of the Reich could be crossed without papers, em-
ployment contracts could be concluded freely. The restrictive Prussian
decrees hardly applied to Italians, partly because they were Prussian de-
crees that were not necessarily adopted by other German states, partly
because they were not strictly enforced.12 Italians already enjoyed the
benefits of social security schemes granting them sick pay and pay-
ments in case of accidents prior to 1914. The absence of an Italian in-
frastructure and of immigrant colonies may have favoured assimila-
tion.13
Considering the role of the state before 1918, it seems that we have
to, first, take into account that Germany was a federal state. Secondly,
we have to distinguish between a determined anti-Polish policy, that at
the very least made it extremely difficult for Poles of non-German citi-
zenship to become settled (i.e., a policy of active exclusion), and a lais-
sez-faire attitude towards other migrant nationalities (passive accep-
tance). It seems that a passive state tolerated the settlement of non-
Polish and non-Jewish immigrants. If nevertheless permanent immi-
gration did not happen on a larger scale, factors other than repressive
state activities must have been responsible, such as the structure of
employment (in the seasonally unstable building trade, as mobile tra-
ders), seasonal migration traditions, and the absence of a strong, pro-
tective ethnic community. A factor we know very little about is civil so-
ciety, i.e., the reception of migrants other than Jews or Poles.
The Caesura of the First World War
The most important factor affecting immigrant integration, indeed a
major caesura, was the First World War. Most of the Italians left Ger-
many, although even when both countries were at war with each other
(from August 1916), a few thousand stayed on.14 The catastrophic eco-
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nomic situation immediately after the end of the war and the fact that
a new German republic now intervened to protect the domestic work-
force contributed to a radically changed framework. Economic condi-
tions and state intervention ensured that there was very little new im-
migration after 1918.15 For the US, Alba and Nee have suggested that
the absence of ‘new supplies’ weakened the ethnic communities and
encouraged assimilation.16 This may also have been the case in Ger-
many, but thus far very little research has been done on the long-term
development of migrant groups in Germany, and thus only tentative
suggestions are possible.
Among the Italians another movement ‘home’ ensued in the im-
mediate post-war years; in the Rhineland and Westphalia in 1926 only
roughly 6,000 Italians stayed – compared to 26,000 in 1915.17 How-
ever, this smaller community now formed associations; they had their
own newspapers and sometimes even schools. As the development of
social and cultural structures was at least partly linked to a massive in-
tervention of the Italian Fascist state, it is difficult to decide whether it
indicates that bonds with the native country were still strong or that an
Italo-German community was emerging, or both.18 There are indica-
tions that the group that survived the post-First World War crisis con-
tinued to stay but grew little: In Hamburg about 400 Italians were re-
gistered in 1916, while in 1925, 555 Italian citizens lived in the city. As
about half of them indicated German as their mother tongue, this was
in all probability a tiny set of mixed families. Italians numbering ap-
proximately 400 to 500 remained behind in Hamburg during the Nazi
era.19
For the Poles, the founding of a Polish state meant that they now
had to opt for Polish or German citizenship, and if they chose the for-
mer, they had to leave Germany. If they stayed, they were confronted
with a social climate severely affected by the hostilities of the war and
the territorial conflict. Due to the transfer of territories to the new Pol-
ish state and the departure of about two-thirds of the Ruhr Poles, the
Polish minority was now much smaller than before 1914.20 As
Kleßmann has argued, the decision to remain in the Ruhr was equiva-
lent to opting for German citizenship and to some extent accepting as-
similation.21 Still, the population of Weimar Germany included one to
two million ethnic Poles (mostly not in the Ruhr but the eastern re-
gions). It seems that, while before 1914 pressure exercised by the
authorities often had the opposite effects and strengthened a minority
identity, in the long run and given the weakened ethnic communities,
assimilation was the more common consequence. Ethnic communities
were weak economically; they mostly consisted of workers, often at the
bottom end of occupational hierarchies. Political organisations and a
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specific trade union existed but were significantly weakened compared
to pre-1914 times.
With regard to civil society and the labour market, conditions were
extremely adverse.22 Compared to the Kaiserreich, economic competi-
tion now combined with hostility against a Polish ‘enemy’ that had de-
prived Germany of much of ‘its’ territory and with anti-Semitic atti-
tudes towards new immigrants from the east. Italians were seen as
traitors in the war – an accusation revived in and after the Second
World War. While before 1918, social democrats, left liberals, and min-
ority organisations had sometimes jointly opposed the repressive re-
gime, this solidarity had now vanished.
A More Interventionist State
The state during the Weimar period was, in a way, far more interven-
tionist than previously. Klaus J. Bade described the changes as a shift
from a policy of rejection (Abwehrpolitik) to a policy dictated by labour
market considerations. Jochen Oltmer now sees ‘the regulating, con-
trolling, and administrating intervention of the protectionist welfare
state’ at work.23 The development of a systematic labour market policy
(in 1927 the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicher-
ung was founded) and the principle of preference for native workers se-
cured by the trade unions fundamentally changed the character of state
intervention into migration. Control became more comprehensive24
and the economic criteria of regulation were accorded greater weight.
But other factors remained influential: When the Reich’s Minister of
the Interior, Martin Schiele, in 1925 warned of the dangers posed by
the ‘new immigration of elements of foreign descent’ (fremdstämmige
Elemente) and appealed to the government to protect the ‘physical and
moral health of our people’, this illustrates that attitudes toward immi-
gration were strongly influenced by nationalist and racist beliefs.25
Apart from elements of the logic of a welfare state, we can see a na-
tion-state at work, striving to secure the ‘German’ east by means of a
population policy which perceived foreign migrants as a dangerous
flood.
Developments in the late 1920s serve as a reminder that state con-
trol over foreign migration is not always effective. An estimated 60-
70,000 foreign Poles had become settled.26 This was possibly an effect
of the war (during which foreign workers had not been allowed to leave
Germany) as well as of ineffective controls and concessions to econom-
ic needs in the post-war years. In the period 1927-1928, Germany and
Poland agreed to a treaty on agrarian labourers which allowed Ger-
many to force several tens of thousands of Poles to assume a migratory
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seasonal labour scheme.27 It seems that an immigration process had
been at least partly revised. Although one could also argue that, by ex-
empting those who had arrived before 1919, it was already recognised
that residence led to rights.
The development of a welfare state28 and the (initially) increased in-
fluence of the labour movement meant that foreign migrants were
now officially granted equal wages as well as inclusion in the accident
and health insurance schemes. It is doubtful whether these provisions
were implemented.29 The ILO represented a new international agency
that began to influence the conditions of migrant labourers – but
again: probably with little effect. Officially, national minorities were
now granted constitutionally guaranteed rights. Selective discrimina-
tion and the suppression of minority languages were no longer official
state policy; the policy of Germanisation was largely discredited.30 The
minorities policy of the German government was mainly determined
by considerations with regard to German minorities outside the Ger-
man state. As it was the aim to preserve them as separate German enti-
ties, Germany (i.e., in the League of Nations) opposed a policy of as-
similation and supported cultural autonomy for minorities.31 But in
reality, it seems that neither the constitutional provisions nor the com-
mitment to cultural autonomy had any major effects on the living con-
ditions of ethnic minorities in Germany. Representatives of the minori-
ties complained about discrimination, and it seems that on the local le-
vel constitutional rights were obstructed.32
Under the extreme conditions of the Nazi dictatorship, very little
space remained for the development of a distinct ethnic identity, and
widespread assimilation occurred. Little seems to be known about con-
tacts between foreign and forced labourers and co-ethnics in Germany.
And yet, on a small scale, immigrant minorities survived the racial
state. In 1951, in the first statistical survey for the young Federal Re-
public of Germany, figures of 20,680 Italian, 73,483 Dutch and 44,268
Austrian citizens were recorded – many of them probably long-term re-
sidents and German family members of male foreigners.33 We know
very little about their modes of incorporation into German society. As
it seems, longer-term incorporation happened via mixed families and
in border regions where economic and social relations transcended the
nation-state borders (Dutch, Austrians).34
In summary, Germany has a longer-term migratory experience but
incorporation processes over several generations were not the rule and
occurred mainly among ethnic Poles, in mixed families, and in border
regions. Economic conditions, the impact of two wars and state inter-
vention combined to prevent or disrupt trends towards immigrant set-
tlement. Those who hung on were faced with the strong assimilationist
pressures of an increasingly nationalist society in the Weimar Republic
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and of the racist and violently oppressive Nazi regime. Given this back-
ground, it is astonishing that Polish life did reappear after 1945 – de-
monstrating the persistence of ethnic identities.35
Eingliederung versus Einschmelzung: Policy Orientations after
1949
In post-Nazi Germany, the West German authorities had to quickly
adopt a position with regard to the incorporation of foreigners. Several
hundred thousand of the former forced labourers and concentration
camp inmates remained in the country. Like recognised refugees, the
former Displaced Persons – now called Heimatlose Ausländer – due to
the intervention of the Allies enjoyed a legal status close to that of Ger-
man citizens. Political intervention, or in Hammar’s terms ‘immigrant
policy’, focussed on the dissolution of the camps and support for hous-
ing as well as economic activities (partly subsidised by UN funds). Ad-
ditionally, specific attention was paid to helping the refugees practice
and retain their cultures, educational systems, and ‘their ethnicity’
(‘Volkstum schlechthin’). Eingliederung/integration was the aim, not as-
similation/Einschmelzung. In 1968, for example, federal and regional
states made about 3.9 million marks available for this purpose.36 This
policy promoting the ethnicity of refugees and former DPs was even-
tually discontinued. It had been motivated by the assumption that
some groups would return to their homelands, but also by concepts
which linked the integrity of the individual to his or her Volkstum. This
attitude was influenced by principles of inter-war minorities policy as
well as by quasi-biological conceptions of the Volk (and by Cold War
politics). As regards the effects of state intervention, we are so far pret-
ty much in the dark as no detailed studies seem to exist of, for exam-
ple, the Ukrainians, Croats, or Hungarians in West Germany.
Policy towards the so-called guest workers lacked a clear objective.
While unquestionably foreign recruitment was initially seen as a short-
term measure and immigration was not intended, it is not true that
the German government pursued a consequent anti-integration policy.
Rather, policies were shaped by conflicting aims and interests.
In the early decades of foreign recruitment the attitude of the autho-
rities was marked by a fairly authoritarian stance. The state was seen
as legitimately claiming control over the movement and residence of
foreigners as well as many aspects of their social behaviour. Rarely do
the files in the archives contain any hint of doubts as to the legitimacy
of state intervention into the lives of foreign individuals. Officials confi-
dently assumed that it was their duty not only to protect the health and
security of the German people, but also to intervene in decisions of for-
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eigners on the size and shape of their families. This meant no ex-
tended families and penalising for instance ‘deviant’ sexual behaviour,
which could lead to expulsion because of a sexual relationship with a
married woman or a person of the same sex.
Contrary to, for instance, the British state with its liberal attitude to
individual freedom, the West German state perceived it as its task to
supervise the Eingliederung (incorporation) of the foreign migrants. Ein-
gliederungspolitik in the 1950s and 1960s had a paternalistic and a re-
pressive side. One of its instruments was the suppression of noncon-
formist behaviour. Thus leaders of strikes were expelled. Counselling
services provided help but also served the interests of political and so-
cial control. Remember that this was the Cold War period and that the
fear of communist infiltration was omnipresent. Immigrant policy be-
fore 1970 remained very limited and under-funded. It consisted of
minor subsidies for the employment of social workers by welfare orga-
nisations and for activities like ‘leisure centres’. Housing conditions
were partly regulated (only employers’ hostels for officially recruited
workers), but active measures for their improvement remained largely
symbolic. After 1 June 1966, the children of foreign workers were ob-
liged to attend regular schools, but it took some time until they actually
did.
Nothing was done to promote the ethnic identities of migrants, and
interventions into the often miserable housing conditions remained lar-
gely symbolic. But it is wrong to assume that, because of a rotation pol-
icy, ‘integration other than on the labour market was not a goal of gov-
ernmental policies.’37 Apart from the fact that rotation was never de-
signed or implemented as a policy, due to a number of considerations
the government was interested in a certain degree of integration and
prevented from implementing a consequent anti-settlement policy. Sev-
eral factors influenced this attitude and de facto policies: Compared to
pre-war times, the sending countries now exercised a considerable in-
fluence on their citizens’ living conditions. Italy in particular, with the
confidence of an essential partner in the process of European integra-
tion, demanded decent housing conditions and rights to family re-
union for its citizens. Within the European Economic Community
rights to equal treatment of workers and family reunion were imple-
mented. Furthermore, West Germany was sensitive to criticism from
abroad and anxious to prove that nothing linked its migration policy to
the racist exploitations of the Nazi regime. The international context
and foreign-policy considerations became a major influence on migra-
tion policy.
An example from the mid-1960s can serve to illustrate how complex
aims influenced state policies towards the modes of incorporation of
foreign migrants. In 1963-4, when labour migration was increasingly
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perceived as a longer-term phenomenon, housing minister Lücke de-
manded that the Cabinet make decisions on the future place of foreign
migrants in German society.38 Shortly before, in his role as president
of the Katholikentag, Lücke had proposed concentrating the guest work-
ers in centres for the different nationalities, and he now renewed his
proposal of closed settlements with churches, schools etc., i.e., a sys-
tematic segregation of the migrant population which, as he claimed,
would help protect the migrants’ cultural integrity. But, in spite of a la-
bour recruitment policy which assumed the return of most labour mi-
grants, the response to these proposals was uniformly negative: Repre-
sentatives of both the churches and of other government ministries ar-
gued that a separate and concentrated settlement of the foreign
workers was not desired; ghettos (sic) would hinder their integration
and raise concerns with regard to internal security. As they insisted,
the aim should be integration – which was explicitly distinguished
from assimilation and involved the retention of migrants’ languages
and Volkstum, but not by means segregation.39 Family reunion was
partly welcomed as men without their families were seen as a particu-
larly explosive potential and the Church feared extra-marital relations
and a decline of mores. Thus a number of considerations worked
against a consequent exclusionary policy.
Altogether, the ‘negative’ interventions of the state remained more
important than the ‘positive’. By controlling access to the country and
the labour market, the West German state influenced migration and
settlement patterns. Until the surge of asylum migration, the state
more or less effectively shaped the composition of the immigrant po-
pulation by largely keeping out Africans and Asians.40 Naturalisation
was not impossible but barriers remained high. Residence permits and
further restrictions channelled economic activities into dependent em-
ployment, as access to self-employment and the professions was re-
stricted. And yet, already in the 1960s, authorities were partly unable,
and partly unwilling, to prevent the permanent settlement of immi-
grants. In autumn 1973, of 3,856,000 registered foreign citizens
877,000 (ca. 23%) had entered the Federal Republic eight or more
years ago – already then, settlement processes were far advanced.41 The
reasons why an effective anti-immigration policy was not implemented
were manifold; they include economic interests, EEC provisions as well
as – most importantly – foreign policy considerations. Rights accorded
by the welfare state or the intervention of the courts were initially (be-
fore the mid-1970s) not decisive.42 The government repeatedly decided
not to use instruments that were in principle at its disposal. Thus, if it
did not passively accept permanent immigration and full integration, it
did not effectively prevent it.
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Integration Policy under Social Democratic Hegemony
With regard to the development of the welfare state, and more gener-
ally state intervention, the late 1960s and early 1970s mark an impor-
tant stage. As is widely assumed, in this period the relationship be-
tween state and society changed fundamentally.43 Economy and society
were now to be shaped from above, at least this was the idea. Labour
market policy was redefined as an active, preventative intervention, and
the governing Social Democrats (Willy Brandt had become Chancellor
in 1969) wanted to create a fairer society. Additionally, the interaction
of central and regional states as well as of state and civil society organi-
sations changed and the network-state began to emerge.
Migration policy was not included in attempts to plan and con-
sciously shape societal developments. But the changed framework af-
fected immigrant policy in two ways: Firstly, the quantitative expansion
of state activities and the welfare budget was reflected in growing
funds. The budget for counselling services, and other activities related
to labour migration, multiplied in the early 1970s.44 Secondly, the ideal
of a more democratic and humane society proclaimed by the Social De-
mocrats, as well as the new ‘spirit of the times’, made it difficult for po-
liticians to appear indifferent towards the often miserable living condi-
tions of migrant families and in favour of their forced return. Civil so-
ciety was, in the early 1970s, ahead of the political elites, and for a
couple of years conditions were favourable for integration. Racism and
discrimination were now widely rejected – while the situation in the
1960s can be described as that of a ‘contained conflict’, i.e., a situation
in which a significant conflict potential existed but was held in check
due to the need to prove West Germany’s character as a democratic na-
tion.
Nevertheless, the objectives of the government’s Eingliederungspolitik
did not change substantially.45 Labour Minister Arendt’s political task
was to provide help in order to enable the foreign workers ‘to settle in
quickly and smoothly’. Integration measures were meant ‘to prevent
isolation and ghettoisation and to reduce tensions and prejudices’.46 In
1971, Arendt declared that the integration of the foreign workers had
overall been successfully achieved, although with regard to housing
and schooling a few problems remained.47 Emphasis was placed on de-
veloping local co-ordination bodies, on language teaching, education
more generally, and on publicity aiming to increase the acceptance of
foreigners as co-citizens with – as was claimed – equal rights (gleichbe-
rechtigte Mitbürger).48 Eingliederungspolitik was explicitly not aimed at
naturalisation – but it also refrained from propagating limited integra-
tion for temporary residents, rather it was claimed that, in all impor-
tant aspects, equality was granted.
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In 1972, the government decided that it wanted to limit, or possibly
reduce, the migrant population in the Federal Republic, and obviously
this decision – together with the subsequent economic crisis – funda-
mentally changed the framework for integration processes. Indeed,
scholarly attention has since then largely focussed on the exclusionary
strategies of the state, the emphasis placed on a solely temporary pre-
sence of migrant labourers, and the denial of incorporation into the
community of citizens. The German state is mainly seen in its role as
guardian and gatekeeper. And of course the demonstrated rejection of
the immigrants’ presence, the high barriers to an acquisition of Ger-
man citizenship, restricted access to the labour market for family
members, programs promoting return, as well as hostility and racism
in German society represent exclusionary policies and attitudes. Due to
the ’official interpretation of German foreigners policy as mainly a pol-
icy for the regulation of entry and stay, moves towards a policy aiming
at integration have remained sporadic’, Esser and Korte concluded in
1985. And, as they further suggested: ‘Because the aims of immigrant
policy in the FRG are contradictory and uncoordinated, one cannot ex-
pect success from the measures taken’.49
Prevented or Promoted Integration: Conflicting Views on Policy
Outcomes
This had long been the accepted picture, and consequently, detailed in-
vestigations of immigrant policy have not enjoyed great popularity.50
Recently, however, established views have increasingly been considered
unsatisfactory. Among social scientists, the common juxtaposition of
different national models of either incorporation or exclusion is now
frequently criticised as too harsh or at least as no longer valid.51 As has
been pointed out, most European countries of settlement adopted mea-
sures to counter educational disadvantages, to improve labour market
integration, to mediate in conflicts and to improve the social situation
in urban concentrations of immigrant settlement. In spite of the re-
cruitment stop of November 1973 and the attempt to reduce the immi-
grant population, the integration budget of the West German state
rose continuously until the mid-1980s (an overview of the Labour Min-
istry’s budget for integration measures gives a figure of 15 million
marks in 1973, 30.7 million in 1978, 63 million in 1982 and at its peak
89.7 million in 1985).52 In 1998, the Federal Labour Ministry’s budget
(for counselling services, language courses, and other projects) was
about 86 million marks. The direct integration measures are financed
by several federal ministries, by the regional states (the Länder), the lo-
cal authorities, as well as welfare organisations (and partly the EU),
88 KAREN SCHÖNWÄLDER
and are only one part of the overall efforts.53 Behind the screen of an
endlessly repeated ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’, Klaus J.
Bade and Michael Bommes claim, a pragmatic policy of integration
was implemented which contributed to a fairly advanced process of in-
tegration.54 But – as they further note – the achievements of integra-
tion were not recognised in the public debate. By focussing on criti-
cism of the stubborn anti-immigration policy of successive West Ger-
man governments, researchers and the wider public had been
distracted from realising how advanced integration processes in fact
were.
It is extremely difficult to assess the effects of specific political inter-
ventions and to decide whether the claims are true. The recently com-
pleted European Effnatis project claims that it, for the first time, ‘em-
pirically compares the integration of [children of international mi-
grants] in a European way and thus allows [it] to test the ‘‘efficacy’’ of
different national modes of integration of migrants’.55 It arrived at the
conclusion that national patterns do matter but only in some respects:
‘In the area of structural integration (education, training, employment)
there is no systematic pattern of national differences.’56 And further it
states that ‘Germany with an ambiguous policy in the past has
strengths in training and employment, but weaknesses in education,
legal integration, and identificational integration’.57 It seems that the
reference to ‘national modes’ of integration, and this means to the ex-
clusionary stance of the German state, helps to explain only some as-
pects of immigrants’ modes of incorporation into West German so-
ciety.
There is now one line of interpretation that emphasises the exclu-
sionary stance of the German state and society as expressed in the
(pre-1999) citizenship law, and tends to assume that the exclusionary
logic was and is in many ways effective – and that where this was not
the case, inclusion was achieved ‘against the state’. Jeroen Doomernik,
in a recent study for the ILO, suggested that the ‘relatively poor inte-
gration into the labour market of the second generation [Turks] is re-
lated to at least the following two factors: the immigrants’ legal posi-
tion and implicit and explicit discrimination. The legal ambivalence in
which many immigrants and even their children find themselves, pre-
vents them from making unequivocal choices.’ But he also admitted
that ‘we have not been able to unequivocally establish precisely how ef-
fective efforts to integrate immigrants and their descendants on the la-
bour market and into the educational system have until now been.’58
A competing approach tends to point out that there is also a logic
working towards integration, a logic which is mainly attributed to the
welfare state, and sometimes to the character of the liberal state. Be-
sides the exclusionist citizenship-model, another ‘national model’
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seems to have been at work, namely ‘German Capitalism’ with its em-
phasis on an integrative course and a strong welfare state. Additionally,
the federal state and plural welfare-state structure allowed different
strategies to be pursued at the same time.
Baker and Lenhardt were already in 1988 arguing that the educa-
tional sector in West Germany was marked by ‘far-reaching tendencies
towards integration’; they even described it as the ‘vanguard of the inte-
gration of foreigners’. In spite of the existence of integrationist as well
as exclusionary aims, powerful practical constraints ensured that the
respective structures and effects did not emerge.59 Similarly, the recent
PISA study, although highlighting severe disadvantages youths with a
migration backgrounds faced, did not show that more exclusionary and
more integrationist stances in the regional states were systematically
related to educational disadvantages. Nevertheless, the situation with
regard to employment and education is extremely worrying. For several
years experts consistently reported progress, i.e., a better formal educa-
tion and improving positions in the labour market of second genera-
tion immigrants. More recently, however, developments are marked by
stagnation and even a reversal of the positive trend.60 This can hardly
be explained by the citizenship policy, but it also leaves us to wonder
about the integrative effects of the education system. With regard to
employment, the worsening situation is probably caused by a mixture
of economic transformations with the effects of discrimination. As lan-
guage and formal qualifications have become more important, in a si-
tuation when labour is scarce, discriminatory selection is more likely.
Developments in education are more difficult to explain, in particular
concerning the Italians who, in spite of a strong legal position and a re-
latively favourable societal reception, do not perform well.61
The New Integration Policy
A new integration policy is currently being designed and implemented.
It can be seen as representing a third phase of German immigrant pol-
icy. It continues to be a basic assumption – which partly reflects Ger-
man political culture – that it is the state’s task to intervene into pro-
cesses of the incorporation of immigrants into German society.
In the first phase (1950s-1960s) intervention was marked by a
strongly authoritarian attitude, and a policy promoting Eingliederung in-
volved mainly conflict-avoidance and the suppression of nonconformist
behaviour.
In a second phase (initiated in the late 1960s), an expanding welfare
state and a more activist social policy became key influences – soon ac-
companied and contradicted by the attempt to, at least partly, revise the
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immigration process. The co-existence of inclusive and exclusive poli-
cies was characteristic for this phase, and policy interventions had inte-
grative as well as exclusive effects.
Since the early 1990s and, in particular, during the governing coali-
tion of Social Democrats and the Green Party, government policy was
based on an acceptance of past immigration. As Germany’s citizenship
law was reformed, the objective of ‘integration’ became, at least for
large parts of the immigrant population, a policy that was no longer
contradicted by the denial of permanent immigration and the often in-
secure legal status of the migrants. If it is true that thus far the hostile
attitude expressed mainly by the restrictive provisions on naturalisation
constituted the major determinant of incorporation processes the situa-
tion has been transformed. Government policy now officially aims at a
permanent and full incorporation into German society of those mi-
grants ‘who permanently live with us and who accept our constitu-
tional values’.62 As this quotation illustrates, the acceptance of perma-
nent immigration and full incorporation has been accompanied by the
introduction of a clearer dividing line between those to be included
and those who shall be excluded.63
Various migrant groups, such as ethnic Germans, refugees and la-
bour migrants, are now perceived as having major problems integrat-
ing. Previously separate integration programmes will be merged and
targeted at all migrants. Unfortunately, no research exists thus far that
would allow us to assess how this will work out for these very different
categories of migrants. The government is responding to a perceived
heterogeneity and lack of planning by proposing a more systematic
and co-ordinated intervention. A new federal agency has been assigned
the task to develop, in co-operation with the federal states and the local
authorities, a comprehensive integration concept. So far, no such com-
prehensive integration policy or administrative structures exist. Accord-
ing to a government-appointed Zuwanderungskommission, ‘pragmatic
improvisation’ was the everyday reality, and ‘short-term requirements
and considerations that covered only a few points determined deci-
sions’.64
The meaning of ‘integration’ as the goal of government policy has
changed. The new integration policies represent a heightened concern
for developing and facilitating a shared cultural basis for participation
amongst recent as well as established migrants and refugees, i.e., a
new emphasis on the cultural and identificational aspects of integra-
tion. Intensified political efforts respond to social and educational dis-
advantages but they are also motivated by new (communitarian-style)
worries about the overall integration of modern societies, or, more spe-
cifically, fears of Islamic fundamentalism. In a way, expectations with
regard to the ability of the state to shape political attitudes and outlooks
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have grown. But at the same time, the meaning of ‘integration’ re-
mains controversial. When the Federal Government’s Commissioner
for Foreigners Affairs defines integration as a ‘permanent process of
consensus-building about the common fundaments and rules of co-ex-
istence in a community’, a process that involves society as a whole, this
is a Habermasian (or Kymlicka-style), communication-oriented concept.
Equal chances and participation as well as the absence of discrimina-
tion are now strongly emphasised.65 But there is also the responsible
Interior Minister’s voice who claims that ‘the best integration is assimi-
lation’.66 It seems unclear what objectives government policy will try to
fulfil. But this is no novelty.
As the government’s commissioner for foreigners’ affairs knows, in-
tegration depends on many factors, some of which cannot be con-
trolled and planned by the state.67 Still, the new approach reflects a re-
newed confidence in the ability to steer social developments at a time
when the call for a new, more reticent role for the state seems to be al-
most universal.68 Political science analyses of the development of the
state in the last few decades assume that not only the external but the
internal sovereignty of the state has eroded and a hierarchical top-down
relationship between the state and the different spheres of society no
longer exists. The state now operates in an increasingly dense network
of transnational as well as internal dependencies and structures of ne-
gotiation.69 While the ability of the nation-state to control migration
processes has recently been hotly debated, the consequences of a chan-
ging state structure and transnationalisation on immigrant policy re-
main largely unexplored. Additionally, the reshaping of welfare states
and the reduced expenditures on social policy measures could diminish
the integrative effects of policy interventions, at a time when the expec-
tations with regard to state-encouraged integration are growing.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the extreme ruptures in German
history largely deprived us of the opportunity to compare second-gen-
eration incorporation processes ‘then and now’ – at least if a compari-
son of developments in Germany is intended. Historians should how-
ever feel encouraged to fill some of the research gaps concerning the
modes of incorporation of those small migrant groups who became
settled and of mixed families.
In a longer-term historical perspective, change rather than continuity
marks the framework for immigrant incorporation. While the character
and role of the state underwent major transformations, the question of
whether ‘the power of the state to control immigration and to enable
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or block integration has increased’70 cannot be answered with an un-
equivocal ‘yes’. State intervention today certainly encompasses more as-
pects of life than in the 1890s or the 1920s, and demands on the state
have increased. But at the same time, restrictions arising from indivi-
dual and social rights, the democratic and social character of the Feder-
al Republic’s constitution, international connections and obligations, as
well as the involvement of a set of actors in the field, have ensured that
overall the ability of the state to enable or control integration has been
reduced. Still, the various modes of incorporation of different groups
of migrants, and the weight of the different factors shaping them, in-
cluding the state, are thus far not very well understood.71
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32 Kleßmann 1986, 502-503. With reference to the Sorbs, Gerald Stone (1972, 33)
argues that Germanising policies ‘continued unchecked’. Representatives of the
minorities frequently complained about discrimination against Polish Germans, e.g.,
the non-confirmation of elected local councillors or the prevention of land purchases,
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Schönwälder and Sonnenberger 2003.
39 Segregation was seen as a danger as large concentrations of foreigners could pose a
potential threat. Experiences in 1945 had made a deep impression, when forced
labourers were released and suddenly presented a (real or imagined) threat. Of
course, the attitude of the federal government in the 1960s was contradictory as it
tolerated residential segregation.
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‘To Live as Germans Among Germans.’
Immigration and Integration of ‘Ethnic Germans’
in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic
Jochen Oltmer
In 1950, in the aftermath of the Second World War and after flight and
expulsion had come to an end, there were about four million Germans
still living in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. Between
1950 and 1975, a total of about 800,000 Aussiedler (immigrants who
are recognised by the German authorities as being of German descent)
passed through the Western German border transit camps, and
616,000 more arrived between 1976 and 1987. Then, with the opening
of the Iron Curtain, mass immigration of the Aussiedler began. Against
the background of ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ in the USSR, their num-
bers increased rapidly from 1987 onwards. During the next nearly two
decades, three million Aussiedler entered the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. In all, more than four million migrants of officially recognised
German descent emigrated to Germany during the second half of the
20th century.1
In comparison, ‘ethnic German’ immigration during the German
Empire and the Weimar Republic amounted to only several tens of
thousands of people who, moreover, to a considerable extent returned
to their countries of origin or continued to migrate overseas. The ‘remi-
gration’ of ‘Germans of foreign citizenship’ since the late 19th century
constitutes the background of today’s influx of Aussiedler, a phenomen-
on that, since the beginning of the 1990s, has been increasingly con-
tentious.2 The following comments will first discuss manifestations
and structural patterns of ‘ethnic German’ immigration between the
1880s and 1930s. Then the focus will turn to the perception within
Germany of ‘ethnic German’ immigration and to the integration – or, if
applicable, non-integration – of the group under consideration, taking
into account the fundamental changes occurring after the First World
War in Germany’s political and economic situation.
‘Remigration’ of Russian-German Settlers in the Empire and
Promotion of ‘Germanness’ in the Prussian East
From the late 19th century onwards, a large number of German settlers
from East, East Central and Southeastern Europe had continued to mi-
grate. Many of those German colonists, for example, who, during the
late 18th and early 19th centuries, had settled in tsarist Russia since the
1870s, moved on to the United States, South America, Canada, and
Australia. This was due to the Russian government’s gradually withdra-
wal, since the 1860s, of important privileges and increasing the pres-
sure on the German settlers to assimilate by pursuing a policy of Rus-
sification. Moreover, economic development was impeded by a lack of
arable land. The first Russian census of 1897 registered a total ‘‘Ger-
man mother tongue’’ population of 1.8 million people.3 Between 1870
and 1914, Russian-German emigration to the US alone amounted to
116,000. The majority of emigrants left Russia after the turn of the
century.4
The exodus of ‘ethnic Germans’ from their settlements in East, East
Central and Southeastern Europe to Germany began in the 1890s. The
financially well endowed but politically contentious ‘settlement law’
(Ansiedlungsgesetz) of April 26, 1886, enabled the Prussian government
to buy up Polish real estate in the Prussian provinces of Posen and
West Prussia for the purpose of German peasant settlement. With the
number of domestic applicants declining, the ‘Royal Commission for
Settlement in the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia’ (Königliche An-
siedlungskommission für die Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen), began,
especially since the turn of the century, to win over German colonists
from abroad, mainly from tsarist Russia. The result fell far short of the
high expectations. Between 1888 and 1914, 21,683 families came to set-
tle in the provinces, of which about one-quarter, 5,480 families, came
from abroad. Of these foreign Germans, most of them came from Rus-
sia (4,900), and, to a lesser extent, from Galicia (500) and Hungary
(80). Most of the settlers of German descent from Russia came from
Russian Poland (3,540 families), the rest mainly from Volynia. As the
Commission’s efforts to attract ‘ethnic German’ colonists were most
pronounced after 1900,5 the percentage of foreign settlers continued to
be disproportionately high throughout the one and a half decades pre-
ceding the First World War. Their proportion peaked in 1905, with
41.9%.
Apart from the self-employed Russian-German peasant settlers, there
was a larger group of colonists, namely, the farm workers called to
work on the estates of the Prussian East. Again, the intention was to
displace the Poles, but in this case the measure was not directed
against Prussian citizens of Polish nationality, but against those Polish
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migrant farm workers from Russian Central Poland and Austro-Hun-
garian Galicia who poured into Prussian agriculture in the hundreds of
thousands each year.6 The Berlin ‘Society for the Welfare of German
Remigrants’ (Fürsorgeverein für deutsche Rückwanderer), founded in
1909 with substantial support from Prussian authorities, brought a to-
tal of about 26,000 Russian Germans to Germany during the six years
prior to the First World War. About two thirds of them came from Voly-
nia.7 However, the number of Russian-German farm workers remained
considerably lower than that of foreign Polish farm workers. In 1909,
216,000 of the latter entered Prussia, and until 1914 their annual
number had risen to about 251,000.8
The purpose of persuading ‘ethnic Germans’ to return was clearly
stated. They were expected to alleviate the effects of the rural exodus
from the East Elbian agricultural region, to take the place of unwel-
come Polish foreign seasonal workers,9 and ‘‘to lay new foundations
for the patriarchal relations between estate owners and workforce that
are so frequently lacking today’’. Moreover, the recruitment of Russian-
German farm workers was supposed to be instrumental in stabilising
the Empire’s domestic political situation. ‘‘We must not forget that the
social-democratic party is making every effort to turn the lack of farm
workers into a permanent phenomenon. Lately the party’s agents have
been particularly organised to stir up the foreign seasonal farm work-
ers. Through an appropriate handling of the returning German mi-
grants, these efforts can be effectively contained’’.10
Advertising for the remigration of ‘ethnic Germans’, a measure sup-
ported especially by the extremely nationalist Pan-German League (All-
deutscher Verband), it was also pointed out that Russian-German immi-
grant families were very large. This was considered a clear advantage
for the aim of displacing the Poles. It had the additional benefit of sup-
plying the Prussian army with a considerable number of recruits who
otherwise would have had to serve in foreign armies.11 Alfred Borch-
ardt, founder and head of the Society for the Welfare of German Remi-
grants and former expert for agriculture at the German embassy in St
Petersburg, concisely summarised the benefits of employing Russian-
German farm workers: ‘‘The advantages are the unspoilt nature of Ger-
man ethnicity, the firmness of faith, the patriarchal family life, the
deep-rooted love for country life and the abundant offspring’’.12
In a report to Emperor Wilhelm II, the Chief President of the pro-
vince of Posen gave an account of the early recruitment measures in
Russia. The state government, he wrote, had indeed increased its re-
cruitment efforts in Russia since the 1890s, but, fearing foreign-policy
complications because of the Russian ban on recruitment and emigra-
tion, only ‘‘on condition that the agitation was pursued with the utmost
caution, appearing as a merely private matter and avoiding any impres-
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sion whatsoever of being connected to the Commission for Settle-
ment.’’ Since 1901, the report continued, thousands of leaflets had
been distributed in German settlements with the help of emigration
agents, and, at the same time, with the support of the Pan-German
League, addresses had been collected: ‘‘The leaflets bore cover ad-
dresses mostly from Russian territory, to avoid attracting the attention
of the Russian authorities’’. The Chief President of Posen, Wilhelm
von Waldow, stressed that the recruitment measures of the Commis-
sion for Settlement had indeed been successful, and that its leaflet had
aroused the ‘ethnic German’ colonists’ ‘‘yearning for their ancient Ger-
man home country’’ where they could ‘‘live as Germans among Ger-
mans’’.13
The head of the Welfare Society emphasised that the society was also
only able to work in Russia ‘‘in secret’’ and, moreover, had frequently
had to take care of illegal border crossings of ‘ethnic German remi-
grants’: ‘‘In order to reach the mother country, they had to risk their
lives … seeking to secretly cross the border. Usually this had the most
inconvenient consequence of forfeiting any possibility whatsoever to re-
turn to their previous home country with impunity.’’14
Russian-German ‘Remigrants’ in the Strategy of German Warfare
during the First World War
The emigration and remigration of the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries did not endanger the existence of German settlements in East, East
Central and Southeastern Europe. It was the European ‘‘new Thirty
Years’ War’’ (Hans-Ulrich Wehler) – 1914-1945 – and its consequences
led to the destruction of most of the main areas of German settlement
in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. In the course of the
First World War and in its aftermath, millions of people all over Europe
lost their homes temporarily or once and for all. In tsarist Russia, the
advance of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies soon led to the
flight, expulsion, evacuation, and displacement of millions of people
from the border areas and war zones of the Russian West. Russian-Ger-
mans were among the victims, and ten thousands of them were trans-
ported East, especially from Volynia. In addition to being evacuated,
Russian-Germans were also subject to displacement, because the tsarist
government considered them as constituting a ‘fifth column’ that could
not be tolerated behind one’s own frontlines.
The settlement of Germans in Volynia was most severely affected by
the direct effects of war and the consequences of displacement. After it
was annexed by German and Austro-Hungarian troops, the region be-
came the centre of the emigration of colonists to Germany. The Society
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for the Welfare of German Remigrants brought about 60,000 Russian-
Germans into the Empire during the First World War. Among them,
30,000 came from Volynia, and about 25,000 of these were mostly
sent to work in East Prussian agricultural sector. Most colonists came
to the Empire after 1916. Of the 33,429 ‘remigrating’ Germans who
were brought to Germany by the Welfare Society until April 30, 1917,
24,102 entered after May 1, 1916. 23,357 people, about two thirds of the
approximately 33,000 ‘remigrating’ Germans who arrived in the Em-
pire until the end of April 1917, were able, with the help of the Welfare
Society, to find employment.15
Contrary to the Welfare Society’s assertions, the immigration of Rus-
sian-German colonists to the Empire during the First World War was
not primarily about humanitarian aid. The main objective was rather
the targeted recruitment of workers in order to alleviate the manpower
shortage in Germany effected by the war. As the German economist
Karl C. Thalheim wrote in retrospect in 1926, the efforts were aimed
at compensating ‘‘for the loss of lives during the war without resorting
to workers of foreign origin’’ and at fortifying newly conquered areas
with settlers who were considered reliable. ‘‘The return of German pea-
sants settling in South Russia and at the Volga was seen to be an op-
portunity for this purpose’’.16 Thalheim’s assessment points to two
strands of discussion that were prominent during the First World War
and also influenced the debate in the post-war era. The first consisted
in considerations concerning the opportunities and benefits of ‘remi-
gration’ to the Empire, focusing on potentials for development after the
(winning of the) war. Second, the ‘remigration’ of ‘ethnic Germans’
mainly from Russia was of concern regarding war aims in general as
well as the specific question of population policy in the areas to be an-
nexed.
During the first year of the war, ‘remigration’ was already intensely
being discussed in connection with plans for annexation and the in-
tended establishment of a ‘border strip’ in the East. The area desig-
nated for annexation was the Russian territory along the Prussian bor-
der from Eastern Prussia in the North down to Silesia in the South. It
seemed particularly suited for this purpose from the perspective of
military, economic, but also ethno-national considerations. Continuing
the policy of settlement in the Prussian East, the annexation was con-
sidered to serve its strategic purposes only if supplemented with a pol-
icy of settlement17 – by creating ‘‘a secure German bulwark through co-
lonisation’’.18
The first measures of a settlement policy were discussed as early as
mid-1915. They were aimed at ‘Germanising’ the ‘border strip’. In this
context, the government authorities mentioned Russian-German colo-
nists for the first time, intending them to play an important role in the
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project.19 This issue was then discussed at the beginning of 1917 by
the relevant departments in Prussia and the Empire, by the supreme
command (Oberste Heeresleitung) and the command of the German
forces in the East (Oberkommando Ost). It was planned to dispossess
the ‘‘Russian-orthodox owners’’, who after the annexation would be
‘‘excluded from acquiring German citizenship’’ anyway. The Russian
state was supposed to compensate them.20 Thus, all of the involved de-
partments agreed without reservation to the aim of annexing a strip of
land along Prussia’s Eastern border as a ‘frontier fortification’ where
the resident population was to be ‘resettled’ and ‘Germanisation’ was to
be achieved by colonists ‘of German descent’ from Russia.21
When German and Austro-Hungarian troops advanced more force-
fully in 1917 and at the beginning of 1918, a far-reaching German pol-
icy of annexation in East Central and East Europe appeared increas-
ingly realistic. On May 2, 1918, a conference was held to regulate eth-
no-nationally motivated privileges for Russian-German ‘remigration’. It
was decided to ‘‘establish an organisation and enable it … to meet all
demands’’. An organisation working within the framework of ethno-na-
tionally oriented migration control was seen to have a variety of tasks
to fulfil. It should increase the ‘ethnic Germans’’ willingness to ‘remi-
grate’, register those ready to ‘remigrate’ according to their number,
qualifications and means, select suitable candidates in their countries
of origin and take them to the Empire, considering the Empire’s capa-
city to admit immigrants with respect to economic, social, and security
matters. Moreover, it was supposed to help with liquidating the posses-
sions of those willing to leave. The organisation was expected to intro-
duce measures in the Empire to accompany and support integration,
namely, to organise the ‘remigration’, provide refugee camps and re-
cord employment and settlements.
In accordance with the results of the conference, the ‘Office for Ger-
man Return Migration and Emigration’ (Reichsstelle für deutsche Rück-
wanderung und Auswanderung) was officially established on May 29,
1918. The director later described the motivation for its formation as ly-
ing in ‘‘the necessity to ensure that this large quantity of valuable Ger-
manness does not pour over Germany haphazardly’’. The issue was ‘‘to
create a central authority in the Empire to systematically direct and
control the flood of migrants.’’22 Thus the primary aim was not to ‘res-
cue’ Russian-German colonists from their war-inflicted predicament,
but the ethno-nationally motivated search for manpower and settlers.
The establishment of the Migration Office therefore resulted from eth-
no-national and demographic considerations with the objective of com-
pensating for the consequences of war by way of migration control. For
this reason the department was vested with the responsibility for ‘remi-
gration’ as well as for emigration from Germany. All areas of responsi-
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bility in connection with the latter were, however, deferred because of
the war. Thus the department initially served as an organisation purely
for ‘remigrants’ with the purpose of preparing the ‘remigration’ after
the general peace agreement.23 Despite all of the feelings of pity ex-
pressed by the authorities and the public for the Russian-Germans’ pre-
dicament, the main aim during the war was to persuade them to re-
main in their areas of settlement.24 At the same time, the authorities
sought to retain the possibility of motivating them to ‘return’ to Ger-
many when the country had enlarged its territory after winning the
war.
The establishment of the Migration Office took place at the height of
the German policy of annexation, at a time when the supreme com-
mand had taken full charge of that issue. This is also shown by the
‘Memorandum on the Polish Border Strip’ (Denkschrift über den pol-
nischen Grenzstreifen) of July 5, 1918. It summarised all of the military,
economic and ethno-national arguments for the far-reaching extension
of the border towards the East that was necessary from the supreme
command’s point of view. General Erich Ludendorff’s memorandum
also set the standards for the question of ‘remigration’ and the respon-
sibilities of the Migration Office. ‘‘For the years after the war, we have
to reckon with a stream of returning German migrants, and it is …
completely up to the Empire’s authorities to control this stream accord-
ing to the interests of the German Empire. … The number of Germans
determined to return to Germany from Russia alone is estimated at 1
½ million = 300,000 families … All of these returning migrants will
have to be made room for. For this purpose neither the small areas in
the Empire remaining for settlement nor the newly acquired parts of
the Baltics and Lithuania will suffice. This is another reason for the ne-
cessity of obtaining the border strip.’’25
‘Remigration’ as a Threat to German Post-War Society and the
Minority Policy
With the defeat of the Reich in 1918, the implementation of the plans
for Russian-German ‘remigration’ that had been developed during the
last year of the war was rendered impossible. In May 1919, the Migra-
tion Office pointed out that ‘‘from the utilitarian point of view of Ger-
man politics … considering the present political circumstances’’ there
was no alternative to the colonists than remaining in their areas, ‘‘as
before, as Ukrainian or Russian citizens’’. This was seen as promising
the ‘‘preservation of Germanness there’’. The Migration Office, more-
over, saw no possibility for Germany to force ‘remigration’.26 The de-
partment reached an unambiguous conclusion concerning the future
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policy towards those Russian-Germans who had come or been lured to
Germany during the war. It stated ‘‘an urgent need … to encourage as
much as possible the return of refugees to their countries of origin’’.
This was not a new assessment, as such a policy of encouraging the
Russian-Germans who had immigrated into the Reich during the war
to return had already been pursued since the end of war in 1918. It
aimed at alleviating the tense situation on the German labour and
housing markets through the outflow of people who were ‘‘entirely des-
titute’’ and partly ‘‘long-term recipients of public welfare’’.27
During the five years of turmoil during the Russian revolution, Ger-
man occupation and Russian civil war 1917-1921/22, an estimated
roughly 120,000 Russian-Germans were able to leave their areas of set-
tlement for Germany. Almost all of them arrived in the course of the
war or during the retreat of German troops from the territories of the
former Russian Empire. For about half of them, Germany was merely
a stopover on their way to the United States, South America, or Cana-
da.28 In the Weimar Republic, the discussion on ‘returning’ Russian-
Germans was largely superseded by the economic and social problems
of a post-war society in which demographic considerations and mea-
sures raised during the world war became increasingly insignificant.
Only occasionally was the question of the appropriate policy towards
‘remigrants’ raised in the press, the political debate, or in administra-
tive provisions. Russian-German ‘remigrants’ and their role in the Ger-
man migration policy of the early Weimar Republic were mainly dis-
cussed in 1921-22 and 1929-30.
According to estimates from the 1990s, Russia during the years of
revolution and civil war, 1917-1922, suffered heavy losses in population,
amounting to some 13 million people in all. As stated by the same
source, 2.5 million of them died fighting for one of the armed units of
the parties involved; 1.5 to 2 million emigrated; 2 million died of epi-
demic diseases; 1 million fell victim to terrorist attacks and banditry;
about 300,000 lost their lives in pogroms against Jews. The majority,
however, more than 5 million people, died in the famine of 1921-22.29
Among them were numerous Russian-Germans. According to esti-
mates and the Soviet census of 1926, the number of Russian-Germans
declined from 1.621 million at the end of 1918 to 1.238 million at the
end of 1926. Taking into account the statistically probable growth in
population, also including gaps in the birthrate, the Russian-German
population decreased by 588,000 in a mere eight years. The reasons
named for the decline of the total population 1917-1922 also apply to
Russian-Germans. Their decrease can also be attributed mainly to the
famine of 1921-22.
The ‘ethnic German’ colonists along the Volga and the Black Sea
were amongst those who suffered the most. Destruction from the civil
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war as well as life-threatening forced taxes in kind and bad harvests as
in other parts of the country, had dramatically aggravated the food si-
tuation since 1920, and it is estimated that 25 million people starved in
Russia in 1921. The famine was most severe in the province of Saratov,
where 2.1 of a population of 2.9 million were starving. The province of
Saratov comprised the settlement area of the Volga Germans where, in
1924, the ‘Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans’
was founded. In mid-1921, three quarters of all of the inhabitants in
the Volga area were starving, and in the winter of 1921/22, almost all
of them. In the settlement areas of Volga Germans, the population de-
clined as a consequence of starvation and emigration from 452,000 to
359,000 between the end of 1920 and August 15, 1921, a rate of almost
one quarter.30 According to data from the Soviet government which are
bound to be underestimated, 48,000 people died in the Volga-German
settlement areas alone, which constituted of 10% of all of the German
colonists living there. Moreover, about 74,000 Volga Germans, about
20% of the total population, fled from the hunger in their villages to
regions which seemed to offer better food supplies, such as Siberia,
Central Asia, the Caucasus area, the Ukraine, and Central Russia.31
Several thousand Volga Germans found their way to Germany, and
possibly 2,000 to 3,000 people fleeing from hunger were admitted to
Germany.32
When the first reports concerning large scale westward movements
of ‘ethnic Germans’ fleeing from hunger reached Germany and pre-
dicted a ‘‘massive inflow to Germany’’, the Ministry of the Interior re-
acted in the early summer of 1921 by proclaiming a clear policy of re-
jection. ‘‘We will have to strive to keep away from Germany that flux of
refugees by all means.’’ All applications for immigration to Germany,
the ministry went on to say, were to be rejected in the interest of ‘‘pro-
tecting the local population from a further deterioration in living stan-
dards’’, given the housing shortages, unemployment situation and pro-
blems with food supplies. The Migration Office was given instructions
by the Ministry of the Interior to employ all means at its disposal in or-
der ‘‘to stop the ethnic Germans in Russia or divert them to other re-
gions outside of Germany’’.33
The Migration Office objected to the strict blockade policy pursued
by the Ministry of the Interior. It regarded the rumours about masses
of refugees flowing towards Germany as false. Therefore it strongly re-
commended ‘‘far-reaching concessions’’, ‘‘for humanitarian reasons
and in view of the German ethnicity’’ of those few refugees who could
actually be expected to cross the border to Germany. The Office ex-
pected the strict closing of the borders to find no sympathy abroad, but
especially within Germany itself, considering that the German immi-
gration policy was already being met with considerable protest anyway.
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The public, it predicted, will ‘‘never understand if those amongst our
German nation who are worst off find closed doors in Germany and
are let to starve at the German border, whereas swarms of foreign ele-
ments, especially Eastern Jews, considering supposedly impending
Russian and Polish pogroms, are regularly granted hospitable admis-
sion in Germany, with the government referring to humanitarian obli-
gations.’’34
Considerations of humanitarian aid and ethno-national preferences
thus constituted the background of this plea by the Migration Office
for a more open immigration policy towards the starving Volga Ger-
mans – as long as the number of immigrants was expected to be low.
The wording of the statement points to scenarios that left, from the
point of view of the Migration Office, no alternative but a blockade pol-
icy. The Office saw Germany ‘‘threatened’’ by a huge ‘‘stream’’ of refu-
gees and expressed its ‘‘fear’’ thereof and of ‘‘demands on public wel-
fare’’, and in general, of the ‘‘great difficulties’’ that a large number of
refugees was likely to cause.
The Foreign Office also opposed a strict closing of the borders to the
starving Volga-German refugees, so the Ministry of the Interior relaxed
the rules and admitted some refugees. However, in the course of au-
tumn 1921, it revealed how easily the tolerance threshold of the Minis-
try of the Interior could be overstepped. Until December 1921, the
number of Volga Germans fleeing starvation who were able to reach
Poland and cross the German border had increased to roughly 500 or
600. For the Ministry of the Interior, this exceeded the low limit of tol-
erable immigration by Russian-Germans, especially considering that
many of them suffered from severe diseases, and because the German
authorities had not been prepared for their admission.
The events in the admission camp in Frankfurt/Oder on December
6, 1921 finally prompted the Ministry of the Interior to once again
close the borders to Russian-Germans. On this day, a transport of some
400 Volga Germans fleeing starvation had arrived in Frankfurt/Oder.
Among them 85 ‘‘seriously ill men, women and children’’, ‘‘completely
louse-ridden and seedy’’, were immediately admitted to the city hospi-
tal. Most of them suffered from highly contagious epidemic typhus.
Within a few days the number of those who had to be put into quaran-
tine in special buildings rose to 150, and by the end of December, 241.
Addressing the Ministry of the Interior, the municipal authorities of
Frankfurt/Oder thought it ‘‘entirely incomprehensible that a contami-
nated transport of this kind was, without any precautionary measures,
led here and we were not informed until we had no choice but to admit
the sick’’.35
After the events in Frankfurt/Oder and in view of the allegedly ‘‘diffi-
cult situation in Germany’’ created by the increase in registered refu-
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gees to a total of 500 to 600, the Ministry of the Interior stated that
‘‘exaggerated consideration for the Volga Germans who left Germany a
long time ago and now point to their German descent’’ was ‘‘mis-
placed’’. The Prussian Ministry of the Interior also took a disapproving
stance. It demanded that the economic and social situation of the po-
pulation in Germany be the main priority when considering the issue,
not the situation of Volga-German refugees.
Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau outlined this policy in a March
1, 1922 letter to the Reich chancellor. He wrote that relief campaigns
for the starving Russian-Germans were to be supported by all means.
The colonies in the USSR, he continued, had to be maintained, espe-
cially because it was not possible for the German population to accom-
modate larger quantities of refugees, considering the continuing con-
siderable shortage in food and housing in Germany as well as the dan-
ger to public health. Therefore, aid for the starving was considered a
‘‘preventive measure in the fields of epidemic control and refugee wel-
fare’’. Rathenau expected the fight against the causes of migration to
also offer economic advantages to Germany. He considered ‘‘South
Russia as a market for our agricultural industry and as a future source
of rich exportable crops can only be secured for us by immediately alle-
viating its desperate situation through enabling the population to re-
main there and cultivate the land.’’36
Return Migration to the USSR and International Protectionism in
Migration Policy
The subsidence of the famine in 1922 marked the end of large-scale
emigration from Russia. The outflow had been decreasing considerably
since the victory of the Red Army in the civil war and the consolidation
of Soviet rule. The first measures to control emigration and labour mi-
gration from the territories under Soviet control had already been intro-
duced immediately after the October revolution. Since 1919, anyone in-
tending to cross the border needed a permit issued by the Soviet Minis-
tries of the Interior and of War. Since 1922, it was effectively
impossible to cross the border of the soviet territory for purposes of
work or emigration, and exceptions were rare.37 Thus, the Soviet Union
became the first state in the world to systematically and highly effec-
tively control and regulate international migration (as well as internal
migration).38 This very restrictive migration policy was closely con-
nected with the Soviet large-scale industrialisation programme that was
to be implemented with the help of far-reaching recruitment and the
allocation of the entire workforce.
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When the famine of 1921-1923 had ebbed, migration movements
back to the USSR became significantly more important. The formal
background was an amnesty declared by the government of the Auton-
omous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans on April 5, 192439
which was later extended to those emigrants who had left the Volga
area prior to 1918. According to the ‘Central Committee of Germans
from Russia’ and the ‘Society for Volga Germans’ who collected appli-
cations for the return to the Volga area and forwarded them to the So-
viet Embassy in Berlin, a ‘‘remigration fever’’ began in 1926. The inter-
est groups had no reservations, ‘‘because after all these years of wan-
dering around, those unfortunate uprooted people do deserve to return
to their homes and familiar work situations’’.40 From the perspective
of the pressure groups, the Russian-Germans’ high willingness to leave
Germany and return to the USSR was mainly attributable to shortcom-
ings in the integration policy of the Weimar Republic that had been cri-
ticised since the early 1920s. The conflict chiefly centred around the
question of creating opportunities for settlement in Germany.41 In their
publications, the pressure groups of ‘ethnic Germans’ from Russia
mainly emphasised the Russian-Germans’ ‘‘disappointment’’42 with
the conditions of their admission into Germany. They were reported to
have been treated merely ‘‘as a foreign nuisance, like Russians’’43 and
as ‘‘annoying rivals’’ in the labour market.44
The soviet intention of preventing emigration worked very much in
the interest of German politics. Fighting the crisis, the government of
the Weimar Republic on the whole pursued a policy of restricting im-
migration which also applied to ‘remigrating ethnic Germans’. Their
fate was regretted verbosely,45 but their immigration was decidedly un-
wanted. This was again evident when, at the end of 1929, Russian-Ger-
man peasants affected by the Soviet compulsory collectivisation went to
Moscow, hoping the German embassy would help them emigrate to
Germany. Against the background of the emerging world-wide eco-
nomic crisis, the German government consented to temporarily admit
them only after extremely hesitant negotiations. In mid-November
1929, about 13,000 to 14,000 ‘ethnic Germans’ ready to emigrate were
waiting in Moscow for their permits. At first the colonists’ efforts to ob-
tain the permits from the relevant Soviet authorities failed. The police
even took measures to put a stop to more ‘ethnic Germans’ coming to
Moscow, and increased the pressure on those peasants already in the
city to return to their settlements.
When the German embassy intervened on their behalf at the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, this was mainly due to German domestic policy de-
velopments. A flood of press reports and publications had started a
heated public discussion about German policy towards the Russian-
German minority. Meanwhile, relief organisations registered high in-
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flows of donations. Against this background, the German government
no longer regarded as justifiable a policy that merely regretted the Rus-
sian-German peasants’ fate but did not come to their aid. Foreign Min-
ister Julius Curtius, addressing the Reich chancellery, emphasised the
particular importance of the public discussion on their fate. ‘‘German
public opinion’’, he wrote on November 6, 1929, was ‘‘already highly
interested and would not be able to comprehend that ethnic German
peasants who, forced by unbearable physical and mental hardship,
have decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union, are let down and
abandoned to perish.’’46 Nevertheless, an unlimited admission of Rus-
sian-Germans into Germany was out of the question for the govern-
ment.
In November 1929, the conflict over the emigration of the ‘ethnic
German’ peasants escalated. On October 19, the Soviet authorities had
permitted the colonists’ emigration on the condition that they depart
immediately.47 Despite the Soviet threat to transport the peasants back
to their colonies, a country willing to admit them had not yet been
found. The peasants’ departure was thus delayed, so that the Soviet po-
lice authorities in mid-November began to initiate transports back to
the colonies. According to German embassy research, 8,000 people, a
majority of the colonists, were affected by the measures. The German
embassy in Moscow asked the Soviet authorities for a deferment of the
deportations.48 Although the foreign office supported the refugees’
temporary admission into Germany, the relevant departments in the
Ministry for the Interior continued to reject it because of the costs and
the fear of provoking similar endeavours.49
In a race against the transports taking the ‘ethnic German’ peasants
from Moscow back to their settlements, the cabinet, after consulting
the leaders of the bigger parliamentary parties,50 on November 18,
1929 issued the permission for the temporary stay of up to 13,000 co-
lonists in Germany.51 At the same time, it became known that the So-
viet authorities had started large-scale deportations that quickly reduced
the number of Russian-German peasants left in Moscow. The trans-
ports to Germany via Latvia and Lithuania began on November 30,
1929.52 Finally, approximately 5,700 Russian German colonists were
brought to Germany.
There had been political pressure within Germany to immediately
admit to Germany all of the Russian-German colonists from Moscow,
pressure that came mostly from the Centre Party (Zentrum) and the
right-wing parties. These efforts found further support in the ample
discussions that took place in the press. The government sought to
withstand the pressure and to find a solution to the economic and la-
bour market crisis via a protectionist migration policy while at the
same time having to admit initially thousands, but soon maybe tens of
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thousands of impoverished peasants. The German Ministries of Fi-
nance and of the Interior as well as the Prussian government in parti-
cular had spoken out against their admittance.53
The fact that the admission policy favoured from the very beginning
by the German embassy in Moscow and by the foreign office that final-
ly prevailed was not least of all due to Reich President Paul von Hin-
denburg’s intervention. The President stated that ‘‘to aid these pitiable
peasants of German race is absolutely necessary for both humanitarian
and political reasons’’. He went on to say that ‘‘public opinion in Ger-
many would not understand it if these people were left to starve to
death, while since the end of the war tens of thousand of foreigners,
mostly very undesirable, have already been admitted into Germany.’’54
Upon the suggestion of Foreign Minister Curtius, the government
eventually formulated clear conditions towards the Russian-Germans’
interest groups for the temporary admission of the German colonists.
The German government allocated six million Reichsmarks on Novem-
ber 19, 1929 for transportation and accommodations in Germany, but
most of it was to be repaid by the interest groups involved. This ap-
plied to all costs for the transport outside of Germany as well as to
costs of accommodations in Germany. Moreover, the interest groups
were instructed to encourage the colonists to move overseas. When the
Russian-German colonists arrived in Germany at the end of 1929, they
were initially accommodated in three camps (Hammerstein/Posen-
West Prussia, about 3,200 people; Prenzlau/Brandenburg, about 1,700;
Mölln/Sleswig-Holstein, about 800). In 1930-31, they moved on from
the camps to destinations in Canada, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.
On February 20, 1930, the cabinet decided not to admit any more
Russian-German colonists, partly for economic reasons, but also in or-
der not to further strain German relations with the USSR.55 The gov-
ernment decided to stop the immigration in expectation of increased
emigration from the USSR in the wake of further collectivisation in
agriculture.56 Experts estimated the size of the exodus expected at
700,000 to 800,000 Russian-Germans, some of whom were believed
to reach Germany.57 Given this assessment, the German ban on immi-
gration since the beginning of 1930 was believed, in the words of the
foreign office, to have ‘‘a strong effect on the colonists to remain on
their native soil’’.58 The German embassy in Moscow and the German
consulates in the USSR were given instructions to warn the Russian-
Germans against emigrating and to point out that immigrants were no
longer being admitted into Germany.59
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Conclusion: The Limits of Ethno-nationally Motivated Preferential
Treatment of One Group of Immigrants
One way of preventing foreigners of German descent from immigrat-
ing and settling in Germany during the Weimar Republic was the com-
paratively strict application of the 1913 Citizenship Law (Reichs- und
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz). This measure stands in stark contrast to the
recognition and admission of Aussiedler (from 1993 onwards called
Spätaussiedler) in the Federal Republic of Germany, a practice that is
tied to the law that deals with the late consequences of the Second
World War.60 In the Weimar Republic, ‘ethnic Germans of foreign citi-
zenship in the Reich’ were denied swift naturalisation rights and legal
equality with Reich citizens. Treating German citizens and ‘ethnic Ger-
mans of foreign citizenship’ equally would supposedly alienate ‘ethnic
Germans’ from their home country, thereby weakening the position of
minorities of German descent abroad. This policy was expected to in-
crease Germany’s attraction for this group of immigrants and to
further contribute to the dissolution of minority groups. Moreover, a
liberal policy of naturalisation was seen as endangering the interests of
the German economic and labour market policies. Thus the rationale
of the Weimar policy towards ‘remigrants of German descent’ was to
prevent immigration to Germany by maintaining the main areas of set-
tlement in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. It was moti-
vated by considerations concerning domestic, foreign, and economic
policies, if necessary contrary to humanitarian interests.61
National Socialist politics developed a completely opposing course
that partly drew on the discussion about settlements during the First
World War. But, in contrast to the Weimar Republic, National Socialist
politics did not aim at maintaining the minorities of German descent
in their areas of settlement. On the contrary – on the slogan ‘‘Back
home to the Reich’’, about one million ‘ethnic Germans’ (now called
Volksdeutsche) were resettled during the period 1939-1944 predomi-
nantly from those areas in the East that were occupied and annexed by
Germany. The resettlement of ‘ethnic Germans’ began in 1939 with
the settlement of 100,000 South Tyrolese mainly in Tyrol and Car-
inthia. In 1940-41, 130,000 ‘ethnic Germans’ from Estonia and Latvia
as well as from Bessarabia were brought to settle mainly in the areas
of Poland annexed by the Reich (‘Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen’,
‘Reichsgau Posen’/‘Warthegau’). Finally, in 1944, 250,000 ‘ethnic Ger-
mans’ from Volynia, Galicia, and Transylvania arrived on German soil
in what was more a flight from the Red Army than a resettlement.62
The settlement of ‘ethnic Germans’ was always based on the deporta-
tion of the indigenous population of Poles, Czechs and Jews. Large-
scale deportations had been introduced in 1939-40, which ended in
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genocide. In order to make room for the settlement of ‘ethnic Ger-
mans’, about 1.2 million Poles and Jews were expelled in 1940-41 from
the formerly Polish areas along the river Warta and in Danzig-West
Prussia, now incorporated into the Reich as ‘Reichsgaue’. And this was
only the beginning, an overall plan for the area had already been drawn
up. Of the more than 10 million people inhabiting the area, only 1.7
million were regarded as ‘capable of being germanised’, whereas 7.8
million Poles and 700,000 Jews were to be expelled. Final responsibil-
ity for resettlement and expulsion lay with the SS who ruthlessly car-
ried out the policy of ‘Germanisation’ in Poland. The ‘general plan for
the East’ (Generalplan Ost), drawn up by the SS in 1942, aimed at ex-
tending the policy of large-scale resettlement for the benefit of German
settlers which had in part already been carried out in Poland to the
whole of Eastern Europe as far as the Urals.63 For a resettlement of
this magnitude, the plan would effect some 45 million people. Thus
the German ‘nation without space’ was to make room for itself, expel-
ling or killing the indigenous populations – with the exception of those
who could still be of use as work slaves.
Fundamental changes in the European balance of power after the
Second World War, the ‘Cold War’ and the destruction of a majority of
German areas of settlement in East, East Central and Southeastern
Europe effected a change in direction of policies towards minorities ‘of
German origin’ in those areas. From the beginning, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany pursued a liberal policy of admission towards Aussiedler
from the Soviet sphere of influence, a policy that, compared to the
treatment of other groups of immigrants, has been combined with
wide-ranging privileges concerning matters of citizenship and social se-
curity. The Weimar Republic had neither been willing nor able to pur-
sue a migration policy of that kind, given the aims of revisionist for-
eign policy for which German minorities and those ‘of German des-
cent’ were treated as a means, but also regarding the economic crisis.
Notes
1 Bade and Oltmer 2003.
2 For further details and considerations cf. Oltmer 2005, 139-217.
3 Kabuzan 1990, 71-74, 79.
4 Brandes 1992, 85.
5 Until the end of 1899, the total number of settlers was a mere 120 families; see
Chief President in Posen to Emperor Wilhelm II., July 12, 1903, Federal State
Archive Berlin-Lichterfelde (BArch B), R 901, no. 30007.
6 Bade 1980a.
7 Prussian Ministry of the Interior in Berlin to Foreign Office in Berlin, July 22, 1913,
BArch B, R 901, no. 30004.
‘TO LIVE AS GERMANS AMONG GERMANS’ 113
8 Bade 1984a.
9 Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, of the Interior and of Finances in Berlin to Chief
Presidents in the Prussian provinces, May 28, 1909, BArch B, R 901, no. 30007.
10 Deutsche Rückwandrer 1908, 24-25.
11 Weber 1915.
12 Borchardt 1915, 12.
13 Chief President in Posen to Emperor Wilhelm II. in Berlin, July 12, 1903, BArch B,
R 901, no. 30007.
14 Borchardt 1915, 8; see also German Consulate in Moscow to Reich Chancellor in
Berlin, February 13, 1908, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18372.
15 Society for the Welfare of German Remigrants in Berlin to Reich Office of the
Interior in Berlin, January 24th 1918, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18385; Neutatz 1993, 432.
16 Thalheim 1926, 114; Altrock 1920.
17 Geiss 1960, 230-239.
18 According to the head of the colonial school in Witzenhausen, who was among the
first to bring ‘‘remigrants’’ to the Empire. Fabarius 1916, 16.
19 Prussian Ministry of Agriculture in Berlin to Prussian State Ministry in Berlin, July
19, 1915, published in: Geiss 1960, 150.
20 Negotiation protocol concerning the ‘‘Remigration of German comrades from Russia
and other countries, and the regulations to be included in the peace treaties in this
respect’’, Foreign Office in Berlin, March 31, 1917, BArch B, R 3901, no. 18385.
21 Fischer 1967, 236-238.
22 Jung 1920, 5.
23 For the history of the Migration Office see Bade 1989. In May 1919, its name was
changed to ‘Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration’ (Reichsamt
für deutsche Einwanderung, Rückwanderung und Auswanderung – Reichswanderung-
samt), and its responsibilities were extended, until, in April 1924, it was downgraded
to the subordinate ‘Office for Emigration’ (Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen).
24 Peschke 1918, 71-72.
25 Chief of the General Staff of the army in the Main Quarter to Reich Chancellor in
Berlin, July 5, 1918, published in Geiss, 1960, 174-176; cf. the detailed
‘‘Memorandum concerning the German colonies in the former Russian Empire and
their remigration to Germany’’, Foreign Office, March 1918, BArch B, R 901, no.
30006.
26 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Ministry
of the Interior in Berlin, March 8, 1919, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18388.
27 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Foreign
Office in Berlin, January 18, 1921, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18389.
28 Schmidt 1993, 42-43.




33 Ministry of the Interior in Berlin to Foreign Office in Berlin, August 9, 1921, BArch
B, R 1501, no. 18389.
34 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Ministry
of the Interior in Berlin, August 19, 1921, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18389.
35 Alderman Frankfurt/Oder to Ministry of the Interior in Berlin, December 10, 1921,
BArch B, R 1501, no. 18404; Malinowski 1999.
36 Quoted from Mick 1995, 350-351.
37 Felshtinsky 1982, 336-343.
38 Dowty 1987, 63-76.
114 JOCHEN OLTMER
39 Amnestie und Rückkehrerlaubnis für wolgadeutsche Flüchtlinge, in:
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44 Die Lage der deutschen Flüchtlinge aus Wolhynien in Ostpreußen, in: Wolga-
deutsche Monatshefte, 2. 1923, no. 7/8, p. 103.
45 The German ambassador in Moscow, Herbert von Dirksen, spoke of a ‘‘system of
putting off the colonists by pointing to the platonic sympathies Germany had for
them’’; Ambassador von Dirksen in Moscow to Foreign Office in Berlin, August 1,
1929, published in: Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, series B:
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Aussiedler in Germany:
From Smooth Adaptation to Tough Integration
Barbara Dietz
Introduction
The immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union played a significant role in the post-Second World
War immigration and integration experience of Germany. But in con-
trast to labour migrants, the inflow of ethnic Germans was not related
to economic factors like recruitment programs or the business cycle.
Because ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion had experienced forced resettlement and ethnic discrimination dur-
ing and after Second World War, they were allowed to enter Germany
and were granted German citizenship upon arrival.
Until the end of the 1980s, the integration of ethnic German immi-
grants (Aussiedler) into the German economy and society proceeded
comparatively straightforwardly. However, since the political changes
in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the integra-
tion of Aussiedler has been characterised by frictions, which are similar
to those of other immigrant populations in Germany. As a result, the
integration path of the recent Aussiedler cohorts attracted the interest of
migration and integration researchers who had thus far not paid much
attention to this group. It became an increasingly discussed research
topic to what extent and why the integration process of ethnic Germans
had changed. Historians, economists, and social scientists contributed
to that debate, referring to various theoretical considerations and com-
parisons with other immigrant groups.
Against this background, this chapter analyses the framework and
the characteristics of the Aussiedler integration and their changes. The
article focuses on the historical background of this migration move-
ment, on the German admission policy, on the socio-demographic
characteristics of ethnic German immigrants, and on the opportunity
structure of the receiving German society. It will be argued that funda-
mental changes in all of these factors contributed to the frictions in the
ethnic German integration experience since the political transforma-
tion in Eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union.
1 Ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union: Historical Background
The history of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union is closely related to the history of European migration
movements. In addition, shifting borders of the German empire played
a role which sometimes included more people who considered them-
selves German and sometimes less. From the 15th to the 19th centuries,
German-speaking migrants came to Eastern Europe as well as to the
Russian Empire, to work and settle there. A considerable part of these
migrants had been explicitly invited by the governments of the receiv-
ing states which wanted them to cultivate land, work in (agricultural)
engineering, or secure border lands. Especially in the case of immi-
grants in the Russian Empire, significant privileges were granted to at-
tract foreign settlers.1 As a consequence of these West-East migrations,
German minority settlements developed in regions which nowadays
belong to Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
and the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, changing borders contribu-
ted to the formation of German minorities in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Upper Silesia, for example, which is now a part of Po-
land, belonged to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation be-
tween 1335 and 1742 and later to Prussia.2 Thus a remarkable part of
Upper Silesia’s population considered itself German. When Upper Sile-
sia was divided between Poland and Germany in 1921 both parts in-
cluded national minorities of the respective other nation.
Until the end of the 19th century, most ethnic Germans lived in
peaceful coexistence with their neighbours in Eastern Europe and Rus-
sia. However, with the growing importance of nation-states and na-
tional ideologies at the end of the 19th century this situation changed.
The political goal to even out national and territorial borders provoked
the expulsion of national minorities or their (forced) assimilation. Na-
tional governments and authorities in Eastern European states and
Russia reacted more and more suspiciously towards its ethnic minori-
ties as well as ethnic German migrants, withdrawing privileges that
had formerly been granted. In addition, ethnic tensions and conflicts
increasingly characterised the relations between Germans and their
Eastern European neighbours.
In the 20th century political transformations and revolutions as well
as two World Wars with Germany as the aggressor destroyed the eco-
nomic and social living conditions of the German minorities in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. Immediately after the Second World
War, the destructive policies of Nazi Germany resulted in the expulsion
and flight of most ethnic Germans who had been living in Eastern Eur-
ope. In the USSR, many Germans had been deported to the eastern
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parts of the country in 1941. Living in labour camps or under police
surveillance until 1955, ethnic Germans were allowed to return to their
former settlements no earlier than 1972. In the 1950s and 60s the Ger-
mans still living in Eastern Europe and the USSR had become a discri-
minated-against minority group. Whereas the Germans in Romania
and to a lesser degree those in Poland had some opportunities to pre-
serve their language and cultural traditions, the Germans in the Soviet
Union were not allowed to speak their mother tongue in public until
the end of the 1960s and suffered severe discrimination in daily life.
2 The Admission of Ethnic Germans into Germany: Politics
Before and After 1989
After the Second World War, Germany emerged as the most important
immigration country in the European context, admitting expellees and
refugees, labour migrants, asylum seekers and to a considerable degree
ethnic Germans as well.3 Between 1950 and the end of 2004, 4.45 mil-
lion ethnic Germans came to Germany, 63% of them after 1989. This
population movement took place after the expulsion and forced migra-
tion of German citizens and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union during and immediately after the Second World War
had ended. At that time – in the beginning of the 1950s – a remarkable
number of Germans (approximately 4 million) were still living in East-
ern Europe and the USSR, holding the citizenship of the respective
states. Because many of them had experienced forced resettlement and
ethnic discrimination, emigration to West Germany seemed like a vi-
able option to escape the difficult situations in their home countries.
However, the emigration of citizens from the former Soviet Union and
Eastern European states was severely restricted. Until the end of the
1980s, ethnic Germans needed the invitation of immediate relatives in
Germany to be allowed to leave the country of origin.4
2.1 Immigration Politics
On the German side, the admission of ethnic Germans was regulated
by the 1949 German Constitution which introduced their right to move
to Germany and receive German citizenship.5 It has to be emphasised
that it only affected those ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union.6 This political setting puts the Aussiedler migra-
tion to Germany in line with many past and contemporary migration
flows which are connected to political and ethno-national determinants.
These population movements often occur against the background of
political repression and ethnic discrimination in the countries of origin
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and political security and ethnic affinity in the receiving states.7 In this
context, the concept of diaspora migration represents a specific form:
It is based on the perception of the sense of belonging and the return
of migrants to a former homeland.8 Because the migration of ethnic
Germans to Germany is linked to the political construction of co-eth-
nics returning to their nation-state it meets the basic criteria of dia-
spora migration.9 A similar constellation can be found in other ethno-
national migration flows, for example, the Jewish migration from the
(former) Soviet Union to Israel and the migration of Greeks and Finns
from the successor states of the USSR to their respective homelands.
Typically, these migration flows require some special political support
on the part of the receiving state and society. Both an ethno-national
migration motivation on the side of the Aussiedler and the assistance by
the receiving German state have characterised the return migration of
ethnic Germans.
Since the beginning of the 1950s, the German government has ac-
tively supported the immigration of ethnic Germans due to political
and ethno-national considerations, urging the officials of the socialist
sending countries to remove emigration barriers. With the opening up
of Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end
of the 1980s, this policy changed remarkably.10 The new migration op-
portunities after the fall of the Iron Curtain which led to an immigra-
tion of 377,000 Aussiedler in 1989, created an ambivalence among
Germans regarding the former open door policy of the German govern-
ment towards ethnic Germans. Although the German authorities did
not abolish the right of return altogether, they exerted a strong effort to
channel and control the immigration of this group.11 A variety of mea-
sures – enforcement of admission barriers, reduction of integration
support, economic assistance to the sending countries – have been in-
troduced since 1990, which are usually instituted to prevent undesired
immigration.12 After nearly 400,000 Aussiedler immigrated in 1990,
these policies led first to a stabilisation and later – since 1994 – to a
yearly decline in the total number of ethnic German immigrants.
Most importantly, the restriction of the Aussiedler immigration was
related to the adoption of a new absorption law (Kriegsfolgenbereini-
gungsgesetz) in 1993. It only allowed Germans from the former Soviet
Union to come to Germany without individually having to prove that
they had been discriminated against because of their German descent.
As serious ethnic discrimination against Germans in Poland and Ro-
mania is almost non-existent since the political transformation, their
emigration has nearly ceased with the enforcement of the new law in
1993. In addition, the new absorption law established an immigration
quota, fixing a maximum number of 220,000 ethnic German immi-
grants per year. In 1999, authorities further reduced this quota to
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100,000. Moreover, since July 1996, ethnic German immigrants have
to pass a German language test as a confirmation of their belonging to
the German people (Volkszugehörigkeit). Because Germans in the for-
mer Soviet Union – which has been the dominant sending country
since 1993 – were not allowed to speak German in the 1950s and
1960s, many of them lost their ties to their mother tongue. Conse-
quently, 53% of 271,532 ethnic Germans who participated in the lan-
guage test between July 1996 and December 2002 failed. It is remark-
able that the percentage of ethnic Germans passing the test has contin-
ued to decline since its introduction: while 74% mastered the language
test in 1996, in 2002 only 43% passed (see figure 2). This confirms
that ethnic Germans could not reverse the process of losing their
mother tongue.
2.2 Integration Politics
Notwithstanding its long-lasting self-image as a non-immigration coun-
try, Germany has absorbed a significant number of immigrants since
the Second World War. However, the modes of immigrant incorpora-
tion were significantly different, concerning different immigrant
groups. Whereas ethnic Germans receive German citizenship shortly
after arrival, migrants of non-German descent have to fulfil demanding
criteria to obtain German citizenship. According to the new law on citi-
zenship which became law in January 2000, foreigners can apply for
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German citizenship only after having been in Germany for eight
years.13
The regulation on citizenship demonstrates that ethnic Germans are
a privileged group compared to other immigrants. Furthermore, ethnic
Germans are entitled to governmental integration support which most
other immigrant groups in Germany are not. Referring to its political
responsibility, the German government regarded it as an objective to
actively support the integration of ethnic Germans into the German
economy and society. Although there have been continuous cuts since
1989, the catalogue of assistance still comprises the following:
– financial assistance for unemployed ethnic Germans (for a maxi-
mum of six months). It can also be obtained while attending lan-
guage classes
– language encouragement (for a maximum of six months)
– support for integration into the labour market, advanced training,
and retraining
– support for the social integration and the professional advancement
of juvenile ethnic German immigrants.
The aforementioned reductions in the integration support for ethnic
German immigrants were the result of a fundamental policy change.
Before the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, the integration of ethnic Germans had been supported
to compensate this group for hardships as a result of ethno-national
discrimination in their former home countries. In addition, ideological
arguments played a fundamental role: In the Cold War period the emi-
gration of ethnic Germans from socialist countries had been used as
evidence of the superiority of the West German system. After the fall
of the Iron Curtain, system competition more or less ceased to exist,
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while the increasing number of Aussiedler, the economic slowdown in
Germany and the German reunification made it more and more diffi-
cult to finance the integration of this group. Furthermore, the native
German population increasingly opposed government spending on
Aussiedler who were often perceived as a burden to the welfare state.
Following these arguments, the German government reduced the inte-
gration support for ethnic German immigrants step-by-step.14
3 The Changing Socio-Demographic Background of Ethnic
German Immigrants
Since the end of the 1980s, there have been remarkable changes in the
sending countries of ethnic Germans: between 1950 and 1988 nearly
two-thirds of all Aussiedler (61%) immigrated from Poland, 12% came
from the former Soviet Union and 13% from Romania.15 In the period
1989-2004, the former Soviet Union became the major sending coun-
try (75% of the ethnic Germans came from there), far ahead of Poland
(17%) and Romania (8%). This change is a result of the opening up of
the Soviet Union, the enforcement of the new German absorption law
and, to a lesser degree, because the German minority populations in
Poland and Romania had greatly diminished because of the ongoing
emigration process.
Reflecting the deportation history of the German minority in the So-
viet Union, the most important post-Soviet sending state is Kazakh-
stan, followed by Russia and Kirgistan.16
As can be expected, the social and cultural background of ethnic Ger-
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man immigrants differs fundamentally, depending on their country of
origin. This reflects the differences of the Romanian, Polish, and post-
Soviet societies on the one hand, in addition it mirrors the strength
and influence of the ethnic German communities there. Whereas Ger-
mans in Romania and Poland settled comparatively close to one an-
other, the majority of ethnic Germans in the former USSR lived widely
dispersed in a multiethnic setting. Most ethnic German immigrants
from post-Soviet states, especially in the younger generation, did not
preserve the German language and cultural traditions. Their ethnic
identity is based on their German descent and the perception by (post)
Soviet authorities. In that respect they differ strongly from ethnic Ger-
mans in Romania and to a lesser degree from those in Poland, who to
a certain degree preserved their mother tongue and German cultural
and religious traditions.
3.1 Emigration Motivations and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of the
Aussiedler Migration: New Features Since 1989
Originally, the emigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union to Germany was related to ethnic factors and
to family reunification. The wish to live free of oppression ‘as Germans
among Germans’ prevailed for those emigrants.17 Therefore, most Aus-
siedler who came to Germany before the end of the Cold War had a
comparatively good command of German and were familiar with Ger-
man cultural traditions. In addition, the Aussiedler of the pre-1989 peri-
od had essentially a German family background, only in comparatively
rare cases did mixed families immigrate. When the emigration barriers
were eased at the end of the 1980s, the political and economic situa-
tion in the sending countries changed drastically, especially in the for-
mer Soviet Union. Since 1989, the economic, social and political crisis
in the sending states led to the departure of ethnic Germans for the
West. Whereas ethnic and family motivations prevailed before 1989,
political and economic migration reasons became more important
thereafter.
It is a striking feature of the Aussiedler migration since the end of
the 1980s that German language competence of recent immigrants
continues to decline and that the share of mixed families, mostly Rus-
sian-German families, in this migration movement has been increas-
ing. This growing bicultural background of recent ethnic German im-
migrants has been documented by the German Federal Administration
Office. Federal Administration Office statistics distinguish between eth-
nic Germans, non-German spouses and children, as well as non-Ger-
man relatives of ethnic Germans.18 In 1993, a comparatively high per-
centage (74%) of the Aussiedler immigration were of ethnic German
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descent. A decade later, in 2004, this share had declined to 19% (see
figure 4).
What were the reasons for the deterioration of the German language
competence and the increase in bicultural families in the Aussiedler mi-
gration after 1989? Apparently the most important factors were the re-
lease of emigration barriers on the side of the (post) socialist states and
the shift of sending countries from Romania and Poland to the succes-
sor states of the USSR. This contributed to a broad emigration move-
ment, especially from the former Soviet Union, and to the develop-
ment of migrant networks. Accordingly, the unfolding of network dy-
namics over time considerably influenced the cultural and ethnic
characteristics of the Aussiedler after 1989.
Migration is usually a selective process – especially in the begin-
ning.19 In the case of most labour migrations, relatively skilled, produc-
tive and highly motivated people are drawn away from the sending
countries.20 If one looks at the ethnic German migration this self-selec-
tion can also be observed, although the selection has expressed itself in
criteria which were related to the ethnic minority background of this
group. In the beginning of this movement, it was especially those eth-
nic Germans who were highly motivated to preserve the German lan-
guage, cultural traditions, and religious practices who emigrated. This
reflected the background of the German minority group in Romania to
a certain degree, but had not been representative for the German min-
ority in Poland and the former Soviet Union. In Poland and the former
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USSR, the German language competence of the German minorities
has diminished considerably since the end of Second World War.21 The
rate of mixed marriages among the Germans in the USSR had been
high compared to other ethnic groups there. At the end of the 1970s,
nearly half of the German couples lived in mixed marriages; in 1989,
Germans had the highest rates (65%) of mixed marriage in the
USSR.22
Network theory has argued that immigrants become less selective in
socio-economic terms and more representative of the sending commu-
nities as the migration networks expand and the costs and risks of mi-
gration fall.23 It seems reasonable to say that such a development also
manifested itself in the case of the Aussiedler migration, approximating
the socio-demographic background of this immigrant population ever
more to the ethnic minority communities in the sending countries.
3.2 Human Capital Characteristics: Continuities and Changes
Throughout its history, the Aussiedler resettlement included entire fa-
milies.24 In most of these cases, ethnic Germans emigrated from their
home countries without a return option. A noticeable feature of ethnic
German immigrants is their younger age structure when compared to
the native German population: 41,8% of ethnic Germans were under
25 upon their arrival in 2004, while in the German population it is
only 26,2%. While the age structure of ethnic Germans and foreigners
in Germany did not differ much in 1990, the age composition of for-
eigners in Germany had come noticeably closer to the native German
population by 2004 (see figure 5). This did not happen in the case of
ethnic Germans, however, who remain younger than natives and for-
eigners in Germany.
For decades the younger age structure of ethnic Germans has been
regarded as a positive factor with respect to the integration of this
group into Germany.25 However, since the end of the 1980s, this as-
sumption has been severely challenged by increases in unemployment,
especially among the younger Aussiedler.
It is comparatively difficult to evaluate the educational attainment
and the qualification of ethnic Germans upon their arrival in Germany.
Nevertheless, the existing data indicate that this immigrant group is
better educated and trained than labour migrants from the recruitment
states.26 At the end of the 1980s, about 12% of ethnic Germans who
had worked prior to emigration had a university degree, 22% had a
high school degree while two-thirds only a primary school education.27
Because their education and training had been completed in (former)
socialist countries, the professional qualifications of ethnic Germans
often did not correspond to German labour market requirements.
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When looking at the occupational structure of ethnic Germans, several
important characteristics can be identified. Whereas in Germany occu-
pation in the agricultural sector decreased remarkably over the years,
the share of ethnic Germans working in agriculture before emigration
has even increased. This is due to the growing number of ethnic Ger-
mans from the former Soviet Union, who still worked to a certain de-
gree in the agricultural sector. Moreover, industrial professions are –
compared to native Germans – overrepresented in the occupational
structure of ethnic Germans. On the other hand, native Germans are
more often employed in service jobs. These differences exist more or
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less independently of the time period that the ethnic German immi-
grants entered Germany.
Because the technological gap between Germany and the (post)socialist
sending countries of ethnic Germans has not declined over the years,
the qualifications of this immigrant group eventually often did not
meet the requirements of the German labour market. In many cases,
qualifications are related to professions in low demand and often do
not meet German standards.28 Because of the ongoing globalisation
process, a shift from the industrial to the service sector has occurred in
Germany and the demand for low-qualified labour has decreased con-
siderably. Whereas in 1985, unskilled industrial workers comprised
3.1% of German employment, in 2000, only 1.5% of the German work-
force was performing unskilled industrial labour. By contrast, some
11.4% of ethnic German immigrants who came to Germany in 2000,
was working in low-qualification jobs before emigration. This demon-
strates a remarkable labour market risk for recent ethnic German im-
migrants.
4 The Integration of Ethnic Germans: New Patterns After 1989
The Aussiedler integration into Germany had been considered a reason-
able success story until the end of the 1980s. Several studies confirmed













Ethnic Germans Native Germans
agriculture mining industrial professions technical professions services unknown
1995













Ethnic Germans Native Germans
Source: Labour Office. 
AUSSIEDLER IN GERMANY 127
that the absorption of this group into the German labour market and
society proceeded with comparatively little friction.29 In subsequent
years, this situation changed, however, and ethnic Germans were con-
fronted with substantial integration difficulties.30
4.1 Integration into the Economy: Increasing Frictions?
Integration into the economy is usually defined in terms of equal op-
portunities for natives and immigrants concerning the labour market
access and income positions. Consequently, the fundamental questions
assessing labour market integration are whether immigrants gain in-
comes on a par with those of comparable natives and whether they face
a similar unemployment risk.
Whereas a relatively successful integration of ethnic Germans into
the labour market could be observed until the political transformation
in Eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union, the economic
position of the Aussiedler increasingly worsened throughout the 1990s.
A 1998 study found that ethnic Germans were in an unfavourable eco-
nomic position when compared to natives: on average Aussiedler earned
roughly 25% less and more often performed unskilled jobs, although
their qualifications were comparable to those of the natives.31 An analy-
sis of income determinants has revealed that the earnings of ethnic
Germans depended on professional training and qualification, however
more than half of this group did not end up working in the professions
they were qualified for.32 Consequently, in many cases, the positive im-
pact of skills did not materialise. In addition, only those ethnic Ger-
mans who bring along good German language skills can be expected
to achieve incomes that are equivalent to those of natives. This is espe-
cially true for all skilled professions, particularly in the service sector.33
As the German language competence of recent Aussiedler has rapidly
decreased, their economic position has become riskier.
In searching for employment, ethnic Germans are dependent on
their German language proficiency, and on their job qualifications
prior to migration. Thus the chances of finding a job are significantly
lower for ethnic Germans with less German language skills and who
have no qualification or training.34 Professions with different profiles
in market systems and transition economies, for example jobs in ad-
ministration, trade, banking, technology or education, denote a special
employment risk. On the other hand, integration assistance by the Ger-
man government supported the labour market integration of ethnic
Germans to a considerable degree, although its impact decreased be-
cause of severe cuts after 1989.35
According to labour office statistics and empirical studies, the unem-
ployment of ethnic Germans is higher than that of natives, but lower
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than that of foreigners in Germany.36 Again, the unemployment risk
increased during the 1990s. In analysing the determinants of this de-
velopment, empirical studies point to the impact of sending country
characteristics. Ethnic Germans who come from the former Soviet Un-
ion and from Poland are more likely to be unemployed than those
from Romania.37 This is explained by language competence, education,
and training and by the integration into sending country networks.
Network-related settlement behaviour has concentrated ethnic Ger-
mans from Romania in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, where a low-
er unemployment rate prevails compared to Lower-Saxonia and North-
Rhine-Westphalia, where comparatively more ethnic Germans from
the former Soviet Union live (see table 2).
4.2 Integration into Society: Path Towards Segregation?
In contrast to foreigners in Germany, ethnic Germans were expected to
bring along a cultural background similar to those of native Germans.
In addition to the state-supported social integration programs this was
supposed to guarantee a smooth absorption into German society. These
considerations are in line with an integration model, putting assimila-
tion at the centre of attention.38 In the medium and longer run, the as-
similation model predicts an absorption of immigrants into the cul-
ture, social structure, and institutions of the dominant host country. In
general, it is expected that immigrants will lose their specific cultural
backgrounds and identities in the integration process.
The most important categories in defining social assimilation are ac-
culturation – meaning the ability of migrants or minorities to adapt to
the language and culture of the host society, and socio-structural inte-
gration – indicating the entrance of immigrants into the social neigh-
bourhoods and institutions of the host country.39 Innumerable aca-
demic and journalists’ articles have described the expectation ‘that for-
eigners and their offspring will first acculturate and then seek entry
and acceptance from the native-born population as a prerequisite for
their social and economic advancement’.40 In the view of Gordon and
many other scholars, the first step of acculturation does not necessarily
lead to other forms of social integration into the host society. Immi-
grants or minority groups may acculturate but still not take part in the
institutions or social neighbourhoods of the receiving society, or come
into closer contact with the native population.
Whereas ethnic Germans mastered acculturation more or less suc-
cessfully until the end of the 1980s, the socio-structural integration did
not proceed without problems. Social contacts of ethnic Germans in
the 1970s and 80s were often already constrained to family members
or friends from the sending countries. Participation in German organi-
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sations, institutions or neighbourhoods was rare. But unlike German
expellees and refugees, who established effective (political) pressure
groups in post-war Germany, ethnic German immigrants have not
been greatly engaged in establishing organisations to pursue their in-
terests. The most important organisations of ethnic German immi-
grants are countrymen affiliations, which have first of all been initiated
to preserve the history and the cultural traditions of ethnic German
minorities. Typically, countrymen affiliations are organised according
to former (historical) homelands, such as the affiliation of Germans
from Bessarabia, Silesia, or Russia. Only in recent years has the affilia-
tion of Germans from Russia put more emphasis on supporting the in-
tegration of German immigrants. It is noteworthy, however, that coun-
trymen affiliations could not attract a large membership. Although 1.6
million ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union moved to Ger-
many between 1989 and the end of 1999, their most important pres-
sure group – the affiliation of Germans from Russia – only increased
by 17,660 members in this period.41 Other organisations, funded by
ethnic German immigrants to provide legal, cultural, religious, or so-
cial support, are of much lower and of mostly only regional impor-
tance.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a slower acculturation path than
in previous decades and a lack of socio-structural adaptation has been
observed for ethnic German immigrants. Parallel to this development,
recent ethnic Germans tended to establish and participate in Aussiedler
networks, which have often been identified as the decisive support for
the development of segregated immigrant communities or sub-socie-
ties. This development refers to a new issue of debate in integration
theory that focuses on the anticipated outcome of social integration. In
most theories, social integration refers to the adaptation of immigrants
to the middle-class cultural pattern of the host country.42 However,
many societies vary considerably when it comes to social class and
many include immigrant networks or minority cultures. Consequently,
it is crucial to ask, into which specific social class or networks of the re-
ceiving society a respective immigrant group integrates.43
In the following, acculturation and socio-structural integration pat-
terns of recent ethnic Germans will be portrayed, using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).44 If one looks at the most
important indicator for acculturation, the proficiency and use of the
host society’s language, the GSOEP data (1997) reveal that nearly all
ethnic German immigrants from Romania had a good or very good
command of the German language, compared to only 61.1% of those
from Poland and 58.9% from the former Soviet Union.45 It is remark-
able that ethnic German immigrants from Poland and the former
USSR expressed a higher proficiency in the Polish and Russian lan-
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guages respectively than in German (see table 1). This language profile
has also had an impact on German language use in daily life, where
79.2% of Ethnic Germans from Romania but less than half of those
from Poland and approximately half of the ethnic Germans from the
former Soviet Union spoke predominantly German. This clearly con-
firms that a fast acculturation of recent ethnic German immigrants –
especially of the most important group from the former Soviet Union
– can no longer be taken for granted.
The socio-structural integration, which is mostly defined in terms of
friendship relations and institutional inclusions in the host country,
will now be explored. The GSOEP data reveal close friendship ties of
the ethnic Germans to former countrymen: nearly 40% of German im-
migrants name people from their former homelands as their three best
friends and 72.4% had at least one friend from the sending country.
Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union are especially involved
in home country friendship circles. This points to the important role of
migrant relations and networks based on personal ties. The meeting
frequency with relatives and friends and the time spent in helping rela-
tives and friends can be used as a further indicator in the evaluation of
social integration. The GSOEP survey found that ethnic Germans were
Table 1 Indicators for the social integration of ethnic Germans (in %)
Romania Poland FSU Total
German language proficiency
(speak German well or very well)
98.0 61.1 58.9 65.0
Proficiency of the home country language
(speak it well or very well)
84.0 90.9 93.4 91.3
Language used in daily life
(mainly German)
79.2 38.8 50.8 50.4
Friendship relations
(all three best friends from the home country)
43.4 24.5 47.7 38.8
Friendship relations (at least one of the three
best friends from the home country)
73.6 64.0 77.7 72.4
Meeting with relatives and friends
(weekly or monthly)
92.0 86.8 95.4 92.1
Helping relatives and friends
(weekly or monthly)
44.0 42.2 60.4 52.2
Participation in social or neighborhood
associations (weekly or monthly)
10.0 4.9 6.6 6.5
Observations (GSOEP 1997) 53 139 197 389
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1997, own calculation.
AUSSIEDLER IN GERMANY 131
heavily engaged in meeting (92%) and helping (52%) their relatives
and friends on a weekly or monthly base. In comparison to native-born
Germans, of whom 80% meet and 42% help their relatives and friends
weekly or monthly according to the GSOEP, the personal relationships
of ethnic German immigrants are stronger. Besides friendships, the in-
stitutional inclusion of ethnic German immigrants is also important
for the evaluation of their socio-structural integration. In the literature
on this subject, no indication exists that recent ethnic German immi-
grants engage in political, social or neighbourhood associations in Ger-
many to any remarkable degree. This has been confirmed by the
GSOEP data. Only 6.5% of ethnic German immigrants participate in
social, political, or neighbourhood associations on a weekly or monthly
base. Because of the intense involvement of ethnic Germans in coun-
trymen friendship networks, it may be assumed that these associations
are often related to ethnic German immigrant issues.
Do recent ethnic German immigrants develop and participate in net-
works after they have entered Germany and what does this imply for
the social integration of this group? In the process of social integration
networks are usually seen as formal or informal ties through which in-
formation and other resources are distributed and channeled.46 Net-
works can take on various forms, which range from family and friend-
ship relations to formal organisations. In this context, research litera-
ture identifies basically two ways in which migrant networks may
function. Migration networks can provide adaptive support in finding
employment, housing, or social information. This mostly short-term
assistance may also have a positive impact on the long-term integration
into the receiving society. On the other hand, migrant networks may
work in the opposite direction, isolating immigrants in limiting their
contacts to their own group and keeping them away from the native
population and from the organisations and institutions of the receiving
society. In the longer run, migrant enclaves may develop, which often
indicate economic disintegration and social segregation.
A valuable indicator for the development of migrant networks is the
spatial distribution of immigrant populations. In the case of ethnic
Germans, settlement after arrival has been influenced to a considerable
degree by the wish to live close to relatives and friends from the coun-
try of origin.47 Nevertheless, German authorities have distributed eth-
nic German immigrants according to a quota system throughout Ger-
many to achieve some burden sharing on the local community level. If
one looks at the settlement behaviour of ethnic Germans between
1989 and 1999, significant differences can be observed with respect to
countries of origin (see table 2).48 Whereas ethnic Germans from Ro-
mania over fulfilled the quota for Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria,
those from Poland predominantly moved to North-Rhine-Westphalia.
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In return, ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet Union
expressed a certain preference for Lower Saxony and North Rhine-
Westphalia. It seems reasonable to argue that this settlement behaviour
reveals a certain evidence for the formation of migrant networks.
The question of whether the settlement behaviour and the participation
of recent ethnic Germans in migrant networks has led to enclaves and
a certain degree of segregation since the end of the 1980s can not be
discussed without looking at the German housing policy. In the begin-
ning of the 1990s, French, Canadian, and US troops were withdrawn
from German territory, leading to free housing space. In cases where
the German authorities were in charge of these housing facilities, they
used them to accommodate ethnic German immigrants. In cases
where the housing space of withdrawing troops was put on the free
market, ethnic German immigrant families frequently rented them to
live close to their relatives and friends who had already moved to these
housing developments. In some cities and communities this contribu-
ted to a considerable amount of segregation of these ethnic Ger-
mans.49
This growing spatial segregation of ethnic Germans has been accom-
panied by a tendency to withdraw from German institutions and neigh-
bourhoods.50 In some cases, the increasing xenophobia of native Ger-
mans enforced this tendency. As a result, recent ethnic German immi-
Table 2 Quota and actual distribution of ethnic German immigrants to German Länder by
countries of origin 1989-1998 (in %)
Land former USSR Poland Romania all countries quota *
Baden-Württemberg 13.5 11.1 33.6 15.0 12.3
Bavaria 12.3 9.2 41.3 14.6 14.4
Berlin 2.0 3.5 0.4 2.2 2.7
Brandenburg 3.1 0.1 0.5 2.3 3.5
Bremen 0.9 1.9 0.1 1.0 0.9
Hamburg 2.7 4.1 0.3 2.1 2.1
Hesse 8.0 7.1 5.3 7.6 7.2
Mecklenburg Vorpommern 2.3 0.2 0.2 1.7 2.6
Lower Saxony 10.4 9.0 2.0 9.3 9.2
North Rhine-Westphalia 23.7 44.7 9.1 26.3 21.8
Rhineland-Palatinate 5.7 3.7 2.7 5.0 4.7
Saarland 3.2 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4
Saxony 5.7 0.2 1.4 4.2 6.5
Saxony-Anhalt 3.2 0.2 0.3 2.4 3.9
Sleswig-Holstein 1.8 2.8 0.3 2.5 3.3
Thuringia 3.1 0.2 0.8 2.3 3.5
Total number 1,620,790 407,091 216,062 2,244,860 100.0
* The quota has been fixed by the refugee law (version of May 26, 1994).
Source: Federal Administration Office.
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grants – first of all those who came from the former Soviet Union in
the 1990s – form predominantly Russian-speaking communities,
where many newcomers integrate. These communities are strength-
ened by the bicultural background of ethnic Germans sustaining a fra-
mework, where the Russian language and major elements of previous
cultural practices are actively retained.
Conclusion
This chapter shows that the integration path of ethnic Germans was
characterised by a structural break at the end of the 1980s. In contrast
to the comparatively smooth integration of this group before the politi-
cal transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, ser-
ious problems in the absorption process could be identified thereafter.
To some extent this came as a surprise: The German minority back-
ground of this immigrant group and the assistance by the German gov-
ernment had anticipated a fast integration into the German economy
and society.
What are the most important determinants that can explain the
changing integration path of ethnic German immigrants? First of all,
the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the
Soviet Union turned the former highly restricted emigration of ethnic
Germans into a mass phenomena. Although a comparatively privileged
admission of ethnic Germans still prevailed after 1989, entrance bar-
riers have been erected to constrain the immigration of this group.
Nevertheless, the immigration of ethnic Germans increased consider-
ably and stayed on a high level even after a new admission law came
into force in 1993. This law introduced new procedures which led to a
change in the sending countries and, through the development of mi-
grant networks, also to changes in the cultural and social background
of ethnic German immigrants. As a result, the German language com-
petence of ethnic Germans, coming predominantly from the former
USSR, decreased and the share of bicultural families in that migration
grew. These features of the recent Aussiedler made their integration
more similar to that of other immigrants in Germany.
Because the education, qualification and training of ethnic Germans
from the former Soviet Union is less compatible with the German la-
bour market than that of ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania,
the economic integration became much more difficult in recent years.
This process was enforced by cuts in governmental integration assis-
tance which have been implemented as a result of policy changes. If
one looks at the social integration of ethnic Germans after 1989, eth-
no-cultural distinctiveness and segregation can increasingly be ob-
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served, indicating the growing importance of ethnic German minority
communities. In that respect, the recent Aussiedler migration and inte-
gration mirrors a new trend in many contemporary migration popula-
tions: the tendency not toward fusion into the host society but to the
retention of a distinctive ethno-cultural identity and to organise in self-
sustaining minority communities. To respond to this new development
in a productive way will be one of the challenges of future integration
policies.
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PART II
HERE AND THERE: DIVERGENT COMPARISONS

Polish Berlin: Differences and Similarities with
Poles in the Ruhr Area, 1860-1920
Dorota Praszałowicz
Introduction
Massive Polish migrations to Berlin started in the 1860s and by the
end of the century, significant centres of the Polish diaspora were
firmly established.1 The process of immigrant community building and
decline has thus far been studied mostly from the Polish perspective,
and to a lesser extent, from the German side, focusing predominantly
on cultural continuity and/or the policy toward immigrants.2 As both
Polish and German discourses have been highly ethnocentric, much
less attention has been paid to the integration and assimilation process.
In this paper I will concentrate on the Polish presence in Berlin. The
settlement of Poles in the Ruhr area will be used as a contrasting case,
highlighting the specific characteristics of Berlin as a fast-growing me-
tropolitan city.
The Polish Berlin of the past was exceptional for at least three rea-
sons. First of all the city was located close to the eastern Prussian pro-
vinces where most of the Polish immigrants came from. Secondly, due
to the partitions of the Polish state at the end of the 18th century, until
1918 there was no state border separating Brandenburg with Berlin
from the eastern provinces. The lack of a state border meant that Pol-
ish influx to Berlin, although literally international, was not an inter-
state move.3 Thirdly, it should be emphasised that despite significant
difference between the Polish and German culture, there was no large
cultural distance between the immigrants and the city residents. Poles,
most of whom were Prussian subjects at the time, usually spoke Ger-
man and were familiar with German values and customs.
Geographical and cultural proximity shaped the Polish diaspora in
Berlin in a special way. Its complex social structure, cultural orienta-
tions, and survival strategies differed not only compared to Polish-
American communities, but also when compared to other centres of
the Polish diaspora in Germany, especially the one in the Ruhr Basin.4
Polish communities in other European cities, such as Paris, were very
different as well. The only place with a Polish immigrant population si-
milar to Berlin’s was Vienna’s.5
Polish Communities in Berlin
Polish migrations to Berlin started at the time of the partitions of Po-
land. In the first half of the 19th century numerous members of the
Polish nobility had already served the Prussian authorities at the Ho-
henzollern royal court, in the Prussian state administration, in the juri-
dical system, and in the Prussian army.6 Polish aristocracy visited Ber-
lin frequently, many noble families had apartments there, and some
aristocratic families owned residences in the city. Prince Antoni Radzi-
wiłł married Louise von Hohenzollern (daughter of Prince August Frie-
drich, and niece of King Friedrich II), and after 1815, their palace in
Berlin became an important cultural centre both for the Polish and
Prussian elite. Count Atanazy Raczyński settled in Berlin in 1820 and
between 1842 and 1844 built a palace with an impressive art collec-
tion.7
In 1810, the Friedrich Wilhelm University was founded, which made
Berlin a magnet for Polish youth.8 The number of Polish students in
Berlin increased and represented various social strata. At the same
time Poles found employment at Berlin University as teachers.9 In the
mid-19th century, a new migration stream brought Polish politicians to
Berlin. In 1848, Poles were granted their representation in the Prus-
sian Landtag, and when the German Empire was established in 1871,
Poles successfully won seats in the Reichstag.10
There were several Polish leaders who openly contested Prussian
rule. In the spring of 1848, a Polish military unit of 150 young men
was formed in Berlin. They eventually left for Posen to join an anti-
Prussian uprising there. On the other hand, the events of 1848 brought
fighting Poles closer to the Germans, which is illustrated by 254 Polish
rebels – well-known patriots Ludwik Mierosławski and Karol Liebelt
among them – who were transported from Poznań to a prison in Ber-
lin. Long investigations and the 1847 trial drew followers and relatives
of the arrested Poles to Berlin. They were eventually released during
the events of March 1848 at the request of the local (Berlin) population.
An earlier example of occasional German-Polish solidarity was an en-
thusiastic reception (Polenbegeisterung) of Polish refugees by Germans
in the 1830s. They had fled Russian Poland when the November Upris-
ing there was crushed and found shelter in Germany, especially in Ber-
lin.
One of the Polish communities in Berlin included the artistic elite:
writers, musicians, and painters. They usually did not stay in the city
for long, some (for example C.K. Norwid) were even forced to leave.
Other Polish artists lived in Berlin without causing any controversy.
The musician and composer Feliks Nowowiejski studied and taught in
the Berlin Academy of Music, Julian Fałat and Wojciech Kossak worked
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at the royal court as painters, and Stanisław Przybyszewski, writer and
performer intermingled with Berlin’s international artistic elite.11
The mass influx of Poles into Berlin beginning in the 1860s was
due to economic reasons. Berlin’s urban growth accelerated in the 19th
century, which contributed to the expansion of the city’s labour market,
making it attractive for inhabitants of the agrarian eastern Prussian
provinces – (table 1).12 This Ostflucht became a well-known phenomen-
on and was analysed thoroughly by prominent scholars.13 Many mi-
grants headed for North America where they joined other European
emigrants. While Berlin continued to be an attractive destination,
others settled in the Westphalian Ruhr area and mostly found employ-
ment in the coal mines. In 1910, about 60% of Polish adult males, and
74% of the Masurians in the Ruhr’s three main administrative districts
were coal miners.14
Economically motivated migration to Berlin was more diversified and
consisted of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers.15 Both in Ber-
lin and in the Ruhr area, men and women were evenly represented.16
Poles did not seek their own niche in the local economy. Most of them
simply joined the emerging working class and contributed to its ethnic
mix. Men found jobs in construction and the road works, or worked as
carriers. Other male immigrants found employment in the mechanical,
chemical, and manufacturing industries on which Berlin’s prosperity
was based. Women were employed in the textile industry or worked as
maids,17 whereas Polish women in the Ruhr had limited options for
employment outside of the household.
Both in Berlin and in the Ruhr area the immigrant population was
young, which is typical for economic migrations. Many migrants took
their families with them; others married at destination. At the begin-
ning of the 20th century in the Polish community of Moabit (in Ber-
lin), the intermarriage rate reached some 50%, with Polish men inter-
marrying more often than Polish women.18 Children constituted about






1880 1 123 794
1890 1 578 000
1900 1 888 000
1910 2 071 000
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin 1905, Berlin 1907, p. 14-15; Statistisches
Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin 1912-1914, Berlin 1916, p. 4-5.
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one-third of the Polish community members in the Ruhr, and the si-
tuation in Berlin was probably similar. In both cases, the large number
of families testifies to the stability of the immigrant population.
Although it seems like a contradiction, the Polish communities in Ber-
lin were characterised by both stability and fluidity. Compared to Ber-
lin, the Ruhr Poles seemed to have moved less frequently.
Berlin Poles did not establish one or more ethnic neighbourhoods,
but were scattered throughout the city with a few concentrations in
working-class districts, such as Wedding, Moabit, Kreuzberg, and Frie-
drichshain, as well as in suburbs of Charlottenburg, Spandau, Schöne-
berg, Lichtenberg, Neuköln and Weissensee, which in 1920 became
part of metropolitan Berlin. Throughout its history, Berlin’s immigrant
population shared public space with local German and non-German
populations.
The economic migration brought also Polish artisans to Berlin, the
most visible among them were tailors and shoemakers. Władysław Ber-
kan, a tailor who established a successful workshop in the city centre,
became a well-known leader of the local Polish diaspora. His memoirs
offer an interesting insight into Polish life in Berlin.19
Generally speaking, the Polish diaspora in Berlin was diversified and
represented all social strata. It had its aristocracy, intellectuals, trades-
men, entrepreneurs, clerks, artisans, and workers, and each social
group was internally diversified. It should be noted that the working
class was overrepresented in Berlin when compared to the social struc-
ture in the predominantly rural eastern Prussian provinces. Moreover,
the Polish working class was dominated by unskilled workers. Mi-
grants who were unemployed, and did not return home, found them-
selves on a margin and in the course of time produced an underclass.
Statistics and Estimates
The exact number of Poles in Berlin has been contested and the accu-
racy of the Prussian statistics has often been questioned by Polish eth-
nic leaders. The official data reflected the number of people who de-
clared Polish as their mother tongue. However, many Polish labourers
may have chosen German in order to secure their positions in the host
nation. Table 2 demonstrates some discrepancies between Prussian sta-
tistics and Polish estimates, but these are not very significant, except
for the 1890 figures.
Paradoxically, the Polish estimates quoted here could have been
based on German estimates. At the very beginning of the 20th century,
according to the Deutsche Zeitung, there were 75,000 Poles in Berlin in
1896 and between 80-90,000 in 1900.20 Let us compare these figures
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with volume of migration to the Ruhr Basin (table 3). As migration sta-
tistics indicate, the provinces of Pomerania and Posen continued to
send the majority of their internal migrants to Berlin and Branden-
burg, while the migrations from East Prussia were equally divided be-
tween the Rhineland and Westphalia, on the one hand, and Berlin on
the other. The ethnic mix of these migration streams was complex, for
it included both Polish and non-Polish populations.
Migration to Berlin
Not only Poles but also French, Jewish, Bohemian and Dutch immi-
grants have, since the 18th century, contributed to the plurality of the
Berlin metropolitan population.21 On the other hand, migration from
the eastern Prussian provinces was ethnically mixed. The territory was
populated by Germans and Poles, with Jews, a smaller minority, as a
third ethnic group. The provinces Silesia, Posen (Poznania), and West
Prussia were typical German/Polish borderland, whereas Jews were
concentrated in the cities of Posen, and to a smaller extend in Silesia.22
All three groups became involved in the migration process, probably
with Jews and Germans as pioneers, followed by Poles.23 Jews were
most prone to migration which resulted in significant decline of their
Table 2 Poles in Berlin at the turn of the 19th century
year Prussian statistics Polish estimates
Berlin District Potsdam Total
1890 15,857 11,482 27,339 60,000
1900 27,326 19,255 46,581 50,000 to 90,000
1905 33,333 35,300 68,633
1910 37,655 43,714 81,369 80,000 to 100,000
Sources: Preussische Statistik, vol. 121, part 1, pp. 158-159, vol. 177, part 2, pp. 2-7, vol.
206, part 1, pp. 76-81, vol. 234, part 1, p. 6; Or downik, June 14, 1888; Rose 1932, p. 10.
Table 3 Population born in the eastern Prussian provinces, and living in Brandenburg, the Rhi-









East Prussia 181 616 73 428 114 871
West Prussia 156 657 35 736 43 551
Pomerania 258 426 12 589 8 075
Posen 222 830 46 915 83 873
Silesia 297 350 42 931 50 710
Source: Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, vol. 20, 1930, p. 396.
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population in the province of Posen. In proportion to the size of the
Jewish group, its migration was much more intensive than either the
Polish or the German outflow. In Posen the number of Jews exceeded
55,000 in 1845, which had dropped to less than 40,000 by 1873.24
There is not enough room in this chapter to investigate the ethnic
composition of the migration streams.25 The issue is interesting, how-
ever, as a single example reveals. Władysław Berkan (the aforemen-
tioned tailor) left West Prussia for Berlin in 1880 in the company of a
young German blacksmith’s son from his home village. His companion
had an aunt in Berlin.26 It was a typical example of chain migration in
which the migration network spread over ethnic boundaries. As soon
as the two migrants reached Berlin, however, they separated. The Ger-
man went to his aunt, the Pole who did not know anybody in Berlin,
looked for his fellow countrymen to find provisional accommodations.
So far, we know little about the way the migration process functioned
in the borderlands. It is difficult, therefore, to estimate the ethnic com-
position of migrations to Berlin. Although Berkan’s case could have
been an exception, it is not inconceivable that people of various ethnic
backgrounds left home together heading for destinations unknown.
We know, for example, that the first Polish migrants travelled with Ger-
mans overseas.27 For Jews this may have been different, however. Cor-
nelia Östreich for example asserts that Jewish migration was a separate
phenomenon, and that it had little to do with the migrations of Ger-
mans or Poles.28 This assertion is corroborated by Jewish migration re-
cords (memoirs, letters, ethnic press) which show this process as a
mono-ethnic venture, based on Jewish social capital.
Another important issue concerns the time and direction of migra-
tion streams. The case of the Poles who organised a military unit in
Berlin to return to Posen (to join the uprising in 1848) demonstrates
that there were many migration streams and counter-streams. The
main destination was Berlin, but many returned home (return migra-
tion), whereas some migrants moved repeatedly between their birth-
place and the Prussian capital (circular migration). Finally, Berlin was
also a transit city for many Polish migrants who were mostly heading
overseas or to the Ruhr Basin. The size of this transit migration is diffi-
cult to estimate, however.
The geographical proximity of Berlin to Poland meant that many
Poles in Berlin remained closely attached to their homes. According to
patterns of late-19th century mass migrations, the majority of Poles left
home for economic reasons and planned to return with their savings.29
Many of them did return, in fact. Others, despite their intention to re-
turn, stayed in Berlin, and some planned from the very beginning to
settle there for good. All of them went home frequently, and sent their
children there for holidays.
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Some Poles like tradesmen, businessmen, and politicians commuted
between Berlin and Poland on a regular basis. Others travelled there
periodically, such as the aristocracy and students. Workers who did not
have a permanent job were involved in circular and/or seasonal migra-
tion. Geographical proximity and the lack of a state border resulted
both in high return migration rates, circular, and/or short-term migra-
tions. The trip was relatively short and cheap. Berlin simply proved to
be a ‘close magnet’, easily accessible, and easy to depart from.30 These
different types of migration were not linked to a specific migrant com-
munity, however. Permanent residents and short-term visitors (to take
two opposite cases) were found in all of the Polish communities, in-
cluding the aristocratic, artistic, and working-class circles.
First World War
The First World War greatly stimulated return migration, which had al-
ready commenced at the beginning of the war and only accelerated in
1918. The status of Polish immigrants changed significantly after 1918,
due to the reestablishment of the Polish state. Moreover, the Treaty of
Versailles introduced the option for citizenship. All who opted for Pol-
ish citizenship had to leave Germany before January 1922. Those who
chose Germany were granted German citizenship, and could stay in
Berlin. The main difference between Polish immigrants in Berlin and
the Ruhr district was that the Poles from the Ruhr decided to migrate
in large numbers (between 80,000 and 100,000) to the mines of
France and Belgium, in order to avoid going to Germany. Another
50,000 Poles migrated from the Ruhr to destinations other than
France or Poland. By the late 1920s, the Polish population in the Ruhr
had oscillated between 96,000 and 120,000.31
For those who decided to return to Poland, Berlin became the transit
city once again. The return migration flow was rather chaotic, espe-
cially since both German and Polish authorities tried to limit its vo-
lume. Polish authorities were worried about the rapid influx of people
who needed housing and work.32 German authorities on the other
hand, tried to prevent the emigration of the labour force, and an-
nounced on May 1919 that men between 17 and 45 years of age were
prohibited from leaving. In 1925, 13,491 Poles with German citizenship
and 5,897 city residents with Polish citizenship were counted in Berlin.
The size of the Polish immigrant community had thus shrunk to one-
third of its pre-war size.
Polish leaders in post-First World War Berlin oriented themselves to-
wards the new Polish state and some of them became Polish diplomats
in Germany. A well-known example was Karol Rose, editor of the Pol-
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ish language daily who was appointed to the Polish consul in Berlin.
Other leaders tried to get the support of the Polish government for lo-
cal ethnic activities, but this was complicated by internal leadership
conflicts. Moreover, Polish Berlin suffered from the departure of its in-
telligentsia, whereas many Poles had integrated into German society,
especially those who had opted for German citizenship.33
Cultural Continuity and Integration
Polish immigrants founded their own societies in Germany, especially
in Berlin and the Ruhr area. The Ruhr Poles produced mostly work-
ing-class organisations and in 1902 established their own trade union
Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP), not in the least because Poles
were not permitted to join German trade unions. The ZZP extended its
influence far beyond the Ruhr area, and in Berlin it opened 24
branches with roughly 6,000 members, with another 24,000 in the
Ruhr area.34 Twelve years earlier in Berlin, the Polish Socialist Society
was founded, after the repeal of the anti-socialist laws. The local branch
of the Polish Socialist Party belonged to the Polish Socialist Party of
Prussian Poland with its headquarters in Posen. Interestingly, during
the International Socialist Congress in Brussels in 1893, Germany was
represented by a 40-member delegation that included one Pole, Boles-
ław Przytulski. However, Polish historians rushed to point out that dur-
ing the Congress Przytulski kept in touch with Poles from Russian and
Austrian Poland, and not with members of his own German delega-
tion.
The most numerous, and probably most powerful organisations,
both in Berlin and the Ruhr area, were Polish Catholic workers socie-
ties attached to local German parishes and organised on a territorial ba-
sis. They had their own libraries, organised meetings, lectures and dis-
cussions, and contributed to Polish language education (organised by
educational societies). The members were all required to go to confes-
sion and take communion at least once a year at Easter. In Berlin, the
local affiliates in 1903 formed an umbrella organisation which in 1913
became known as Vereinigung der Pfarrkommitees.35
It should be stressed, however, that the Poles in Berlin produced a
variety of societies which served the diversified local ethnic population,
and which were organised along class lines,36 although the Polish
upper classes contributed financially to charities and the educational
movement, which was led by artisans. This buttressed the ethnic cohe-
sion which was instrumental in sustaining and negotiating Polish na-
tional identity,37 which was further fuelled by the national tensions
after the Polish partitions at the end of the 18th century. German
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authorities hoped to assimilate (Germanise) the Polish population in
the East, while local patriotic elites (part nobility and intelligentsia) ac-
tively and successfully defended Polishness.38
The most influential immigrant organisation was probably the Pol-
ish Industrial Society (Towarzystwo Przemysłowców Polskich – Verein der
Gewerbetreibenden), an elitist organisation founded in 1867 and or-
iented toward educational, cultural, and charity tasks.39 It provided
many Polish local societies (established mostly by artisans and skilled
workers) in Berlin with moral and financial support and also promoted
the Polish bank (Skarbona/Sparbuchse) that was established to make
Polish immigrants financially independent from German financial in-
stitutions.
Both Berlin and the Ruhr area had their own Polish singing socie-
ties, drama circles, political groups, educational organisations, charity
organisations, youth societies, units of Polish Falcons, and women’s
clubs.40 All of these were confronted with the pressures of Germanisa-
tion.41 This hostile policy meant that Poles were unable to establish
their own cultural centre in Berlin prior to 1920. Instead, Polish socie-
ties met regularly in Polish and German restaurants.42 On the eve of
the First World War, there were 60 restaurants owned by Polish immi-
grants, which were popular with both Polish and German customers.
There were at least 20 German restaurants and beer gardens that were
frequented by Polish immigrants.43 This intermingling of Poles and
Germans shows that ethnic mobilisation was unable to prevent integra-
tion.
In 1892, various Polish societies in Berlin formed the Alliance – an
umbrella organisation, which in 1897 brought together 37 of the 40 lo-
cal organisations. In contrast to local societies that limited their activ-
ities to neighbourhoods, the new Alliance organised mass meetings, at-
tended by hundreds (800 to 1,000) of Poles.
Efforts to establish a Polish press in Berlin can be traced back to
1874 and between 1890 and 1897 the Gazeta Polska w Berlinie (Polish
Newspaper in Berlin), a semi-weekly was published, after which it was
transformed into a successful conservative daily Dziennik Berliński (Ber-
lin Daily). This paper was supposed to oppose the socialist weekly Ga-
zeta Robotnicza (Workers’ Post), founded in Berlin in 1891. About the
same time (1890) the popular Polish daily Wiarus was launched in Bo-
chum, aimed at Polish miners.
Notwithstanding the stress on national unity, the Polish diaspora
was split between the political left and the conservative (Catholic) right.
These conflicts may have had a alienating effect, on the other hand,
they taught immigrants how to negotiate and reach compromises.44
For a long time, Polish leaders tried to keep ethnic arguments out of
German politics in order to maintain internal cohesion. They avoided
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involvement in political debates at election times, trying not to support
any political party. In the course of time, however, ethnic activity be-
came politicised. Nationalistic movements, a new form of ethnic activ-
ity, became salient at the turn of the 19th century. The First World War
did not stop Polish ethnic activity, and by the end of the war almost 60
Polish societies were operating in Berlin. In 1921, a new federation,
the Polish Alliance in Germany (Związek Polaków w Niemczech) was es-
tablished to consolidate the Polish immigrant population in Germany.
Most Polish studies on migrations to Berlin focus on the ethnic cul-
tural activities of immigrant societies and ignore the integration pro-
cess. In the eyes of most Polish historians, integration simply meant
Germanisation, which from a patriotic point of view had to be con-
demned. Germanisation could be translated into German as Entnatio-
nalisierung; a very loaded term that implies treason. There are a few ex-
ceptions, however to the Germanisation fixation. Kazimierz Rakowski
who spent few years in Berlin at the turn of the 19th century, pub-
lished an essay in 1901 that presented interesting examples of Polish
involvement in the life of the host community. Another exception is
the memoir of Władysław Berkan who mentioned his frequent interac-
tions with Germans. Memoirs are one of very few sources that shed
light on (good) ethnic relations in the workplace.
The main tasks of Polish ethnic activity, were to promote cultural
continuity and to counteract the pressures of Germanisation. Migration
studies demonstrate, however, that ethnic associations, regardless of
their orientation, always stimulate assimilation.45 They often serve as a
bridge between ‘old’ and ‘new world’, and help ease a cultural shock.
They make it possible for an immigrant to adjust to a foreign world.46
With regard to Polish ethnic activity in Berlin two factors are impor-
tant. First of all immigrant societies had to struggle against unfavour-
able state politics, and secondly (partially as a result of the first) the
ethnic institutional wholeness was never reached.47 The anti-Polish
policy prevented the establishment of Polish parishes and limited the
influence of the ethnic leadership. As a result, Berlin never became a
centre of Polish intellectual life. In contrast to Paris, which in the 19th
century hosted the elite of Polish society including the leaders of Polish
uprisings, the patriotic aristocracy, famous composers, and the popular
romantic poets.
One of the reasons why Berlin failed to become a Polish cultural
centre was its proximity to Poland, where Posen continued to be a
point of reference for the Berlin Poles. The immigrants developed their
own publishing activity, although it was not as important as in other
Polish diaspora centres because they regularly received Polish newspa-
pers, books, and textbooks for their children from Posen. They were
frequently visited by prominent Polish politicians, and if necessary,
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they would go to Posen to consult patriotic leaders about their activ-
ities. A number of Polish societies in Berlin were branches of larger or-
ganisations headquartered in Posen. That was the case of both the Pol-
ish Falcons and the Polish Socialist Party. As a result, the Berlin Polish
elite escaped from the shadow cast by the Poznań elite.48
Another factor which hampered immigrant activity was the lack of
an ethnic parish. Most Polish immigrant communities in the world
were organised around their Roman Catholic churches. Because of the
considerable size of the Polish Catholic population in Berlin, one
would have expected that there would be many Polish parishes operat-
ing in the city. Despite Polish dispersion in Berlin, immigrants tried
very hard to create a Polish Catholic ‘Fürsorge’. This failed, however, be-
cause of the Prussian assimilation policy which culminated in Bis-
marck’s Kulturkampf. At that time, immigrants suffered both as Catho-
lics and as Poles. Moreover, they were not supported by the Roman
Catholic Church in Germany. The Breslau diocese to which Berlin be-
longed exerted assimilation pressure on immigrants instead. In fact,
the Polish situation both in Berlin and in the Ruhr area was typical of
any immigrant group confronted with politicised assimilation pres-
sures.
The Poles nevertheless remained loyal to the Roman Catholic
Church, and put a lot of effort into organising their own Catholic socie-
ties,49 which brought them closer to the host population. Ethnic Catho-
lic societies followed German patterns, and thus helped acquaint Poles
with German associational life. It should be noted that Catholic socie-
ties were unknown in Polish territories at the time. Moreover, the Pol-
ish Catholic societies usually kept in touch with similar German socie-
ties, thus bringing immigrants and natives together. The first Polish
Catholic Society was established in 1865 in Berlin, and this was an-
nounced in the Berliner Volkszeitung in a short note published in Pol-
ish.50 The society met regularly in the Catholic House (German) at
Niederwallstrasse 11.
Polish-German clashes could not be avoided, however. In 1906,
some 4,000 Polish parishioners of St. Marien Liebfrauen Parish an-
nounced a boycott of the parish in the hope that it would attract the at-
tention of the Church hierarchy. Their main aim was to petition for
Polish language services. During the one-year boycott, Poles attended
services in another parish, and did not pay their dues to the St. Marien
Liebfrauen. In general, immigrants were refused the right to have Pol-
ish priests and they had to fight for Polish language services. The only
Polish priest, Rev. Władysław Enn worked in the St. Pius Church in
Friedrichshain between 1885 and 1887. After which, he was sent to Po-
sen. He was replaced by Rev. Wilhelm Frank from Silesia who spoke
Polish but did not contribute to Polish ethnic activity.
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The St. Paulus Church (Moabit) initially hosted a good relationship
between Rev. Marian Wallenrod and his Polish parishioners. But this
deteriorated when a new parson, Rev. Jakob Hoecksfeld, was appointed
in 1910. In March 1914, a conflict over the language of the first holy
communion ceremony arose. The Poles pressed for Polish language
service, but the priest refused. Local Polish leaders thus decided to
postpone the ceremony. In the summer time children were brought to
Posen, where they enjoyed the first holy communion ceremony in Pol-
ish in the local St. Martin’s Church. This case demonstrates the impor-
tance of geographical proximity. There was no other Polish diaspora
centre that could have found this type of solution.
The pressure of Germanisation was not only exerted in Berlin but
also in the Ruhr. The Roman Catholic Church there usually refused to
assign Polish priests, sending instead German priests who had been
trained to speak Polish.51 In 1913, 75 priests were involved in religious
services for the Poles, with only three Poles among them. In 24
parishes, Polish services (with sermons and hymns in Polish) took
place every Sunday, and in 101 other parishes they were organised on
an irregular basis. It should be stressed that not all German priests in
Berlin were hostile toward their Polish parishioners, as the example of
Rev. Marian Wallenrod has already made clear. Another case in point
was Rev. Strombeck who supported decorating a chapel in his church
in Tempelhof with an image of the Madonna of Częstochowa, the icon
of Polish Catholicism.
Notwithstanding the large number of Polish associations and natio-
nalistic activities it should be stressed that the majority of Poles did not
participate in Polish community building. At the beginning of the 20th
century, Kazimierz Rakowski estimated that the size of the Polish po-
pulation in Berlin was roughly 60,000, but according to him, only
about 5,000 joined ethnic societies or read Polish newspapers. That
was much less than in most Polish diaspora centres, especially in the
Ruhr. One of the reasons could have been geographical proximity to
Polish territory which resulted in regular contacts with people at home.
Maybe there was simply no need to find substitution for traditional pri-
mary social relations. Another explanation is the often temporary char-
acter of migration which made migrants indifferent to the ethnic
cause. On the other hand, short-term migrants depended on ethnic
networks and it would seem that they would at least be somewhat in-
volved in the ethnic community.
More adequate explanations point to the problems connected with
national identity. Discussing the size of the Polish population in Berlin,
Rakowski wrote: ‘It is highly doubtful that these people can be called
Poles without any hesitation. They quickly lose their national identity.
Actually, their identities were never fully expressed, instead they were
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based the on social milieu at the place of origin, on the language and
denomination’.52 National identity which was not well constructed at
the time of the peasant emigrations from Polish territories, trans-
formed, and sometimes radically so in their new surroundings. Iden-
tity is always highly contextual and selective and here became renego-
tiated and reconstructed. Those immigrants who declared German as
their mother tongue were not cynical liars. Instead they were probably
confused about their identities, about the differences between locality,
nationality and citizenship, between their every day language and the
official state language.
Rakowski noted that many Poles joined local German societies in
Berlin, and offered a few examples which illustrate the complexity of
the identity question. The first case relates to the Poles who joined Ger-
man Catholic societies and were thus losing contact with their Polish
tongue.53 According to Rakowski there were many Polish members in
these societies, and in one of them, Poles even formed a majority, but
‘still agreed to have meetings in German’.54 Clearly German was per-
ceived as the natural way to communicate in working class circles,
although not among their ethnic leaders.
A highly interesting example of integration is the Kriegerverein, the
Polish unit of the German Kriegerbund. Its members were Poles who
had served in the Prussian army. At their meetings they spoke Polish
and sang Prussian marching songs which they had learned as soldiers.
They proudly identified with Prussia and the Prussian army, and they
regularly celebrated the emperor’s birthday.55 Members of the Krieger-
verein identified both with their ethnic tradition and with the German
Empire. Ethnic identity expressed itself in two ways: First, the society
was a Polish unit of the German association where Polish veterans
could celebrate their past together with their compatriots. They could
have entered local (German) units of the Kriegerbund, but chose to es-
tablish their own ethnic branch instead. Moreover, according to Ra-
kowski, they distanced themselves from Polish ethnic clubs and socie-
ties. Instead, they kept in touch with both the army, and the Krieger-
bund headquarters, and while celebrating the Emperor’s birthday they
usually were provided with live music played by an army band. The
second dimension of ethnic identity is language. Members of the Krie-
gerverein clearly knew German, but preferred to speak Polish. Language
for them was not an element of patriotic discourse, but a matter of
everyday convenience.
Rakowski also discussed a process of ethnic amalgamation. He
blamed intermarriages for the decline of ethnic distinctiveness by a
number of immigrant societies, whose members married German wo-
men. The Polish Singers Society, for example, printed posters advertis-
ing concerts in German. Thus, Polish (male) singers, of whom many
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were married to German women, hoped to reach both Poles and Ger-
mans. Rakowski accepted German language posters, but criticised the
society for singing German songs, and reciting German poetry.56 Eth-
nic amalgamation was also noticed by Abramowicz, the author of an-
other Polish Berlin memoir. Abramowicz wrote explicitly that mixed
marriages stimulated assimilation and that children of these families
did not speak any Polish.57 He complained that over time family names
would be the only remaining evidence of Polish roots.
Rakowski’s laments regarding immigrant integration indicate that
the process was well advanced. This process, however, was eased by the
dynamic of the metropolitan population in which radical and rapid
transformation was underway. The receiving society was a mixture of
local people and large numbers of newcomers, both Germans and non-
Germans. The structural differentiation was advancing and opened up
room for immigrants in old and new social strata. Poles contributed to
the social dynamic and integrated into various segments of the newly
emerging social structure. Most of them joined the working class, a
new strata comprised largely of newcomers. Migration was an inherent
experience of the working class in a time of rapid changes where indi-
viduals faced many options. And so while negotiating their identity
they were free to choose between upward mobility which usually was
consistent with assimilation or cultural continuity (maintaining Polish
identity and traditions) which significantly diminished one’s chances
for social advancement.
The new metropolitan population was pluralistic and dynamic, but
the German Empire was not. The militant nation-state sought to assim-
ilate immigrants, and exerted pressure on them. Immigrants reacted
by adopting various strategies. Most Polish immigrants in Berlin as-
similated into the mainstream German culture.58 They did not leave
many records behind which might offer us some insight into the me-
chanisms of the process, however.
State – Community – Individual
The Prussian state (beginning in 1871) and the German Empire pro-
moted immigration to Berlin. It was expected that the relocation of the
Polish population would break social ties, ultimately leading to the dis-
integration of the Polish community, and that it would push Poles into
revising their identity. The state authorities made it clear that any eth-
nic (non-German) activity was unwelcome. Until the end of the World
War I, there were no ethnic parishes and no regular Polish schools in
Germany. Polish immigrants, in Berlin as well as in the Ruhr area, did
develop an entire range of societies, however. These associations varied
152 DOROTA PRASZAŁOWICZ
in terms of class, attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church, politi-
cal ideas, cultural interests, etc. Still it is important to realise that only
a minority of the immigrant population was ever involved in ethnic
community building activities.
Immigrants adopted various strategies to counter the assimilation
pressures. Most of them conformed, especially since their upward mo-
bility led them into higher strata of German host society. This process
has thus far not attracted much attention from scholars. The reason
may be that it is difficult to find sources which give insight into the
mechanisms of assimilation. Most studies on class and social mobility
in Germany overlooked the ethnic dimension of the process. The Pol-
ish studies, on the other hand, made people believe that the ‘‘ethnicity
forever’’ attitude prevailed.
The analysis of personal documents gives us some sense of how in-
dividuals struggled with assimilation and with the social pressures they
faced in their everyday lives. Those who resisted full assimilation left
some evidence. They gave us insight into their integration process, and
into their efforts to secure cultural continuity. Those who assimilated
did not write much about the process. We know that this process was
not linear, that it was bumpy and complicated. Immigrants had no vo-
cabulary which would enable them to frame the process. However, it is
certainly worth the effort to seek out new sources and continue to
question traditional sources, such as the ethnic press and immigrants’
letters.
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Appendix I
Roman Catholic Parishes in Berlin which gathered many Polish members at
the beginning of the twentieth century
1. St. Hedwig / Św. Jadwigi
2. St. Michael / Św. Michała
3. St. Sebastian / Św. Sebastiana
4. St. Paulus / Św. Pawła
5. St. Mathias / Św. Macieja
6. St. Pius / Św. Piusa
7. St. Bonifatius / Św. Bonifacego
8. Herz Jesu (Charlettenburg) / Serca Jezusowego
9. St. Marien Liebfrauen / Najświętszej Marii Panny
10. St. Antonius / Św. Antoniego
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, Berlin 1907, Jahrgang
30; Amtlicher Führer durch die Fürstbischöfliche Delegatur, Berlin
1912; quoted after Murzynowska 1981, 91.
Appendix II
Polish students at German universities at the end of the 19th century and at
the beginning of the 20th century*
Berlin Breslau Leipzig
1871 58 86 4
1875 24 112 20
1880 43 111 26
1885 64 106 20
1890 59 49 23
1895 64 70 27
1900 79 81 29
1906 106 139 51
1910 128 158 125
1914 132 176 103
* Breslau, Berlin and Leipzig received the largest portion of Polish youth which studied in
Germany. The table gives data for the universities only.
Source: Witold Molik, 1989.
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Appendix III
List of Polish societies and institutions in Berlin (1919)
1. Verein der Gewerbetreibenden in Berlin
2. Verein der Bäcker
3. Verein der Schlachter
4. Verein der Friseure
5. Industrieverein ‘Piast’
6. Verein polnischer Geerbetreibenden in Moabit
7. Verein ‘Bildung’ in Berlin
8. Konferenz des Heiligen Jan Kanty
9. Verein ‘Zuflucht’
10. Vereinigung der Pfarrkommitees
11. Polnische Gewerkschaft
12. Kreis ‘Befreiung’
13. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Niederwalde
14. Verein polnischer Bürger in Berlin
15. Verein ‘Stella’
16. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein ‘Lech’
17. Nationalverein der gegenseitigen Hilfe
18. Verein der Bürger und Bürgerinnen in Moabit
19. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Norden Berlins
20.Polnisch-Katholischer Verein unter der Obhut des Heiligen Josef
21. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein unter der Obhut des Heiligen Anto-
nius
22.Freundeskreis der Polnischen Bühne in Berlin
23. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Berlin
24.Verein Polnischer Schützen in Berlin
25. Verein Polnischer Schumacher in Berlin
26.Verein Polnischer Tischler in Berlin
27.Verein der Kaufmannsjugend in Berlin
28.Verein der Polnischen Jugend in Berlin
29.Musikverein ‘Laute’
30.Gesangverein ‘Halka’ in Schöneberg
31. Gesangverein ‘Harmonia’
32. Gesangverein ‘Cecylia’ in Berlin
33. Gesangverein ‘Echo’ in Neuköln
34. Gesangverein ‘Moniuszko’ in Berlin




39.Männerturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin I
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40.Männerturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin II (Moabit)
41. Männerturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin III (Wedding)
42.Frauenturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin I
43. Frauenturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin II (Moabit)
44.Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Schöneberg
45. Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Neuköln
46.Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Oberschöneweide
47.Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Schöneberg
48.Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Neuköln
49.Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Wilmersdorf
50.Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Oberschöneweide
51. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Lichtenberg
52. Verein der Polinnen aus Niederwalk in Berlin
53. Verein der Polinnen ‘Stern’
54. Verein Polnischer Bürgerinnen in Berlin
55. Verein der Polinnen unter der Obhut des Heiligen Josef in Berlin
56.M. Konopnicka – Verein der Polinnen in Berlin
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A Passage from India:
Trajectories of Economic Integration in London
and Mediterranean Europe1
Mark-Anthony Falzon
In this paper I shall be looking at Hindu Sindhis, a well-defined com-
munity of traders from northwest India. More specifically, I will com-
pare the pathways of economic integration of Hindu Sindhis in two
very different places – London and the Mediterranean island of Malta.
Data for the paper derive from two sources. Intermittently between
1995 and 2000, I conducted anthropological fieldwork in Malta, Lon-
don, and Bombay (Mumbai). I draw extensively on oral history as nar-
rated to me by several senior traders. Research in the Malta National
Archives in 1999 yielded 88 records pertaining to 10 Sindhi firms that
date from 1887 to 1928.2
Any study of migration and integration must include a look at pro-
cesses of economic integration at the national and, increasingly, global
levels. It is evident that, from the vu cumpra (‘want to buy?’) peddlers
selling everything from beach towels to souvenirs in Italy, to Gujarati
corner-shopkeepers in Britain, entrepreneurship of some sort is the oc-
cupational choice of many thousands of immigrants to Europe. This
phenomenon has been studied for various situations (notably the Neth-
erlands and the US) and there is a sizeable body of work on ‘ethnic/im-
migrant entrepreneurs’.3 As the word ‘ethnic’ indicates, most of the
studies trace the integration of immigrant groups into host economies
by focusing on the group itself – in so doing ‘‘they reduce immigrant
entrepreneurship to an ethno-cultural phenomenon existing within an
economic and institutional vacuum’’.4 There is a dearth of studies that
locate particular groups within different spatio-temporal contexts, thus
highlighting the importance of the interaction between ethno-cultural
dynamics and local socio-economic situations, as part of the integrative
process.
In this paper I will try to show that Hindu Sindhi diaspora and mi-
gration are:
– themselves embedded, to paraphrase Clifford, in ‘particular maps
and histories’, these being quite often specific to nation-states;5
– uneven processes that leave ostensibly homogenous (on the basis of
ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.) groups with marked internal dif-
ferentiation as regards access to resources and structural positions
within nation-states and the global economic system.6
Although ‘Sindhi business’ may, on the basis of ethnic affiliation, be
seen as a vertebrate category, in fact it takes on different local hues as
different facets of the diaspora that themselves have developed within
particular historical milieus, encounter specific local situations.
Introducing Hindu Sindhis
Hindu Sindhis (henceforth ‘Sindhis’) originate in the province of Sind
which from 1843 to 1947 was the most northwestern province of Brit-
ish India; Sind became part of the newly-formed nation-state of Paki-
stan with the Independence of India and the Partition of the country
in 1947. When the British conquered Sind and annexed it to their In-
dian possessions in 1843, the province had for several hundred years
been ruled by a series of Muslim dynasties. Prior to the Muslim con-
quest, the population of Sind was predominantly Hindu with a strong
Buddhist presence;7 by the time of the British annexation however, it
was mainly Muslim with roughly one-fifth of the population being
Hindu. The Hindus of Sind were mostly employed in trade and small
business, although a very small number of them served as administra-
tors to the Muslim Talpur Mirs and aristocracy and, later, to the Brit-
ish.
In a nutshell, there were two major waves of population movement
out of Sind. The first, which originated with the British annexation of
the province in 1843, was confined to a group of merchants from the
small town of Hyderabad (to be distinguished from the city of Hydera-
bad in central India) who, leaving their families behind, struck out in
search of business opportunities to places as far apart as Panama and
the Straits Settlements (today’s Singapore). Because the wares they sold
and traded in originally were the handicrafts of Sind (‘Sind works’),
these migrants were known as ‘Sindworkis’ and the type of long-dis-
tance translocal commerce they practised as ‘Sindwork’. This first sig-
nificant population movement was therefore centred solely around
trade and may be described as a ‘trade diaspora’.8
The second migration, on the other hand, was a direct result of the
political and social strife that came with the Partition of India in 1947.
Sindhis left their homes in the fledgling Pakistan en masse and moved
to India or to locations such as Malta where they already had consider-
able business interests. Since then the Sindhis that had settled in India
after Partition have participated in a third migration: the so-called ‘In-
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dian diaspora’ which has seen millions of people move out of the sub-
continent in search of opportunity.
Sindhi migration therefore is typical of modern mass migrations
from India (and South Asia generally), which have taken place within
two broad contexts: the first, that of Imperialism within which Indians
left the subcontinent as indentured labourers or (as in the case of the
Sindhis) independent traders; the second, that of free migration to wes-
tern countries and the Middle East in search of better job opportunities
in all sectors.9 As a result of this series of migrations, Sindhis today
are dispersed in well over one hundred countries. They retain a degree
of cohesion that manifests itself in marriage and kinship practices, in
the politics of group identity and, most notably, in the types of business
relations they engage in. Most importantly, they have managed to inte-
grate and embed themselves into the economies of their various desti-
nations, often taking into their stride sea changes in economic struc-
ture and opportunity. It is at this point that comparison becomes possi-
ble.
The Sindwork Diaspora and the Mediterranean Link
As witnessed by the tragic events unfolding daily on Sicilian beaches,
to immigrants today, Mediterranean Europe is little more than a step-
ping stone towards the economically more promising northern Eur-
opean countries. This, however, was not always so and has to do with
the Mediterranean’s present status as a political and economic back-
water. In order to understand Sindhi migration to Malta one has to
think back to a rather different situation in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, when the Mediterranean was one of the important theatres
of northern European interest; this was particularly true for the British,
for whom the middle sea was an essential part of the route to India,
the ‘jewel in the crown’ of empire.
It is mainly the first wave of diaspora that concerns us here. Sind-
work and its long-distance networks of trade emanating from Hydera-
bad were also, but not exclusively, the product of historical contingency:
a number of causal factors were at play. First, the deposal of the Talpur
Mirs by the British caused a sudden breakdown in the patterns of con-
sumption of high-quality handicrafts by local ruling elites with the re-
sult that established Hindu Sindhi traders had to locate new markets
for their goods. Second, the world in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury was one of rapidly growing opportunities and a British-dominated,
expanding world economy. This happened on two levels: first, the
growing ease of communication and transport in north-west India and
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Sind itself, and second, the global reality of a growing exchange of
goods and people often across vast distances.
British rule expanded the limits of communications and transport in
Sind. In 1889 for example, the Indus Valley Railways that linked up
with major lines in India to connect Karachi to Delhi was completed.
In 1864, the Indo-European Telegraph Department laid a submarine
cable between Karachi and Fao (in what was then Turkish Arabia), join-
ing the Turkish telegraph line and therefore linking up Sind (Karachi)
with Europe.10
More importantly the Suez canal, opened in 1871, proved a major
impetus behind the increasing level of transport and communication.
In 1891,– for instance, Sind participated in some sort of foreign trade
with 37 countries as compared to 18 in 1871.11 The argument here is
not merely that Sind was linked up with the world in terms of enter-
prise and trade, but that this world was itself expanding rapidly due
partly to the British ‘policy of adventure’ and cultivation of free trade.
Besides, the case of Sind is typical in that the second half of the 19th
century witnessed the beginning of large-scale communication technol-
ogies with the diffusion of the telegraph and the invention of the tele-
phone. The period, that has been described as the ‘second Industrial
Revolution’,12 was one of confluence of different technological develop-
ments that created new ways of producing, travelling, and communi-
cating. This point is essential in order to understand the link between
a small landlocked town in Sind and a Mediterranean island. Although
the move out of Sind by Hyderabadi traders was a reaction to local cir-
cumstances, it was feasible only because of the global realities of the
latter half of the 19th century. This then was the infrastructure which
made possible the bridging of geographical boundaries through trade
and brought the first Sindworkis to Maltese shores.
The first Sindwork firms were established in Hyderabad around
1860. After this date one comes across Hyderabadi traders setting up
business in several places around the world. They arrived in Japan a
few years after the 1868 Meiji Restoration;13 in 1890 Bulchand, a bhai-
band from Hyderabad, landed on the shores of the Gold Coast in what
today is Ghana14; around 1880, Sindhi traders went to Ceylon;15 in
1870, Sindhi firms established themselves in Gibraltar, and in Sierra
Leone via Mediterranean routes in 1893;16 and in Hong Kong, a small
Sindhi community was active by the late 19th century.17
The first thrust of the diaspora seems to have been in the direction
of the Mediterranean – Markovits holds that their first destination was
Egypt – and later through India to the Far East.18 The Mediterranean
then, as now, was a favourite destination with travellers and tourists
from Britain and the industrial countries of northern Europe and as
such constituted a profitable market for the handicrafts of Sind –
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which were of high repute among connoisseurs of ‘Oriental’ (in Ed-
ward Said’s sense) artefacts. Around the same time the ‘overland route’
to India through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (rather than
round the Cape of Good Hope) became popular with the coming of
steamers – P. & O. vessels, for example, began plying this route in
1840. Passengers would embark at the ports of the north and sail
round through Gibraltar, disembarking at Alexandria and proceeding
by Nile steamer to Cairo; from Cairo they went by carriage to Suez
where they embarked on another boat down the Red Sea and fre-
quently changed into a third one at Aden according to whether their fi-
nal destination was Bombay, Calcutta, or Madras.19 The names of these
places come up again and again in the papers of Sindworki firms from
the mid-19th century. The Mediterranean, then, with its shiploads of
travellers eager to buy into the idea of ‘authentic’ souvenirs, provided
an attractive market for the Sindworkis.
Later, as Sindworkis diversified into curios and silk and started to
draw upon sources other than local Sind production, they found excel-
lent centres of production and sourcing in India and the Far East, parti-
cularly Bombay (where many Sindwork firms set up depots and, in
some cases, offices functioning in conjunction with Hyderabad) and Ja-
pan. The main line of trade of Sindwork seems to have been the export
of silk and curios from the East to the West. Here the points of the
compass pertain to the provenance of producers/consumers rather than
their location – in the geographical sense, an Indian-made curio sold to
a British traveller in Singapore, for instance, was moving from West to
East. Firms were quick to open new branches and expand their net-
work to places as far away as Panama and Australia, generally follow-
ing the lines of international travel – not surprisingly, their expansion
often converged with the advance of the British Empire, itself the major
actor in the large-scale international human interactions of the time.
Sindworkis in Malta: Tourism and the Trade in ‘Curios’
The earliest record of Sindworki activities in Malta dates from 1887;
when the firm Pohoomull Brothers applied to the colonial authorities
for the release from customs of one case containing ‘Oriental goods
and some fancy weapons as knives, daggers, etc.’ Since the application
states the firm’s intention to sell these wares in its shop, it is evident
that it had been operating in Malta for some time – enough time to es-
tablish a shop that is.20 By the first decade of the 20th century, at least
ten Sindwork firms had established businesses in Malta. For many of
these firms, Malta was one node in a trade network spanning the Far
East, the Mediterranean, East and West Africa, and South America.
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Although the main trade was that of the export of silk and curio items
from the Far East and India respectively to the tourist and visitor entre-
pôts of the Mediterranean and South America, there were significant
subsidiary currents of a more localised aspect. Thus, for example, there
were circum-Mediterranean networks which were engaged in the re-ex-
port of goods that did not sell well in a particular place, or in the export
of locally-manufactured products.
The typical Sindhi establishment in Malta was an import business
and a retail outlet on the main shopping thoroughfare of the island,
Strada Reale (later Kingsway and today Republic Street) in the capital
Valletta. As photographs from the period show, the shops were gener-
ally well laid-out and the wares arranged in an attractive way – this was
a luxury tourist market that required central locations and a quality im-
age.
It is worth keeping in mind that the factor behind the presence of
Sindhis in Malta was the geographical location of the island within the
context of the British Empire. Most Mediterranean shipping routes in-
cluded Malta on their itinerary and this meant a large presence of tra-
vellers, troops, and administrators stopping over briefly and exploring
Valletta, including the main shopping area that was situated a couple
of streets away from the harbour. The dependence of Sindhi firms on
tourists and stop-overs was evident in the spatial location of their busi-
nesses, which ensured that from the time a ship dropped anchor to the
time it left Malta, the visitor was tempted constantly by the Sindworkis’
wares.
Their dependence on the tourist sector was also evident in the types
of goods they sold. Up to around 1930, Sindhi shops in Malta were
mostly engaged in the curio and luxury textiles trade; a typical Sind-
work shopfront sign from 1907, for instance, read ‘Grand Indo-Egyp-
tian Persian Bazaar – Suppliers to the German Imperial Family.’ They
catered to the Orientalist tastes of tourists and visitors and made little
effort to explore the local market. This is not to say that they had no
Maltese customers; turn-of-the-century Japanese ceramics, one of the
lines that Sindhis dealt in, survive in many a Maltese home today.
Shops were stocked with Japanese ceramics and antimony wares,
brassware, silk items of clothing such as kimonos imported mainly
from Japan, silver filigree, embroideries, and curiosities.
The Sindworki firms seem to have been well-organised: they had let-
terheads printed professionally for their correspondence for instance,
and they also enrolled the services of the town’s more established law-
yers when relating to the colonial government. In all cases the head-of-
fices, where the important decisions regarding the firm network were
taken and personnel enrolled, were in Hyderabad; the telegraph was
widely used for rapid communication between Malta and Sind. Most
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Sindworkis present in Malta at the time were salaried employees. Each
firm had a manager and a number of shop assistants (who apparently
often doubled as cooks and servants to the managers) depending on
the size of the firm. The owners of the firms are recorded as visiting
Malta from time to time, presumably to check on the progress of the
branch and scout for new ideas and markets.
Employees were recruited on a two-and-a-half- or three-year contract
basis. Potential recruits were generally located by word of mouth, inevi-
table in a small town like Hyderabad; one case specifically mentions
that an employee was enrolled through an uncle of his who was on
good terms with the owner of the firm.21 The passage to and from Hy-
derabad was paid for by the firm; in the few cases in which salary is
mentioned, it appears that half the employees’ monthly salary was sent
back home to Hyderabad, and the other half given to the employees in
a lump sum when their contracts ended (this was probably only the
case with junior employees). During their period of employment, they
lived together in housing provided by the firm, usually in Valletta itself
or its suburb, Floriana. Neither managers nor junior employees were
allowed to bring their wives and dependants over from Hyderabad and
it was only after Partition in 1947 that Sindhi men in Malta were
joined by their families. There were several instances of relatives work-
ing together in the same firm.22
As regards employment itself, there were two systems in operation.
The first was based on the old gumashta (agent) system whereby the
owner of the firm employed agents to run his various branches. These
agents were a type of working partners – they worked on a commission
basis, and had some degree of autonomy. The second, and by far the
most common, type was that of the salaried employee. Employees were
recruited generally on a three-year written contract that bound both
employer and employee for the duration of that period. Bhaiband boys
were enrolled at a young age (15 or so was a typical age for a son,
slightly older for a relative or acquaintance, to leave school and join a
business) and assigned to a particular branch.
Originally, wherever the Sindworkis went, they tended to keep to
themselves and form little enclaves. They did not necessarily mix with
other groups of Indians present in their destinations as traders or in-
dentured workers. By the mid-20th century, trading associations were
being formed by Sindhis around the world, usually aimed at protecting
their interests as a group. Yet even within these enclaves, competition
was rife. Individual firms expected complete loyalty from their employ-
ees and did not encourage them to socialise widely, especially not with
the employees of other firms. (Again, as the joint petition for better
conditions from Malta shows, the employees did not necessarily sub-
scribe to this idea.) Members of particular firms ate and worked to-
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gether, slept under the same roof, and sometimes did puja (worship)
together – this was partly because the risk of trade information leaking
to another Sindwork firm was a constant worry to the employers and
considered to be too great to encourage a wider socialisation.
Post-1930s Diversification
In the early 1930s, a change took place in the Sindwork business based
in Malta as the main companies withdrew their interests. According to
the memory of Sindhis living in Malta today, this was due to falling
profits. This explanation is probably correct given that the worldwide
economic recession and the resulting flop in tourism dealt a heavy
blow to the silk and curio industry – the firm Udhavadas & Co, for in-
stance, was one of the casualties.23 However, the shops that had be-
longed to these firms did not close down; rather, they were sold to the
former employees (generally to the managers) of the firms, who were
ready to operate at smaller profits. Further proof of this change of own-
ership lies in the fact that today most of the premises from where the
firms operated still belong to the descendants of the erstwhile employ-
ees.
Therefore, since the late 1930s, Sindhi business in Malta has been in
the hands of the erstwhile managers of the Sindwork firms who had
become the owners of the retail outlets, and their descendants. Apart
from the close relatives of the traders who moved from Hyderabad to
Malta (often via a number of intermediate stops in India or elsewhere)
to join their menfolk permanently, Partition produced no significant in-
flux of Sindhis along the established model of ‘splintering off’ the ma-
jor firms and recruiting new people from India. There were two rea-
sons behind this. First, Malta being a very small island with limited
market possibilities, it was not seen as a land of opportunity as were
places such as Hong Kong and Africa. Second, and more importantly,
from 1952 to 1985, tight immigration laws meant that the only Sindhi
men who could move to Malta from elsewhere were those who got
married to local Sindhi girls. As one informant complained to me, ‘we
wanted to do favours to our cousins, but we couldn’t. In 1952, the doors
were closed and we couldn’t bring anyone to Malta. For 33 years not a
single person came from India’. Sindhi business in Malta has therefore
tended to be passed down and/or to change hands within or between
the same 8 to 10 families. The local development of Sindhi business is
therefore a very interesting case study in that it shows a closed system
in terms of number of personnel – even if these people remained well-
connected in terms of both family (through marriage, that is) and busi-
ness to Sindhis across the world.
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This shift in the personnel structure coincided with a general change
of line. Although a few shops continued to deal in the old line of curios
and luxury textiles, many of them started to diversify and explore the
local market, concentrating on a wider variety of textiles. By the begin-
ning of World War Two the strength of Sindhi businesses in Malta had
become the import, wholesale, and retail traders of textiles mainly for
the local market. Many of the shops specialising in curios and luxury
textiles had shifted towards, and diversified into, the general textile sec-
tor. This proved to be a wise choice. The post-war period in Malta was
characterised by the growing affluence and changing expectations of
Maltese society – indeed, old people in Malta today tend to differentiate
strongly between the lifestyles they led before and after the War. The
textiles sector gained steadily in importance as Maltese women gener-
ally (as opposed to a small urban elite, that is) became aware of fash-
ions and started making clothes that went beyond utilitarian principles
and experimented with styles and type of textiles. In the period be-
tween the late-1950s and the mid-1970s, Sindhi retailers enjoyed a veri-
table bonanza of business. Through their family and trading connec-
tions in the Far East and notably Japan, they had access to affordable
and good quality sources of textiles. During that period, they had little
competition from Maltese businessmen and monopolised the textiles
market almost completely – the saying among Maltese seamstresses
was: ‘Jekk trid bicca drapp tajba mur ghand l-Indjani’ (‘If you are looking
for quality textiles, ask the Indians’’).
Things were to change yet again, however. During the last quarter of
the century Malta’s female workforce increased and diversified even as
sex discrimination was officially erased regarding wage rates in 1971.
This meant that there were more women with less time and more cash
to spare who needed smart clothes for everyday use, and who were
therefore prone to buy ready-mades. Sindhi businesses were quick to
respond: by the mid-1980s, almost all of the textile shops in Valletta
had changed their line to ready-mades, with an emphasis on the lower-
middle end of the market. This time competition with Maltese-owned
businesses was intense but the Sindhis were able to combine competi-
tive prices with relatively good quality and managed to hold their
ground in this new sector very well indeed. The proliferation of Mal-
tese-owned boutiques in fact offered new opportunities for Sindhis,
since almost all of them became large-scale wholesalers as well as retai-
lers; previously they had tended to concentrate on import and retail.
Most boutiques owned and run by the Maltese were and still are small
local ventures that rely on wholesalers with established import links
for their stocks. Sindhis relied on their knowledge and established net-
works of translocal trade (one should keep in mind that they could
draw upon a long history of Sindwork) to supply these small retailers.
166 MARK-ANTHONY FALZON
Today around 19 Sindhi-owned businesses deal in ready-mades while
four deal in textiles. The latter specialise in high quality textiles – there
is still a demand for this upper-end market since Maltese women pre-
fer to have clothes made to measure for special occasions such as wed-
dings.
Not all Sindhi businesses made the shift from curios to textiles to
ready-mades, however. Two or three continued to operate in the bazaar-
type line and to cater to tourists as well as an increasing number of
Maltese people looking for off-beat gifts or cheap home decorations.
These bazaar-type shops were very creative and innovative in their
choice of lines. In the early 1980s, for instance, cheap electronics such
as watches, calculators, and games sold very well; again, Sindhi connec-
tions in Hong Kong and other mass-production centres in the Far East
placed them in an excellent position to import, retail, and wholesale to
Maltese shopkeepers. Their shops, situated as they were on Malta’s
prime shopping street, were almost assured brisk business provided
the product was attractive.
The central location of their shops also meant that the Sindhis were
excellently positioned to tap major economic booms as they came.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tourism grew dramatically from an
insignificant trickle and by 1989, the annual figure of one million visi-
tors was reached. A number of Sindhi businessmen (generally those in
the bazaar line) ventured into souvenirs and at present a significant
number of souvenir shops in Valletta belong to Sindhis – at one point,
one enterprising individual ran a chain of four shops, all situated on
the main street and all of which had belonged at one time to the Sind-
work firms.
Since the 1970s, Sindhis in Malta have ventured increasingly into
new lines. One business set up in 1972 specialises in supplying to in-
dustry – his company employs 19 Maltese people and imports and dis-
tributes a range of products used by the local manufacturing industry.
A few have opened Indian restaurants as a subsidiary business to their
import and wholesale trade; these are staffed by chefs and waiters
brought over specially from India (not Sindhis, though) and two are co-
owned with Maltese partners. One young entrepreneur whose father is
in the business of importing, wholesaling, and retailing of souvenirs
and bazaar-type goods has set up a separate real estate agency, again in
partnership with a Maltese businessman.
Worthy of mention is the fact that Sindhi traders in Malta came to-
gether in 1955 to form the Indian Merchants’ Association (Malta). In
my mind this indicates a change in the spatial perception of business.
Before Partition, when Sindworki firms were for the most part based
in Hyderabad, local operations in Malta and elsewhere were seen as
‘branches’, as extensions of the company that is. The morphological
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metaphor of the branch linked geographical extensions across space to
the main trunk based in Hyderabad: the tree was the firm. After Parti-
tion, when it became clear that an eventual return to Sind was unlikely,
local operations were visualised as pockets of business, located quanta
of firms; there was no longer a ‘branch’ connecting them to Hyderabad.
The Association was never very active in actual terms and in 1989 it
was renamed the Maltese-Indian Community, which supports my argu-
ment for a shift in perception towards a located ethnic group. Today it
concerns itself with community activities such as Diwali parties and
running the temple and community centre.
The general trend is that while in the early days of its establishment
Sindhi business in Malta was a specialised operation, it has moved in
the direction of diversification, higher local investment, and embedded-
ness in the Maltese business world. The various lines Sindhis have ex-
plored are in part a result of local market conditions, but they are also
products of connections with Sindhi businessmen living around the
world, which have enabled them to integrate into local economic struc-
tures.
Doing Business in a World City: Sindhis in London
Sindhi business practices in London ought to be understood within the
context of the economy of a city the influence of which has for centu-
ries extended well beyond English or British shores. In general terms,
the importance of London as a node of translocal processes makes
sense within the recent framework of thought advanced.24 The observa-
tion that, as Braudel puts it, ‘cities always have a measure of control
over physical space through the networks of communication emanat-
ing from them’25 is certainly nothing new. Recent theorists, however,
have suggested that in an increasingly interconnected (‘globalised’)
world, advanced service systems tend to agglomerate in a few large me-
tropolitan centres which go beyond the classical connective role of ur-
ban settlements and attain the status of ‘world or global cities’. Sassen
argues that the transformation of the world economy (a process which
gained momentum in the 1960s) to one based on services and finance
brought about a renewed importance of major (‘global’) cities as sites
for certain types of activities and functions.26 ‘World cities’ are the
nerve centres of the globalised economy; they are the sites of most of
the leading global markets for commodities, commodity futures, invest-
ment capital, foreign exchange, and equities and bonds; and they at-
tract clusters of specialised business services, especially those that are
international in scope.27 Moreover, as Castells holds, ‘the global city is
not a place, but a process. A process by which centres of production
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and consumption of advanced services, and their ancillary local socie-
ties, are connected in a global network …’28 Of course, the importance
of world cities extends beyond the economic sphere and, as Hannerz
for instance shows, they serve as hubs of ‘transnational connections’
on levels of cultural production other than the economy.29
London is no run-of-the-mill world city. It belongs with Tokyo and
New York in a league of special importance, and this is partly the result
of its unique history. King describes a process whereby London chan-
ged from an Imperial capital to a world city – a specialised finance and
business centre and base for cultural production in an increasingly in-
tegrated new international division of labour. Especially interesting is
what he calls the period of the ‘internationalisation of London’ from
the 1950s to the 1980s, as a result of which ‘London has become the
arena of international capital, the site for the creation of global prof-
it’.30
Its primacy as a global city and the growing post-war importance of
London as a hub of international commerce and finance crossed paths
with the Sindhi diaspora in three ways. First, the migration of Sindhis
to London in the post-war years is to be seen within the context of the
replacement, by international labour from the former colonies, of a po-
pulation which was employed in manufacturing, and which left the city
as the sector gave way to financial services.31 A few Sindworki firms
had branches in London before Partition, but the bulk of Sindhi migra-
tion to the city (and to Britain in general) gained momentum in the
1960s. Many of the Sindhis who are now self-employed in business
originally moved to London from India as young graduates of technical
colleges (in some cases as students) and eventually caught up with the
Sindworki firms operating there and went into business after a period
of employment with these firms. We note, therefore, a shift in the
sense that many of the Sindhis who moved to London as aspirants to
the technical and professional salaried employment sector ended up
moving on to self-employment using the Sindwork firms as stepping
stones.
One of the reasons behind this shift was the degree of racial discri-
mination which these Sindhis encountered in London. Gul, for in-
stance, moved to Britain from Kenya – where he had held a good cleri-
cal job with the Army – in the late-1960s: ‘When I came here racism
was unbelievable. People made fun of my accent, even though I spoke
excellent English. After years of service with the Army in Kenya, I
came here to be offered a job as a doorkeeper’.
Santosh is now the proud owner of a thriving electronics business
based in fashionable offices in north London: ‘When I first arrived
here, I worked for six weeks in a nightshift job with a dry-cleaning
firm, smelling all the nice smells of piles of clothes being washed. I
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then joined K. Chellaram, with whom I worked for three years before
setting up with my brother-in-law’. Racial discrimination was not lim-
ited to people seeking employment: Dharam, a qualified engineer who
did get a job with a British company run by a ‘particularly enlightened
Britisher’, remembers how ‘clients would often look disappointed that
the company had sent them an Indian engineer’. The factor of discri-
mination, then, prompted many people to seek employment with Sind-
worki firms that had offices in London – as one trader told me, ‘at least
they were Indians like us’. Of course, Sindworki bosses were only too
keen to employ Sindhis, partly because, as one of them put it to me,
‘English employees look at the time and ask for their rights’. The Sind-
worki network in London at the time was rather tight-knit and this fa-
cilitated the entry of new arrivals into the sector. Sindworki offices were
concentrated in the Moorgate area where one building in particular,
Salisbury House, housed several Sindhi offices (about 50 by one infor-
mant’s estimate); the owners of the firms socialised regularly at a pub
there, and the exchange (deliberate or not) of business information was
especially easy. One trader told me how he had taken a week off from
one firm in order to try another, but his boss got to know about this
through the Moorgate circle and was ‘very upset’ about his employee’s
disloyalty.
Today that racial discrimination is – at least on the institutional level
– much less salient than it was in the 1960s, many young Sindhis are
going for well-paid middle-managerial and consultancy jobs in London.
Sindhi parents tend to attach importance to their children’s qualifica-
tions (even if this is not necessarily seen as the antecedent of profes-
sional employment – many of them would still wish their sons to take
over their businesses, for instance) and are generally willing to finance
post-graduate degrees, generally in business studies and management,
at the LSE and other reputed Universities. These young people, there-
fore, find themselves in good positions to take up well-paid jobs, and
an increasing number are doing just that.
The second population movement of Sindhis into London was due
to the ‘Africanisation’ programs which took off in East Africa in the
mid-1960s. East Africa had for a long time been a major site of settle-
ment and business operations for Sindhis, who were generally but not
exclusively involved in the import and wholesale sector; these opera-
tions were of course the product of Sindwork, which had continued to
attract Sindhis from India to Africa after Partition. In 1967 in Kenya,
the rights of non-citizens to stay in that country for any length of time
were withdrawn. Deprived of their right to do business and/or reside
in the country, non-citizen Indians suddenly found themselves in an
uncertain position and in the period between September 1967 and
March 1968, approximately 12,000 Indians rushed to settle in Britain.
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In Tanzania, official restrictions on the private mercantile sector practi-
cally killed off private firms by 1970. In Uganda, Idi Amin expelled all
Indians from the country in August 1972 as the culmination of a series
of ‘Africanisation’ measures orchestrated by himself and his predeces-
sors; a total of 28,600 refugees moved to Britain between September
and November of that year. In a nutshell, by the late-1960s and early-
1970s it was evident throughout East Africa that the era of free com-
merce (and in Uganda, the right of residence) was over, and that In-
dians generally and Sindhis particularly had no future there.32 As a re-
sult, a substantial number of the Sindhis moved from East Africa to
London.
By my estimate, the Sindhis in London today number a few thou-
sand. They have settled mainly in north and central London, and today
distinguish themselves as ‘central London Sindhis’ or ‘suburban Sind-
his’. The former are very wealthy and generally own Sindworki firms
spread over several countries, though some have made their money in
London. The latter are generally people who migrated, as described
above, from East Africa or India and are in small self-employed busi-
nesses or other forms of employment. This is no doubt a broad gener-
alisation – homes in neighbourhoods such as Hampstead or Swiss Cot-
tage often cost a lot of money – but by and large it seems to hold. Sind-
his themselves certainly believed this; they often pointed out to me the
differences in lifestyle between the two groups, and the alleged snob-
bishness of the ‘central London Sindhis’. Lila, whose multimillionaire
Sindworki family belongs squarely in this category, explained to me
how she socialised with women from millionaire Gujarati, Marwari,
Punjabi, and Sindhi families living in central London, and that ‘wealth
has a lot to play in the selection of this circle – six out of my eight best
friends, including three Sindhis, live on ‘‘millionaire row’’ – Avenue
Road near Regent’s Park’.
The second way – after the process of post-war immigration – in
which London’s status as a world city and Sindhi life in it are related,
pertains more directly to business. Sassen has argued that to look at
the global economy in terms of international finance or global telecom-
munications is only part of the story; it leaves out a plethora of activ-
ities and types of workers that are intimately connected to and indir-
ectly produce global flows.33 Thus, a world city consists indeed of city
bankers and jet-setting financiers, but it also consists of substantial po-
pulations of people who are connected to them – whether by cleaning
their offices, fitting fillings to their teeth, or selling them CD-Walk-
mans for their morning jogs. In turn, everyone needs the food store,
the newsagent, and of course the curry house. Sindhis in London have
tended to go into the provision of consumer items, although a substan-
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tial number run restaurants or hotels, or provide some other service
such as dry cleaning.
The huge (presently around 8 million), upwardly-mobile population
of a metropolis such as London creates an insatiable appetite for consu-
mer items; moreover, its cutting-edge commercial practices demand
the latest technologies and innovations, and reward the people who are
in a position to provide them. Sindhis, because of their family and
community connections with Japan and other manufacturing centres
of the Far East, are in such a position. A substantial number of Sindhis
in London are in the electronics line, as evidenced by their presence on
Tottenham Court Road, a hub of wholesale and retail electronics shops.
In this context it is interesting to note how profoundly the routes of
Sindhi business are related to changing global conceptions of quality.
In the early days of Sindhi operations in London (mainly from the
1930s to the 1960s), Sindworki firms often sourced products from Brit-
ain for their wholesale and retail businesses in Africa and elsewhere;
then, British manufacturing was synonymous with high quality in the
minds of many, while Japanese-made goods were seen as second-rate –
as one trader who imported from Japan to East Africa told me, ‘we
used to joke that they lasted a week and then died on you’. But as the
image of Japanese manufacturing changed from that of tackiness to
that of dependable technology and affordability, established Sindhi
business routes were simply reversed to tap into the new global market
trend. Interconnectedness shows up in other, similar instants. Accord-
ing to informants, the ‘hot line’ in the 1970s was the import of watches
and cheap electronics from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea (note the
similarity to the situation in Malta) – then of course, these countries
specialised in such manufacture, and again Sindhis were well-equipped
in terms of business connections to exploit the change. A significant
number of Sindhi businesses in London tap into their connections
with India and elsewhere to cater to the ‘ethnic niche’ market34 – that
is, the large numbers of people of South Asian origin settled in the city.
One trader I met, for instance, made his money importing sari materi-
al through his brother based in Japan, for which he found ready sale
among Bangladeshis in London. Again, this sector is to be seen within
the context of the population dynamics of a metropolis, in the sense
that only an urban locality attracts enough migrants from a particular
place to form ‘ethnic markets’ – in Malta for instance, it would be in-
conceivable for Sindhi importers to specialise in such a sector, because
the country in no way attracts the thousands of migrants that London
and other big cities do.
The third way in which the dynamics of London impinge upon and
interact with Sindhi business practices has more directly to do with the
city’s status as a world city. Many of the major translocal Sindhi firms,
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with branches in several places and generally involved in import and
export but also sometimes in manufacture, have offices in London
which, because of its infrastructure as a world city (communications,
banks, etc.) is seen as an excellent place to co-ordinate business, espe-
cially finance. Possibly the best example of how London serves as a
hub of translocal Sindhi business is that of confirming houses, which
among Sindhis were in their heyday during the 1970s and 1980s. The
principle of the confirming house was summed up to me by a Sindhi
who made millions in the business and now lives in a penthouse over-
looking Regent’s Park in Central London: ‘A wants to import from B,
but he has no money; B doesn’t know A, so credit is out of the ques-
tion; the confirming house steps in as intermediary’. ‘A’ in this case
are Sindhis operating in West Africa (notably Nigeria and Ghana), who
imported goods from Chinese and other suppliers (‘B’) in Far Eastern
countries. Direct credit between these suppliers and Sindhis in Africa
proved very hard to negotiate, and many small traders based in Africa
did not have the type of credit worthiness to go directly to the interna-
tional banks. (With particular reference to Nigeria, there was the addi-
tional problem that Nigerian banks would not open letters of credit on
behalf of exporters in the Far East.) Sindhis in London therefore set up
confirming houses specialising in financing this trade. The confirming
house in London would open a letter of credit in favour of the exporter.
As soon as the goods were shipped, the exporter would get paid by the
confirming house; the confirming house then allowed the importer in
Africa a credit period which allowed him to sell the goods. Again in
the case of Nigeria, the system was for the trader to pay his local bank,
which in turn paid the confirming house in London through the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria.
London was particularly well-suited to act as a hub of the financing
of Sindhi trade. It is a ‘supranational’ key city situated at the core of a
general post-war tendency towards the globalisation of capital; and in
any case, the city has played an historic role as the hub of the world’s
financial system resulting from the accessibility of support services
such as foreign-exchange brokerage, expertise in financing interna-
tional trade, and good communications.35
The Sindhi confirming houses themselves were mostly financed by
British and other banks based or having branches in London, although
some of them also made use of their own finances. They charged con-
firmation commissions of 4 to 5% (occasionally 3 or 6%); this de-
pended on the liability and the stability of the country in question – as
one confirming agent told me, ‘(t)o Liberia I may not accept 10% while
to the US, 3 to 4% will do’. Apparently some countries imposed
charges on money remittance, which practice increased the commis-
sion charges. The credit period was equally variable but was generally
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in the region of 90 to 120 days from the day of shipment. In addition
to these charges, the importer would have to pay the commission
house the interest charged by the bank, plus any other expenses.
There were two types of confirming businesses. The first were
known as ‘house to house’ and were owned by the importing company
itself, typically a large and established Sindworki firm. Apart from fi-
nancing trade, ‘house to house’ confirming houses acted as foils to si-
phon money out of Africa into Britain – the ‘profit’ made by the Lon-
don company would ultimately be coming from the African company
owned by the same people – and therefore distribute the assets of that
company. This distribution of assets was extremely important for com-
panies operating in West Africa, which was seen as a very unstable re-
gion. The second type was ‘third party’ or ‘customer finance’ confirm-
ing houses, which were separately-owned financing companies. Some
Sindhi confirming houses in London had a few Gujarati clients based
in West Africa, but the bulk of the trade took place between Sindhis;
note, however, that this did not necessarily include the exporters, with
whom relations of trust did not matter very much given that they were
getting paid by the banks. Because they were ready to extend credit to
Sindhis based on trust, confirming houses served as excellent step-
ping-stones for businessmen trying to establish themselves, who would
otherwise never have managed to obtain credit from banks, let alone
Far Eastern suppliers – as one confirming agent told me, ‘in a way it is
easier to start a business without initial capital, because of confirming
houses’.
Confirming houses therefore made profits of 4 to 5% on thousands
of business deals often worth vast amounts of money, and many Sind-
his in London became millionaires in a matter of a few years. The sys-
tem constituted a very important node of translocal Sindhi trade for
about 15 to 20 years; all my informants told me that there has been a
decline in its importance since the 1990s. There were several reasons
for this decline. First, apparently the confirming house – importer net-
works were rife with problems of betrayed trust and defaulted pay-
ments, and this prompted many businessmen to be more wary and
limit deals based on trust to relatives and Sindhis they knew well. One
Sindhi who worked with a confirming house in London for four years
told me that he observed several instances of malpractice by the firm,
such as changing the date of receipt of payment from Africa and thus
‘nicking a few days’ more interest’, claiming higher interest than the
bank in London actually charged, and taking deposits from the Sindhi
importers based in Africa before the letter of credit was opened, thus
earning bonus interest on this money (which was deposited in banks).
In addition to these problems, there were those brought about by eco-
nomic and political shifts – the main reason behind the decline of the
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London-Nigeria link, for instance, was the major slump in Nigerian
trade in 1984 – due to falling oil prices.
Discussion
Sindhis around the world are interconnected in terms of kinship, reli-
gion, and ethnicity through practices such as transnational marriage
matching and visiting, an equally diffuse belief in the cult-deity Jhule-
lal, and common myths of origin and historical formation. In this
sense, one may comfortably speak in terms of ‘the Sindhi diaspora’ –
and of course this level of corporacy affects business practice, as I ex-
plore elsewhere.36
On the other hand, the Sindhi diaspora is a highly diverse collection
of strategies which have developed differently on two levels. First, be-
cause the term ‘the diaspora’ in fact subsumes at least three waves of
migration from the sub-continent; and each of these waves is located
within a particular social and historical milieu. First, we have seen that
in Malta Sindhis established themselves as part of the Sindwork dia-
spora of the 19th century; while in London, they mostly derive from
the post-Partition movements and in particular from the expulsion of
Indians from East Africa. Second, it is because of the economic aspect
of ‘the diaspora’ that has developed in response to local situations,
which of course are embedded in local structures of market and com-
mercial organisation. Thus, in Malta, the development of Sindhi busi-
ness has to be understood in terms of a small and somewhat-isolated
(because of immigration laws) community operating within the context
of a small nation-state with limited and shifting local markets; in Lon-
don, Sindhi business practices have for their nourishment drawn on
the dynamics of a world city and its needs and translocal connections.
The personal histories recounted to me in Malta and London can be
differentiated into a number of types. In Malta, they indicate a closed
system of businesses being passed down through families and growing
or shrinking according to the number of men in those families. When
younger businessmen point out changes, these usually refer to lines
and methods of doing business. In London, most Sindhi traders pro-
duce life histories of mobility and the exploration of opportunities and
markets, generally involving transnational shifts. The point is that
‘Sindhi business’ is very much an umbrella term for practices which
vary considerably according to locality. Moreover, it is essential to rea-
lise that trajectories of economic integration, even when underpinned
by the centripetal dynamics of specific ethnic groups, are the results of
historical interactions between mobility and local economic circum-
stance.
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Afro-Caribbean Migrants in France and the United
Kingdom
Laurence Brown
The shortage of comparative studies on Caribbean migration is per-
haps not surprising given that the region’s general historiography re-
mains fragmented by the borders of language, nation, and empire.1
However, in the past decade there has been an upsurge in comparative
scholarship on Caribbean migration, particularly by those seeking to
make connections between contemporary immigration in North Amer-
ica and Western Europe. Led by anthropologists and sociologists, recent
studies have adopted differing comparative frameworks to analyse the
cultural changes and social structures which have shaped the experi-
ences of Afro-Caribbean migrants on both sides of the Atlantic. In ad-
vocating that histories of migration more consciously develop compara-
tive approaches, Nancy Green has identified three distinct analytical
frameworks to interpret population movements; linear, convergent and
divergent comparisons.2 For Afro-Caribbean migration, the linear ap-
proach has been most often used by anthropologists seeking to high-
light the cultural differences faced by the migrants between their socie-
ties of origin and those that they enter as immigrants.3 Sociologists
have tended to construct divergent comparisons contrasting the experi-
ences of Caribbean migrants between different societies to emphasise
the impact of differing state policies or the similar labour markets
faced by immigrants.4
While linear comparisons focus on the relationship between a single
Caribbean territory and the metropole, divergent studies have been far
more geographically ambitious. Covering Caribbean immigrants to the
US, Canada, England, France, and the Netherlands, they often compare
migrant groups drawn from different territories, ethnic groups, and so-
cial classes. This assumption of regional commonality however is
highly problematic due to the historical distinctiveness of migration dy-
namics, trajectories, and systems for each Caribbean society. As Nancy
Foner notes of her own comparative work on contemporary Jamaican
migration, even within population movement from a single country
there can be significant differences due to the social composition of
migrant flows and historical change in both sending and receiving so-
cieties.5 Recognising the individuality of island environments and their
migration systems does not necessarily preclude posing questions of
‘‘big structures, large processes, huge comparisons’’ (to borrow the
Charles Tilly’s phrase), however it does stress the importance of linking
together sending and receiving societies in the same comparative fra-
mework.
Such a multifaceted comparative approach has been developed in Fo-
ner’s studies of Jamaican migrants as well as in Margaret Byron and
Stephanie Condon’s examination of return migration from Europe to
the Caribbean.6 Like their work, this chapter also combines both a line-
ar and a divergent approach; contrasting the integration of two groups
of immigrants into two European societies, but also remaining focused
on their changing connections to the Caribbean. A generational and
transnational comparison of contemporary Afro-Caribbean migration
to Britain and France reveals that processes of integration have not
only differed between the two countries, but they have also changed
over time. These divergent paths of integration were shaped by shifting
state policies and labour markets, as well as by changes in the mi-
grants’ own connections to the Caribbean. The emergence of a distinc-
tive second generation within Afro-Caribbean migrant families in Brit-
ain and France has raised common issues of identity and exclusion,
while also highlighting the contrasting transnational networks which
these communities have constructed.7
Dynamics of Post-1945 Migration to Britain: The Windrush
Generation
Seeking to preserve the formal unity of empire after the Second World
War, British authorities passed the British Nationality Act 1948 which
merged the mother country and its colonies in a single citizenship as
subjects to the British crown.8 The 1948 legislation was intended to so-
lidify the nexus between Britain and the white Commonwealth, and its
implications for colonial immigration from the Caribbean, Africa, or
Asia were largely unanticipated. Arriving in the midst of the debates
over the Act, the SS Empire Windrush docked in Britain in June 1948
carrying 492 West Indian passengers. Surprised by the arrival of these
‘coloured colonial immigrants’, the Labour government saw their
movement as the product of exceptional wartime circumstances in
which a troop transport ship had offered relatively cheap passage to the
UK, and in which Jamaican ex-servicemen with their demobilisation
gratuities had money available to afford the voyage.9 For British autho-
rities, the arrival of the Empire Windrush did not symbolise the begin-
nings of a new mass migration, but rather a unique exception to the
continuing limitations on passenger transportation from the Caribbean
to the UK. Between 1946 and 1950, it is estimated a total of 1,826 West
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Indians landed in Britain, of which a third were stowaways, and the re-
maining two thirds of the arrivals were carried by only six ships.10 Of
these latter passengers from the Caribbean, almost half arrived on the
‘‘exceptional’’ voyage of the Empire Windrush.
Faced with the difficulties of direct passage by sea to the United
Kingdom, Jamaican travel agent Freddie Martin improvised another
route across the Atlantic in the spring of 1950. Martin arranged for Ja-
maican migrants to fly to New York, and then travel on to Britain by
sea at a cost of 90 pounds.11 During the following year, 2,000 immi-
grants travelled to England via North America, which was more than
the total immigration in the first five years following the war. Annual
movement remained at this level for the following year, and when Mi-
chael Banton surveyed West Indian migration to the UK in 1953, he ar-
gued that it was possibly even decreasing.12 However, in the next two
years there was a radical increase in the intensity of movement as in
1954 an estimated 10,250 West Indian immigrants arrived in Britain,
and this more than doubled the following year to 24,500. At the heart
of this transformation were not the ‘push’ factors of unemployment or
population density in the Caribbean, nor the ‘pull’ factors of labour de-
mand in the UK. Rather, the growing flow of migrants was fuelled by
the increasing availability of transportation, due largely to a parallel
stream of emigration from Southern Europe. Mass Caribbean migra-
tion to Britain was directly enabled by its connection to a second mi-
gration system – by the low-cost fares offered by passenger steamers re-
turning to Italy, Spain, and France after having carried European immi-
grants to Latin America.
In January 1955, British authorities were surprised by the arrival of
500 migrants from Barbados, Montserrat, Grenada, and St Kitts at Vic-
toria Station in London. They had travelled by sea to Italy, and then by
train across Europe at a fare of 67 pounds per head.13 As a result, the
British Colonial Office requested its officials in the Caribbean to regu-
larly report on departures from the islands. For 1955, these reports give
details on almost 22,000 migrants, which represented 90% of the esti-
mated arrivals for that year. The colonial reports therefore provide a re-
vealing vision of not only the differing points of departure in the Carib-
bean, but also of the distinctive streams within this intensifying move-
ment.
West Indian immigrants arriving in the UK via European ports (lar-
gely Genoa, Vigo, and Marseilles) represented half the total movement
of 1955. However some of these emigrant ships from Southern Europe
also sailed directly to British ports, and when we include such vessels
like the Auriga (which on separate voyages landed passengers at Ply-
mouth, Genoa, and Southampton) then the total carried by these ships
rises to almost two-thirds. It was this connection between the two mi-
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gration flows – between emigration from Southern Europe to Latin
American and immigration from the Caribbean to Northern Europe –
that was crucial to the development of a mass movement from the
West Indies.
The importance of the changing availability of transportation in
shaping the flow of migration across the Atlantic leads to a reinterpre-
tation of the impact of US immigration policy on emigration flows
from the British West Indies during the early 1950s. The 1952 McCar-
ren-Walter Act, which dramatically reduced the quota for Caribbean im-
migration to the US, is often described as responsible for the dramatic
increase in migration to the UK. However, the decisive change in US
immigration policy came in 1950, with the reduction of its wartime
program of agricultural migrant labour. During the war, 62,439 Jamai-
cans had been seasonally employed on the US mainland.14 While the
changes of 1950 made migration to Britain a more appealing avenue of
economic advancement, it was not until 1954-55 that Atlantic shipping
made such mass movement possible.
A second important aspect of the 1955 figures for migration is that
they highlight the importance of gender relations in shaping the dy-
namics West Indian migration to Britain. The proportion of women
and children travelling together was greatest on the BOAC flights from
Jamaica to London, and on the smaller, regular shipping lines that
sailed directly to Britain. In contrast, the large passenger liners from
Southern Europe often carried predominantly male passengers. Given
the higher costs of the BOAC flights, these were probably paid for by
remittances from Britain, and so often represented dependants joining
their male partners. Yet, as Margaret Byron rightly argues Caribbean
women were not simply ‘‘passive movers’’.15 The strikingly low level of
children who traveled to Britain before 1962, show that most Afro-Car-
ibbean women migrated as wage earners rather than as homemakers.
As Stuart Hall records,
Of Jamaica’s new emigrants to the United Kingdom during
1953-62, 52 per cent were male, 40 percent female, and only 8
percent children... Adults who left Jamaica between 1955 and









BOAC Flights from Jamaica 52 3,209 - 3,209
Shipping for British Ports 61 5,857 2,088 7,965
Shipping for European ports 39 8,470 2,344 10,814
Total 17,536 4,432 21,988
Source: Colonial Office telegrams, LAB 8/1902, National Archives, London.
180 LAURENCE BROWN
1960 were accompanied by 6,500 children but left behind a
further 90,000.16
Many of these children in Jamaica were fostered in rural districts such
as St Elizabeth and St Ann where the proportion of children to adults
increased to over 800 per 1000 adults, whereas in Kingston the pro-
portion was 450 per 1000 adults.17 The low levels of child migration
throughout the 1950s were only partially compensated for by the arrival
of dependants during the 1960s.
The significance of transportation networks in shaping Caribbean
migration is also revealed by the extent to which the early movements
to Britain were dominated by Jamaica. According to departure records,
almost 80% of the Caribbean migrants to the United Kingdom in 1955
were from Jamaica. The development of trans-Atlantic migration from
the Eastern Caribbean was especially shaped by the extension of air
transport to the region. The construction of airstrips on islands such as
Montserrat in 1956, and the growth of regular air services became the
conduit that was responsible for the second upsurge in immigration in
the late 1950s.18 The arrivals in Britain during the peak years of Carib-
bean immigration in 1960 and 1961 were largely carried by air. Three
quarters of the Jamaicans who rushed to Britain during these years, in
anticipation of UK legislation blocking this type of migration, travelled
by aeroplane.19
Access to transport therefore not only explains the total emigration
figures given above, but also the differences in timing between move-
ments from specific territories. In comparison to its population, Jamai-
ca was significantly over-represented in the early movements to the







Jamaica 1,609,814 148,369a 9.2
Trinidad & Tobago 825,700 9,610 1.2
British Guana 558,769 7,141 1.3
Barbados 232,085 18,741 8.1
Grenada 88,617 7,663 8.6
St Lucia 86,194 7,291 8.5
St Vincent 80,705 4,285 5.3
Dominica 59,479 7,915 13.3
St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla 56,693 7,503 13.2
Antigua 54,060 4,687 8.7
Montserrat 12,167 3,835 31.5
Total 3,664,283 227,040 6.2
Source: Peach 1968, 15 & 21.
a From 1953-1961.
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UK. Barbados and the northern islands of Dominica, St Kitts, Nevis,
Anguilla, and Montserrat, also experienced significant emigration to
the UK. (table 2) Local conditions, traditions of migration, and avail-
ability of transport all seem to have fuelled movement from these terri-
tories. In contrast, there was relatively less migration from the south-
ern Windward Islands and Trinidad, due to the latter’s economic ex-
pansion in the 1950s and to fewer transport opportunities.
While streams of movement from each island responded to distinc-
tive dynamics, there does seem to have been a shared vision of migra-
tion across the British West Indies. For many in the early 1950s, their
aims were to ‘‘‘better themselves’ by going overseas for a few years’’
and to then return with the economic and social capital gained in the
outside world.20 While official and public debates in Britain on co-
loured immigration cast the new arrivals as permanent settlers, for the
migrants themselves, most remained focused on returning to the is-
lands they had left behind. The metropolitan vision of Caribbean mi-
gration as unidirectional was reflected in the construction of British
immigration statistics, which regularly published the difference be-
tween immigration and return movements rather than totals for the
two flows. In reality, streams of migrants were moving in both direc-
tions across the Atlantic, although the peak of return migration for
those migrants from the early 1950s paralleled the new influx of the
late 1950s.21
The intention of migrating for several years and then returning,
powerfully shaped both the formation of migrant communities in Brit-
ain and the transnational connections they maintained to the Carib-
bean. Temporary migration made remittances of central importance to
West Indians both abroad and at home. In raising the passage money
for the journey across the Atlantic, family and friends often provided
crucial financial support.22 Migrants therefore arrived in Britain with a
web of economic and social obligations to those at home – to repay
loans, to provide passage money for others, to give material support to
the families they had left behind.23 Remittances were therefore of im-
mediate importance for both the migrants and those at home; in 1960
a quarter of Montserrat’s national income was from overseas remit-
tances ($800,000 British West Indian Dollar, BWI) while in 1963, Ja-
maica received £8.1 million from the same source.24 The need for re-
mittance funds shaped both the employment that newly-arrived mi-
grants sought (as factory work offered immediate wages for regular
remittances) and the communities they constructed in Britain.25
Remittances and chain migration were the core of the transnational
connections established by West Indians in Britain. Initial Labour gov-
ernment policy had sought to actively disperse black migrants across
the country, to avoid the race riots which had erupted in British port ci-
182 LAURENCE BROWN
ties after the First World War.26 However, in the 1950s, Caribbean mi-
grants increasingly congregated together in London, Birmingham,
Leeds, and Leicester as they relied on each other to find housing and
employment. As Ceri Peach writes of London:
Chain migration from islands produced distinctive clusters so
that, north of the river, there is a kind of archipelago of Wind-
ward and Leeward island colonies from Dominicans around
Paddington to Montseratians around Finsbury Park.27
With general housing shortages, and private rental signs frequently an-
nouncing ‘‘No Blacks’’, migrants most often depended on each other
through sharing rooms, sub-letting, or quickly seeking to become
homeowners themselves. Racism in the private housing market, there-
fore forced many West Indians to invest in home ownership, depleting
their resources for remittances or a return passage.28
Racial discrimination also fundamentally shaped West Indians’ entry
into the British labour market. Although contemporaries saw the late
1940s and early 1950s as a period of dramatic labour shortage, the ex-
periences of blacks immigrants were highly ambivalent. In the wake of
the arrival of Empire Windrush in 1948, the Colonial Office identified
nearly a quarter of a million vacancies across Britain in hospitals, metal
foundries, and textile miles, however the Ministry of Labour remained
strongly opposed to the use of black immigrant labour.29 Employers
were also reluctant to hire black males where they would be working
with white women, and were opposed to having more than small num-
bers of West Indians in the same workplace.30 West Indian migrants
therefore tended to be concentrated in certain areas of the economy –
for example, in the transport sector they were initially recruited only as
bus conductors or as station staff on the railways.31 By late 1958, Lon-
don Transport employed 4,000 black workers, a quarter of whom had
been directly recruited from the Caribbean.32
Reinforcing the barriers of racial discrimination was the contrast for
the migrants between the work cultures of the Caribbean islands and
those of their new environment. West Indian economies followed the
seasonal rhythms of export agriculture, which meant that occupational
multiplicity and flexibility were crucial for both men and women to
avoid temporary unemployment.33 The limited monetary rewards avail-
able within the islands meant that skilled labour and status (the latter
derived from clerical or government employment) were highly va-
lued.34 In travelling to Britain, most migrants saw themselves as skilled
or semi-skilled workers, leading Basil Davidson, an economist at the
University of the West Indies, to comment, ‘‘A man would claim to be
a ‘painter’ or a ‘mechanic’ simply because, in some remote past, he
AFRO-CARIBBEAN MIGRANTS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 183
held a brush or a spanner in his hand or even watched someone else
handling these implements’’.35 Davidson’s criticism explains the con-
trast between the perceptions of coloured immigrant labour as un-
skilled by British officials and employers, and the expectations of the
migrants themselves that their vocational skills would provide econom-
ic advancement. The following table comparing 400 Barbadian mi-
grants with the island’s general workforce in 1955 shows that migration
was occupationally selective but was also seen as an avenue to skilled
employment overseas.
Significantly, West Indians faced pervasive discrimination not only in
the private sector of the labour market but also in the public sector.
The hostility to hiring coloured immigrants by government agencies
has been detailed by Clive Harris, and was particularly important given
that this was a period of both economic and state expansion. Harris
stresses that the exclusion of Afro-Caribbean migrants was explicitly
justified on the grounds of culture rather than race.36 However, given
the colonial education system in the British West Indies, such cultural-
based distinctions were exceedingly difficult to apply. These tensions
were reflected in the following description of one Afro-Caribbean can-
didate, who applied for an engineering position at the Ministry of War
1949:
His qualifications were all right; his English was quite good; he
answered pretty well; and although he wasn’t a strong candidate,
he would have been passed as he was. But both departments re-
presented that it was out of the question to appoint him, and
Major Sumner [chairperson of the selection panel] felt bound to
acquiesce. They gave him a border-line mark, but he won’t get
in.37









Agricultural Labourers 5 26 - 31
Professional / Clerical Workers 12 16 23 13
Skilled and Factory Workers 70 29 - -
Small Traders 4 12
Seamstresses 41 15
Domestics 32 25
Other 12 29 3 -
Source: Cumper 1957, 74.
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Discrimination was widespread in both the higher and lower levels of
public sector employment, reflected in Prime Minister Winston
Churchill’s outrage at the several hundred Afro-Caribbean workers em-
ployed in the British postal service.38
The issue of discrimination in the public sector raises the debate
over the State’s involvement in the ‘racialisation’ of West Indian immi-
grants. Randall Hansen has argued that sections within the British
State mounted a principled opposition against a racialised policy, and
that as a whole, politicians and civil servants were far more liberal re-
garding immigration than British public opinion.39 Yet, both of these
arguments focus on policy-making as an internal process, and there-
fore fail to show how the State interacted with other sections of society
(such as the public exchanges that produced Churchill’s objections to
black postal workers). As Kenneth Lunn rightly argues:
Attitudes and cultures were often formulated in the local con-
text, whether it was through the influence of the local state or
community/workplace networks. This is not to argue for the ab-
sence of national input, politically, culturally or economically,
but to suggest that this had to compete with a number of often
oppositional forces, whose origins were from a more localised
setting.40
In examining the reaction of the British State to Caribbean migration,
it is therefore important to focus on the tensions and differences with-
in the State – between national and local bodies, between different
Ministries, and between politicians of the same political party.
Significantly, within British government debates, the Colonial Office
was consistently one of the strongest advocates for West Indian mi-
grants.41 Such a role was certainly shaped by the importance of migra-
tion to Britain’s colonies and its potential impact on the imperial rela-
tionship. In July 1948, reacting to Caribbean disillusionment at the
failure to create a migrant labour scheme to parallel the European Vo-
lunteer Worker program, the Governor of Barbados wrote to his super-
iors:
Quite honestly, I think that the refusal to organise emigration
from the West Indies into the United Kingdom or to give really
adequate or convincing reasons why it cannot be organised is
doing more harm to pro-British feeling and sentiment in this
part of the world than anything which has happened for a very
long time... At the risk of repeating myself, I must once again
emphasise of what extreme importance is a sensible and amic-
able settlement of this question of emigration to the United
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Kingdom. I know that the Colonial Office realises the position, I
don’t think that His Majesty’s Government as a whole does, and
it really is a vital matter in the relationship of certain of the Car-
ibbean Islands, Barbados in particular, with the Mother Coun-
try.42
Yet, as the imperial relationship changed during the 1950s so the Colo-
nial Office’s involvement in immigration policy became increasingly
weaker.43 During the summer of 1961, the legislation limiting Com-
monwealth immigration was deliberately kept secret from colonial gov-
ernments in the Caribbean and delayed until after Jamaica’s referen-
dum on independence.44 Rumours of impending immigration restric-
tions meant that during the same time there was a huge influx of
arrivals seeking to beat the ban. The end of British colonialism and the
closing of coloured immigration were therefore inter-linked processes
which culminated in 1962 with the redefinition of British citizenship
to exclude Afro-Caribbean migrants from the rights of entry to the for-
mer mother country.
Migration and the Tensions of Assimilation in the French Antilles:
The BUMIDOM Era
Nineteen-sixty-two was a decisive year for movement from the Carib-
bean to Europe as it marked both ‘‘the end of free movement from the













Source: Katznelson 1973, 34.
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Caribbean to Britain and the institutionalisation of an organised labour
migration from the French Caribbean’’.45 While the Commonwealth
Immigration Act was being debated in Britain, the French government
created a new state agency, the Bureau pour les Migrations Intéressant les
Départements d’Outre Mer (BUMIDOM) to encourage and shape emi-
gration from the French Antilles to the métropole. Such contrasting
imperial policies were both a product of contrasting conceptions of citi-
zenship and colonialism, as well as the differing position of the Carib-
bean in the respective European empires. Symbolically, Martinique and
Guadeloupe were described as part of France’s vieilles colonies, whereas
the British West Indies which had also been colonised in early 1600s
were labelled as part of the New Commonwealth during the 1950s im-
migration debates in Britain. The close connections between France
and her Caribbean colonies had been reinforced after 1945; directly to
forestall American influence in the region and indirectly by the trau-
matic conflicts of decolonisation elsewhere (particularly the prolonged
war in Algeria).
In the wake of the Second World War, France had redefined its Car-
ibbean colonies as Départements d’Outre-Mer. Départementalisation was
seen as fully integrating the islands into France’s political, economic,
and social welfare system, as well as representing the fulfilment of full
assimilation into Republican political culture.46 Such measures had
been welcomed in Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1946 as important
measures to mark the end of colonialism. However, in the mid-1950s
there was increasing disillusionment at the lack of social and economic
development in the islands, with early supporters such as Martiniquais
poet and politician Aimé Césaire becoming outspoken critics of French
policy. Fuelled by local and international currents, the growing inde-
pendence movements of Martinique and Guadeloupe seemed to culmi-
nate in mid-December 1959 with three days of serious rioting in Fort-
de-France. Fred Constant has emphasised the significance of these
events as the development of state-organised emigration was partly in-
tended to guarantee political stability in the DOMs.47 Criticism of the
limitations of the administrative assimilation of 1946 therefore led to
the effort in 1962 to redefine assimilation into a physical exchange of
peoples between the islands and the métropole.
Fuelling the political tensions of the late 1950s was the economic
transformation of island society in the French Antilles. Administrative
integration in 1946 had led to a dramatic increase in the state bureau-
cracy on the islands. As Edmond-Smith writes of Martinique:
Between 1954 and 1967 the public sector increased the number
of its employees by 239 per cent. The tertiary sector is the main
source of permanent stable jobs and high incomes, it employs
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37 per cent of the total wage earners but has 70 per cent of the
permanent jobs and distributes 73 per cent of the total (Martini-
quais) wage bill. Of a total wage bill of 500 million francs, the
19,000 civil servants receive half, or as much as the 62,000
wage earners of the private sector among whom 56,000 tempor-
ary workers receive one-fifth.48
The economic dominance of the public sector made state employment
a highly attractive career for Antilleans, and explains the strength of re-
sentment against the immigration of French officials from the métro-
pole. For the islanders, ‘‘the position of civil servant is thus highly
prized: the incumbent has a stable job, a regular salary, pension and
status, as well as a salary much higher than that of other sectors of the
population doing similar work’’.49 While emigration from the British
West Indies often drew disproportionately from government function-
aries and clerical workers as they had the resources to travel, for
French Antilleans such employment offered a secure career within the
islands.50
In contrast to the expansion of the public sector, export agriculture
was marked by concentration and mechanisation with the islands’ con-
nection to the European Economic Community.51 The contraction in
the sugar industry was particularly dramatic as production in Martini-
que fell from 86,100 tons to 21,800 tons between 1961 and 1972, and
the island’s agricultural labour force fell from 36,098 workers to
17,000.52 Drawing on Operation Bootstrap in Puerto Rico, emigration
was conceived by French officials as a safety valve to reduce social ten-
sions and unemployment during the period of economic transition.
If political and economic tensions formed the context for the forma-
tion of BUMIDOM in 1962, its explicit justification was the ‘demo-
graphic problem’ in Martinique and Guadeloupe caused by their ra-
pidly increasing populations. Alain Anselin strongly argues that the
rates of natural growth for both islands were decreasing significantly
throughout the 1960s, and that the demographic problem was partly
constructed by French authorities to justify their own policies.53 While
state officials made demographic growth their main rationale for orga-
nised migration, such perceptions did have a powerful impact on gov-
ernment policy, particularly the priority given to family unification and
to young and female migrants. The spectre of population increase
while not the only motive for official action did directly shape the char-
acter of state-organised migration to France.
The emergence of BUMIDOM in 1962 drew on earlier currents of
migration to France which had been fuelled by state action and private
initiatives. In contrast to the British West Indies, it seems that sea pas-
sage was more regularly available from the French islands to Europe,
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so that in 1955, several hundred British West Indians travelled first to
Guadeloupe and then onward to Marseilles and Genoa. In 1954, there
were an estimated 9,240 Martiniquais and 6,380 Guadeloupeans resid-
ing in France, and by early 1962, this had increased to nearly 40,000
Antillais and Guyanais.54 Some of these migrants had been directly re-
cruited as workers for state employment in the post-telecommunica-
tions (PTT) and health services.55 This early emigration to the public
sector in the métropole in the 1950s was fuelled by the status of state
employment in the islands and by the belief that training overseas
would allow emigrants to transfer to a similar occupation in the public
sector at home.56 By 1959, young men in Martinique and Guadeloupe
became subject to conscription for national military service, which, in-
tensified by the conflict in Algeria, also became a major conduit for mi-
gration to the mainland.57 Conscripts were frequently demobilised in
France, with an open option to return to the Caribbean. A far less suc-
cessful scheme was the Service Militaire Adapté which sent conscripts
to public works projects in French Guiana to deliberately encourage
their later settlement in the territory.58
The creation of the BUMIDOM in 1962 therefore directly drew on
these pre-existing flows of migrants to France, however the Bureau had
an important impact in re-shaping the dimensions and dynamics of
movement. The Bureau aimed to provide information to potential mi-
grants, to subsidise their transportation and to place them in appropri-
ate employment or training programs. In its twenty years of existence,
BUMIDOM assisted 84,600 migrants which represented just under
half of the Caribbean immigration into France during the period. Im-
portantly, this migration was developing as other currents of immigra-
tion into France were becoming increasingly constrained. Aldrich and
Connell argue that:
Migration from the overseas départements seemed more appro-
priate than migration from either Africa or the Iberian peninsu-
la, traditional sources of imported labour, because it solved em-
ployment problems both inside the métropole and in the outre-
mer; furthermore it was easier to regulate and was wholly Fran-
cophone.59
As French citizens, migrants from Martinique and Guadeloupe were
eligible for public sector employment that was not available to foreign
nationals, and were largely seen as not raising the cultural or racial ten-
sions caused by the arrival of other immigrant groups.
Family reunification was central to BUMIDOM policy, both for its
impact of demographic growth in the islands and to make the Carib-
bean community in France a more permanent population. By 1966,
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31% of the migrants assisted by BUMIDOM were classified as family
reunions.60 The Bureau adopted a deliberate policy of seeking to en-
courage the migration of children through differential subsidies by
age.61 Such a policy was especially significant given the economic con-
straints which shaped migrant decision-making.62 As a result, the pro-
portion of immigrants under the age of 14 for French Caribbean mi-
grants in 1968 was almost double that of British Caribbean migrants
in 1961 (See Graphs 2 and 3). While large numbers of children were
fostered in the British and French islands during both migrations, it is
probable that the numbers were much lower in the French Antilles
due to the state facilities provided for family migration.
A second core responsibility for BUMIDOM was in providing voca-
tional training to assist in adapting to French society and employment.
Training programs were especially important given the rural back-
ground and low educational qualifications of many of the early mi-
grants.63 The Bureau organised training programs in construction, me-
tal work, domestic service and health care but few of these schemes
seemed to offer occupational mobility. The limited nature of the train-
ing offered confirms in some ways the criticisms that BUMIDOM was
focused on recruiting unskilled labour for particular sectors of the
French economy.64 Significantly, BUMIDOM’s programs deliberately
attempted to disperse the migrants across France, with the intention
that they would move into local employment.65 However, most mi-
grants opted to move to Paris instead where they had social connec-
tions or better economic prospects. Such attempts to spread migrants
geographically, echoed efforts by British authorities in the early 1950s.
Both policies were motivated by fears of migrant concentrations creat-
ing racial tension, and both failed due to the social networks and ambi-
tions of the migrants themselves.
Family connections as well as BUMIDOM recruitment were two fac-
tors which encouraged Afro-Caribbean migrants into the public sec-
tor.66 With the decline during the 1970s of France’s manufacturing in-
dustries, and the increasing growth of the service sector, both metropo-
litan and island economies reinforced migrant preferences for state
employment. By 1982, while 60% of French labour force were engaged
in the tertiary sector, such employment represented 80% of France’s
Afro-Caribbean workers.67 Male migrants were concentrated in the
PTT and police, while almost 40% of female workers were involved in
the health services. State employment however gave such migrants lat-
eral rather than vertical mobility, as most were concentrated in the low-
er levels of the public services.68
With attempts to close off foreign immigration to France in 1974,
the growing problems of domestic unemployment in the metropolitan
economy, and the intensifying criticism within the Caribbean of state-
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sponsored emigration as fuelling dependency rather than development,
BUMIDOM policy became increasingly controversial. As a result, the
agency gave priority to encouraging family migration during the
1970s, and was closed in 1982 by the new Socialist government. Re-
placed by the Agence Nationale pour l’Insertion et la Promotion des Tra-
vailleurs d’Outre-mer (ANT) the focus of government action shifted away
from encouraging emigration to facilitating the integration of the exist-
ing migrant community and to assisting return migration to the Carib-
bean.69 This reversal in immigration policy was paralleled by a policy
of political decentralisation which was also intended to stimulate eco-
nomic development in the islands and therefore lessen the internal
forces that fuelled migration to France.
Diverging Transnational Communities, Converging Second-
Generations
While the changing contours of state policy had a powerful impact on
the initial arrival and integration of Afro-Caribbean migrants in Wes-
tern Europe, the communities they have established in Britain and
France have also been shaped by their changing connections to the Car-
ibbean. Demographically, there is a significant contrast between the
Caribbean-born populations in Britain and in France. The British Car-
ibbean-born community has ‘aged’ with little Caribbean immigration
after the late 1960s, and with a steady return migration back to the
Caribbean by retiring workers.70 In contrast, the Caribbean-born com-
munity in France maintained a relatively constant demographic profile
between the 1968 and 1990, largely due to the continual movement
between the islands and the métropole. One important difference for
the Antilleans in France is the decrease in Caribbean-born children un-
der 14 in 1990, which reflects the significance of BUMIDOM’s family
reunification policy for the earlier movements.












Source: Byron 1996, p. 95
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More problematic is the comparison between Caribbean-born migrants
and the second (or third) generation in the two countries. Recent Brit-
ish censuses have shifted to a subjective approach to ethnic identifica-
tion, whilst French censuses identify the second generation based on
parentage, but limit this category to those under the age of twenty-five
and unmarried.71 As a result, there are considerable difficulties in both
countries in estimating the total population of Caribbean-origin.












Source: Byron 1996, p. 95
Graph 4 Estimates of Population of Caribbean-Origin in Britain, 1951-1991
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Graph 5 Estimates of Population of Caribbean-Origin in France, 1954-1990
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Dominating the contrast between the two communities is the continu-
ing and concentrated character of movement between the French Antil-
les and France. While the Afro-Caribbean community of France is de-
scribed as the troisième ı̂le, there is no similar reference for British West
Indians who often have family divided between the UK, the US, Cana-
da, and various Caribbean territories. Concentration has reinforced the
intense physical interaction between France and the DOMs. From
1967, BUMIDOM organised subsidised return vacations to the Carib-
bean which by 1970 had grown to almost 6,500 per year.72 Workers in
the French public sector were able to lobby for a conge bonifié, in which
they were able to claim two months vacation in their home island sub-
sidised by the State.73 Return flows of migrants to the Caribbean were
also encouraged by the economic problems which struck France be-
tween the mid-1970s and mid-1980s.74 As a result, Byron and Condon
argue that ‘‘French migration became relatively dynamic by the 1980s,
with people confident of moving in either direction, if and when it was
convenient and affordable for them to do so’’.75 These constant move-
ments between the troisième ı̂le in France and the Caribbean (as well as
the growth of tourism) fuelled a tripling of air traffic to the region be-
tween 1971 and 1991.76
The concentration of migration movements was also reflected in the
high level of island endogamy amongst the relationships of Caribbean
residents in France. Endogamy was not only facilitated by continual ar-
rivals, but also by the intention to return to the Caribbean. French cen-
sus statistics are unclear as to whether partners from the métropole are
of Caribbean or European origin, so that the high level of island endo-
gamy recorded in the following table would still be an underestimate.
Such a pattern of family relationships echoed the island endogamy of
Caribbean migrants to Britain in the 1950s which was fueled by net-
works of chain migration and by their ambition to return. One early
Montserratian migrant to Britain stated:
Table 4 Co-Residential Relationships of Caribbean Migrants to France, 1990
Male’s Place of Birth
Female’s Place of Birth Guadeloupe Martinique Métropole Non-French Total
Guadeloupe 14,220 2,836 4,880 1,476 23,636
Martinique 2,880 15,532 5,548 1,560 25,872
Métropole 8,396 10,932 - - -
Non-French 1,436 1,828 - - -
Total 27,552 31,920 - - -
Source: Marie 1993, 106.
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My wife comes from Montserrat too. That way there is no head-
aches. We can go back to Montserrat – or move anywhere – at
any time and we won’t be quarrelling. I am not looking to go
back to Montserrat just yet. The English are a tolerant people for
now. But it might go the other way. You never know when you
are a trespasser in another man’s country.77
However, as Caribbean migrants became a more permanent commu-
nity in Britain during the 1960s, patterns of relationships changed and
island endogamy declined. The decline of island chauvinism and the
construction of a black British identity was both a cultural phenomen-
on and expressed in social relationships.78
A second key divergence between the Caribbean communities of
Britain and France was the differing perceptions of integration held by
European policymakers. Strikingly, issues of integration and assimila-
tion were largely downplayed by BUMIDOM in contrast to the fears of
British civil servants that coloured immigrants would create racial con-
flicts like those occurring in the US during 1960s. Yet, despite this
fundamental contrast in government policies between the two coun-
tries, the experiences of Caribbean immigrants in the labour market,
education, and housing have been remarkably similar.79 Therefore, for
the second generation of both communities there has been a tendency
towards convergence, especially during the economic crisis of the early
1980s.
The experiences of the descendants of Afro-Caribbean migrants to
Europe during the 1980s, in many ways anticipate the recent US de-
bates over ‘second generation decline’.80 Given that much of the Amer-
ican scholarship on the second generation is still at a speculative stage,
especially for Caribbean migrants whose children have yet to enter the
labour market, the European experiences of an earlier migration seems
to offer an important comparative perspective.81 In both Britain and
France, the economic upheavals of the 1980s resulted in dramatically
high unemployment levels for Afro-Caribbean men. Employment in
the service sector to some degree shielded Afro-Caribbean women from
the collapse in the labour market.82 In France, the most recent mi-
grants (largely those in their twenties) suffered double the national un-
employment rate.83 Such experiences highlight the importance of the
national economy in setting the parameters for integration, although
the contrasting approaches of Mitterand and Thatcher to their respec-
tive Afro-Caribbean communities shows that state policy also has a sig-
nificant influence in politicising social issues.84
In 1997, the British-raised writer Caryl Phillips crossed the Atlantic
on a banana boat to retrace his parents’ journey from St Kitts to Brit-
ain. At the end of his voyage, Phillips described how:
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On this bleak late winter’s morning, I am happy to be home. As
I look at the white cliffs of Dover I realise that I do not feel the
sense of nervous anticipation that almost forty years ago charac-
terised my parents arrival, and that of their generation. I have
not travelled towards Britain with a sense of hope or expectation,
I have travelled towards Britain with a sense of knowledge and
propriety, irrespective of what others, including my fellow pas-
sengers, might think.85
This image of the different journeys faced by two generations of Carib-
bean migrants highlights the profound historical changes which have
shaped both their own identities and the European societies in which
they have settled. Island cultures and transnational social networks
have been refashioned in environments which have been dramatically
transformed in the second half of the 20th century. The first and sec-
ond generations of Caribbean migrants to Western Europe have there-
fore followed differing paths of integration, as they have responded to
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Trade Unions and Immigrant Incorporation:
The US and Europe Compared
Barbara Schmitter-Heisler
The process of immigrant incorporation (or exclusion) is complex and
shaped by many factors. Among the most important, are the character-
istics of immigrants (their ethnic/racial characteristics, their human
and social capital), the economic, social and political characteristics of
sending and receiving societies, and the relationships between them.
Recent theories and research has focused increasingly on the latter
characteristic, in particular the creation and maintenance of transna-
tional ties and transnational communities. While the transnational per-
spective has provided new insights into the changing contemporary
reality, this perspective has tended to marginalise or simply exclude
many of the variables deemed important in previous society-focused
perspectives.
The question of whether transnationalism is a new phenomenon or
just a newly discovered one, has been the subject of some debate.1 The
purpose of this paper is not to contribute to this debate. I tend to agree
that the transnational dimensions of immigration while not new, have
become increasingly more salient for understanding immigration and
its consequences in the 21st century. Yet, this need not imply that other
variables have become marginal or irrelevant for our understanding of
immigrant incorporation.
Indeed, it is not unusual that variables deemed important in pre-
vious perspectives are discarded or marginalised when a new perspec-
tive becomes more and more accepted, only to reappear at a later point.
A good example for this process is the paradigm shift in the 1970s
from the assimilationist model to the differentialist model of immi-
grant incorporation. In this case, we can observe a more recent return
to an, albeit, revised assimilationist model.2
This chapter is loosely based on an assimilationist/integrationist per-
spective, where integration is seen as a process, not a final state, and
where integration is a matter of degree.3 Borrowing from Theda Skoc-
pol’s ‘bringing the state back in’, the broader purpose of this paper is to
bring the host society back into the equation.4 I propose to do this
modestly by focusing on one host society institution, namely trade un-
ions.
Trade Unions and Immigrants
Among host country economic, social, political and cultural institu-
tions, trade unions merit particular interest. They have been the chief
champions and representatives of working class interests in industrial
societies and the majority of immigrants to such societies have been,
broadly speaking, members of the working class. This was the case at
the turn of the last century and it is the case today.
Although trade unions are primarily social organisations that repre-
sent the interest of the working class vis-à-vis employers and the larger
society, they also play important economic and political roles. In cham-
pioning economic, social, and political rights for workers and advan-
cing and representing working class interests, trade unions have played
an important historical role in integrating the working class into the
economic and socio-political fabric of advanced industrial democracies.
As the majority of immigrants to industrial societies then and now
have occupied unskilled and semiskilled positions at the bottom of the
labour market (i.e., they are members of the working class), and as
trade unions represent the interest of this class, immigrants appear to
be the natural constituents of unions.5
The potential integrative thrust of trade unions is threefold. First, at
the societal level, trade unions may defend the interests of immigrants,
by attempting to influence immigration policy and anti-discrimination/
anti-racist legislation. Second, at the level of the work place, immigrant
union membership does not only establish institutional ties between
newcomers and unions, it may also serve as a basis for participation in
other political and social organisations, including political parties, and
voluntary and community-based organisations. Third, at the level of
union organisation, trade unions may provide immigrants with posi-
tions of leadership. These activities develop and strengthen ties be-
tween newcomers and existing institutions, increasing the formers’
stakes in the host society’s institutional and organisational structure.
Yet, the relationship between trade unions and immigrants has often
been a difficult one as unions confront two major dilemmas: whether
to support immigration or to support restricting it, and whether to re-
cruit immigrants as members or to exclude them. How they respond
to these dilemmas is crucial to their role in the process of incorpora-
tion. While part of the institutional structure of all advanced industrial
societies, trade unions differ in a variety of characteristics (e.g., struc-
ture, ideology and goals, density, and role in the political system). They
also change over time, as they must adapt to changing economic, so-
cial, and political circumstances. As such their roles in the process of
immigrant incorporation are expected to vary across societies and over
time.
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My central question concerns the conditions and circumstances un-
der which trade unions are more or less likely to contribute to this pro-
cess. This question is best addressed within a historical (then and now)
and comparative (here and there) framework. While the main purpose
of the paper is explorative and analytical, I will frame the questions
and discussions using illustrations from the United States, France, and
Germany.
I begin with the United States for two reasons. First for better or for
worse, much of the literature on immigration and immigrant incor-
poration explicitly or implicitly has drawn on the ‘American experi-
ence’. Second, the scholarly literature on immigration and trade unions
is considerably more developed in the American case. By taking the dif-
ferences between the United States and Europe into consideration, a
more detailed exploration of the American case will then allow me to
ask some questions about the two European cases.
Trade Unions and Immigrants in the United States, Then and
Now
A key characteristic of the American experience is the fact that mass
industrialisation coincided with and was fuelled by mass immigration
in a society where the prevailing ideology promised the newly arriving
‘huddled masses’ success through hard work and a piece of the Ameri-
can dream. At the same time, American capitalism at the turn of the
century was probably the most ruthless and employers wielded often
uncompromising power in their attempts to thwart union organisation.
Until the 1930s, the American state invariably and staunchly supported
the interests of employers over those of workers. In this context, the
trade union movement confronted significant economic, social, and po-
litical difficulties in organising an ever-growing, ethnically and racially
diverse labour force. In a situation where unions were squeezed from
above by the employers and the state, and from below by immigration,
‘immigration has played a decisive role in the American version of la-
bour politics’.6
As a result of this and other factors, particular to the United States,
such as the extension of voting rights to white males before the advent
of mass industrialisation, the American trade union movement has
been less ideological and more pragmatic than its European counter-
parts.7 Their overall pragmatic posture and relative independence from
political parties (often identified as the source of American union
weakness), however, has given American unions considerable flexibil-
ity, allowing them to adapt more rapidly to new and changing situa-
tions.
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In terms of the first dilemma, until the 1980s, American unions
have fairly consistently opted for restriction, supporting all legislative
initiatives to restrict immigration.8 Vernon Briggs’ historical examina-
tion of the relationship between union density and immigration rates,
showing an inverse relationship between the two appears to support
the rationality of this choice: unions gained strength when immigra-
tion was low and lost strength when immigration was high.9 In a con-
text that assumes that restrictionist legislation is an effective tool for
controlling immigration, the unions’ quest for restrictions seemed ra-
tional and promised results.10
While the legislative efforts of American unions are well known,
their organising efforts and successes with foreign-born populations
are frequently overlooked. Although the evidence suggests that un-
skilled immigrants had been eager to unionise at the turn of the cen-
tury,11 the structural and ideological limitations of the member unions
of the AFL (American Federation of Labor) which had become the
dominant labour federation by 1900, made them uninterested or even
hostile.12 As craft unions they sacrificed the broad interest of the work-
ing class to win increased wages and benefits for their exclusive mem-
bership, primarily skilled workers, most of whom were native born and
they were strictly opposed to recruiting among the unskilled, most of
whom were foreign-born.13
The changing industrial structure associated with mass production
in the 1930s gave rise to the new industrial unions of the CIO (Con-
gress of Industrial Organization). It is important to note, however, that
the rise of the CIO came at a time when immigration had been se-
verely restricted (the decade 1930-1940 had the lowest number of im-
migrants since the 1890s) and immigration issues had receded from
the national agenda. The new CIO unions welcomed the unskilled, in-
cluding the long-marginalised African-Americans who had migrated to
the industrial North in the period after the First World War and the un-
skilled first- and second-generation immigrants.14
In addition to welcoming the immigrant populations, the unions of
the CIO and many AFL unions that adopted the structure of industrial
unions in the 1930s served as a vehicle for economic integration and
cultural assimilation.15 As George Sanchez observed in the case of Mex-
icans in Los Angeles in the 1930s and 1940s, union activity played a
crucial role in changing the perspective of Mexican-Americans toward
political activity in the United States, making labour and political activ-
ity the ‘greatest ‘‘Americanization agent’’’16
Union membership offered first- and second-generation immigrants
opportunities to develop leadership skills as union officials and second-
generation immigrants predominated among CIO activists.17 The suc-
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cess of unions in turn brought foreign-born workers into the economic
mainstream, providing them with stability and dignity.18
Union membership rose steadily in the period after the Second
World War, at a time when legal immigration was relatively low,
although undocumented immigration was clearly on the rise in the
1950s. In the period between 1950 and the 1980, unions focused on
routine activities such as enforcing existing contracts. Organising activ-
ities had become less important and were ‘conducted according to
long-standing routines’.19
The historic 1965 Immigration Act, which was supported by the un-
ions, was not intended to open the country up to a new and massive
wave of legal and increasing undocumented immigration, especially
from Mexico which had been outside the previous restrictive quota sys-
tem, but was now included in the new system. Beginning in the
1960s, undocumented immigration increasingly occupied legislators
and unions.20 The unions saw the undocumented as a significant
threat and supported all legislative efforts aimed at eliminating or at
least reducing the flow of undocumented workers. Consequently, they
welcomed and strongly supported the provision for employer sanctions
in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. With the exception
of the United Farm Workers Union, which joined the AFL-CIO in
1965, the unions did little to organise legal or undocumented immi-
grants who continued to arrive in increasing numbers throughout the
1970s and 1980s.
The rapid increase in mass immigration that began in the 1970s also
coincided with deindustrialisation and a decisive shift to a service econ-
omy. The decline of the manufacturing sector (and associated job
losses) which had been the backbone of the union movement in the
1950s, and the rise of the service economy contributed to a rapidly de-
clining union membership (from a high of slightly above 30% of the
labour force in the 1955 to 15% in 1990).21 The new unskilled service
sector jobs were increasingly filled by women and new immigrants,
and the latter no longer originated predominantly in Europe, but hailed
from Asia and Latin America, particularly Mexico.
As was the case with the AFL at the turn of the 20th century, the
AFL-CIO unions initially saw these new workers as difficult to organise
and as a threat to wages and working conditions and they took a defen-
sive stand. In the service sector they concentrated on organising the
skilled, such as teachers, and municipal and county workers most of
whom were citizens or long-term legal residents, not recent immi-
grants or undocumented workers.22
Beginning in the early 1990s, facing an all-time low membership,
the two major union federations, AFL-CIO and the Teamsters, radically
changed their positions as champions of restrictionism to champions
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of immigration. At their 1993 annual convention in Washington, DC,
the AFL-CIO issued a historic policy resolution that praised immi-
grants ‘in building the nation and its democratic ideals,’ and ‘playing a
fundamental role in building our movement and continue to make in-
dispensable contributions to the strength of our unions to this day’.
The resolution concluded by stating that ‘immigrants are not the cause
of the nation’s problems’ and that the AFL-CIO was committed to pro-
viding fair opportunities to legal immigrants and due process to those
entering the country illegally.23
In line with the new thinking, in the mid 1990s the AFL-CIO op-
posed some of the recommendations of the Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform aimed at curtailing illegal immigration and at reducing le-
gal immigration, contributing to the defeat of the proposed measures
and allying itself with a formidable coalition of interests that included
the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Christian
Coalition, among other strange bedfellows.24 At the 2000 New Orleans
meeting of the Executive Committee, the AFL-CIO announced that it
was seeking the repeal of employer sanctions and that it favoured a
new amnesty bill for six million illegal immigrants. John Wilhelm, Pre-
sident of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers International Union, made
it clear that ‘the labour movement is on the side of immigration’.25
The unions’ new direction was not just restricted to pious senti-
ments and announcements. The 1993 resolution included a new com-
mitment to organising and strategies for all member unions to develop
programs for immigrant members and potential members and to work
with immigrant advocacy groups.
Harking back to the organising heydays of the CIO and the need to
organise the unorganised, the unions have made a renewed commit-
ment to organising workers that had previously been excluded, in parti-
cular women, minorities, and immigrants.26 To underline their new
commitment, the AFL-CIO created a new organising office and set
aside $20 million for organising campaigns.27 With the help of bilin-
gual organisers, they began aggressive organising and recruitment
campaigns among immigrants in the service sector where they have
been concentrated, including the hotel and restaurant industry, the
construction industry, the garment industry, the food industry, and
among janitors.28
The new leaders that came into office in 1995, including John Swee-
ney (AFL-CIO) and Richard Trumka (Teamsters), were at the forefront
of these changes and they have brought into high positions Hispanic
leaders such as Linda Chavez-Thompson, AFL-CIO vice-president in
charge of immigration issues and Eliseo Medina, vice-president of the
SEIU (Service Employees International Union).29 Indeed, within the
AFL-CIO, the SEIU has become the fastest growing union with around
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1.4 million members.30 Referring to immigrant membership in SEIU,
Eliseo Medina, West Coast Vice-President of the union, noted that
‘thirty percent are immigrants, twenty percent are children of immi-
grants’ and among the immigrants ‘many are here illegally’.31
This historic turnaround has met with some success in union orga-
nising among Hispanic immigrants in particular, and in areas of heavy
Hispanic concentration, such as California.32 While much of the orga-
nising efforts have concentrated on Latinos, the largest immigrant
group in the United States – Latinos have proved to be relatively easy
to organise (some have argued because unions are common in Latin
America) – union organising efforts and successes have not been re-
stricted to the Latino population. They have included Asian women at
the Los Angeles airport, Armenian workers in home health care, and
even parking attendants from East Africa,33 and Taiwanese immigrant
workers in Los Angeles.34
Unions have not stopped at bringing immigrants into the union
fold. They have also pursued broader social justice ends,35 often hand
in hand with other progressive groups and organisations.
In August 2003, the AFL-CIO joined with other organisations to de-
mand changes in immigration law and policy, including calls for the le-
galisation of undocumented workers, and better work place protection
for temporary foreign workers.36 To mobilise the new coalition, and to
‘spotlight immigrant rights and the injustices of current immigration
policies’,37 the AFL-CIO has played a key role in organising and spon-
soring, ‘the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride’ consciously modelled
after the 1961 civil rights movement freedom rides. Making direct re-
ference to the struggle of black Americans during the civil rights era,
John Sweeney rallied supporters stating that ‘we believe as Martin
Luther King Jr. believed, that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere’.38
Unions have also mounted campaigns to encourage immigrants to
seek American citizenship and vote.39 An exit poll of Latino voters in
the recent Los Angeles mayoral election found that 22% of these voters
were union members and that the vast majority had voted Demo-
cratic.40
This historic turnaround was a clear response to rapidly declining
membership rates in a changed environment that threatened union
survival and was championed by a new progressive leadership elected
in the 1990s. The new leaders did not only recognise that the new im-
migration was here to stay, but that continued and unquestioning sup-
port of restrictive legislation would only alienate potential new mem-
bers. Most important perhaps, they recognised that in the age of globa-
lisation, such legislation was doomed to be ineffective. In these
circumstances, it made more sense to abandon previous support for re-
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strictionist policies, to welcome immigration and immigrants, includ-
ing the undocumented, and to step up efforts to organise them. As Ro-
ger Waldinger has noted, ‘the AFL-CIO is now one of the few main-
stream organisations that has come out as decidedly pro-immigrant’.41
As was the case during the heydays of the CIO, unions have pro-
vided immigrants with leadership positions at the local level and the
national level and they have championed their cause in the larger so-
ciety.42 While the longer-term effects of this turn-around cannot be as-
sessed at this point, American unions have recognised the need to or-
ganise immigrants and have committed themselves to this task. Most
recently, the relative importance of organisational efforts has been fore-
most among the issues leading to a pull out of seven member unions
from the AFL-CIO to create the Change to Win Coalition. The rene-
gade unions’ leadership had grown dissatisfied with the continued de-
cline of unions and the slow pace of organising.43 John Wilhelm, co-
president of UNITE HERE (hotel, restaurant and garment workers),
declared that the union was committed to spending half of its revenue
on organising campaigns. Immigrants will be the main target of these
campaigns.44
Europe, Then and Now
While immigration and immigrants have played a role in the creation
of the working class in many Western European societies (France, Ger-
many, Switzerland, and Belgium), in none did in-migration reach the
numbers or proportions found in the United States. Although France,
like the United States, and unlike Germany, was considered a country
of immigration during the early period of unionisation (between 1895
and the First World War), migrants constituted a relatively small pro-
portion of the population (rising from 2.5% in 1906, to 3.9% in 1921
and to 6.1% in 1926).45 Until recently, Germany imported ‘foreign
workers,’ who were not expected to settle there but eventually return to
their countries of origin. In the period between 1890 and the First
World War, foreign workers in Germany made up approximately 4% of
the labour force.46
Compared to the United States, the historical and contemporary
scholarship on trade unions and immigration in Europe is more lim-
ited.47 Most existing scholarship focuses on the positions of trade un-
ions regarding immigration policy and there is little scholarly work on
strategies to bring immigrants into union organisations. The dearth of
literature is particularly pronounced for the pre-Second World War
period.
208 BARBARA SCHMITTER-HEISLER
The comparative literature on trade unions is rich with discussions
on the divergent development of unions in the United States and
Europe and frequently points to the absence of a strong socialist move-
ment in the United States as an example of American exceptional-
ism.48 While American unions have tended to be pragmatic and not di-
rectly linked to political parties, European unions have been more ideo-
logical, and more closely linked to political parties, communist,
socialist and Catholic. Before the Second World War, the trade union
movements in Germany and France were characterised by multiple
federations, each with its distinct ideology and party affiliation.
While French union organisation has undergone some changes
since the early 20th century, in line with the overall political discontinu-
ities in recent German history, changes in German trade unions have
been more dramatic. In 1933, shortly after coming to power, Hitler
abolished all independent trade unions, replacing them with the Nazi
Party affiliated German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront). After the
Second World War, German trade unions reorganised into a unitary
structure in one federation, the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund-
German Trade Union Confederation).49
Students of French trade unions agree that French union structures
have been fragmented and divided along ideological lines often leading
to rivalries between federations.50 The two most important federations
in terms of membership today, are the CGT, and the CFDT (Confédera-
tion General du Travail, Conféderation Française Démocratique du Tra-
vail), followed by the FO (Force Ouvrière). Compared to German un-
ions, which have been well integrated into the post-Second World War
corporatist system of decision-making, French unions have had some
difficulties forging coherent political strategies vis-à-vis the state.51
Although German unions have experienced some decline in mem-
bership (from 40% in 1950 to 33% in 1997), union membership in
France has fallen precipitously from 30% in 1950, to a low of 9 to 10%
of the labour force, the lowest union density among industrialised na-
tions, a ‘trade unionism without members’52 which finds itself in a
‘deepening crisis’.53
French Unions, Then and Now
Although the French State encouraged immigration and the assimila-
tion of immigrants before the Second World War, unlike the United
States, France failed to develop a comprehensive immigration policy
and immigration remained a kind of laissez-faire system for the first
seventy years of the 20th century. Before the Second World War French
unions generally favoured the overall restriction of immigration hoping
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that it would reduce the supply of labour. Support or opposition to re-
strictions, however, varied somewhat with the rise and fall of unem-
ployment. During periods of low unemployment unions were more in-
clined to support immigration and they were strongly opposed when
unemployment increased.54
In their 1918 program, and in keeping with their universalist ideolo-
gical position, the pro-Communist CGT (France’s largest federation
founded in 1895) officially defended ‘the right of all workers whatever
their nationality to have the right to work where they can’55 and wel-
comed immigrants as members. In the 1930s, when economic and po-
litical crises gave rise to high unemployment and increased xenopho-
bia, both the CGT and the CGTU (which had split off the former in
1920) pressed for immigration restrictions now arguing that immigra-
tion served the interest of capital at the expense of labour. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that the CGT co-operated with the government’s ef-
forts to send home thousands of workers in the 1930s.56
Although unlike the AFL the French labour movement subscribed to
a more inclusive, internationalist ideology, the organisational efforts of
French unions have been relatively weak.57 Thus, by 1914 the French
labour movement had organised only one million French workers,
making it barely capable of unionising foreign workers, who are notor-
iously more difficult to organise,58 and French law preventing foreign
workers from occupying leadership positions in unions further reduced
foreign workers’ interest in union membership. In turn, the unions’ in-
ability to use immigrant union leaders further limited their abilities to
recruit more immigrants into its fold and foreign labour organisers
were often subject to expulsion.59
In the 1920s, the CGT and in particular the CGTU did make some
attempts at organising foreign workers and defending their interests.
The CGT advocated equal pay for foreigners holding the same jobs as
French persons, opposed the expulsion of foreigners for union activity
and advocated the right of foreigners to become elected unions offi-
cials.60 Although the CGT established a national office for organising
migrants in 1924, the union’s organising drive met with little success.
By 1929, only about 7,500 of the 90,000 Polish miners had joined the
CGT’s miners union and of the 425,221 Italians in France only 15,000
had joined CGT unions.61
The CGTU’s organising efforts included the creation of a special de-
partment for foreign workers with a central co-ordinating office in
Paris and regional offices in the provinces and the establishment of
ethnic sections. Unlike the CGT, which supported the principle of
prioritising French workers at the onset of the Depression in 1930, the
CGTU continued to favour a policy of equal treatment. In its 1931 and
1933 Congresses, the CGTU supported the ‘complete freedom of fron-
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tiers, an abolition of all police measures and control of immigration
and an end to all expulsions’.62
Noting that language represented a significant barrier to organising
immigrants, the CGTU organised French classes for immigrants,
urged union leaders to learn foreign languages and printed pamphlets
and propaganda in Spanish, Polish, and Italian. In the face of lacking
enthusiasm among French members and new waves of expulsions of
foreign militants, these efforts met with little success. In 1925, the
CGTU miner’s union could only claim to have organised some 2,200
Polish workers, representing only 8% of Polish miners. In the 1920s,
at a time when some 438,000 Italians were working in France, the
CGTU declared an Italian worker membership of 10,000 to 25,000.
Despite its pro-immigrant internationalist stance, ‘the CGTU failed to
integrate the foreign worker into the French working class’.63
Given their past inability to shape immigration policy, in 1945,
French unions strongly supported the creation of an Immigration Of-
fice (Office National d’Immigration) and they were given representa-
tion on the agency’s Administrative Council. Yet, the unions’ quest for
control over immigration proved illusory as the ONI turned out to be
ineffective. As long as the French economy was growing, employers di-
rectly recruited labour abroad by-passing the office, or immigrants sim-
ply arrived to seek work. As a consequence, the work of the ONI was
reduced to regularising workers already in France, issuing work and re-
sidence permits, rather than controlling their entry.
While the French government ignored these practices throughout
the 1950s and 1960s, in 1968, it tried to gain some measure of control
by moving to end them for unskilled workers.64 After several decades
of neglect, and following the economic downturn of the early 1970s,
immigration policy became a salient issue in France.65 In 1974, follow-
ing the oil crisis, the French government suspended further work-re-
lated immigration and began to tighten residence permits and citizen-
ship rules.
Given the ‘uncontrolled’ flow of immigration until the late 1960s, it
is hardly surprising that the CGT officially opposed immigration begin-
ning in 1947 and continued to do so throughout the 1950s and early
1960s.66 In the late 1960s, recognising that immigration was unavoid-
able, both the CGT and CFTD (the CGTU had reunited with the CGT
in 1936 and the CFTD had emerged from the Catholic union move-
ment in 1964) no longer opposed it in principle, demanding instead
greater government control and the legalisation of undocumented im-
migrants.
They also recognised the need to organise immigrants and to defend
their rights,67 at the work place and in the larger society, including
their right to housing and the absence of discrimination. During the
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volatile 1970s, unions supported several radical strikes and actions in-
itiated by immigrants.
Although there were some minor differences between the two major
federations, both established commissions for immigrant workers at
the national and departmental levels and organised language and edu-
cation groups. Unfortunately little is known about the successes or fail-
ures of these policies, especially their effect on membership recruit-
ment and immigrant leadership positions within the union.
Beginning in the late 1980s, economic and political developments
forced the unions to rethink their approach,68 and they began to con-
sider a more open policy. As the more regulated labour markets of the
1960s and 1970s gave way to highly competitive, less regulated labour
markets, and as the state’s ability to control immigration weakened,
unions pursued a more nuanced approach. While they continue to seek
to reduce the numbers of immigrants, they recognise that immigration
is inevitable and that overly restrictive policies only forces immigrants
into a precarious underground.
Thus unions have increasingly favoured policies that bring immi-
grants into the mainstream. These include the legalisation of undocu-
mented workers, the extension of work and residency permits, the fa-
cilitation of permanent residency and the liberalisation of family reuni-
fication. They have taken these positions in opposition to anti-
immigrant measures taken by the French government in the past
twenty years.
At the same time, unions continue to focus on education and train-
ing, providing literacy and language courses and teaching French work-
ers to be more tolerant, sympathetic, and understanding of newcomers.
In keeping with their ideological position French unions have contin-
ued to engage broader societal issues, including the need for adequate
housing, the teaching of the mother tongue and calls for equal wages
for equal work. All three federations (CGT, CGTF, FO) have focused
particular attention on the problems of racism, which they see as a pro-
blem for all workers, French and immigrant alike.
Despite their political/ideological and tactical support for immigrants
and immigrant issues, French unions have not been successful in at-
tracting immigrants as members. While they have championed immi-
grants and their rights, immigrant union membership has remained
below that of natives.69
German Unions, Then and Now
While migrants came to work in Germany before the First World War,
unlike France, Germany did not experience much in-migration in the
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inter-war period, and during the war the Nazi government made ample
use of forced labour.70 Mass immigration to Germany is primarily a
post-Second World War phenomenon and Germany emerged as the
most significant immigration country in Europe in the latter half of
the 20th century.
While much of the work on pre-First World War migration to Ger-
many has focused on Polish workers,71 foreign workers in Germany in-
cluded several nationalities, including citizens of Austria-Hungary, the
Netherlands, and Italy.72 Although most were not considered immi-
grants and were expected to return to their home countries, some man-
aged to remain and settle in Germany.
Until the Nazi government abolished free trade unions in Germany
in 1933, the German trade union movement was divided along ideolo-
gical/religious lines. The two most important union federations were
‘free’ social-democratic unions and the Christian unions, with the for-
mer being by far the largest and most influential.73 After significant or-
ganisational struggles during the latter part of the 19th century, the
German union movement grew considerably between 1896 and 1913.
Membership in the free unions increased from one million in 1904, to
two million in 1910, and reaching 2.54 million in 1913.74 In the same
year, the Christian unions counted only 350,000 members.
As was the case for French unions, German unions’ attitudes toward
foreign workers tended to vacillate between internationalism and pro-
tectionism, moving closer to protectionism during periods of economic
crises (e.g., 1900-1902 and 1907-1908).75 Of the two federations, the
Christian unions tended to be closer to the protectionist pole. Unlike
the free unions which variously supported immigration and stressed
solidarity with foreign workers, they opposed unrestricted immigration
and supported the preferential treatment of German workers.76
While the free unions recognised the need to organise foreign work-
ers and began publishing pamphlets and periodicals in Polish, Czech,
and Italian as early as 1898, their successes in recruiting foreign work-
ers, were rather meagre. By 1912, only 7,000 Italians working in Ger-
many had joined unions,77 and officials in the construction workers’
union (most Italians worked in the construction industry) reported that
only 6 to 7 thousand of the 130,000 Italians working in that industry
had joined the unions.
While the Polish workers in the agrarian East had little chance to or-
ganise, as most German agricultural workers were not organised, the
Polish miners in the industrial areas of the Ruhr presented a geogra-
phically concentrated industrial work force and a potential membership
for the German trade union movement. While both the Christian and
free trade unions officially opened their doors to Polish miners they ig-
nored their cultural differences, and language needs.78 Although sev-
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eral thousand Polish miners were said to have been members of the
two German unions, Polish workers did not feel that German unions
represented their interests.79 In 1902, Polish miners organised their
own union, the ZZP (Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie) in Bochum
and membership in the ZZP grew rapidly, soon counting 20,000
members.80 While the ZZP often collaborated with German unions
(especially the Catholic unions) in strike actions, it also stood in oppo-
sition to them concerning religious and in particular nationality issues.
Although French and German unions took a more inclusive, uni-
versalist stand than American unions, often taking pro-immigrant posi-
tions, the evidence reviewed above suggests that in the period before
the second World War, they were barely more effective as agents of in-
tegration than their American counterparts.
In their four country comparison (Germany, France, Switzerland and
Great Britain) of immigration in Europe, Castles and Kosack note that
‘German unions have probably done more than those of any other
country to integrate the foreign workers into the labour force and have
taken on welfare functions going beyond the normal trade unions
tasks’.81 The DGB’s welcoming stance can be partially attributed to the
fact that in the German case, unlike the French case, the government
sought the unions’ agreement before recruiting foreign workers begin-
ning in 1955 when German unions occupied a position of power and
influence that eluded French unions. While not enthusiastic about the
prospect of bringing foreign workers to Germany, especially at a time
when unemployment was still a factor, the unions agreed provided that
the workers recruited would be treated equally to German workers in
terms of wages and working conditions.82
Until the mid-1970s, German unions supported the prevailing no-
tion that immigration to Germany was a temporary phenomenon and
that the ‘guest workers’ would eventually return to their countries of
origin. As such they did not object to the passage of the restrictive
1965 ‘Aliens Act’. A few years later, when many progressive social
groups, including churches, recognised that the temporary had become
permanent, unions were at the forefront of supporting changes in the
law leading to its eventual liberalisation.83
In his review of German trade union attitudes and actions, Kühne
describes four phases.84 In the first phase (1955-73), unions saw migra-
tion as temporary and concentrated their activities on insuring equal
rights for migrants at the work place. In the second phase (1973-82),
following the recruitment stop of 1973, unions supported the right of
family reunion, but also a more restrictive regulation for the reunion
of children and spouses. In the third phase (1982-1990) trade unions
were among the first groups to recognise the fact that Germany had
become a country of immigration and needed to adjust its laws and po-
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licies accordingly. In keeping with this recognition, unions sought to
improve immigrants’ residence and socio-political rights. They also ob-
jected to the possible expulsion of foreigners drawing unemployment
and welfare benefits proposed by the government and a law aimed at
enticing immigrants to return by providing them with monetary incen-
tives.
Among the DGB member unions, the IG Metall (Industriege-
werkschaft Metall, metal workers’ union, until recently Germany’s lar-
gest union within the federation) was particularly active in supporting
immigrant workers’ rights and was the first to call for voting rights for
immigrants in local elections.85 It also opposed the 1990 Aliens Law as
not sufficiently liberalising and demanded the liberalisation of the re-
strictive citizenship laws. While continuing to favour immigration re-
striction, but in recognition that Germany had become a country of im-
migration, IG Metall and the DGB supported a new immigration law
that would allow immigration based on a quota system that would take
employment conditions into account. In the fourth phase, 1989 to pre-
sent, trade union concerns focused on the asylum and refugee crisis.
In view of political pressure to undermine the liberal asylum law de-
rived from article 16 of the German Constitution, trade unions em-
barked on a vigorous campaign to maintain the existing right to asy-
lum.86
The DGB supports the strengthening of the legal position of immi-
grants already in the country, but opposes economic migration which
is deemed to have adverse effects on labour market policy. In this con-
text, the unions are especially opposed to short-term migration. Voicing
their support for more systematic integration policies, the unions fa-
vour the granting of automatic permanent residency permits for for-
eigners who have been in Germany for a long time, arguing that the
current system of diverse legal statuses reduces immigrants’ readiness
toward integration. Along similar lines they have urged increased re-
cognition of foreign diplomas. Recognising that discrimination is a rea-
lity, they also support an anti-discrimination law.87
At the organisational level, in the first and second phase, German
unions have been quite successful (especially when compared to their
French counterparts) in bringing immigrants into the union fold. This
was less due to their organisational skills and tactics, then to the fact
that the majority of immigrants until the late 1970s were working in
manufacturing industries, which had been the source of traditional un-
ion strength.88 Like the French unions, German unions did make
some accommodations to their new comrades. They established special
offices for immigrants, they provided language courses, and they
placed immigrants in special administrative union positions dealing
with foreigners. Yet, beginning in the late 1980s, immigrant union
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membership and the number of immigrants elected to union officers
which had increased steadily in the 1980s, stagnated.89
Spoilt by past successes, German unions have confronted some diffi-
culties in adjusting to the changing conditions of a post-industrial and
globalised economy.90 Having grown accustomed to their privileged
position in Germany’s post-war social and political system, they are
now ‘groping to regain the initiative’.91 Having been able to rely on
their institutional resources (labour laws, industry level bargaining), or-
ganising has become ‘the stepchild of German unions’92 and German
unions have come to view organising in terms of communication and
publicity, often using advertising companies to sell the ‘union product.’
While such methods are hardly effective in retaining existing members
and organising non-members, they are likely to be even less effective
in recruiting new immigrant workers. As Wolfgang Streeck has re-
cently pointed out in the case of IG Metall, more than 50% of that un-
ion’s members are above the age of fifty. Furthermore he remarked that
the unions are out of touch with the contemporary political under-
standing of young German people in general and young people of im-
migrant descent in particular.93
Conclusion
Given the lack of systematic data, the conclusions that can be drawn
from the previous discussion are tentative. While trade unions are in a
position to contribute to the integration of immigrants, the literature
on trade unions and immigration, especially in the two European
cases, has focused on union policies toward immigration and immi-
grants in general and the data on union actions and activities toward
immigrant workers, on immigrant membership in unions and their
leadership positions within unions are sketchy.
Despite differences in ideology and structure, trade unions in all
three countries had little success in organising immigrants before the
First World War. In the American case, the unions of the AFL opposed
immigration and rejected immigrants as members. German and
French unions vacillated between restrictionism and internationalism.
While they generally supported the rights of migrants, and made some
feeble attempts to organise them, they also had to confront the legal re-
strictions imposed on foreign labour and the workers’ own return or-
ientation and fears of deportation. Overall, unions probably played at
best a minor role in the process of immigrant integration in all three
countries. In the case of the United States, the organising drives of the
CIO unions provided increasing opportunities for first and second im-
migrants and the evidence suggests that they played an important role
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in the process of integration throughout the 1930s and 1940s, at a time
when new immigration was low.
The picture in the period after the Second World War is more mixed.
In the German case, unions were initially able to recruit immigrants
into the union fold, but they have had some difficulties in adjusting to
new socio-economic conditions and new constituents, including more
recent immigrants. Like French unions they have concentrated primar-
ily on defending the rights of immigrants in the larger society. While
their immediate post-war position and activities, helped immigrants ad-
just to German society, their relatively unchanged stance in the face of
a rapidly growing service economy and new types of immigrants, in-
cluding asylum seekers and refugees may have lessened their potential
as an integrative force in the 1990s.
French unions have tended to concentrate their resources on lobby-
ing for political issues, and mobilising strikes and demonstrations.
While many of these issues have included issues directly relevant for
immigrants (e.g., anti-racism campaigns, campaigns for the religious
rights of Muslims), there is no evidence that they have actively pro-
moted their union membership.
Compared to German unions, French and American unions have
been relatively weak and both have confronted significant membership
losses in the past thirty years. In contrast to French unions, however,
American unions have begun to respond to these losses. Harking back
to their pragmatic lineage, they have recognised that their very survival
depends on organising the new labour force in the service sector, and
much of this labour force is immigrant labour. As has been the case
with the changes from the AFL to the CIO during the 1930s, begin-
ning in the 1990s the AFL-CIO has attempted to inject new vitality
into the American labour movement by championing immigrant equal-
ity and rights and like the CIO in the 1930s, the ‘new’ AFL-CIO has re-
turned to its organising roots. Most recently, the relative emphasis and
urgency placed on the need to organise immigrants, women and mino-
rities and to aggressively promote them to leadership positions, has
been at the heart of a new split within the American labour movement.
Whether the new Change to Win Coalition will be successful in its
quest to revitalise the American labour movement and to act as an inte-
grative force for millions of low skilled and poorly paid immigrant
workers labouring in the service sector, remains to be seen.94
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Konzeption der Ausländerbeschäftignugspolitik’’ Bonn, 1977. The unions had
participated in the commission.
84 Kühne 2000.
220 BARBARA SCHMITTER-HEISLER
85 Voting for non-EU foreigners in local elections was declared unconstitutional by
Bundesgerichtshof.
86 Pitted against the SPD government at the time. Unions take stands on political
issues. At the local level unions encourage members to get involved with refugee
councils.
87 www.dgb.de/themen/zuwanderung.




91 Behrens, Fichter and Frege 2002.
92 Ibidem.
93 Frankfurter Hefte, no. 6 (2001).
94 For information about the Change to Win Coalition’s program, see www.
changetowin.org.
TRADE UNIONS AND IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION 221
No More than a Keg of Beer:
The Coherence of German Immigrant Communities
Marlou Schrover
One evening in January 1878, a special train ran between the Dutch
cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht.1 The journey lasted an hour and the
train stopped at every station in between. The local Utrecht newspaper
had predicted that many people would take this train to attend a play
at the German theatre in Amsterdam, and indeed 272 people did. It is
not certain whether all of them went to the German theatre. There was
also a circus in Amsterdam that same night. A fortnight later, another
special train was announced in the Utrecht newspaper. This time the
German theatre in Amsterdam premiered the play Freund Fritz, a com-
edy in three acts.
The German theatre in Amsterdam was a very active organisation.
On March 29, 1839, the opera Othello was performed. It was the 51st
performance at the theatre that season. There had been two produc-
tions every week, each time of a difference play or piece of music. De-
spite this enormous activity, the German theatre in Amsterdam had
not been doing well financially. There was too little interest in the per-
formances, and there were quarrels amongst the organisers. In 1839,
the director feared that his theatre, the only one in its kind in the Neth-
erlands, would be forced to close. The Theatre Français did much better,
despite the fact that the French immigrant community was only a frac-
tion of the size of the German one. The French theatre, however, also
attracted the Dutch elite, who admired French culture and enjoyed an
evening of French entertainment. This elite did not appreciate German
culture in a similar fashion. The German theatre however, managed to
survive throughout the 19th century. The construction of a railway net-
work contributed to its survival, because it enabled people from further
away to travel to Amsterdam for an evening performance.
Utrecht did not have its own German theatre. The percentage of Ger-
man immigrants in Amsterdam was not much larger than Utrecht’s
(2% in Amsterdam versus 1.4 in Utrecht), but the actual population of
immigrants in Amsterdam was larger. In 1859, 5,286 Germans were
living in Amsterdam. Apparently this number was not enough to
maintain a theatre, but luckily it was supplemented by Germans from
elsewhere as transportation improved.2 But the relatively modest size
of the German immigrant community was not the only reason that the
theatre was struggling. In 1880, the American city of St. Louis had a
German population that was ten times that of Amsterdam. St. Louis
had over 300 active German clubs and societies, not counting the nu-
merous church-related organisations.3 Yet, its theatre did not do well
there either.4 The German language press of St. Louis praised the plays
at the theatre endlessly, but like the theatre, the newspapers were
struggling as well. The press and the theatre both had a vested interest
in the preservation of the German language and its culture. The Ger-
man language schools and German churches of St. Louis had similar
interests, but did not do much better either. Language was clearly not
what was keeping German communities together.
In 1964, the Canadian researcher Raymond Breton believed that im-
migrant organisations increased the coherence within a group of immi-
grants because the creation of an immigrant organisation made the
group’s boundaries clearer.5 Critics of Breton’s work pointed out that
counting the number of organisations was not enough to measure the
extent of a community’s cohesion.6 Some organisations made strong
demands on the loyalty of its members. Therefore, it was not only the
number of organisations but also the character of the organisations
that was important.7
Immigrant organisations are an interesting source of information
about a group’s identity or ethnicity.8 The character, size, and number
of organisations indicate the extent to which immigrants want to pro-
file themselves as being different, or are seen by others as being differ-
ent. Immigrants set up organisations to create, express, and maintain a
collective identity.9 By forming an organisation, immigrants fence off
their ethnic identity from others.10
It is generally accepted that ‘groups’ and ‘ethnicity’ are social con-
structs.11 The consensus about the social construction of ethnicity does
not mean that ethnicity is defined in the same way by all authors.12 A
typical example of a definition is the one used by Bonacich and
Modell.13 They define ethnicity as a communalistic form of social af-
filiation, arising from a special bond among people of like origins, and
disdain for people of dissimilar origin. The definition leaves it open as
to what people share. Although it is not clear what is needed to create
a separate ethnicity, language and religion feature in all of the defini-
tions. As this article will show, language and religion were not enough
for the cohesion of German immigrants.
This article describes the organisations of German immigrants who
came to the Netherlands in the 19th century. The focus is on German
immigrants in the Dutch town Utrecht. Comparisons are made with
German immigrant communities elsewhere, especially in the U.S.
What was it that held German immigrants together and set them apart
from others? German immigrants in various countries set up similar
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organisations: churches, Liedertafeln (Singing Societies), and Turnver-
eine (Gymnastic clubs). We take a closer look at these organisations to
see how these organisations expressed their Germanness or Deutsch-
tum. Before that, I briefly outline the characteristics of the German im-
migrant community in Utrecht.
A German Community?
Since I have described the German immigrant community of Utrecht
at some length elsewhere,14 a short summary will suffice. In the 19th
century, German immigrants formed by far the largest minority in
Utrecht (as in the rest of the Netherlands); 60% of the immigrants
was born in German regions. In the middle of the 19th century, there
were more than 40,000 Germans in the Netherlands. In Utrecht, as in
the Netherlands as a whole, German migrants constituted 1 to 1.5% of
the population. In 1849, Utrecht had a total population of 50,000.
There were three times that number of inhabitants by 1920.
The German immigrant communities in the Netherlands were
much smaller than those in the United States. At the end of the 19th
century, more Germans lived in New York than in Berlin.15 In 1880,
St. Louis had 54,901 German born inhabitants of a total population of
350,518 (16%). Cincinnati had a German population of 46,157 of a total
of 255,139 inhabitants (18%) and Milwaukee had 31,483 Germans of a
total population of 115,587 (27%).16
Between 1850 and 1859, there was a total of 957 German immi-
grants in Utrecht of whom 535 were men and 422 women (sex ratio
1.3). Between 1860 and 1879, 1231 additional immigrants arrived: 747
men and 484 women (sex ratio 1.5). On average, German men stayed
in Utrecht for a shorter period of time than their female counterparts.
Migration to Utrecht mostly consisted of young adults, rather than of
families with children.
The German immigrants were not all from the same regions, but
some concentrations can be pointed out.17 The majority of the German
immigrants came from regions that border with the Netherlands.
Shopkeepers and shop assistants came from the region around the riv-
er Ems, in Oldenburg’s Münsterland. These shopkeepers sold textiles
and cloth, and were almost all men. The assistants were both men and
women, but the former outnumbered the latter. The shopkeepers lived
and worked in the city centre, where they had large shops and board-
ing houses for their assistants. We find these communities of shop-
keepers in all of the major Dutch cities. The shopkeepers and their em-
ployees formed 20% of the German immigrant community in Utrecht.
Smaller groups (each 5%) were formed by the filemakers from the
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Ruhr area and stucco-workers from a specific part of Oldenburg; these
were all men. Domestic servants mainly came from the region near
the German-Dutch border, where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.
Migrants from the Westerwald, in Nassau, formed the largest group
within the German immigrant population (30%). They were traders in
stoneware jugs and pitchers. The Westerwalders formed a strong cohe-
sive community. The community had a high intermarriage rate (85%).
The Westerwalders lived in a few streets where they formed 80% of
the population. The Westerwalder community in Utrecht was essen-
tially a transplanted village, as defined by the American historian
Kamphoefner.18 Most of the Westerwalders in Utrecht came from two
villages: Ransbach and Baumbach. Other Dutch towns had Wester-
walder communities that were similar to the one in Utrecht, but the
community in Utrecht was particularly large. The Westerwalders in
Utrecht also show similarities to Westerwalder communities in the
United States.19 These communities were alike in their cohesion. They
were, however, older than the Utrecht community. In Utrecht, the com-
munity dated from the beginning of the 19th century. The Wester-
walders that migrated to America sailed on four ships that left the
Dutch port of Rotterdam in 1740, 1744, 1749 and 1753. The American
communities were also transplanted villages, but the Westerwalders
that went to America showed a greater diversity including pastors and
schoolmasters. In Utrecht, there were only traders. In the American
cases not only large parts of a village population were transplanted, as
in Utrecht, but also the complete village social network.20
Formal Versus Informal Organisations
Informal organisations may predate formal ones. In her classic 1949
article on immigrant organisations, the American sociologist Mary Bos-
worth Treudley21 made the assumption that formal organisations not
only arose after the community had existed for long enough to reach
some stability, but also that formal institutions became more important
as informal ties became weaker. When individuals no longer shared
enough common experience and understanding to be bound by infor-
mal ties, the immigrant community sought to forge more formal ties
so as to retain some form of bonding.
By their nature, informal organisations leave few traces in the ar-
chives. As a result, they are difficult to track down. Some individuals
did, however, play an important role in the German immigrant society,
and can therefore be seen as the key figures in an informal network.
Theodor Engelmann, for instance, played such a role. He came to
Utrecht in 1869 and married the daughter of the by that time very fa-
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mous and popular Utrecht professor, F.C. Donders. Engelmann’s wife
died within one year of the marriage at the birth of their twins. Engle-
mann remarried a German pianist, Emma Vick Brandes.22 For the next
20 years the couple regularly organised concerts in their home, which
were attended by some 200 people per event. German composers – in-
cluding Johannes Brahms – musicians and scientists attended these in-
formal gatherings. The events were a meeting point for all those who
shared an admiration for German culture, language, and science. Reli-
gious and political discussions were taboo.
Similar roles were played by Henry Rahr, Heinrich Geuer, and Jo-
hann Kufferath. Rahr was a shopkeeper who sold pianos and sheet mu-
sic. He also tuned and repaired pianos and as such knew many people.
He was an active member of many clubs and societies, and regularly
organised concerts. Geuer was a glass painter who set up an organisa-
tion which he called the Shelfish [sic] Club, because he missed the eve-
nings full of fun and nonsense he used to enjoy in his native Cologne,
and which had been concluded with a traditional meal of haddock
(Schellfisch). Johann Kufferath was the city music director, appointed as
such by the city government. He was responsible for the city orchestra
and music education. In the 40 years that he held his job, he invited
countless soloists to perform with the orchestra, and sent orchestra
members to Germany to fulfil their professional training.
The American historian Dobbert shows how German pub owners
played an important role in the informal German immigrant net-
work.23 In the 19th century it was joked that if three Germans mi-
grated to America, the first one opens a pub, so that the other two will
have a place to argue.24 The pub owner would introduce the newly ar-
rived immigrant to the more settled countrymen. The pub owner
would also provide a place for groups of immigrants to meet, com-
bined with the lavish consumption of German beer.
In Utrecht, 35 German immigrants – men and women – owned
either a pub or a hotel. The pubs served German beer and had German
waiters and staff. Three of the most important hotels were German.
A German Language?
German immigrants spoke a variety of German dialects.25 The Platt-
deutsch that was spoken near the German-Dutch border was very differ-
ent from the dialects that were spoken elsewhere.26 The Plattdeutsch of
the lower Rhine and Weser was a bit like Dutch, and very different
from the melodious Bavarian of the South, or the nasal Saxon of the
East. The written German, Schiftdeutsch, was the language of the upper
classes: university graduates, higher government officials, teachers,
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noblemen, and commissioned officers. It was the language of Goethe
and Schiller. As the historian Dobbert remarks, it was not a living lan-
guage, since the majority of the immigrants did not speak it.27 Mi-
grants were taught written German before their migration, but their
children grew up in the new country with spoken German only. The
language could therefore never be the essence of Deutschtum. This se-
verely limited the range of all organisations that were based on lan-
guage, such as theatres, schools, and newspapers.
In the beginning of the 19th century Utrecht had a small private
German school with 30 pupils. By 1850, the school had disappeared.
Some of the wealthier German immigrants could employ private in-
structors or could send their children to boarding schools. There are in-
dications that some German immigrants pursued this tactic. However,
neither option was chosen on any large scale. It was not only the lan-
guage problem that made it difficult to run a school. The rich and the
poor, as a rule, did not send their children to the same school. The
same was true for Catholics and Protestants. Differences in language,
class, and religion made it difficult to set up school. Even in the Dutch
city of Rotterdam, which had a much larger and more homogeneous
community, attempts to set up a school did not succeed until the end
of the 19th century.28
A German Church?
A little under half of the German immigrants in Utrecht were Catholic,
about the same percentage were Protestant and 2% were Jewish. About
half of the Protestants were Lutheran, and the other half Calvinist. Reli-
gious differences were important within the Utrecht population as a
whole, as they were in the rest of the Netherlands. Dutch Catholics
and Protestants were usually organised in separate associations. The
German society was also deeply divided along religious lines.29 Thus it
is reasonable to expect that the German immigrants in Utrecht were
also organised along religious lines.
The number of German Jews in Utrecht was small. They joined
Dutch Jewish organisations in Utrecht. They also joined German non-
Jewish (and non-religious) organisations, such as the singing societies
described below. This is remarkable since in the second half of the
19th century, Jews in the Netherlands were usually denied access to
gentile social clubs.30
In the United States, Catholics in German immigrant communities
had their own parishes. In 1851, in New York, there were approximately
35,000 German-speaking Catholics. They congregated in two German-
language churches.31 German Catholics in New York were poor and
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were concentrated in a few neighbourhoods. Although German-speak-
ing Catholics and Irish Catholics lived in the same neighbourhoods,
they did not attend the same churches.32 The Germans here felt that a
loss of language was tantamount to a loss of faith.33 Of course, Latin
was the language of the liturgy, but for sermons, confessions and
hymns it was a possible to choose between Dutch and German.
In Utrecht, there was no Catholic parish that can be labelled Ger-
man. This can be deduced from Confession records. Confession before
Easter was obligatory for Catholics and the registers of those who con-
fessed have been preserved. From these it is clear that the Wester-
walders and Münsterlanders attended different churches. They went to
the church nearest to where they lived. The Westerwalders and Mün-
sterlanders came from different German regions, they spoke different
dialects, and belonged to differed social classes. The Münsterland shop-
keepers were amongst the richer inhabitants of Utrecht; the Wester-
walders amongst the poorer.
There may also have been another important difference. In St. Louis,
Catholics from the Rhineland and Southern Germany were ill-in-
formed concerning church matters and prone to leaving their church.
Catholics from the north of Germany were well-informed concerning
their religion and were thus more loyal to their church.34 Thus a differ-
ent attitude towards their own religion could also explain why Catholics
from the various regions did not congregate together.
The Lutheran community was very different from the Catholic one.
The Lutheran immigrants in Utrecht included both men and women,
but men far outnumbered women. The result was that all of the wo-
men could, if they wanted, marry within their own church, while the
men could not. The Lutheran community was characterised by a high
intermarriage rate. This made the church very much an organisation
for immigrants and not for their offspring.
The Lutheran church in the Netherlands has a long history. German
immigrants had been coming to the Netherlands for centuries prior to
the nineteenth century.35 The number of immigrants was high in the
17th and 18th centuries. Their numbers started to decline at the end of
the 18th century. The Lutheran church in the Netherlands during this
period was well-organised.36 Its members were almost all immigrants
and most were German born. Many children and grandchildren of
Lutheran immigrants left the Lutheran church and joined the Dutch
Calvinist church. This meant that the survival of the Lutheran church
depended on new arrivals from German regions.
As time passed, repeated conflicts arose within the Lutheran church
about whether the sermon should be in Dutch or in German. The dis-
cussions revolved not only around the language to be used during ser-
vices, but also concerning adaptation to Dutch society. In German
228 MARLOU SCHROVER
states, the Lutheran church was much more orthodox than its counter-
part in the Netherlands. In German states the church could afford to
take this position because the German states were largely religiously
homogenous. The civil government supported the dominant religion
and vice versa. In the Netherlands, the Lutheran church was a small
minority church and could not claim the same support. The more
orthodox perspective in the Netherlands was advocated by preachers
trained in German regions. To counterbalance this orthodoxy, the train-
ing of preachers in the Netherlands was favoured.37
After the turbulent period of 1780 to 1787, when the Prussian army
invaded the Netherlands, the Lutheran church wanted to distance itself
from the German invaders and its German heritage.38 It symbolically
broke with its status as an immigrant church and became a Dutch
minority church. The breach was stimulated by a sharp decline in new
immigrants by 1800. In the 19th century, only a very small portion of
the Lutheran church members was born in German regions, although
they often descended from German parents or grandparents. Most of
the new German Lutheran immigrants who came to the Netherlands
in the middle of the 19th century decided not to join the Lutheran
church. This decision was reinforced by the fact that the sermons and
psalms were no longer in German. Considering the long tradition of
Lutheran migration to the Netherlands, one would have expected new
arrivals to expand their organisational infrastructure. Instead, the new-
er migrants who arrived in the mid-19th century found the infrastruc-
ture was no longer very German and was therefore of little attraction to
them.
The conflict within the Lutheran church in the Netherlands shows
remarkable parallels to conflicts elsewhere. One constant was that lan-
guage always played a role. The mid-19th century Lutheran church in
Cincinnati decided to keep German as the church language as long as
five church members preferred services in German.39 In the Nether-
lands, the 18th-century conflict is usually described as a conflict be-
tween established Lutherans and their offspring on the one hand, and
new arrivals on the other. In the US, the conflict was seen more as the
outcome of differences between the Plattdeutsch-speaking German im-
migrants from Oldenburg, and the Hochdeutsch-speaking Lutherans
from the south. The Lutheran community of Cincinnati circa 1830 con-
sisted of Lutherans from Württemberg and Switzerland, later joined by
German migrants from Oldenburg. The Plattdeutsch-speaking German
immigrants were more orthodox, the Hochdeutsch-speaking Germans
more liberal. In the end, the Plattdeutsch-speaking immigrants estab-
lished their own church where only speakers of their own dialect were
welcome.
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In the 19th century in the US, the Lutheran church was seen as ‘one
of the strongest bulwarks of […] Deutschtum’.40 The Lutheran church
played a crucial role in some German immigrant communities.
Through its schools and its sermons, both in German, the Lutheran
church maintained its culture or its coherence within (the Lutheran
part of) the German community. However, religious differences meant
that it was never one united German community. According to Luebke,
19th-century German immigrants in the US identified themselves pri-
marily as Catholics, Lutherans, Evangelicals, Mennonites, or Metho-
dists, and only secondarily (sometimes only incidentally) as German.41
In 1890, in Cincinnati there were 12 German Evangelical, 3 Lutheran,
6 Methodist, 4 Presbyterian, 2 United Brethren, and 1 German Baptist
church, and 34 Catholic Parishes. If the Lutheran church was a bul-
wark of Deutschtum we should ask whose or what Deutschtum that was
precisely.
Innere Mission and the Gustav Adolf Stiftung
The Lutheran church in Utrecht had grown increasingly unattractive
for newcomers since the mid-19th century. New organisations arose
that catered to the needs of the most recent German Protestant immi-
grants. Contrary to the older organisations, these newer organisations
had ties to the emerging German State.
In the second half of the 19th century, two new organisations
emerged: the Innere Mission [The Inner Mission] and the Gustav Adolf
Vereeniging (GAV).42 Both organisations, although in a somewhat dif-
ferent manner, did what was called missionary work amongst the Ger-
man immigrants in the Netherlands. The Innere Mission and the GAV
both stepped into the gap that had opened up when the Lutheran
church became less German.
The Innere Mission was based in Germany, but it was also active
amongst German Protestants outside Germany. The Innere Mission di-
rected its attention mainly at those Germans who perceived their stay
in the Netherlands as temporary such as stucco workers and agricultur-
al labourers. The organisation created a link between Protestantism
and the new German nationalism. Retaining people for the faith was
equated with retaining them for the nation. German migrants were
handed brochures by wandering Innere Mission priests (Reiseprediger)
with the symbolic title ‘Wegweiser zur Heimat’(guide to the homeland).
By keeping to their religious beliefs, the immigrants would be able to
find their way home and would thus be saved for the nation. Not all of
the German immigrants were addressed in this manner, only the Pro-
testants. The wandering Innere Mission priests came regularly to
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Utrecht upon the invitation of the stucco master Herman Abeling, who
organised the church services at his own expense and advertised them
in the local newspaper. Some 80 people usually attended the services,
40 of whom were stucco workers. The rest were other Germans living
in Utrecht, who for many years had not heard a German service.
The GAV was an affiliate of the German Gustav Adolf Stiftung (GAS).
The GAV, however, remained independent of the GAS for several rea-
sons. One was the emerging German nationalism, which the GAS
wanted to support along with Protestantism. The GAV believed that
these were separate issues, noting that ‘Christ was not a German’.43
The GAV wanted to fortify Protestantism, not a German Volksgeist. In
Utrecht, the GAV had between 300 to 400 members. Membership lists
have not been preserved, but it is fairly certain that not all of its mem-
bers were German, although Dutch Calvinists were advised by their
own newspapers not to join this organisation. One-fourth of the GAV’s
funds went to the German parent organisation (GAS). But the GAV
found its own course and disassociated itself from the German nation-
alism that became increasingly stronger in the GAS as the 19th cen-
tury progressed. Some German immigrants in the Netherlands dis-
agreed with this stance and joined the GAS instead.
Liedertafeln
All of the German immigrant communities had their singing societies
or Liedertafeln. In other countries, Liedertafeln managed to unite Ger-
man immigrants from very different regional and religious back-
grounds. According to the American historian Bohlman, singing
played a crucial role in the shaping of a German-American identity.44
The first Liedertafel in Germany was set up in Berlin in 1809.45 The
Liedertafeln played a role in the movement for a united Germany. In
the 1840s, they were an alternative to forbidden political organisations.
The idea of the Liedertafel was exported to other countries, together
with ideas concerning German unity. Exporting the idea, however, im-
plied transforming it. In the Flemish part of Belgium, Liedertafeln were
set up to increase Flemish unity, just as the German Liedertafeln were
meant to encourage German unity. A stronger Flanders, it was argued,
could be created by singing in German, since this implied creating a
distance from both France and the Walloon provinces. The Liedertafeln
in the German regions, however, perceived their Flemish counterparts
as advocates of a greater German empire, which might include Flan-
ders.
In Denmark, Liedertafeln had favoured the union of Schleswig-Hol-
stein with Germany. After Sleswig-Holstein became part of the Ger-
man Empire, anti-German sympathies in Denmark grew stronger. For
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the Liedertafeln, this meant that they became much more German in
nature. In 1867, it was decided that only German-born men and their
sons could become members of the Liedertafeln and that the official
language at meetings would be German. As a reaction to anti-German
sympathies, the German immigrants withdrew into their own organi-
sations and made these more exclusively German in nature.46
The dilemma of the Liedertafeln concerned what kind of unity they
supported: the unity between German immigrants, as was the case in
the US and England, or support for a united Germany and a Great Ger-
man Empire, which might include parts of Denmark, Flanders, or the
Netherlands.
The first Liedertafeln in the Netherlands were established in 1827.
They were led by Germans, used German study materials and sang
only German songs. The Liedertafeln differed from the older singing so-
cieties in the way its members sang seated at long tables. In the period
from 1827 to 1915, some 500 of these singing societies were founded.
Between 1845 and 1915, annual Dutch-German singing contests, were
held alternately in Cleves and Arnhem. German contestants usually
came from the Lower Rhine region, although interest began to wane
after 1852. A sharp rise in the number of Dutch organisations followed,
and the Netherlands organised its own singing contests. The Dutch
singing societies were, however, already less German by the mid-19th
century. Contestants were required to perform at least part of their re-
pertoire in Dutch and composers were invited to write new Liedertafeln-
style songs in Dutch. The reason for this was the fear of annexation,
which was expressed throughout the second half of the 19th century
and especially after the wars of 1866 and 1870. The fear of annexation
was, however, perhaps less important than the fear of being suspected
of supporting annexation.
The Dutch Liedertafeln were not exclusively immigrant organisations;
there were also numerous non-German singers, including Dutch con-
testants and immigrants from other countries. In Utrecht, the Liederta-
fel Aurora was established in 1845 by the Dutchmen, F.C. Kist. The Lie-
dertafel had approximately 500 members. One in five was German. An
analysis of the membership lists shows that the singing societies were
all-male but open to German immigrants from various religious and
regional backgrounds. Members included rich Catholic shopkeepers
and their assistants. There were Lutheran, Calvinist, and Jewish mem-
bers from almost all runs aspects of society. Geuer, founder of the Shel-
fish Club was a member, as was piano dealer Rahr, city music director
Kufferath, two of the most important pub and hotel owners, and the
president of the GAV. Lower-class Catholics, however, were totally ab-
sent. None of the poorer Westerwalders were members.
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In 1849, the second Liedertafel was established in Utrecht. The
UMZV (Koninklijke Utrechtse Mannenzangvereeniging) was a singing
society with a membership of some 770. Some of the members from
Liedertafel Aurora switched to UMZV. Some of the German shop-
keepers, who were not yet members of the older organisation, joined
the UMZV instead. For the rest, we find a similar mixture as that of
the Aurora. Again we find no Westerwalders amongst its members. A
third organisation was founded in 1873, but this one seems to have
been short-lived.
If the Liedertafeln shaped a German-Dutch identity, like it had shaped
a German-American identity, this was an identity that, in the first
place, did not clearly distinguish the Germans from other groups, and
secondly, it was not an all-inclusive identity. Singing societies managed
to include some parts of the German immigrant community, but by no
means all.
Turnvereinen
Turnvereinen or gymnastic clubs were as characteristic of German im-
migrant communities as the singing societies were.47 The Turnvereinen
were founded in the beginning of the 19th century. They were regarded
as subversive organisations by the German government. After the
failed revolution of 1848, many Forty-Eighters or Turners, as these re-
volutionaries called themselves, left for the United States where they
founded the German-American Turner Movement and prepared for
new revolutions in Germany. In American towns they built exercise
halls, the so-called Turnhalle. These were often impressively large
buildings, that not only housed the gymnastic club itself, but also thea-
tre clubs, rifle clubs, chess clubs or German language schools.48
Utrecht also had its gymnastic clubs, but they did not play the same
role as those in England and the US. The reason for this is that the re-
volutionaries who emigrated from Germany did not go to the Nether-
lands. With no revolutionaries, the gymnastic clubs were just gymnas-
tic clubs. One German revolutionary did come to the Netherlands, Carl
Euler, did indeed set up a Turnverein in Utrecht. This, however, was a
general organisation rather than a German club and it had none of the
aspirations that the German Vereine had elsewhere. Its members, 153
in total, were mostly students. Euler seems to have run a second,
rather informal Turners association. After Euler left Utrecht in 1851,
the gymnastic club Kallisteneia was founded to continue the informal
group established by Euler. The club had 150 members, but only one
was German. Carl Euler did return to Utrecht once, in 1854, this time
as an advocate for the GAV.
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Mid-19th century Utrecht had seven gymnastic clubs with a com-
bined membership of several hundred. The clubs all attracted different
sectors of society: students, army officers, civilians, and boys. None of
the clubs called itself German; no club used the German word Verein
in its name. Seven gymnastic clubs was a lot for this relatively small
city. With so many gymnastic clubs, there was little need for German
immigrants to set up a German organisation of its own.
In Cincinnati, the Turners set up an impressive Turnverein, which
non-German children started to join, and since the children of German
immigrants no longer spoke or understood German, English became
the accepted language.49
In St. Louis, the German immigrants were successful in their efforts
to get gymnastics on the curriculum of the public schools. The Turnver-
eine Teachers also became gym teachers in the public schools.50 After
this period Turnvereine diminished in popularity. The gymnastic clubs
were clearly German in inspiration, but after half a century they had
lost much of their Deutschtum. The majority of the German immigrant
community had from the beginning not supported the political ideas
of the original Turners. Catholic German immigrants were advised to
stay away from the gymnastic clubs. If the Turnvereine were indeed ex-
pressions of Deutschtum it was again, like the Lutheran church, a
Deutschtum, which included only a part of the community.
German Unity
The German immigrant communities in the US had numerous organi-
sations, but were far from united. ‘Wherever there are four Germans
gathered, they will find five different ideas.’51 Most organisations did
not survive the first generation, despite the effort of German language
schools, pub keepers, newspapers, and theatres to keep the Deutschtum
alive. The children of German immigrants no longer spoke German.
In an attempt to save the lively German culture that once was, albeit
distributed over many different organisations, some key figures in the
major German-American immigrant communities attempted to arrive
at a more united position by finding a common denominator they were
sure existed. German communities in America first celebrated German
Day in 1883 to commemorate the arrival of the first German immi-
grants in 1683: Pastorius and his Palantines aboard the Concord, the
German equivalent of the Mayflower.52 Later, this celebration was com-
bined with the anniversary of the battle of Sedan. Neither the original
notion, nor the anniversary of the battle of Sedan appealed to all Ger-
man immigrants. The Forty-Eighters and the Catholics disassociated
themselves from the nationalistic and anti-Catholic sentiments that this
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movement was based on. In the end, the common denominator be-
came the struggle against Prohibition, which was seen as a real threat
to German identity. German organisations profited from the sale of
beer during large gatherings, and Prohibition would eliminate this
source of income. In the end, the Deutschtum represented nothing
more than a keg of beer.
In Utrecht, the first organisation that presented itself as German,
the Deutsche Verein zu Utrecht, was founded in 1897 by recent German
immigrants, all Protestant middle-class men. Contrary to the situation
in other countries, where the word Verein was used much earlier, this
was the first organisation that used this word. The choice of name was
not irrelevant. A name can represent a collective identity and through
the name a collective identity is shaped.53 This new organisation used
both Deutsche and Verein in its name. Its aim was to stimulate German-
ness, sociability (Geselligkeit) and a love for Germany. Despite its uni-
versal claims and its appeal to Deutschtum, this organisation, like the
previous ones, only represented one portion of the German immigrant
population.
The First World War was a watershed in German-American history.
Many German-Americans began to dissociate themselves from their
German ancestry. The situation in the Netherlands was different, due
to Dutch neutrality during the war. The Germans in the Netherlands
set up organisations that supported German-Dutch families who had
lost their breadwinners during the war. This was followed by the crea-
tion of a memorial for the German prisoners of war who had died in
the Netherlands. In the 1920s, the first real attempts were made to cre-
ate more unity. In the 1930s, German organisations came under Nazi
influence. At that time, unity was achieved by denying the Germanness
of some.54
Conclusion
Most of the 19th century witnessed the migrations of Germans, while
there was no actual German State. This meant that there were no state
initiatives that could shape or hinder immigrant initiatives by, for in-
stance, enforcing homogeneity and coherence. Before the founding of
nation-states, sending societies did little to keep in touch with their for-
mer residents. On the contrary, prior to 1871, the various German
states as a rule did not take back people that had emigrated, even if it
was the emigrant’s intention to migrate only temporarily. Once people
left, they were often refused re-entry. This changed after German unifi-
cation.
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In contemporary society, migrants are seen, both by the sending and
the receiving societies, as still belonging to their country of origin, de-
spite their migration and long-term stays outside their country of birth.
This feeling is expressed by the use of the term ‘migrant’ even for the
second or third generation.55 This hereditary immigrant status affects
the way immigrants and their descendants organise themselves. In the
past, immigrant organisations were mostly a first generation phenom-
enon, which may offer immigrant organisations greater continuity.
Government initiatives and the emergence of the nation-state seemed
to make the real difference between the situation then and now.
Deutschtum existed in the 19th century, despite the absence of a Ger-
man State. Germanness was just a multitude of German organisations
making various claims on Germanness. There was a sense of identity,
but it was not expressed collectively. Germanness, then, existed without
a common denominator. When the German national state finally took
shape, this had a profound influence on the notion of identity. Bound-
aries were defined more sharply, but also excluded more people.
The German immigrant community in Utrecht was not a coherent
community although claims on coherence were made by some organi-
sations. It could be asked how coherence, or claims on coherence, re-
lates to integration. The German migrants from the Westerwald
formed the community with the most coherence and the least integra-
tion. It was also the community with the least formal organisations,
and Westerwalders also did not participate in more general German or-
ganisations. The coherence of the community seems to have curbed
the need for formal organisations and at the same time forestalled the
integration of this group. Among the other Germans, coherence was
less important and formal organisations were relatively open and inte-
gration was easier than among the Westerwalders.
The governments of contemporary sending societies set the bound-
aries within which the immigrant organisations could function. The
governments of the sending societies, contrary to past practices, have
tried to maintain an influence over their former subjects for a much
longer period of time. Meanwhile, the governments of the receiving so-
cieties continue to label the children and grandchildren of immigrants
as immigrants. These factors when taken together, seem to give immi-
grant organisations more a sense of continuity. The examples given in
this article reveal that claims of a common identity can be made with-
out a consensus on what this identity actually is. The results are the es-
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Religious Newcomers and the Nation-State:
Flows and Closures1
Thijl Sunier
The presence of Muslims in Western Europe is at once a new and an old
phenomenon. At the present moment, several million people with an Is-
lamic background work and live in Europe, but the relation between
Europe and what has been coined the ‘Islamic world’ did not start with
the arrival of migrants after the Second World War, the ‘third wave’ of
Islam as Cardini has called it.2 This relation dates back to the earliest
Islamic history and it is mainly a relation between Islam and Christian-
ity.3 In more recent times, many Western European states have devel-
oped a history of colonial relations with the Islamic world. Said has de-
monstrated how these shaped the image of ‘the Islamic world’ and
how this image in turn legitimated colonial rule.4 Moreover, it has set
the scientific paradigm for the study of Islam in the 20th century.5
More relevant for the issue at stake is the fact that the image of Isla-
mic society as one devoid of any rational basis, contributed to the self-
image of the post-revolutionary secular nation-states, both in Europe
and in the Middle East. The French historian and philosopher Ernest
Renan (1823-1892), famous ideologue of the (secular) nation-state,
wrote extensively about Islam and even went into debate with the
equally famous Islamic modernist Jamal ad Din al-Afghani. Renan’s
critique had much to do with the idea of Islam as a pre-modern reli-
gion and the idea of the secular nation-state as the highest stage of so-
cietal development thus far. As Djait put it: ‘His [Renan’s] harsh treat-
ment of Islam is tied in with a grand egalitarian vision of cultural pro-
gress’.6 Thus what concerns us here is not the accuracy of the images
themselves, but the role they played in the development of the self-im-
age of Western European nation-states in the 19th and 20th century.
Not so much the age-old controversy between Islam and Christianity is
relevant, although it does play a role as a canon for rhetoric, but rather
the image of Islam as a pre-modern religion that by definition does not
separate between state and religion. It was assumed that whereas mod-
ern nation-states, on their path to modernity, had effectively relegated
religion to the private sphere, Islamic societies were theologically in-
capable of separating the public from the private and the political from
the personal.7 It is particularly this image that was reactivated during
the most recent close encounter between Islam and Europe: the post
Second World War era.
Two developments are of crucial significance here: the large scale
immigration of workers and their families from the 1950s on, and the
emergence of Islam as a political factor in many countries of the Mid-
dle East and Asia since the early 1960s. Both developments posed a
new, and in certain respects, unprecedented challenge to the religious
status quo in Western Europe. Islam was at once a religious newcomer
in these nations, but certainly not an unfamiliar one as I have argued
above.8 The formation of Muslim communities and their organisa-
tional, social and political activity, triggered a series of, sometimes fun-
damental, debates about the character of the nation-state, secularisation
processes, the role of education, fundamentalism, the position of wo-
men, and related issues. The Iranian Revolution and its European off-
shoot, the Rushdie affair, the uprising in many parts of the Islamic
world and more recently the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in
New York, in Madrid, London and Amsterdam, and most recently the
Danish cartoon affair in February 2006 have heightened the sensitivity
of policymakers, opinion leaders, and citizens to the presence of Islam
in Western Europe. At the beginning of the 21st century, religion has
largely supplanted national origins and ethnicity as the key boundary
marker and has become a key principle for social organisation and
community building. Many politicians and journalists in the West, fol-
lowing the lead of American political scientist Samuel Huntington dis-
cuss the new Muslim presence in Europe against the backdrop of an
age-old ‘clash of civilisations’ between the West and the Islamic East.9
Such an approach is a half-truth at best, and seriously misleading
when pushed too far. While no one can deny that Eurasian history has
been marked by a series of confrontations between the Islamic South-
East and the Christian North-West, it is also incontrovertible that the
two civilisations have often interacted in more positive, mutually bene-
ficial ways. A sober view of the historical relationship between Europe
and Islam should take both into account.10
Immigration of Muslims: The Integration Debate
Since countries in Western Europe have at least on paper accepted the
fact that most migrants are here to stay, a debate has broken loose about
the ways in which these newcomers would be integrated into the coun-
tries of settlement. The term ‘integration’, however, amounts to concep-
tual confusion not least because there is no generally accepted defini-
tion of the term. What is meant by integration very much depends on
how one defines the principal actors in the process and how one ac-
cesses ‘the issue at stake’. Engbersen and Gabriels, for example, have
240 THIJL SUNIER
argued that in the public debate and politics of the Netherlands, inte-
gration is narrowed down to the socio-economic position of ethnic or re-
ligious migrants.11 This runs the risk of ‘ethnisising’ the issue. The inte-
gration of migrants renders a unique character in such a way that it
tends to overlook more general processes or factors that account for
the position of newcomers, such as class structure. Migration to Eur-
ope started, after all, for economic reasons both on the sending and on
the receiving end.
Another problem is the sometimes complete neglect of the norma-
tive dimension of integration. Nation-states are active cultural agents.12
Integration has a clearly normative connotation. It is related to ques-
tions of social order and it deals with the relation between individuals
and the state. Nation-states have historically grown normative views on
this relation. When we look at the ways in which Dutch society dealt
with the so-called ‘maladjusted’ working-class families in the first half
of the 20th century,13 and we analyze the educational programs de-
signed to ‘integrate’ these people into the mainstream society, there is
a striking parallel with the so-called ‘civilisation’ programs (inburgerings-
programma) designed for newcomers today. Normative rules have chan-
ged of course but the process is almost identical. In that respect inte-
gration is a specific form of socialisation. This is what Peters calls the
‘moral dimension of integration’ and it is closely linked to what has
been coined as ‘moral citizenship’.14 Related to that is the neglect of
the role of power in many studies. Integration into a new society is of-
ten perceived as a neutral process of cultural adaptation in which indi-
vidual migrants become a member of a new society. The recent plans
of the Dutch ‘minority’ minister Verdonk to introduce quantifiable,
measurable criteria for integration developed by the Amsterdam econo-
my professor Van Praag, is a typical example of this way of thinking.
Thus Van Praag argued that integration ‘should be liberated from the
grasp of the soft sociologists’.15 This is the dominant liberal view on in-
tegration and it is largely based on the perspective that the state is a
neutral arena.16 But at the same time it is, very paradoxically, the liber-
als who opt for a more thorough control by the state on the integration.
Integration is, however, in principle a phenomenon of unequal power
relations. It is a process whereby people try to get access to vital re-
sources, both material and immaterial. Irrespective of how we define
these resources, it is important here to state that this implies action
from the side of the newcomers.
Contemporary migration and integration is often treated as a un-
ique, unprecedented phenomenon. As a consequence, historical com-
parisons with previous immigration are regarded as irrelevant. Accord-
ing to this view, it makes no sense to compare the ways in which
Catholics in the second half of the 19th century negotiated their place
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in Dutch society with Muslims today, or to look at the similarities in
the position of Jews in the beginning of the 20th century. It is like com-
paring apples with pears. The present discussion about the place of Is-
lam in Dutch society gained momentum when a well-known ideologue
of the Dutch Labour Party launched a new round with the publication
of an article called The Multicultural Drama. Important for the issue at
stake is the part where he stated that the struggle between religious
groups at the end of the 19th century was a struggle between groups
which were a part of Dutch history for centuries. Despite their reli-
gious differences they were held together by a common history and a
common commitment to the Dutch nation. Muslims, on the other
hand, have just recently arrived. Their (lack of) commitment to society
is the essence of the problem.17 A slightly different version of this argu-
mentation can be heard from those who point out the negative images
about Islam. The difficulties that Muslims face in getting access to the
central institutions of society are related to negative stereotyping and
(religious) marginalisation that prevent them from taking part in so-
ciety. They argue that the crucial difference between the anti-papism of
19th century Netherlands and Muslims today has to do with the age-old
controversy between Islam and Christianity.18 Comparisons makes no
sense, because the cultural distance between Islam and Christianity is
insurmountable and the circumstances are fundamentally different.
There are of course important differences with respect to the eman-
cipation process of Catholics in the 19th century, of Jews in the early
20th century, and the integration of Muslims today, and images about
Muslims do have a specific content especially since the recent turmoil,
but the similarities are at least as important. In earlier research, I ar-
gued that a crucial aspect of the integration of Muslims in Dutch so-
ciety is the emancipation process, sustained by organisations and insti-
tutions established by Muslims.19 In all three cases, religion constitutes
the core of a emancipation movement.20 As to negative stereotyping
and marginalisation, one has only to look at what Protestants thought
of Catholics to understand that cultural and religious distance is rela-
tive and situational. Religious boundaries are more important than the
religious stuff they enclose, to paraphrase Barth.21 Instead of treating
the precarious position of Muslims in Western Europe primarily in
terms of the internal dynamics of migration, or to relate it to age-old
stereotypes about Islam, I will analyse it primarily within the frame-
work of the historical process of state formation and nation-building
and the emancipation of religious minorities. The present encultura-
tion of Muslims will be better understood, we believe, by comparing it
with the way the European nations have coped with religious difference
and the emergence of new religious actors in earlier periods of their
history, that is roughly from the early 19th century onwards. We then
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get an idea of the similarities and dissimilarities in the ways in which
particular nation-states deal with these issues. This is the first argu-
ment I want to put forward.
Muslims and the Nation-State
Integration is thus a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. It is my
contention that there are similarities and parallels between the position
of Muslims and other religious minorities in earlier stages of history.
The integration of Muslims is of course linked to their (former) mi-
grant status. They are for the most part indeed newcomers, but is it
also an issue that puts the significance of religion in the process of na-
tion building back on the political agenda. It has to do with the ways in
which nation-states deal with religious diversity and how they perceive
themselves. Whatever we think of the presence of Muslims, it is clear
that the developments with respect to Islam, both within Europe and
in the world at large, have challenged the character of Western Eur-
opean nation-states. It is a widespread misunderstanding that Western
European nation-states are ‘accomplished’. The fundamental formative
episodes go back more than a century and a half and their status quo
need not, so to speak, to be reconfirmed. So this is very dubious and
an ideological statement at best. Billig has shown that even established
nation-states must constantly ‘reconfirm’ and ‘re-enact’ their status
quo.22 Hegemonial discourses and meta narratives about the nation
must be retold over and over again. The very image of Muslims as ar-
riving in an accomplished nation-state is part of that hegemonial dis-
course, by which Muslims are a priori excluded from becoming part of
the nation as Muslims. The fuzz that is made about imams saying nasty
things about western society, or the fear that ‘our’ democracies will be
‘islamised’ by ‘waves’ of migrants with an Islamic background,23
proves, so to speak, the thesis that nation-states are contested and de-
fended.
An essential aspect of that nation-building process is the construc-
tion of terms by which groups are included and excluded. Thus Bruba-
ker has referred to citizenship as a form of social closure.24 It is an ex-
clusive status that some people acquire and others will not. The pre-
sent turmoil about the ‘faces’ of Islam is mainly a (power loaded)
debate about the question whether Muslims could be part of the nation
or not. It is a debate about the very character of the nation and it will
influence this character. The modern state provides a neutral legal and
administrative framework, but as I stated above, as a socio-cultural net-
work the nation is not neutral at all. The question what is ‘French’
about France or ‘Dutch’ about the Netherlands can only be answered in
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terms of a particular, historical narrative. This calls into question the
often drawn sharp distinction between ‘civic’ nations such as France
and ‘ethnic’ nations such as Germany. Even ‘hardcore’ civic nation-
states in which citizenship is primarily articulated in political terms,
such as France, need a certain degree of common culture, mostly in
the form of formative narratives. In this narrative, some groups will oc-
cupy centre stage while others will find themselves at the periphery.
Likewise, some will be represented in an early stage of the narrative
while others will only make their appearance towards its end. In the
course of the story of the nation, certain groups will move from the
periphery towards the centre, and the way that particular story is told is
a defining characteristic of the nation.
In some European states, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and
Germany, as well as in some parts of the Balkans, religious pluralism
has persisted since the late 16th century. But in the first three cases,
Protestantism enjoyed a cultural and political centrality none of its
competitors could claim. For all their pluralism, these nations were not
religiously neutral spaces. The same is true of the post-Ottoman Bal-
kan nations.25 Consequentially, nations were often formally committed
to religious neutrality while their cultures, including their political cul-
tures were suffused with the values and habitus of the dominant reli-
gion. This observation also applies, of course, to those nations in which
formal religious pluralism only arrived in the early 19th century. For-
mally, all religions are equal, but in practice the traditional, established
religion occupies a privileged cultural space (a good example is the
comparison of the French headscarf affairs with the Bavarian crucifix-
affair).26
Political Culture
The second argument I want to put forward has to do with nation-
states as products of historical development. Regarding the integration
process, Adrian Favell has convincingly demonstrated that integration
discourses reflect the dominant political culture of each nation-state.27
Integration touches on general issues about the ‘politics of diversity’
apparent in all nation-states.28 This is especially true for the arrival of
immigrants with an ‘alien’ religious background such as Islam.29 The
way in which France deals with religious diversity differs in important
respects with the way in which Germany does and this can be ex-
plained by referring to historically grown differences in the way nation-
hood, citizenship and emancipation are conceptualised. The prolonged
and acrimonious conflict between republicanism and clericalism in the
French Third Republic is paralleled by the German Kulturkampf, the
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School Conflicts in Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as the contest
between secularism and Islamism in recent Turkish history. In all such
cases two questions are at stake: 1. The opposition between a secular
and a religious definition of the nation and the state; 2. The status of
various groups who do not belong to the old dominant church. The
outcome of the conflicts over these matters largely determined the nat-
ure of the political culture of a given nation as well as the place of the
religious within it in the 20th century.30
The key concept here is ‘political culture’ and it deserves some clari-
fication. As a concept ‘political culture’ was coined by the American po-
litical scientist Gabriel Almond;31 it refers to ‘a particular pattern of or-
ientations to political action’. A few years later, the concept was elabo-
rated by Almond and Verba in a comparative study on political
stability, in which they introduced the term ‘civic culture’ roughly de-
noting the same.32 The book became the standard work of the so-called
‘political culture approach’ in political science. Since then, the term has
continued to be a focus for research on political models and political
praxis.33 Political culture refers to ‘political style’, political values and
norms, patterns of political decision-making, legal issues, but also to
the historical imagination, myths, and hegemonic discourses. The vari-
ety of aspects clearly shows how difficult it is to pinpoint the concept
to one definition. When we concentrate on issues of religious minori-
ties, multiculturalism, citizenship, and nation-building, there are nu-
merous comparative studies, mainly in the field of sociology, political
science, and political philosophy that refer to political culture in one
way or another.34 Instead of discussing the conceptual history of the
term and its use in social science, I will explain why I think that the
concept is relevant.
In the first place, it is one of the key concepts for comparative analy-
sis. I start from the hypothesis that nation-states indeed show differ-
ence in political culture. Although all European nation-states, including
Turkey, grant religious freedom to all its inhabitants, at least on paper,
there are not only significant differences in legal and institutional ar-
rangements between nation-states, the discourses that accompany
these arrangements also differ considerably. The actual net effect of
this freedom differs accordingly. Against the background of the post-
war influx of migrants from non-western backgrounds, the increase of
transnational networks and processes of globalisation, some scholars
have, however, argued that these developments seriously challenge the
nation-state as the key political entity and that we have entered an era
of post nationalism.35 Even multiculturalism as a political program, it
is alleged, seriously challenges the traditional nation-state concept.
I strongly doubt this. Despite important developments, the nation-
state still does play a crucial role as a powerful unifying agent and re-
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pository of legitimisation.36 Despite the undeniable globalising tenden-
cies, the European nation-states still maintain their historically evolved
distinct political cultures, which implies, among other things, that
modes of civic incorporation, concepts of citizenship, and models of in-
tegration differ considerably from one nation to another.37 European
integration, it is often argued, will lead to a gradual erosion of the dif-
ferences between nations. That may be true of economic policy, but the
politics of language, religion, education, and even immigration are na-
tional, or even regional rather than European issues.38 On the contrary,
the acceleration of the process of European integration since the late
1980s (from the Maastricht Treaty to the Euro) has led to a growing
awareness of national identity, and in some cases to a revival of nation-
alism and regionalism.39 The recent debate about so-called ‘national
historical canons’ in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark
points in the same direction.
Political culture is not just a static category,40 but the outcome of a
struggle, a negotiation process that at the same time structures and
shapes further political processes. What a political culture ‘is’ at a given
moment in history is thus highly path-dependent. Instead of assuming
that every nation-state can be boiled down to one single politico-cultur-
al essence independent from time and space, I surmise that there is in
every nation-state a historically grown set of peculiarities that can be
identified as political culture and that takes different shapes within dif-
ferent contexts. Proper comparison can show us the workings of politi-
cal culture, but also its relativity and the contingent character of the
concept rather than its presumed unchangeable essence. Thus when
we take the French notion of laicité, the explicit separation of religion
and state as an aspect of French political culture, it does not mean that
this principle appears in the same shape and meaning under all the
various circumstances, despite the ‘legal reification’ of the concept in
the Constitution. Under ‘normal’ circumstances laicité indeed means
that state and religion are separated and thus that religion is free of eta-
tist constraints. But there are periods in the history of France in which
there was a heightened concern about laicité, for example at the time
when Jules Ferry, Minister of Education at the beginning of the 20th
century, issued the famous secularisation laws.41 In that period laicité
denoted the weakening of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state by
putting it at the same level as religious minorities in the Republic.42
The concept of laicité was in fact designed by the revolutionaries to
counteract the dominant position of the Catholic Church. During the
turmoil about the so-called headscarf affairs in the first half of the
1990s, laicité was invoked as a means of legitimising the ban on the
headscarf.43 Thus in 1994, Minister of Education François Bayrou, pro-
posed a tougher policy against all forms of religious proselytism and a
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ban on ostentatious signs at school, thereby referring to the secular
character of the Republic. This has a completely different meaning, not
least because Islam never had something close to a dominant position.
Bayrou’s position was restated by president Chirac in December 2003
in his speech following the publication of the report by the Stasi Com-
mission on secularism.44 The legislation that was implemented there-
after, was in fact a firm reconfirmation of the secular principles of the
secular republic, but under completely different circumstances. Those
who defend a more liberal attitude and challenge the strict secularist
politics, do not normally question the separation of church and state.
They prefer to question the interpretation of this principle.45
Aspects of political culture are contested and contextualised and they
shape the discourse. It follows that in the above case laicité has been a
relevant discursive field in French political culture for quite some time.
As such, political culture (or laicité for that matter) is an object of re-
search, something that can be identified empirically and comparatively.
Two aspects are particular relevant: The first is the national narrative
that structures political culture as a discursive field. The second is poli-
tical culture as an actual political repertoire.
Political culture as national narrative
A crucial element in political cultures is the narrative about the nation,
the national myth. As such, it is a story of the nation about itself: the
grand narrative about the nation’s past, present and future. Concerning
the French case, Wieviorka argues that nationalist arguments that re-
ject Islam on traditional religious grounds should be separated from re-
publican arguments that refer to universal principles of equality of all
human beings.46 This may be true in theory, in practice, however, na-
tionalist and universalist arguments are mixed up. It was Bellah who
pointed to the quasi-religious character with which modern (secular)
nation-states refer to themselves, using the term ‘civil religion’.47 To
paraphrase Geertz, one could consider these narratives as model of and
model for the nation.48 An important aspect of national myths is that
they are hegemonic. According to Haas, a national myth is: ‘the core of
ideas and claims that most citizens accept about a nation-state beyond
their political divisions’.49 Universalism is part of that myth. Anderson,
Billig and others have argued that nation-states tell this story through
the creation of a national history.50 These national histories are of
course contested and re-written over and over again, yet they co-shape
dominant discourses and as such have a certain durability and effect.
Moral communities are constructed by presenting the history of the
collective to the next generation. History textbooks are an excellent
source for the analysis of national imaginaries. In it, a selective look is
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thrown at the nation’s past, taking up what is considered necessary in
understanding the present and omitting what is considered irrelevant.
It is through history textbooks that the notion of ‘what a nation stands
for’ is transmitted from one generation to the next. The concepts pre-
sented in history textbooks are, of course, not to be confused with rea-
lity: they reflect what the nation wants itself to be (or what it wants to
be seen as), rather than what it actually is. As in every socialisation pro-
cess, children are not confronted with social life as it is but as it should
be, sometimes in an almost self-stereotypical way. However, this does
not mean that it is meaningless. On the contrary, principles of legiti-
macy are defined by transmitting how civil society should be dealt with,
who should participate, and how solutions should be found.51
Political repertoires and contentious politics
Political culture not only refers to dominant discourses, but also to the
political process itself. When we look at the previously presented exam-
ple of laicité in France and the ways in which it has been applied in
concrete situations, it becomes clear that we do not deal with abstract
political principles but with concrete contested issues (headscarves,
schools, houses of worship, etc.) and real political actors. As I stated
earlier, religious newcomers are involved in an emancipation process, a
struggle to get access to resources. It is my contention that nation-
building is first and foremost a process sustained by political collective
action. The nation-state is the very outcome of political struggle. Politi-
cal culture provides the constituent elements of the contestation and
structures the subsequent political struggles so that the outcome will
set the stage for the next phase. Political culture can thus be considered
as the argumentative repertoire, the available political language that po-
litical actors have at their disposal. There are of course other dis-
courses, but the dominant one has proven to be the most effective to
meet the demands in situations where there is inequality of power. To
put it differently, it is of vital importance to master the societal skills of
the dominant society and to understand the apropriate language. An
example may elucidate this. During a debate between members of the
Dutch Christian Democratic Party and spokespersons of some Islamic
organisations about integration and the position of Islam, the mem-
bers of the CDA were very critical about certain Islamic values that ‘do
not fit into our society’. The spokesman of the Arab European League
(AEL), presently one of the most active Muslim organisations in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, referred to ‘sovereignty in one’s own set’
(sovereiniteit in eigen kring), in order to demand the right to live accord-
ing to Islamic prescriptions. He knew precisely that this principle, de-
veloped by Dutch Protestant actors during the school struggle at the
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end of the 19th century, would appeal to CDA members. They
remained, of course, critical towards Islam, but the AEL representative
at least did not have to ‘explain’ what he meant. Thus repertoires that
have been produced in previous periods and previous political arenas,
can prove to be useful and effective in present ones. As such, political
culture is in itself a process and it follows that the most successful
political actors are those that master the dominant discourse. McAdam
et al. have argued that the vast majority of studies of nationalism are
mostly concerned with the first aspect, the (dominant) discourse, rather
than with the question of how this came about.52 Actors seem to have
been ruled out and emphasis is laid on institutionalised aspects rather
than on non-institutionalised forms of contestation and political agen-
cy. But political culture refers as much to collective political struggle as
it refers to national discourse.
Historically speaking, we can distinguish significant events or con-
tentious fields that have made up political culture. McAdam et al. have
referred to these events as ‘contentious politics’ which they define as
an:
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims
and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant,
an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims
would, if realised, affect the interest of at least one of the clai-
mants.53
Thus political cultures are transformed into relatively brief episodes of
political conflict and thereafter persist a longer period of ‘normal poli-
tics’. I consider this definition as a useful instrument for the analysis
of processes of nation-building and the reactions to religious newco-
mers. The working hypothesis is that the diverging reactions to Islam
in different European nations are best explained by the different dis-
courses of nationhood, the disparate political cultures in those coun-
tries, and the different paths emancipation takes. If this hypothesis is
correct, a historical and cross-national comparison of state formation,
nation-building, and political cultures will explain the differences and
similarities between countries, and in particular their responses to reli-
gious newcomers as well as their specific modes of making Muslim
immigrants into citizens. With respect to these episodes of contention,
one can think of the struggle for political empowerment of religious
minorities/newcomers. An analysis of this process among Jews in the
early 20th century may be crucial for the case of contemporary Mus-
lims. One can also think of the school struggle as a contentious epi-
sode in Dutch history. Instead of treating the debate about Islamic
schools as a migrant issue alone and as a unique case, we can consider
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it as a phase in a long history of the struggle over the control of educa-
tion.
To test the above mentioned hypothesis, I include three countries in
the comparative analysis: France, the Netherlands, and Turkey.54 De-
spite crucial differences, all three countries can be considered as typical
examples of homogenising nation-states.55
France, the Netherlands, and Turkey
Political culture is thus both a discursive field in which certain narra-
tives, values and exemplary events occupy centre stage and a script for
political behaviour, rhetoric, and style. The nature of the 20th-century
political cultures in European nations has depended on the outcome of
the political struggles over the relationship between church and state
and the competing definitions of the nation in the 19th century. This
leads to two important insights. One is that nation-states can be de-
picted as ‘flows’, as an ongoing process of negotiation and struggle over
meanings and power. The other is that those in power always try to
present the nation as a fixed entity that rests on historical and institu-
tionalised principles. These processes of flow and closure should be at
the heart of any historical analysis of nation-building.
A comparison of the school conflict in France’s Third Republic and
the Netherlands may illustrate this. In France, the struggle over the de-
finition of the nation-state was played out between Catholic clericalism
and a secular-Republican, ‘Enlightenment’ ideology of ‘laicité’. The
French liberals were thoroughly steeped in the art of mass politics and
carried the majority of the nation with them. The conflict was espe-
cially bitter because it was linked to a more fundamental struggle over
the political regime as such which had divided French society ever
since the Revolution of 1789. It took as long as the early 20th century
before the conflict was resolved with legislation that was designed to
separate the church and the state: the so-called Combes laws of 1904-5.
This marked a double triumph: of laicité over clericalism, and of the
Republic over its assorted enemies. As a result, the political culture of
the French Republic became a militant secularism which tended to ex-
clude the religious from all public spaces. This outcome enhanced the
position of France’s two religious minorities, the Protestants and the
Jews, but not as minorities. It was (and is) as individual citizens that
Protestants and Jews played an important role in the Republic.56
In the Dutch case, the school conflict evolved along different lines
and the outcome was the reverse. Here, the Ancien Régime had not
suppressed religious diversity but rather ‘tolerated’ and ‘channeled’ it
under the tutelage of the political authorities and the Dutch Reformed
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Church. The liberal 1848 Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion,
including religious schools, in the framework of the separation of
church and state. It was the attempt by the Liberals in the 1870s to im-
pose a quasi-monopoly on the state schools that triggered fierce Calvi-
nist and Catholic opposition. Where Catholics and Protestants were
each other’s enemies for much of the 19th century, they now joined
forces in the wake of a liberal victory over the control of education. The
Dutch Liberal leader Kappeyne was not so far from Jules Ferry’s ideas
in France, but it was somewhat less aggressively secularist. The out-
come of the political struggle differed from that in France in two ways.
First, the Liberals had to concede victory to the confessional parties
who proved to be far more adept at mass politics than their rather eli-
tist Liberal counterparts. Dutch Catholic, but more so Protestant, politi-
cal actors with their extended networks in all layers of the population,
were much better able to mobilise their rank and file than the once
powerful Catholic Church in France. Second, this victory was more a
compromise in that the 1848 constitutional settlement was never for a
moment called into question. The upshot was a system of organised di-
versity in which all religious groups enjoyed the status of ‘minorities’
(even though Protestant culture, but not any particular Protestant de-
nomination, retained a dominant position).
The political outcome of the church-state struggles shaped the party
system and the political habitus of both the French and Dutch elites.
These were then inserted into a dominant narrative of national history
which explained the success and vitality of the nation in terms of cer-
tain arrangements and virtues which had proved their mettle over the
centuries. A national political culture was grounded in deep certainties
about ‘the way we do things in this country’.
Modes of discursive closure: Narratives of nationhood
Today, in the wake of the possible EU membership of (‘Islamic’) Tur-
key, we often hear about the ‘Judeo-Christian’ roots of European civili-
sation. Seventy-five years ago this would have been almost inconceiva-
ble, at least for the general public, as much as it is inconceivable to
speak today of the ‘Abrahamic’ roots of European civilisation. This is a
good example of the dynamics of flow and closure in the making of
European identity. At each historical juncture nation-states ‘seal off’
their identity by formulating exclusive narratives about their being in
the world. One way of inculcating these narratives is by teaching his-
tory. The narratives in history textbooks offer a selective representation
of parts of national history. The narrative changes over time: every gen-
eration rewrites history. Nonetheless, certain patterns and values dis-
play a remarkable longevity. History, after all, is not only about facts
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but also about how a nation should live, and how creative solutions to
problems should be reached. It is through the history lessons in com-
pulsory education that the idea of ‘what a nation stands for’ is trans-
mitted from one generation to the next. National histories provide us
with a central narrative around which national political cultures are or-
ganised. In all modern nations the teaching of history in elementary
and secondary schools transmits a view of national history in which pa-
triotic symbols and virtues are highlighted. Certain key events enjoy a
paradigmatic status and certain men – or, more rarely, women – play
the alluring roles of heroes or villains.57
In Dutch history, for example, the 16th-century revolt against Span-
ish absolutism which ushered in national independence is such a pivo-
tal event. The villain of the piece is the sinister Duke of Alva who, in
1567, was sent to the Netherlands at the head of an army to crush the
rebellion. Alva was traditionally depicted as cruel, Catholic, and tyran-
nical. He is everything a good Dutch citizen is supposed not to be: pre-
ferring violence over persuasion as his favourite political tool; instead
of toleration he supports the inquisition; instead of collective rule and
local autonomy he represents absolutism and centralisation. The great
patriotic heroes are depicted as the opposite of this. William of Orange,
the ‘founder’ of the Dutch Republic, was a tolerant and peaceful man
who only resorted to armed force as a last resort. The other great stad-
houder (governor), William III, is praised for his military skills but
these are deployed in a series of defensive wars against the bid for
European hegemony by the absolutist France whose king, Louis XIV,
turns out to be a ferocious persecutor of the Protestants, a ‘second
Alva’ one feels tempted to add.
French schoolchildren learn a very different story. In their school-
books, Louis XIV is the grand roi who unified France after a long era of
civil wars, who promoted economic growth and protected scientists
and artists, and during whose reign France became the dominant mili-
tary and cultural power on the European continent. His persecution of
the Calvinists is mentioned as a regrettable sideshow. However, the
grand event of French history, comparable to the Dutch Revolt against
Spain, is the revolution of 1789. Its protagonists are the true heroes of
French Republican history. Men such as Sieyès, Mirabeau, Condorcet,
and also Robespierre, are the great lawgivers, inspired by Reason and
Virtue. Their ideas and values, the ‘indivisible’ republic, liberty, equal-
ity, and fraternity sum up the virtues and duties of the citizen. The fig-
ure of the revolutionary who innovates in a voluntarist and radical
manner is thus a positive symbol in French history.58
An analysis of history textbooks further shows that France views it-
self as a ‘universal nation’, an important and pivotal protagonist of
world history and universal values. The grande revolution proclaimed
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the message of human rights not only to the French people, but to the
world. French history is divided into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, the Ancien
Régime and the Republic. The Ancien Régime saw a struggle between
Enlightenment and clerical intolerance with Voltaire as the key hero:
both his courageous fight against an oppressive Catholic Church, as in
the Calas affair, and the way he used his literary skills in political
causes deeply influence French political culture to this day. After the
revolution, French history is depicted as an ongoing struggle for ration-
ality and equality. The public sphere is the space where these values
must be enacted, by means of legislation and also by the energetic con-
tribution of the citizens of the Republic. The collective organisation of
citizens on a religious or ‘identity’ basis, however, is suspect because it
harks back to the anti-republican clericalism of the late 19th century
and, beyond that, to the corporate privileges of the Ancien Régime.59
The republic is, or so it seems, always threatened by its clerical, obscur-
antist, and particularist enemies who are defeated from time to time,
only to rise from their ashes anew. Again and again the Republic has
to be saved by the resolute action of its virtuous citizens. Each episode
represents a step forward in the march toward universal rationality.
While French history textbooks underline the creation of the new,
Dutch historical narratives are much more concerned with the preser-
vation of the old, and with the protection of the nation from the out-
side world. The Dutch history of nation-building is a sequel that at-
tempts to build up something that can withhold the challenges from
outside. Historical narratives tell us that the participation of the bur-
ghers in town governments was an old-established practice in Flanders
and Holland. Urban self-government based on medieval privileges is a
positive reference in Dutch national history. In the Dutch story, Philip
II, the Spanish king, sought to introduce ‘innovations’ and to impose
‘foreign’ law thereby unwittingly igniting a revolution. But the term ‘re-
volution’ should be applied with care. In Dutch history a revolutionary
political style is much less appreciated than in France. Many Dutch his-
torians have managed to turn even the history of revolutionary epi-
sodes like the Batavian Revolution of 1795 into a series of consensual
political arrangements. So the main lesson of history is that the Dutch
always seek to proceed by piecemeal reform, building their society in a
process of trial and error.
While the unity of the French state is always threatened by groups
who place their own identity above their allegiance to the nation, the
Dutch national narrative explains how diversity and national unity are
successfully reconciled time and again. The ‘great men’ in Dutch his-
tory are not ‘heroes’ but steadfast and earnest men who can bridge dif-
ferences by means of skilful bargaining and moral leadership. In com-
parison with French history, rhetoric is less valued and negotiation
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more. Religious difference is seen as a question of organised tolerance
and mutual accommodation. In this view of national history, the pillari-
sation model that emerged victorious out of the 19th-century conflicts
between liberals, Calvinists, and Catholics can be interpreted as a nat-
ural and typically Dutch development. Power-sharing and the peaceful
resolution of conflicts are the key to the prosperity and flourishing of
the Dutch nation. Subcultures do not constitute a danger to national
unity, so long as they play according to the Dutch rules of the game –
that is the lesson of this history.60
This is in no way denying that there are also important common ele-
ments in the Dutch and French national narratives: for example, pro-
gress, toleration, and human rights are core values in both cases. The
differences between French and Dutch political culture should not be
overstated. Since the late 19th century, both are liberal polities in which
individual rights are guaranteed by the constitution. But within the
limits of the liberal model of politics and society, the accepted manifes-
tations of the religious in public space and the political representation
of religious groups and their ideas have followed consistently different
patterns. To sum up the similarities and differences between French
and Dutch political culture in a brief formula: French political culture
is liberal-republican while Dutch political culture is liberal-communi-
tarian. Or to put it differently: France could well be depicted as a ‘na-
tion above (ethnic or religious) communities, while the Netherlands is
a ’nation despite communities’. The similarity between the two lies in
the fact that both nation-states envisage a nation as an independent
‘thing’ unto itself. In Germany and Great Britain, for example, the con-
cept of the nation cannot be explained without referring to religious or
ethnic specificity.
This combination of similarities and differences is reflected in the
dominant national myths of the two nations. In history textbooks and
other national narratives the similarities between the two histories are
not denied or obliterated, but they are inserted in a master plot which
is organised around the differences. It is the differences that confer
meaning on the similarities, not the other way around. In the Nether-
lands, this is the myth of the eternally tolerant and diversity-loving
Dutch, living on a proverbial island amidst threats; in France, the myth
of the secular republic promoting equality, freedom and reason. These
national myths, in their turn, became part of the national political cul-
tures of the 20th century, and as such, they became causally efficient
in various ways: as parts of the curriculum in elementary schools, and
as national canons invoked as a matter of course by mass media and
politicians, in everyday debates as well as public ceremonies and com-
memorations. These dominant narratives of nationhood have conse-
quences for the perception of religious newcomers, whether they are
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immigrants or not. They have influenced the way Catholics and Jews
have ‘found their place’ in the Netherlands, and Protestants and Jews
in France in the 19th and 20th centuries. And they are highly relevant
to the cultural and political integration of Dutch and French Muslims
in the contemporary period.
One of the reasons why Turkey is included in this analysis is because
it offers us a compelling example of how the logic of nation-states oper-
ates. The republic was founded on the ruins of the once-powerful mul-
ti-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Although many modern
states in the Middle East were once part of that empire, Turkey can
generally be considered as its principal heir. Many of the measures ta-
ken by the Kemalists in the 1920s and 1930s can only be understood
in relation to the Ottoman heritage. The Kemalist program was not
only a reaction against the dominant position of the imperial Islamic
establishment, it was also a Turkish-nationalist reaction against the
emancipatory movements of non-Turkish subjects during the last cen-
tury of the empire. This alone makes the Kemalist revolution a typical
nationalist one, comparable to the French Revolution. But there are
also important differences. In the case of the French Revolution the
abolition of the absolutist monarchy was the prime objective of the re-
volutionaries. The separation of church and state was of course some-
thing that played a role at the outset, yet it was only accomplished
more than a century afterwards. It was the outcome of a struggle. In
the case of the Netherlands, the actual separation of church and state
took place in 1983 only after a period of long deconfessionalisation. It
was an event that was of significance only to insiders. Hardly anybody
in the country really understands the implications of the revisions to
the Constitution in 1983. In Turkey, the Kemalist revolution was a total
‘Umwertung aller Werten’, that implied a series of fundamental reforms
that radically changed the relation between church and state. In fact, it
was not the outcome of a societal struggle or a gradual process, but of
the radical measures of an authoritarian regime. But apart from that,
the Kemalists borrowed some significant political ideas from European
countries such as France, Switzerland, and Italy in the construction of
their own model of the nation-state.61 Notably, there are some striking
parallels between France and Turkey with respect to the relation be-
tween state and religion. Both France and Turkey subscribe to the
‘État-laı̈que’ (the Turkish word is laiklik), and Turkey is well known for
its thorough policies on the headscarf. There are several cases in which
women wearing headscarves as a political statement in ‘public space’
were accused of subverting the foundations of the Turkish state.62 The
way in which the revolution was enshrined in official textbooks and
documents can be depicted as an extreme form of discursive closure.
History was rewritten in an even more radical manner than in France.
RELIGIOUS NEWCOMERS AND THE NATION-STATE 255
Dynamics of change: the nation as a site of contestation
Another way of analysing political culture is to look at the emancipa-
tion of religious newcomers and to contentious episodes, particularly
in a cross-national comparative perspective. To wind it up let me offer
just a few clues as to what is at stake in the three countries with re-
spect to the position of Muslims in society. What are the lines along
which collective action and emancipation finds a resolution and what
are the specific elements that constitute the discourse about Islam?
As noted earlier, there is a strict separation between church and state
in all three countries.63 This is important not only because it accounts
for the secular basis of these nation-states, but also for the fact that no
religious denomination can apply for a special status as religious de-
nomination. In all three countries there is no recognition of religious
denominations, nor is there any legal basis for public funding of reli-
gious activity. This alone makes the three cases interesting because, un-
like in Germany where a form of legal recognition exists, or Belgium
where the state recognised Islam already back in 1974, it implies that
the emancipation of Muslims is most effective along the lines of com-
munity building and political empowerment. The same is true for the
United Kingdom but for different reasons. There are also important
differences between the three cases because the separation of church
and state does have different implications, elaborations, and above all,
different meanings, especially with regard to religious freedom. In Tur-
key, laiklik in fact implies control of the state over religion. At the time
of the foundation of the republic in 1923, all religious institutions were
closed down and later on replaced by state bureaucracies that handle
all religious affairs. Thus the training of imams is a state affair and all
other (private) initiatives in this respect are as yet illegal.64 The state
thus has a powerful instrument in controlling religious activity by sim-
ply declaring all non-state initiatives illegal. This has caused a dramatic
change in the position of the traditional Islamic clergy.65 More drastic
for the position of Islam in Turkish society, however, has been the com-
plete ban on political activity. This may sound strange for a country
where the party with an absolute majority in Parliament since Novem-
ber 2002 is an Islamic party, it remains one of the most delicate issues
in Turkish politics. As long as the Constitution stipulates that religion
and politics should be separated, it remains possible for the judge to
ban a party even if it has an electoral majority. When analysing Turkish
politics over the past 60 years, it becomes clear that politicians have al-
ways been very aware of this. Despite all this, some important changes
took place over the past 50 years in the post-war era. They have mainly
to do with societal developments, but they did have an effect on legal
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issues as well. Even more important is that the very meaning of laiklik
has been contested on many occasions.66
In France, there is religious freedom, but there are no legal provi-
sions whatsoever that can be used by Muslims as a religious denomina-
tion. Muslims have no other option than French citizenship; their reli-
gious background is irrelevant. Muslims are free to set up religious in-
stitutions and there are even consultative bodies concerning religious
issues, but they do not have a legal status. In order to take issue with
something they have to resort to other means and other societal fields.
In the Netherlands, the history of pillarisation, and particularly its legal
provisions offer a crucial instrument for Muslims to gain access to re-
sources. Despite hot discussions about the desirability of Islamic
schools, there is still strong political support for the continuation of
the Dutch state-financed pillarised school system. The same is true for
a pillarised system of welfare.
Most comparative overviews stop at this point by merely stating that
there is indeed an interpretative margin in all legislation. It is up to in-
dividual officials to use this margin in a particular way. It is my conten-
tion, however, that legal provisions are but one aspect of the structure
of political opportunities that shape contentious politics. Legal provi-
sions with respect to religion may work out differently in a struggle
about schooling than in the case of headscarf affairs. Each contentious
field has its own dynamics, its specifics actors and specific proble-
matics. We must also bear in mind that there is a lot of religion with-
out contention. General statements about the position of the Muslims
in one country are meaningless as long as we do not access the specific
circumstances and issues that are at stake.
Concluding Remarks
From the above a built-in paradox in the concept of political culture
emerges. On the one hand, it both offers contenders the necessary ar-
gumentative repertoire for their case, and it sets the limits of the terms
of negotiations. On the other hand, it is precisely the content of politi-
cal culture that is at stake in contentious politics.
In Turkey, the post-Second World War period constitutes the most
crucial era for the position of Islam in society and for the relation be-
tween ‘church’ and state. Two main factors account for that. The first is
the democratisation after the Second World War and the second is
massive urbanisation during the 1950s. It is the combination of these
two important developments that set the stage for the debate about Is-
lam in society. Islam gained a political foothold and it became a highly
politicised and sensitive phenomenon, despite the strict anti-Islamic
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legislation. There is every reason to treat the relation between the origi-
nal city dwellers in the big cities of Turkey and the newcomers from
the countryside as one between indigenous population and religious
newcomers in Western Europe. We must bear in mind that the cities
in Turkey were bulwarks of secular republicanism from the early 1930s
until the end of the 1950s. There has been a huge cultural and societal
gap between the cities and the countryside for centuries. Urban and
rural populations had but a scant notion about each others existence.67
The massive urbanisation was as much a ‘culture shock’ for the urban
population in Turkey as was the arrival of Muslim migrants to Western
Europe for indigenous populations. And much in the same way as the
arrival of Muslims in Western Europe triggered a debate about religion
and society, it did the same in Turkey.68 The impact was even stronger
since the urbanisation caused a fundamental demographic and power
shift, whereas Muslims in Western Europe comprise only a tiny por-
tion of the total population. In Turkey, despite the remaining strict leg-
islation, Muslims managed to shift the power balance and to funda-
mentally change the dominant discourse from one that places Islam
against modernity to one that considers Islam as a genuine and inher-
ent aspect of Turkish civilisation, the so-called Turkish-Islamic syn-
thesis. This was certainly not a ‘way back’ as many orientalists would
like us to believe.
France and the Netherlands grant religious freedom to all denomina-
tions and religious activity is permitted as long as it does not contradict
the Constitution. The crucial difference between the two countries is
that in the Netherlands religion has always played a role in the process
of nation-building,69 whereas in France the nation was initially con-
structed as an alternative to the dominant position of the Catholic
Church. Another crucial element is the way in which the relation be-
tween Islam and integration is perceived. If we want to analyse the dis-
course on Islam and the presence of Muslims in France, we have to
take the colonial situation into account.70 In the colonial era, France
had always adopted a very strict assimilationist policy, much in line
with the Republican political culture. Muslims from the former colo-
nies now living in France did not have many problems integrating into
French society as long as they emphasised their French citizenship and
their willingness to assimilate into French society. The sharp increase
in the number of newcomers since the early 1980s, the events in the
Islamic world, together with the demands of the well-educated young
Muslims in France have changed the general climate towards Islam.
Those who assert their Islamic identity and request citizenship are met
with suspicion.71 The net result is that there is hardly a remaining mid-
dle strategy between a radical rejection of French assimilationism and
complete absorption.
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In the Netherlands, the history of pillarisation has at least produced
a discourse that ‘understands’ religious institutionalisation. Demands
for cultural autonomy fit within the pillarisation ideology. As an orga-
nising principle, pillarisation is of course no longer viable. More rele-
vant in my view is the consultation model (poldermodel) in the Nether-
lands, which links the civil society to the political system. Although
there is no official recognition of religion, there are numerous plat-
forms, consultation boards, think tanks and other peculiarities of civil
society in which Muslim organisation do play their part. They have at
least led to an certain level of integration into civil society. The most
crucial factor in my view is the mixing up of integration policies and
religious issues. Particularly in the 1980s Muslims have been able to
get access to vital resources, not so much as Muslims but as migrants.
The emphasis of the backward position of Muslims was effective in
that period. The present climate (particularly after the dramatic events
in the past years) produces principally two different discourses among
Muslims. On the one hand, there is a group, of which the aforemen-
tioned AEL is a representative, that rejects the conflation of Islam with
‘foreignness’ and backwardness. They demand citizenship and reli-
gious equality. In a way this is a pillarisation strategy. On the other
hand, there are groups that comply with the increasing pressure to ‘pri-
vatise’ religion. Empirical evidence shows that the support for those
who challenge the dominant discourse have recently begun to gain
ground.
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American Immigrants Look at their Americanisation
Dorothee Schneider
During the years 1840-1930, the population of the United States grew
more than at any other period in its history, largely because of the in-
flux of immigrants from Europe. The newcomers, because of their
background and their numbers, were considered a challenge to Ameri-
can national identity, and the movement to make the immigrants into
Americans matured in direct response to their arrival. Consensus over
what ‘American’ values were, proved elusive, though this did not di-
minish the zeal with which a large number of institutions, people, and
communities became engaged in the massive attempt to teach ‘Ameri-
canism’ and ‘American citizenship’ to immigrants and to convert as
many into ‘real’ Americans as possible.1 The movement for Americani-
sation which began as the articulation of a general mistrust of the new-
comers’ ability to assimilate culturally and politically, became a highly
organised attempt to educate, indoctrinate and convert immigrants to
American modes of political behaviour, workplace docility and social
conformity by the time the First World War reached its apex. But the
official Americanisation movement disintegrated quickly after the war
as Federal funding ended in 1919. Very little is known on the continu-
ing Americanisation movement or its afterlife in the 1920s and 1930s.
The following essay will show how Americanisation lived on in the two
decades after First World War, within communities of immigrants lar-
gely outside the influence of Federal programs. During this period the
structure and meaning of Americanisation for immigrants changed in
important ways from something ordered by the government to a pro-
cess immigrants, shaped for themselves. In many ways my essay will
build on an emerging new historiography which has focused on the
creation and re-shaping of Americanisation by those who were tradi-
tionally thought of as mere objects of the crusade: working-class immi-
grants. ‘Americanisation from below’ as my colleague James Barrett
has called it, took less institutional forms. Instead, it was rooted in so-
cial and community life. Seen this way, Americanisation was a loca-
lised, evolutionary process, difficult to fix in terms of chronology or
milestones.2 Acquiring political and legal citizenship through naturali-
sation, for example, was just one of the many ways that immigrants
choose to respond to the call for Americanisation. Learning the lan-
guage, associating with other Americans and adopting other parts of
what were considered American value systems were equally important.
The immigrants’ understanding of America, its society, culture and citi-
zenship will therefore also be a dominant theme in this paper.
The movement to Americanise immigrants was ideologically con-
nected to two somewhat contradictory strands of political ideology at
the turn of the last century. First, the movement began and continued
to grow in close connection with the movement for social reform and
the betterment of the working class and, secondly, it was linked to the
movement to restrict immigration to the United States. In the 1890s,
before the Americanisation movement acquired its name and the offi-
cial imprimatur of state support, much of the effort at social and cul-
tural assimilation and Americanisation took place in settlement houses
and reform groups, such as the YMCA. Jane Addams’ Hull House at-
tempted to teach Americanisation in part by guiding immigrants in
their own discovery of how American culture merged with Old World
traditions: Literature, theatre and crafts tended to be taught with an eye
to re-gaining traditional connections. But health, hygiene, child rearing
and cooking as well as US history were part of the ‘American’ canon of
enlightenment, science and awareness of the larger world. In many
ways, the work of settlement houses and other reform-minded Progres-
sives was directed at freeing immigrants from both the shackles of con-
fining traditions and from ignorance. Of course, Americanisation also
meant teaching immigrants the rights of American citizens and ex-
plaining how a democratic state was supposed to function. Participa-
tion was encouraged but always voluntary, and, if one believes Addams’
accounts, debates about political and constitutional questions were of-
ten dominated by socialists and union supporters – neither of which
was considered a core ‘American’ constituency.3
The knowledge and ability to function in a new political and social
universe was also intended to render immigrants less vulnerable to at-
tacks by immigration restrictionists for whom Americanisation was
also increasingly important. Restrictionists always considered Ameri-
canisation a mechanism to separate worthy from unworthy immi-
grants. In their scheme of things, US citizenship was closely linked to
Americanisation, with the naturalisation procedure emerging as an im-
portant test and selection mechanism. The implicit assumption in US
naturalisation law and practice, that every immigrant to the United
States would eventually become a US citizen, disturbed the restriction-
ists who complained about the many unqualified, barely literate immi-
grant labourers who became naturalised US citizens and voters over-
night with little knowledge of the English language and the US consti-
tution.4 Restrictionists’ efforts to secure the Americanisation of
prospective citizens therefore began as a push to make naturalisation
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more stringent and add elements of Americanisation to the naturalisa-
tion examination.5 But this turned out to be difficult to realise. An Eng-
lish language requirement was added to the naturalisation procedure
in 1903 – though what constituted competency in English was never
defined. Beginning in 1906, a comprehensive Federal naturalisation
law introduced uniform requirements to the naturalisation process,
which rendered it somewhat less vulnerable to fraud and irregularity.
While this law reduced the number of petitioners, especially in urban
areas, it did not connect the acquisition of citizenship with Americani-
sation. The core problem of how to ensure not only that fewer immi-
grants became citizens, but that the right people would become Ameri-
cans, was not resolved for the restrictionists, who henceforth concen-
trated their efforts on an immigration (rather than a naturalisation)
restriction.6
It was the First World War, which changed the equation of citizen-
ship and Americanisation in fundamental ways. Americanisation
moved centre-stage in the home-front effort to unite the nation, and
ensure patriotism and to imbue immigrants with a sense of citizen-
ship. This effort involved the Federal government, because it financed
English language and American history instruction in countless ve-
nues. A wide-ranging partnership of reformers, patriotic groups, busi-
nesses and municipal, state, and federal authorities took up the cam-
paign for Americanisation and institutionalised it in countless lectures,
classes and evening schools. As an integral part of this campaign, cul-
tural and social Americanisation of immigrants was linked to a cam-
paign for naturalisation.7 The formal Americanisation campaign of the
war years was built on a loose network of voluntary agencies and asso-
ciations which organised patriotic-themed classes in Americanisation,
Fourth of July ‘Americanzation Day’ celebrations, and exhortations to
take out US citizenship. By 1916, the Bureau of Naturalization, which
had done little more than collect statistics on naturalisation for the
prior decade, had also published an outline for a ‘Course on Citizen-
ship’. This pamphlet, the first of many, was to be adopted by the volun-
tary agencies that continued to be responsible for the actual instruction
of immigrants. The Bureau also began to forward the names of immi-
grants who had taken out ‘first papers’ to voluntary associations who
would then be responsible for contacting the prospective citizens as po-
tential students in their Americanisation classes. The Bureau also
worked with the primary First World War propaganda agency, the
Committee on Public Information. As it became visible to the larger
public, Americanisation became an integral part of the propaganda ap-
paratus of the First World War. It reflected a national agenda, not the
needs or actual behaviour of immigrant communities.
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But Americanisation, as recent scholarship has shown, was actually
an internally quite diverse movement. In content and sponsorship, the
Americanisation campaign of the First World War era continued to re-
flect the divided impulses of immigration reform and restriction. For
the reformers, Americanisation still represented the emancipation of
immigrants from ignorance and illiteracy. For employers, especially
those who sponsored Americanisation classes, such as the Ford Motor
Company, Americanisation promised a better educated and also more
docile and disciplined labour force. Many businesses coupled the ex-
hortations to Americanise with more substantial pressure: job promo-
tions or even just getting hired was linked to the acquisition of US citi-
zenship. Some made the attendance of citizenship classes mandatory
for their immigrant employees. Federal and other state agencies used
Americanisation in similar ways: Municipalities and states made US ci-
tizenship a prerequisite for public sector jobs from street sweeper to
high school teacher. Congress mandated that the newly established in-
come tax be twice as high for ‘non-resident aliens’ (though it provided
no definition of what a non-resident alien was). Ultimately, Americani-
sation, it was hoped, meant not just political support for the political
Table 1 Immigration, Declarations and Completed Naturalisations, 1908-1921
Year Immigration First Papers Filed Naturalised
1908 782,870 147,229 25,963
1909 751,786 145,794 38,372
1910 1,041,570 167,228 39,206
1911 878,587 186,157 55,329
1912 838,172 169,142 69,965
1913 1,197,192 181,632 82,017
1914 1,218,480 214,016 105,439
1915 326,700 247,815 96,390
1916 289,826 207,935 93,911
1917 295,403 438,748 94,897
1918 110,618 335,069 151,449
1919 141,132 346,827 217,358
1920 430,001 200,106 177,683
1921 805,228 273,511 181,291
1922 309,556 273,511 170,447
1923 522,919 296,633 145,084
1924 706,896 424,540 150,510
1925 294,314 277,218 152,457
1926 304,488 277,539 146,331
1927 335,175 258,295 199,804
1928 307,255 254,588 233,115
1929 279,678 280,645 224,728
1930 241,700 62,138 169,337
Source: US Commissioner of Naturalisation, Annual Report
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establishment from those on the public payroll, and a compliant work-
force in the private sector. It would hopefully also keep in check dissi-
dent social and political movements among the foreign born, in parti-
cular the socialists and anarchists among America’s immigrant work-
ing class.
The effect of the Americanisation campaign of the First World War can
be measured in a variety of ways. The Annual Reports of the Commis-
sioner of Naturalisation for the War and post-War years show no clear
trend in most respects. Immigrants who wanted to become US citizens
had to file a ‘Declaration of Intention’ (also called First Papers) after a
minimum residence of three years. Two years later, they could apply to
become naturalised US citizens (Second Papers), undergo the requisite
examination and swear an oath to the Constitution.8 Thus the number
of ‘First Papers’ taken out by immigrants served as a rough indicator of
immigrants’ intentions, realised only two years later when the naturali-
sation petition was actually submitted and then granted by the courts.
Despite the steeply climbing number of ‘First papers’ taken out be-
tween 1914 and 1917, the number of completed naturalisations actually
decreased in that period. Completed naturalisations increased only in
1918 and reached their apex the following year.9 We can thus assume
that the Americanisation programs of the War years had either a mini-
mal effect on naturalisations or reached primarily those who were still
years away from becoming US citizens and could therefore only file
their First Papers in response to the Americanisation campaign. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that both were true: Americanisation classes
had a high dropout rate. Those who qualified for US citizenship did
not usually need the help of classroom instruction. Those that did ben-
efit from instruction, would take more than a couple of years to be-
come US citizens.
The only program of wartime Americanisation which could be called
an unmitigated success was military naturalisation. Introduced by a
special Congressional law in 1918, it allowed members of the armed
forces to naturalise without filing a declaration of intention first, and
with a minimum of formality (no citizenship or English examination
took place, in most cases). In all, over 287,000 men took advantage of
this law until 1925.10 After all, soldiers on the American Expeditionary
Force became the quintessential Americans during the War and could
not be denied US citizenship on formal grounds.
The First World War Americanisation campaign was heavily criti-
cised as soon as the War was over, however. Many immigrant groups
found that the coercive character of many programs had had the very
opposite effect on immigrants from what a conversion to the American
creed was supposed to accomplish. The immigrant press and spokes-
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men of immigrant organisations were almost universally critical of the
programs.11 In an explicit comparison with what he considered the fun-
damentally different view and meaning of citizenship in non-demo-
cratic Europe, Carol Aronovici of the California State Commission of
Immigration and Housing observed in the Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science:
To one who knows the soul and spirit of the immigrant who has
passed through the painful experience of analyzing, sorting and
accepting American life, the spectacle of the rabid and ignorant
Americanization efforts was disheartening. It did not represent
America as the foreigner had pictured it in his dreams before
landing upon these shores. It flavored more of Hungary where
the magyarization of several millions of people was attempted
by means not consistent with American tradition or of Russia of
the Tsarish days with the persecution of the Jew and the dena-
turalization of Poles.12
Aronovici’s fellow reformer, Edward Hale Bierstadt, director of the For-
eign Language Information Service, agreed. ‘The very word ’Americani-
zation’ is a dangerous choice. It reminds the immigrant too strongly of
‘Russianization’ or ‘Germanization’,’ he wrote.13 Bierstadt supported as-
similation as an alternative and proposed extensive co-operation with
immigrant communities to further this goal.14
Because the close connection between Americanisers and their gov-
ernment sponsors had such a powerful negative effect, Progressive re-
formers began to reconsider the use of the state’s political and legal
powers to further the goal or Americanisation.15 But before a consen-
sus emerged on this question, Congress took the initiative. With na-
tionalist fervour subsiding by 1920, the House of Representatives
ended funding for Americanisation, and for the Foreign Language In-
formation Service and cut to the funding of the Department of Natura-
lisation.16 Instead, Congress turned its attention to a comprehensive
immigration restriction law, which it passed in 1924 (the so-called quo-
ta law).17 The Commissioner of Naturalisation continued his efforts to
further Americanisation programs and instruction for US citizenship
despite a much-reduced budget. Even though the Commissioner’s An-
nual Reports continued to paint a rosy picture, it became clear that
community support for Americanisation classes dropped quite dramati-
cally in the 1920s. While 1,299 classes were offered in 1921 to about
117,000 men and women, this number declined to 225 classes with
correspondingly fewer students in 1931, the last year of the Bureau of
Naturalization as an independent agency. During the 1920s and 30s,
the Federal government clearly receded from its First World War role
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of co-ordinating Americanisation and citizenship campaigns. Instead,
it retained (indeed strengthened) its power to regulate the flow of im-
migrants through increasingly elaborate border controls and admission
and deportation laws and practices.18
The Americanisation classes, which did continue on the community
level, were only loosely connected to any Federal efforts from the
1920s on. YMCAs, public schools, and sometimes ethnic associations
or parishes hired teachers, bought the citizenship manuals (the only
connection to the Federal government) and staged patriotic festivals.
Even though some Americanisers continued to press for instruction in
everything from personal hygiene and child-rearing methods to consti-
tutional history, most offerings were essentially English classes with
some basic instruction in American history and politics to prepare im-
migrants for the ‘citizenship exam’, that is, the requirement that pro-
spective citizens show familiarity with the principles of US government
and the US constitution.19 Without the pressure of wartime, immi-
grants appreciated these offerings, especially if they were taught by fel-
low ethnics. The class could serve as a conduit for further education in
night schools, or it would simply provide a socially approved institu-
tional setting for the more socially isolated immigrants (especially wo-
men) when they wanted to venture out in public. Roland Damiani, an
Italian shoe worker in Beverly, Massachusetts, was proud of the Ameri-
canisation classes conducted in his community.20 In 1936, a WPA in-
terviewer visited the citizenship classes conducted among Polish wo-
men in a New Hampshire mill town. She found few of the women able
to speak sufficient English to be interviewed, but all eager to take out
their citizenship papers, independently from their husbands. The
classes, though badly taught, offered companionship as much as an in-
troduction to an America in which these women had lived for over
twenty years, but where they had few outside contacts. The women
met and studied to affirm their place in their ethnic community and to
negotiate their knowledge of the strange place beyond together.21 For a
group of Polish and Jewish women interviewed at length by Chicago
sociologist Sophonsiba Breckinridge a few years earlier, citizenship
classes represented a first foray into the public sphere, a step some-
times undertaken with great trepidation. (Many women preferred to be
instructed by husbands or sons for their citizenship exam). But once
coaxed into the class – often attended only by women – they could be-
come eager learners, though some never overcame their shyness or il-
literacy.22
The analyses and description of Americanisation programs and the
ups and downs in the naturalisation figures provide us with only a lim-
ited perspective on the meaning of Americanisation and American citi-
zenship for the immigrants themselves. For a close-up view of how
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Americanisation was perceived by immigrants, we have to turn to oral
histories and published autobiographies of immigrants during the late
Progressive Era. In the few published reminiscences, which mentioned
American citizenship and Americanisation before the First World War,
Americanisation had a timeless quality, intimately connected with a ro-
bust sense of achievement and success for the immigrant authors.23 A
more varied and less idealised picture of what becoming an American
meant to immigrants emerges from the life histories collected by the
Works Progress Administration (WPA) as part of its American Folklife
project in the years 1936-1939.24 The experiences that these oral his-
tories depict are usually fractured, in keeping with the difficult lives of
the storytellers. But they also reflect strikingly on the fragmented nat-
ure of American culture and politics of their time and the awareness
that the political and social unity that earlier Americanisers had
sought, had remained elusive.
The experience of transformation from an immigrant’s tenuous grip
on the country to a respected citizen’s firm place was rare in the oral
reminiscences collected by the WPA. In these stories, other elements
provided the building blocks for varied perspectives on integration and
Americanisation. By and large, the focus lay on ethnic community, of-
ten embodied by the church and the voluntary association, the work-
place and, to a lesser extent, the schools. Other elements of American
life prominent in the 1920s and 30s, such as mass culture, political life
and consumer culture were occasionally important in the narratives,
but not central to the story. Age and, more importantly, race and ethni-
city as we understand them today played a very important role in these
immigrants’ perspectives of their own Americanisation.
Among the oldest of the interviewed immigrants was Fermin Souto,
a Galician-born cigar-maker who had lived in Havana, New York, and
Florida. The 77-year old told a WPA interviewer in 1936 that he had
read about the United States first as a teenager when he devoured
heroic stories about Lincoln and Washington. This motivated him to go
to the US and become an American citizen at the earliest possible mo-
ment. While he had lived virtually his entire life within the close-knit
and isolated Cuban immigrant community of Tampa, Souto saw him-
self as an American without reservations, albeit one with a special per-
spective on the United States.25
Judge J. Faudie, a German-born Texas farmer, who had lived in the
state since the 1880s, had similarly lived his entire life on the geo-
graphic and political margin of the United States. When he arrived in
Texas, the memory of the Alamo was very much alive in a state where
Yankee ‘Americans’ were still considered newcomers. But Faudie saw
himself as part of a long line of German immigrants who had always
lent their unwavering support to the American cause. ‘German settlers
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assumed the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship. They
took part in the Texas war against Mexico, the Spanish-American War
and the World War,’ he declared proudly.26 Although they had not lived
their lives at the centre of American society, these men considered
themselves Spanish and American, German-American, Texan and
American. Americanisation did not stand in the way of reconfirming
their different origins and specific culture in the United States. Just
like more prominent citizens of immigrant origin, they could consider
themselves successful and well-recognised members of a local ethnic
community and Americans at the same time.
Religious and ethnic volunteer organisations were anchors in immi-
grants’ lives and by the 1920s, their role as agents of Americanisation
became recognised by reformers as well. But their position was full of
ambivalence. After all, their very raison d’être was to prevent complete
assimilation of immigrants into the US mainstream. Pressured by the
movement in the First World War, many ethnic associations and
churches had become part of the Americanisation movement. This was
seen as a way to influence the kind of Americanisation their members
would undergo. As a result, the immigrants most eager and most suc-
cessful in taking out citizenship papers by the mid-1920s, were those
connected to ethnic clubs. Some of the ethnic organisations encour-
aged their members to become US citizens, others did not even accept
non-naturalised immigrants as members.27 ‘I am an American’ stated
a Portuguese American fisherman to the interviewer, and added, by
way of explanation, ‘I am a member of the Portuguese-American
Club.’28 Citizenship raised one’s status in the ethnic community of the
1920s. WPA interviewers recorded that the women immigrants in
Manchester, New Hampshire were motivated to become citizens be-
cause this would make them eligible to become members of the ‘Pol-
ish-American Club’ and participate in the annual parade wearing spe-
cial folkloric costumes. Here the completed conversion to a new citi-
zenship was expressed by wearing ‘old world’ clothes.29 For Fermin
Souto, his citizenship certificate – one of the most precious things he
owned – was kept at the Tampa ‘Centro Espanol’ of which he had been
secretary for decades.30
Many of those interviewed in the WPA program or by Breckinridge
were involved in the life of ethnic parishes. The Poles of Manchester,
New Hampshire, for example, were all members of the same parish,
headed by father Bronislaw Krupski, of the Polish National Catholic
Church. Krupski was critical of the traditionalism of his flock and tried
to replace it with a sense of obligation and patriotism to America.31
This was unusual, because, by and large, priests and other religious
workers kept their distance from the narrative of citizenship, though,
in other ways, they were openly engaged in negotiating American cul-
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ture for themselves and their flock. Lizabeth Cohen has observed that
for the Poles of Chicago, the 1920s brought intense pressure to Ameri-
canise from the church hierarchy, a pressure resisted in some ways
(ethnic parishes were maintained) and absorbed in others (English be-
came the language of the parishes in most cases).32 Caroline Ware
showed that in the 1930s, Italian churches in New York tried to turn
their precarious position around and ‘strove to place themselves in
such a position that the process of Americanisation would bring the
Italian people to them rather than drive them away’.33 The Reverend
Wilfred Ouelette, a French-Canadian priest in Maine, was a key figure
in the successful attempt to negotiate a position for his parishioners
between French-speaking Quebec and the United States. He took great
pains to explain to the WPA interviewer that French-Canadians in his
community were not as French as the Quebecois, nor were they assimi-
lated into Yankee New England. As he saw it, his parishioners treas-
ured their mixed French-British-American heritage. This made them
well suited to life in the borderlands. Their Arcadia was right here and
he was not going to convert them but instead help them to maintain
their language, and orient them within their history. ‘We are loyal to
the country in which we claim citizenship, but we are also loyal to our-
selves and our traditions.’ America allowed this and was therefore a
good place to be.34
The Reverend Elias Skipitares, a Greek Orthodox priest, largely self-
educated and ordained in the US after life as a farmer, construction
worker, and ‘phrenologist’ in the American West, presented a third vi-
sion for ethnic persistence amid assimilation. For him, America was a
country of material plenty with a need to reconcile the needs of mind
and body and follow traditional church rules, at least among his coun-
trymen. ‘The Graecians are a people of faith and devout’ he told the
WPA interviewer.35 His parish secretary, William Felos, a storekeeper,
agreed.36 Both men saw no need to change their spirituality in any
way, indeed they saw a need to maintain their traditional church ties
even more in view of the obvious American deficiencies in this regard.
The Italian stonemasons interviewed in Montpelier, Vermont, were not
as articulate, but their involvement in the devotional life of their Catho-
lic parish made this clear as well. The interviewer noted how closely in-
terwoven family and parish life were for these men, traditionally not a
given for the Italians (as it had been for the Irish). The granite cutters
themselves saw no contradiction in this; America was the greatest
country (although Italy was more beautiful); its realm was not a spiri-
tual one, though, but a public and political sphere.37 In this sense, the
Italians had, of course, accepted a very American role for their church
– one that would give space to civic conversion, to a secular patriotism
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whenever that seemed necessary. But, in general, such concerns re-
mained outside the province of the church and religious life.
The world of work was the public sphere for most immigrants. It
reached into every immigrant’s home, especially during the 1930s, an
era of high unemployment and lively unionisation. Trade unions had
grown in Gilded Age America and during the Progressive Era because
of their promise of an Americanism which blended individual prosper-
ity and collective solidarity. Employers denounced this as un-American,
offering paternalism and the possibility of success through individual
achievement as alternatives.38 By the 1920s, with the unions greatly
weakened, (in part because of the AFL’s failure to present a meaningful
alternative vision to patriotic Americanism after the First World War)
corporate Americanism became the dominant patriotic ideology in the
workplace. This set of beliefs called for distance from leftist unions
and socialist political activism and for abstention from confrontational
tactics in the workplace. Employers continued to be ideological suppor-
ters of classic Americanisation which emphasised work discipline.39
Some helped organise citizenship classes but most just used persua-
sion to make their workers enrol, lest they lose their jobs or a promo-
tion.40 This could be a powerful motivator at a time when jobs were
scarce. Roland Damiani, an Italian-American shoe factory worker in
Massachusetts, admitted that the major employer in town, the Ameri-
can Shoe Company, had exerted considerable pressure on their immi-
grant workers to attend Americanisation classes, promising them pro-
motions and pay raises in return for their naturalisation as US citi-
zens.41 But for Damiani this did not detract from the appreciation and
deep bond he had for his employers. Perhaps Damiani felt such a close
connection with his employers because to him it was not an anon-
ymous factory but a world where community and labour were united.
For many of the other immigrant workers interviewed, the world of
work, whether it was the granite pits of Vermont or the cigar factories
of Ybor City, it was the world of the craft shop where the ties of work
and social cohesion were strong. For others, such as the many Greek
restaurant owners interviewed in the Carolinas, the world of work was
the small business anchored in the (non-Greek) community. In most
cases, these men had not re-created the world of Old Europe in their
workplace but entered a New World (they had been farmers or la-
bourers before) and transformed it and re-interpreted it for themselves.
Others sought independence on the land or at sea as farmers, vintners,
or fishermen – a goal distinctly out of reach in the old country for
most.42 Whatever their work situation, the men and women inter-
viewed by the WPA, appreciated America above all because it had of-
fered them the opportunity to find and keep a steady job.43 Having a
job made enthusiastic Americans out of immigrants because, com-
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pared to their homelands, work was so abundant and relatively well
paid. Even in the late 1930s, the immigrants interviewed recounted few
problems finding work – much in contrast to the world they had left
behind. Work could kill, or at least tire you out, but its redemptive qua-
lities in America were also ever present.
‘I suspect that with too many immigrants and their children, ‘‘Amer-
icanism’’ is too much a matter of prosperity, of being able to surround
oneself with the symbols of material well-being and of being able to in-
dulge in doings plainly indicative of your standing in the community’,
wrote Louis Adamic in 1942, when the memory of the depression was
already fading.44 Adamic had picked up on something that ran like a
thread through non-institutional Americanisation in the years between
1919 and the 1940s: the integration of immigrants into the world of
consumerism. Frances Kellor, one of the original Americanisers of the
First World War, was among the first who had argued that American-
ised immigrants represented a lucrative consumer market. Since the
early 1920s, her publications urged businesses to address the immi-
grants as consumers, earning the scorn of the more idealistic Ameri-
canisers.45 Others took up her call, urging the Americanisation of the
immigrants’ hard-earned money through American banks (in part as a
way to prevent the funnelling of the money into European econo-
mies).46 After all, immigrants were now taxpayers, they should also be-
come earners of interest. But the WPA interviews do not support Ada-
mic’s and Kellor’s assessment that immigrants were or should be en-
thusiastic consumers. The interviewees admitted that earning money
was important but that they refused to see the fact that they could earn
good money as a transforming experience in itself. While some ac-
knowledged that America was a money-obsessed place, they did not
see this in positive terms. ‘America is a land of easy money. There is
more money in America and, strange to say, more suffering than in
the old countries’ thought Gus Geraris, a Greek immigrant.47 Few ad-
mitted to owning much property or participating in the world of fi-
nance.48 Ostentatious display was reserved for ‘traditional’ occasions,
such as funerals or parades. Only one interviewee admitted to having
dabbled (and being wiped out) in the stock market. Some women men-
tioned being well insured as members of ‘American’ insurance compa-
nies and ethnic voluntary associations. But such invisible forms of
property (visible only after one’s death in the form of an elaborate fun-
eral) were more acceptable than other forms of wealth. The more os-
tentatious consumerism seen by observers as inevitable part of Ameri-
canisation would be reserved for the next generation.49
Work and community were at the centre of immigrants’ lives and
their perception of America. Politics and participation in civic affairs,
always at the centre of the earlier Americanisation movement, was of
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secondary importance. Those interviewed often mentioned democracy,
the right to vote and the rights of common citizens as ideals that
seemed attractive about America and becoming a naturalised citizen.
But the connection between the abstract ideals and concrete issues was
rarely made. The Chicago women interviewed by Sophonsiba Breckin-
ridge often stressed the pride they felt because they could vote, but it
was not clear if the women actually voted or took any interest in poli-
tics. Many of the men who told their stories to the WPA workers had
political opinions, but these mostly showed their profound alienation
from day to day politics. Some were critical of Roosevelt, others suppor-
tive and a few were quite knowledgeable on some aspect of US foreign
policy, but whether this actually translated into any active participation
in American political life was unclear. American citizenship was cer-
tainly not central to the way these men experienced politics and was
rarely mentioned.
In their 1929 classic, Middletown, Robert and Helen Lynd attempted
to portray a typical American town as it struggled toward the modern
age.50 Immigrants or members of visible ethnic groups or different
races were absent from this story; even ten years later they had not yet
made an appearance. In this sense, the WPA interviews with immi-
grants were all about people at the margins, even though many of the
interviewees lived lives at the centre of their communities. Margins are
relative, and the immigrants’ views of themselves offer some interest-
ing insights into what constituted integration to them and to the Amer-
icans around them. Adam Laboda observed that he would always be a
Pole in his home of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, but on a visit back to Po-
land ‘I was not called a Polack, I was always called an American and it
made me very proud’.51 Mrs. Ruth Chinn recalled how Chinese boys
from Seattle, sent back to be educated in China, behaved ‘like Ameri-
cans’ and therefore had to be sent back to the United States. In the
eyes of the Chinese they had become too American to tolerate, though
American society would deny them political citizenship (if they were
foreign born) and higher education as well as other forms of cultural
citizenship because they did not ‘belong’ to the United States either.52
The most adept at negotiating their truncated citizenship were Afri-
can-Americans. WPA interviewers recorded a thing or two about Afri-
can Americans’ status within and outside the American mainstream
and their ability to see themselves within America and yet outside it.53
Among the African-Americans interviewed was Wilbur Roberts, a resi-
dent of Riviera, Florida, who at 84, after more than two decades in the
US, had still not succeeded a US citizen. The interviews with him do
not spell out why, but very likely, the disenfranchisement of nearly all
African-Americans in the South played a role in the lifelong denial of
citizenship to this immigrant. The 1930s found him and his family
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mired in poverty with his daughter, like him born in the Bahamas, un-
able to get a WPA job. Still, the man admired America and preferred it
to live under the British. ‘Americans help their poor, but them Brit-
ishers don’t; they’re always thinking how much better they are than
folks like us, and they ain’t got no time to help us’.54 Wilbur Roberts
was integrated into the world of African-American-Carribean seaboard
people, he owned land and a house, but the lack of legal and political
citizenship hurt economically and politically especially during the
1930s.
Mrs. Juanita Hernandez-Garcia, a native of Mexico, also was forced
to straddle more borders than she wanted to. She described her cross-
ing into the United States from Mexico 60 years earlier, talking about
the space in between the nations as ‘free country, everything free, pe-
cans, wood, water, wild meat.’ Indians, encountered on the way, wanted
to adopt the dark-skinned little girl. Once in San Angelo, the family
settled and Mrs. Hernandez-Garcia became part of the ranching econo-
my of West-central Texas where she worked as a cook and her husband
as a ranch hand and skilled leather goods maker. But after 60 years,
now an old widow, she felt that although she had become part of
America as much as anybody else on the Texas range, important re-
wards had eluded her. ‘Me no citizen of the United States, no have
same like citizen, no get pension, no have money but $1.70 per week
to make me live, good people of San Angelo City give to me. Me father,
me family, me husband give life for this good country, me work all life
here but no get nothing but good talk and $1.70 a week’.55 As far as we
know, Mrs. Garcia did not even try to file for US citizenship. However,
if she had, in all likelihood the authorities would have been unim-
pressed with her accomplishments and would have excluded her from
citizenship on the basis of her illiteracy. The connection between illiter-
acy and race was well known to officials, but few places offered the ne-
cessary educational support to remedy this situation in the 1930s and
40s.
The recorded observations of the late 1920s and 1930s represent, in
a way, the most varied assessment we have of immigrants’ perception
of Americanisation programs and ideas. No such data were collected
for later decades, in part, because Americanisation faded from the cul-
tural and policy landscape during the years of the Second World War
and the Cold War. The War years themselves did not see a revival of
the anxiety and anti-immigrant feelings of 1915-1919, with the signifi-
cant exception being the deportation and incarceration of Japanese
Americans. Ironically, at the height of Japanese deportation, the Na-
tional Education Association launched a campaign for tolerance educa-
tion, named ‘Immigrants all, Americans all’ in part to stem the tide of
anti-Semitism.56 By and large there was very little Americanisation
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education and citizenship training during the Second World War and
only a slow and modest revival of it after the War. With a slowly grow-
ing stream of immigrants (still predominantly from Europe) in the late
1940s and early 1950s, citizenship classes experienced a modest revi-
val, though, they were little more than instruction in the basics of Eng-
lish and US history. Anti-communism and Americanism became inse-
parable elements of official Americanisation instruction during these
years.57
The low interest and participation in Americanisation programs in
post-war America had a parallel in the low naturalisation rates of post-
war immigrants. During the 1950s fewer than 1.2 million immigrants
became US citizens. In the following decade, the figure was barely
above 1.2 million (2.5 million people immigrated during the 1950s and
3.3 million during the 1960s). We must assume that these immigrants,
like those interviewed in the 1930s, made their calculations about nat-
uralisation based on their own life experiences. Increasingly, the emer-
gence of a modern welfare state, which included immigrants in its pro-
grams, made naturalisation and US citizenship of secondary impor-
tance for immigrants. Foreign-born residents of the United States
could participate in US society in every way except as voters, even if
they did not become US citizens. The other substantial privilege for
naturalised citizens, their ability to become preferred sponsors of rela-
tives for immigration, declined in importance, as Europeans were less
likely to emigrate to the United States after 1960. Non-Europeans, re-
gardless of sponsorship, continued to face steep quota hurdles until
1965. Only after the quota system was lifted and Asian and Latin-
American immigrants could come to the United States under the same
provisions as Europeans, did the naturalisation of immigrants begin to
increase steadily, especially among East Asians. Since the late 1980s, a
similar increase in naturalisation rates has taken place among Latino
immigrants in the United States. At the end of the 20th century, the
large wave of naturalisation petitions was commonly seen as motivated
by the desire to sponsor relatives as immigrants on the one hand and
by the fear of losing possible Federal benefits for the needy on the
other. The increase in the number of naturalised US citizens was there-
fore not the result of a higher degree of Americanisation or any Ameri-
canisation campaign on the part of the Federal government. Instead,
this reflected a pragmatic re-assessment of the value of US citizenship
immigrant groups.58
The WPA interviews with immigrants of various origins in the
1930s give us a many-faceted view of America and Americanisation. At
first glance, the only characteristic they have in common is that they
do not seem to reflect any sort of official ideology of Americanisation.
Nor are the interviews united by a sense of resistance to official ideolo-
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gies of patriotism, achievement and loyalty. Instead, what emerges is a
wide array of interpretations of citizenship and what it means to be
and to become an American. In many ways the ideas expressed by the
interviewees are expressions of the individuals’ standing in an ethnic
community, a generation of immigrants or a regional culture. But
throughout, highly individual considerations also played a role. Even in
instances where immigrants were assigned a racial status with large
implications for social and economic inferiority (as African Americans,
Chinese or even just as ‘Polacks’), the immigrants resisted that ascrip-
tion. They claimed ‘American’ status anyway, even if that status was
only recognised by those back in the old country – the family in Po-
land, the Chinese in China, for example.
The WPA narratives and the state of Americanisation in the post-
First World War era also indicate that, in the American case, the gov-
ernment provided very little but it also demanded very little from those
wanting to be American. Self-sufficiency, economic, social, and to a cer-
tain degree cultural, was the highest virtue in a country that presented
itself as a highly individualistic society to immigrants in the twentieth
century. The state demanded loyalty, service, and sacrifice during war-
time, but in times of peace – even during an economic crisis like the
Great Depression, the government did not supervise its citizens closely.
Distance from the state was one of the reasons, immigrants were left
to fashion their own America and their own Americanisation. This
could mean a fragmented sense of nationhood at times, but it would
also render the process of becoming American more resilient and open
to very diverse group of newcomers in the future.
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Drawing Up the Balance Sheet
Leo Lucassen, David Feldman and Jochen Oltmer
This book offers an insight into the history of the settlement of immi-
grants in Western Europe. By displaying a wide range of experiences in
different periods and countries it disaggregates the simple notions of
migration and integration. Given the large differences in both the op-
portunity structure of the various European nation-states and in the
characteristics of the migrants, this need not come as a surprise. Be-
fore shedding some light on the main paths of integration in Western
Europe’s past and present, we should first return to the US, the origin
of this specific historical comparison. Compared with the rather clear-
cut distinction between old and new migrants in the current discussion
among American migration scholars, transplanting this framework to
Western Europe has proved to be both productive and problematic for
at least three reasons.
First of all, defining the temporal limitations of ‘old’ and ‘new’ mi-
gration in Europe have proved difficult. Whereas in the US it is more
or less agreed upon that ‘old’ refers to the period 1880-1920 and ‘new’
to the post-1965 era, the situation in the ‘Old World’ is much more in-
tricate. Different states in Europe followed distinct political, cultural,
economic, and demographic trajectories, which resulted in different
migration rhythms and regimes. This is reflected in the dissimilar tim-
ing of labour migrations: high in inter-war France and the Netherlands
and low in Germany and Great Britain. Moreover, migration from the
colonies, predominantly after the Second World War, depended on the
particular timing of the decolonisation process and on the existing co-
lonial links1 in the British, Dutch, and French empires.2 Algerians in
France, West-Indians in Great Britain, and Dutch Indonesians came in
large numbers during the 1950s, whereas the immigration of Dutch
Surinamese, and the Pakistanis and Indians in the United Kingdom
peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. Descendants of erstwhile German
emigrants to Eastern Europe, known as Aussiedler, ‘returned’ massively
in the late 1980s and 1990s. Thirdly, the many political reconfigura-
tions of large parts of Europe in the twentieth century, especially per-
taining to Germany, resulted in people moving over borders and bor-
ders over people as Klaus Bade once put it.3 This produced huge migra-
tion flows in Central Europe, both after the First and Second World
Wars.
The result of these different national pathways in Western Europe
does not offer a clear cut periodisation as in the US case, where the
period 1918-1970 (except for the internal migrations and the recruit-
ment of Mexicans through the Bracero program) is characterized as
one of low immigration. Instead, in Europe different chronologies pre-
sent themselves, depending on the specific structure of the comparison
and on the choice of countries. This is demonstrated by several contri-
butions in this book. For example, whereas a classic (American-type)
comparison is offered in the case of Poles then and Turks now, Barbara
Dietz distinguishes old and new German Aussiedler in the post-Second
World War era.
Secondly, in addition to the issue of periodisation, Western Europe
diverges from the US when we consider the nature and activity of the
state. Whereas the US constitutes a united federal state, Western Eur-
ope embodies different traditions of nation-building, state-formation,
and citizenship.4 In the inter-war period France actively stimulated im-
migration for economic and demographic reasons, as the contributions
of Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard and Laure Teulières illustrate, whereas
other countries either discouraged or at best tolerated immigration.
From a political point of view, we witness large differences in the defi-
nition of citizenship and the attitude towards immigrants, refugees or
former citizens, demonstrated by the chapters by Jochen Oltmer on
Weimar Germany and Karen Schönwälder on the post war era.5
Thirdly, in Western Europe the migration dynamics differed to a
large extent from those in the American case, especially in the second
half of the 20th century. Whereas since the First World War American
authorities have tried to regulate immigration by legal means, albeit
not always successfully, European countries had even greater difficul-
ties when they tried to prevent or regulate immigration. Colonial mi-
grants had virtually unlimited access to the United Kingdom, France,
and the Netherlands, as is illustrated by the Laurence Brown’s chapter
on Caribbean migration and in Blanc-Chaléard’s overview of Algerian
migration to France. Only after the bulk of the migrants had settled
were restrictive legal measures put in place, often reluctantly.6 The case
of Germany, which had no colonies, is only slightly different as descen-
dants of former emigrants to Eastern Europe, who were perceived as
part of the German people, were given the right to ‘return’ after the
Second World War. Furthermore, various massive internal migrations
took place, which were both unforeseen and unwanted, but impossible
to prevent. Between 1840 and 1910, the migration of hundred of thou-
sands of Irish and Polish-speaking German citizens within the political
entity to which they belonged resulted in the large-scale settlement of
Irish men and women in Scotland, Lancashire, London and elsewhere,
with equally large numbers of ‘Poles’ settling in Berlin and the Ruhr
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area, as is shown in Dorota Praszalowicz’s and Leo Lucassen’s contribu-
tions. Here we can draw a parallel with the ‘Great Migration’ of Afri-
can-Americans – as well as whites – from the Southern states to the
North in the period 1918-1960, which remarkably has only sporadically
been incorporated into the American discussion of old and new migra-
tions.7
The failure to regulate migration effectively in post-war Europe is
last but not least illustrated by the unexpected and unforeseen effects
of the welfare state. As James Hollifield and others have demonstrated,
the recruitment of guest workers since the 1950s in France, Germany,
Belgium and the Netherlands resulted in the unintended and un-
wanted settlement of large numbers of immigrants and their families.
As a result of their prolonged stay, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, Yugosla-
vians, Turks and Moroccans built up both civic and social rights which
made it virtually impossible to expel them. This was especially notable
when, after the oil price crisis in 1973, most countries resorted to re-
strictive immigration policies. In this new context, many guest workers
realised that it was better to remain in their country of residence, be-
cause by leaving they would jeopardise their rights to return.8
Although the situation of the Mexicans in the United States is to some
extent similar, as is illustrated by the ongoing chain migration after the
end of the Bracero system in 1964,9 the fundamental difference is that
the ensuing – largely illegal – Mexican immigration was mainly deter-
mined by the demands of the American labour market.10 Only in the
last decade Southern Europe and the Mediterranean are increasingly
resembling the US-Mexican model, as hundred thousands of illegal
African workers find work in countries like Spain and Italy without en-
tering the social security system.11
The case of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, however, was
quite different and their immigration and integration highlight the
specificity of Western Europe. Especially the unforeseen effects of the
liberal welfare state, combined with a restrictive aliens policy, produced
a very different situation. Legal mass immigration through family re-
unification occurred in a period of recession (1973-1993) and economic
reconstruction. The result was that millions of – on the whole – low-
skilled migrants and their families settled in Western Europe in a peri-
od of mass unemployment and the disappearance of low-skilled jobs in
the mining and industrial sectors.
Finally, the settlement process of migrants in the United States has
been much more thoroughly studied than in Western Europe, where
historical narratives of migration tend to be inwardly focused, describ-
ing certain case studies within national frameworks. We have not,
therefore, forged a systematic comparison of how the different groups
of migrants settled in various periods and countries. Nevertheless, we
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have gained more insight into differences and similarities that enable
us to understand the conditions under which different modes of inte-
gration have developed. In this way, Paths of Integration takes one step
towards closing the knowledge gap between Western Europe and the
US. Therefore, we hope it will advance the interdisciplinary and com-
parative study of the settlement and integration of immigrants in the
long-term.12
A European Harvest
Migrants in the centre
Although the migration history of Europe is more complicated than
that of the US, this does not imply that the old and new scheme can-
not be applied, only that the outcome is much more differentiated.13
This differentiation is not only a reflection of the three factors men-
tioned in the previous section, but also because in this book (reflecting
the historiography in general) we have decided not to restrict ourselves
to ‘large and problematic groups’. The American historiography, by
contrast, is – often implicitly – limited to such groups, at least where
the ‘old’ part of the comparison is concerned.14 Our approach may be
less focused and therefore offers fewer distinct patterns, the good news
is that it draws attention to other less well-known paths of integration,
making the concept less linear and more layered. Moreover, divergent
cases of small and inconspicuous migrants, experiencing a silent inte-
gration process, cast an often revealing light on the more general con-
ditions under which the settlement process evolved.
In this volume, we have distinguished three different paths of inte-
gration. The differences between these three can be systematised by
differentiating between two dimensions of integration: 1) structural
and 2) identificational. Whereas the structural refers to social and eco-
nomic denominators, like the position in the labour market, school at-
tainments and residential patterns, the identificational dimension is re-
stricted to the question of with whom migrants and their descendants
identify and how the ethnic group and the receiving society at large fig-
ure in this. To measure this, one can use personal contacts as a point
of departure, ranging from marriage partners to friends and the adher-
ence to ethnic organisations.15 This leads to four possible outcomes of
the settlement process (table 1):
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The first path resembles the one taken by many ‘old’ immigrants in the
US: slow, bumpy, and only partly leading to upward mobility, whereas
the salience of ethnicity decreased over time in Europe. As in the US,
these migrants were initially perceived as a threat, because their alleged
racial, cultural, social, or political characteristics would make them un-
fit for assimilation. Moreover, their human capital in terms of labour
market skills and education were on average low. The best examples
are the majority of the Irish who settled in Great Britain circa 1850, the
Poles who migrated to the Ruhr area at the end of the 19th century,
and part of the Italians who moved to France in the same period.
This route bears many similarities with the second path, taken by
most ‘new’ coloured and low skilled migrants in the US from the
1970s onwards and the migrants in Western Europe who for various
reasons are considered as fundamentally different, whether in racial,
cultural and or religious respects. Colonial groups, such as the Alger-
ians in France, West Indians in both Britain and France, as well as
Muslim migrants in general (Turks, Moroccans, Pakistani and Bangla-
deshi) fit into this category. On average, their integration process takes
a long time and is seldom linear.16 There are strong indications that a
significant portion of the descendants of these migrants will experience
little social mobility and become locked in the underclass. The main
difference with ‘old’ migrants in both the US and Western Europe is
that this partial underclass formation, or segmented assimilation, may
go together with an ethnic stigma. Whether ethnic minority formation
will indeed be the outcome in the long run, remains to be seen.
A third, much more silent and faster, path is represented by a num-
ber of smaller groups which were perceived as less threatening, and
whose human capital was both higher and more diverse. A good exam-
ple are German immigrants who settled in a number of countries in
the 19th and 20th centuries.17 Many of them were skilled workers or
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shopkeepers and traders who already upon arrival can be classified as
(lower) middle class. Furthermore, they were internally heterogeneous
because of their diverse political and religious characteristics. Many
among the first generation were active in ethnic associations, as the
contribution of Marlou Schrover shows, but socio-economic, political,
and religious differences prevented a homogeneous ethno-political mo-
bilisation. Moreover, the adherence to ethnic associations was largely
restricted to the first generation and was not accompanied by spatial
segregation or concentration, as was the case in many American cities
in the period 1850-1920.18 This relatively fast integration of Germans
is also illustrated by the large proportion of immigrants, both men and
women, who married indigenous partners. A special case is described
by Laure Teulières concerning the Italians who settled in rural south-
western France. Here their relatively rapid integration was not only
furthered by the human capital of the migrants, many of whom were
lower middle class, but also by the regional opportunity structure. After
the decimation of young French men in the First World War, Italian
farmers and agricultural workers were in demand and could relatively
easily procure land and small farms. Both immigrants and the indigen-
ous French population shared a rural perspective and a common reli-
gion, which made it much easier to overcome initial linguistic and cul-
tural barriers.
These German and Italian cases, however, also show that the integra-
tion process was not linear, because of intervening political factors. The
outbreak of the Second World War turned these migrants and their
descendants into enemies, which slowed down and partly reversed the
integration trends begun in the inter-war period. In the long run, how-
ever, the war did not pose a structural barrier.
Finally a fourth, mixed pathway arises from the case studies in this
volume. Looking more carefully at the Poles who settled in Berlin
(Praszalowicz) and the Indian traders in London (Falzon), it is clear
that they occupied a position in the local society different from the
groups who followed the first two paths. Both Poles and Sindhis were
not locked in the lower ranks of society, but – like the Germans and
Italians in the second path – their social structure was quite diverse.
What distinguished them from the Germans and Italians, however, is
that they were to a certain extent seen as alien, a perception that was
based on, respectively, a nationalistic and a colonial discourse. This
stigmatisation was, however, less enduring than the discrimination ex-
perienced by Poles in the Ruhr area or by other colonial groups who
entered Britain later, because of the specific interaction between a bet-
ter-skilled immigrant group and a more diverse opportunity structure.
Both Berlin and London were cities with many different economic sec-
tors and a heterogeneous population. This made immigrants less visi-
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ble, less numerous (relatively speaking) and it gave them more oppor-
tunities. The relation between the specific make up of local opportunity
structures and the integration process has already been noted by Ewa
Morawska in her book on Jewish immigrants in Johnstown, Pennsylva-
nia.19 In this predominantly industrial town Eastern European Jews in-
tegrated much more slowly than did their co-religionists in cities like
New York.
Institutions and the state
A significant characteristic of European migration studies is the strong
focus on political and institutional opportunity structures in various
countries and periods. Actors like the state, churches, and unions have
been analysed extensively. Important questions include how and to
what extent institutional factors have moulded the integration process
of immigrants. It is not surprising that the comparative model is often
applied, at both the national and local levels. Brubakers’s study on
France and Germany, which highlights the differences in the definition
of citizenship is well known.20 Other scholars prefer the local level in
order to understand the workings of urban or rural opportunity struc-
tures on the settlement process of migrants.21 This research tradition
is well represented in the third part of this volume. Barbara Schmitter-
Heisler shows the effects that different union politics, both between
countries and between periods, have on the way migrants have become
integrated in Western European and American societies. In the last
decades of the 20th century, German unions have been much more ac-
tive than their Dutch counterparts, for example, in recruiting migrants
and also in giving them political power. Whereas Schmitter-Heisler’s
comparison is primarily between countries,22 Blanc-Chaléard’s chapter
on the Algerians and Italians in France is historically framed, suggest-
ing that in the past the ‘world of work’, which includes the workplace
and union activity, was much more important in integrating migrants
through the homogenising influence of the workplace than nowadays.
A difference which may have a negative impact on the integration of
Algerian migrants and their descendants.23
Much more intensively studied than unions – or churches – is the
state in its many manifestations, both with regard to migration and in-
tegration policies. In this volume, Oltmer and Schönwälder focus on
the evolution of state practices within one country, in their case Ger-
many, instead of employing the classical interstate comparison. Their
contributions show the significance of both national traditions, as
stressed by Brubaker, and the specific political regime. Moreover, as
Oltmer makes clear, the attitude of the state towards its own dispersed
ethnic population abroad has been important in shaping the ways in
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which aliens at home have been categorised and treated.24 Schön-
wälder, on the other hand, stresses the dramatic changes in the power
and character of the state concerning immigration. The emergence of
the welfare state in particular has brought about a new dynamic, both
with regard to the ability to regulate migration and to the way migrants
are expected to integrate. She demonstrates that this had both negative
and positive consequences for migrants. While their rights increased,
the interventionist attitude of the liberal welfare state has generated
more obligations and demands for migrants to fulfil. One might add
that this changed relationship between the state and the migrants is
also reflected in the constant monitoring of the integration process of
migrants and their descendants, highlighting problems and failed inte-
gration. However understandable this is from the point of view of pol-
icy makers, this preoccupation with problems also gives ammunition
to nativist feelings and may – willingly or unwillingly – give rise to the
polarisation of the discourse on migrants, which increasingly distin-
guishes between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Since the late 1980s, this develop-
ment has taken place with respect to migrants from Muslim countries,
as is described in the contribution of Thijl Sunier. Starting with the
Rushdie affair in 1989 and followed by the First Gulf War, the smoul-
dering Islamophobic mood came to a breaking point in 2001 with the
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, followed by attacks in
Madrid (2003) and London (2005), the assassination of the Dutch film-
maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the Danish cartoon affair in Febru-
ary 2006.25
The role of the state is therefore ambivalent. Not only because its
power is restricted and because its actions often lead to adverse and un-
intended results, but also because the state is only one actor in a rather
busy arena. Applied to the migration policies over roughly the last cen-
tury or so, we can see a clear increase in both the power and ambition
of state institutions to maintain control. Until the 1950s, however,
much of the integration programmes was left to private organisations,
such as churches and unions and to migrants themselves. A pertinent
example from the American situation is discussed in Dorothee Schnei-
der’s chapter on the Americanisation movement. While many associate
this movement with a top-down state-led assimilation program, Schnei-
der shows that the reality was quite different and less coercive. In fact,
in many cases it were the migrants themselves who helped those who
arrived later. The initiative may have come from the state level, but the
application of the policy was left largely to private initiative.
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Western Europe and the US Compared
Despite vast changes in the opportunity structure of the receiving so-
ciety, the integration process of migrants and their descendants in Wes-
tern Europe in the past and in the present shows a number of remark-
able similarities. Apparently, these long-term processes are at least
partly independent of the specific context in which they arise. There-
fore, we feel more comfortable with the premises of the ‘optimist’
school in the US discussion, which stresses the ongoing assimilation
process among recent migrants.26 This book has made clear, however,
that there are also significant discontinuities with the past. Partly these
converge with the factors that are stressed by the ‘pessimist’ school in
the American discussion; these scholars draw attention to (1) the great-
er cultural and racial differences between immigrants and natives, (2)
the communication and transportation revolution that facilitated on-
going transnational ties, and (3) the more segregated nature of the
(hour glass) economy, implying that in the past social mobility was ea-
sier than it is now.
The last two factors also play a particular role in the Western Eur-
opean case, albeit in a slightly different guise. Notwithstanding the
many similarities with transnational practices from the past, the cur-
rent situation seems to encourage migrants and their offspring to re-
main in contact with the world they left behind and to foster multiple
identities.27 Whether in the long run this will fundamentally change
the primary identification of the second and third generation remains
to be seen. Closely linked to the transnational argument is the develop-
ment of globalised collective identities, mainly in a religious form. In
the European case, this is most manifest in the case of Muslim mi-
grants from Turkey, North Africa, and Asia. Not only do some of them
increasingly identify with Islam as a pan-ethnic religion,28 but, per-
haps, even more importantly, Muslims all over Western Europe are
seen as forming one coherent religious group, with alien and threaten-
ing values, despite the many differences among them. Also here a di-
vergence from the past can be noted. Whereas in the 19th century, the
anti-Catholic rhetoric against Irish migrants in Britain was confined
specifically to the UK context, not spilling over to the Catholic Italians
in France or the Catholic Poles in Germany (who were feared for other
reasons), this is different from the case of Islamic migrants at the end
of the 20th century. From the 1980s onwards – and especially after
September 11, 2001 – they are increasingly perceived as problematic
and non-assimilable. The anti-Islam discourse clearly affects the social
positions of Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, the Algerians in
France, the Moroccans in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the Pakis-
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tanis and Bangladeshis in Great Britain, to mention the most impor-
tant groups.29
The changed economic climate, which offers fewer possibilities for
upward social mobility, is to some extent also discernible in Western
Europe. Many migrants, both colonial and non-colonial, tend to congre-
gate in highly segmented parts of the labour market, with low pay and
few chances of upward social mobility. This may have been the same
for many ‘old’ migrants, but in the last half of century the ‘world of
work’, to use Marie-Claude Blanc Chaléard’s expression in her contri-
bution, went through profound changes. She compares the Italians
then with the Algerians now, and argues that labour migrants in the
past – those at the lower rungs of the ladder – integrated automatically
because the workplace was much less segregated than in the second-
half of the 20th century. Entering a quarry or factory meant being ex-
posed to native workers and their organisations. Unions were hostile at
first to the newcomers, but this opposition did not last and in time mi-
grants became an integral part of the workforce. This is different from
the present situation. Barbara Schmitter Heisler in her contribution
points out, that unions have recently put more energy into recruiting
immigrants, although the integrative force of the workplace has been
severely weakened because certain jobs are now almost exclusively left
to migrants.
What makes the position of the low-skilled newer migrants even
more different from their predecessors before the Second World War,
is the long-term mass unemployment which has characterised much of
Western Europe since the 1970s. Coupled with the high unemploy-
ment rates among the second generation in Britain (West Indians and
Pakistanis), France (Algerians), Germany (Turks), Belgium (Moroccans)
and the Netherlands (Turks and Moroccans), this casts an anxious sha-
dow on the future.30 To what extent this will affect the integration pro-
cess in the long run, remains uncertain. Much will depend on the de-
gree to which the second generation succeeds in attaining higher edu-
cational levels and getting jobs.31
As we have seen, the three ‘classic’ factors which are central to the
American ‘old’ and ‘new’ debate (different migrants, transnationalism,
and segregation of the labour market) are insufficient to demarcate the
differences in integration processes between Western Europe and the
US. We would therefore like to finish by summarising what the conse-
quences of the more interventionist nature of the state in Western Eur-
ope are. First of all, there is the increase in intervention and monitor-
ing and the emergence of the welfare state. Although states were inter-
fering with the settlement process of migrants long before the 20th
century as, for example, the repression and forced assimilation of
Moors and Jews in early modern Spain illustrates, it is undeniable that
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the emergence of the nation-state in the 19th century and the welfare
state in the 20th have greatly enhanced its interest in its citizens, and
by implication in the migrants who settled within its borders.
Both the US and Western Europe have been worried by the assimil-
ability of the ‘new’ migrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
In the US this led to the installation of the Dillingham Commission,
which created the Immigration Act of 1907 and whose report was hi-
jacked by nativist forces after the First World War, when much more
stringent immigration controls were introduced and migrants were
confronted with Americanisation programs.32 In Europe, early exam-
ples of state interference are found in Wilhelmine Germany, where the
Polish-speaking minority was exposed to extreme assimilationist poli-
tics. Both the use of the Polish language in public and ethnic organisa-
tions were suppressed and in the inter-war period various researchers
tried to monitor the assimilation process of this internal minority, espe-
cially of those who migrated to the Western part of Germany.33 More
generally, the state interest in immigrants is reflected by their in-
creased statistical visibility in the form of censuses all over Western
Europe and the growing interest of scholars in the position of immi-
grants.34
The monitoring process increased greatly after the Second World
War when the state’s involvement in society in general entered a new
phase of what Jim Scott has dubbed ‘making society legible’.35 With
the new immigration from both the former colonies and from labour-
exporting countries around the Mediterranean, state officials and scho-
lars became increasingly interested in the developments of the integra-
tion process, both for the first and second generation. Although there
are important differences between European countries when it comes
to the way immigrants and their children have been categorised,36 the
monitoring of migrants and their descendants has evolved into a gener-
al interest of the receiving societies. The initial intentions may have of-
ten been benign, aimed at preventing the formation of an underclass,
but an important consequence was the identification of immigrants
with social problems. The one-sided attention to their (slow or failing)
integration in various domains (especially the labour market and the
educational system) highlights the social problems of immigrants, and
easily stimulates polarised anti-immigrant politics and ensuing nativist
feelings. A good example is the use of the term ‘allochtones’ in the
Netherlands, which, since the 1980s has come to denote problematic
immigrant groups. The term, however, also includes their descendants,
stressing the fundamental difference between them and the ‘autoch-
tone’ Dutch citizens. Notwithstanding the fact that most ‘allochtones’
were born in the Netherlands and at this point have Dutch citizenship,
in the collective perception of the receiving society they remain funda-
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mentally different, reinforcing the notion that, in the end, they are dif-
ferent from the ‘real’ Dutch.
The emergence of the full-fledged welfare states in Western Europe
after the Second World War not only stimulated monitoring, but also
partly changed the dynamics of migration. Whereas before 1940, mi-
gration was primarily determined by labour market needs, in the last
quarter of the 20th century, welfare benefits have become an additional
attraction for potential migrants, especially after the economy took a
downturn in 1973. Notwithstanding higher unemployment and re-
duced economic opportunities, immigration not only continued but
also soared. Guest workers brought their families and in some cases,
like the Surinamese in the Netherlands, a massive colonial migration
occurred. This unfortunate timing was especially detrimental to the in-
tegration process, not only because many migrants became perma-
nently unemployed and dependent on welfare benefits, but even more
so because it affected their children’s chances.37
Most of the factors mentioned above were less significant in the US.
The segmentation of the labour market may show some similarities,
many new migrants in the US are skilled and do not start at the bot-
tom.38 Furthermore, the problematisation of Muslims is less wide-
spread and deeply felt, even with the Patriot Act which increased the
stigmatisation of Arab-Americans. The most striking difference, how-
ever, is the role of the state. Although some researchers argue that
American welfare benefits have a negative effect on the self-selectivity
of migrants,39 these are insignificant by European standards and have
not led to extensive long-term unemployment among major immigrant
groups in the US. Furthermore, the US grants migrants more autono-
my and is less concerned with ethnic subcultures, provided that those
who do settle there for good identify with the basic principles of the na-
tion-state. This book therefore not only offers fresh insights in paths of
integration in Western Europe, but also puts the American experience,
which is often studied in isolation, into a comparative perspective.
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Gerstle, Gary (1989), Working Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City,
1914-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gerstle, Gary and John Mollenkopf (eds.) (2001a), E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and
Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
— (2001b), ’The Political Incorporation of Immigrants, Then and Now’, in: idem (eds.),
E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political In-
corporation New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1-32.
Gieseck, A., U. Heilemann and H.D. von Loeffelholz (1995), ‘Economic Implications of
Migration into the Federal Republic of Germany 1988-1992’, International Migration
Review 29, no. 3, 693-709.
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lungen im Überblick. Berlin: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 661-709.
Higham, John (1956), Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism: 1860-1925.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Higman, B.W. (ed.) (1999), General History of the Caribbean, vol. VI: Methodology and His-
toriography of the Caribbean. London: UNESCO.
Hoerder, Dirk (1988), ‘The attitudes of German trade unions to migrant workers, 1880s
to 1914’, Migracijske teme 4, 21-37.
— (2000), ‘Historical dimensions of many-cultured societies in Europe: the case of
Hamburg, Germany’, in: Dirk Hoerder and Rainer-Olaf Schultze (eds.), Socio-cultural
problems in the metropolis: comparative analyses. Hagen: ISL-Verlag, 121-140.
— (2002), Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium. Durham and
London: Duke University Press.
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Marks, Gary (1989), Unions in Politics: Britain, Germany and the United States in the Nine-
teenth and Early Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Marquez, Benjamin (2001), ‘Choosing Issues, Choosing Sides: Constructing Identities in
Mexican-American Social Movement Organizations’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no.
2, 218-235.
Marrus, Michael (1980), The Politics of Assimilation: The French Jewish Community at the
Time of the Dreyfus Affair. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, P.L. (1994), ‘Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration’, in: W.A. Cornelius, P.L.
Martin and J.E. Hollifield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 189-225.
Massey, Douglas S. (1995), ‘The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States’,
Population and Development Review 21, no. 3, 631-652.
Massey, D.S. et al.(1998), Worlds in motion. Understanding international migration at the
end of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J.E. Taylor (1993), ‘Theo-
ries of international migration: A review and appraisal’, Population and Development
Review 19, no. 3, 431-466.
Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino and J.E. Taylor (1994), ‘An
Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case’, Population
and Development Review 20, no. 4, 699-751.
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Ein interkultureller und interkontextueller Vergleich am Beispiel von deutschen und
türkischen Familien’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 29, 310-327.
Nauck, Bernhard and Anja Steinbach (2001), Intergeneratives Verhalten und Selbstethnisier-
ung von Zuwanderern. Expertise für die Unabhängige Kommission ‘‘Zuwanderung’’.
March.
Neutatz, Dieter (1993), Die ‘deutsche Frage’ im Schwarzmeergebiet und in Wolhynien. Politik,
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Conféderation Française Démocratique du
Travail (CFDT) 209
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